Is a more perfect Union in
Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally
honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief
to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members
of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1])
was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of
Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his
re-election campaign.[2]
At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy
cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral
relations.”[3]
E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a
sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question
untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations
between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent,
was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing
invasion of Ukraine.
To be sure, U.S. President
Trump’s political support of Orbán could be attributed in no small measure to
the fact that Orbán had been “the only European leader who openly supported Trump’s
re-election campaign.”[4]
Rubio even stated at the joint press conference that the “person-to-person
connection” that Orbán had “established with the president has made all the
difference in the world in building this relationship.”[5]
So was Trump willing to bypass the very existence of the E.U. on the strength
of his political relationship with Orbán? If so, and if a strong E.U. was
actually in the national interest of the U.S., was Trump putting too much
emphasis on loyalty to Trump himself?
It can be argued that Viktor
Orbán had been pursuing policies that were at odds with the E.U., and more
specifically with the ability of the federal institutions to exercise their
exclusive and shared competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). In fact, the
Commission had withheld funds from the state of Hungary because Orbán’s state
administration had violated E.U. law and breached rule-of-law and justice requirements.
Furthermore, Orbán had been wielding his state’s veto in the European Council
to keep Ukraine from being annexed to the European Union. In fact, the
Hungarian leader’s oil-related coziness to Russia’s President Putin had
undercut the E.U.’s support of Ukraine militarily and thus enabled Putin’s military
aggression. Is the implication for Trump that Putin’s aggression should not be
countered by the E.U., or perhaps he preferred that individual E.U. states aid Ukraine
militarily? If so, the fruits of collective action, even just by mutual
cooperation but more strongly by a federal army, would by implication be contrary
to the American national interest, according to the Trump administration.
Relying on the E.U. states as
if their mutual coordination would be enough to enable Ukraine to push back the
occupying Russian troops and military hardware—a dubious assumption—opens up
the possibility that those states could again turn on each other. To forestall
or put out military conflicts being waged by the armies (i.e., militias) of the
U.S. member-states, U.S. basic laws was made so that Union could have a federal
army and the federal president could temporarily coopt a state army for use by
the Union. Is it now in the American national interest that the E.U. be given comparable
competencies by its states—especially given the astronomical American expense
and lives given in the previous century to put out two World Wars, both
of which were sourced in European conflicts?
Furthermore, given the policy
of the Trump administration to pull back American military support to protect
Europe, relying on E.U. states to remilitarize without any militarization of
the E.U. itself along with that of its states seems to be counterproductive.
Would not the American interest be in line with another Union being like the
U.S. rather than the former Articles of Confederation, in which the American
states were in a federal Union but still fully sovereign from 1781-1789? Before
the Articles, the new republics (i.e., ex-colonies) in the U.S. were sovereign
countries in a military alliance. In contrast to the latter two arrangements,
the E.U. sports dual-sovereignty.
I contend that it is actually
contrary to the strategic interest of the U.S. that the E.U. and its share of
governmental competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) be diminished or ignored in
favor of the U.S. going it alone with particular E.U. states as if they were
still fully sovereign countries. Ignoring an aspect of
political reality is not a good basis for going forward in international
relations. Furthermore, a bottom-heavy federal system in which the federal governmental
institutions are perpetually thwarted by Euroskeptic state governments (e.g.,
Slovakia and Hungary) even in the carrying out of existing federal competencies
is inherently unstable, and thus such a Union could eventually collapse if unimpeded
conflicts reach a sufficient severity between particular states, or even if states
frustrated by paralysis at the federal level secede from the Union as Britain
did, though the rationale for that state seceding arguably had more to do with resistance
to the E.U. having any share of governmental sovereignty than with
frustration over ineffective bureaucrats in Brussels.
Whereas David Cameron, a
former prime minister in Britain preferred that the E.U. be based on something
like the American Articles of Confederation (with each state remaining fully
sovereign), the American national interest voiced by Rubio in supporting Viktor
Orbán viewed the E.U. as a case of the dreaded multilateralism, and thus the E.U.
as akin to an international organization like the UN or even NATO. In having a
supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), a directly-elected parliament (i.e., the
European Parliament), an executive branch headed by a president who could be
considered to be the federal president (i.e., the Commission and Usula Von der Leyen,
respectively), an upper chamber representing the states (i.e., the European
Council and the Council of Ministers), the E.U. cannot be construed as only
multilateral or even international in nature. So, Trump’s antipathy toward that
Union is not only in error, but also reflects negatively on the basic structure
of the American Union because both unions sport modern federalism (i.e., dual
sovereignty rather than confederal fully-sovereign states).
That is, Rubio’s position in
favor of Orbán not only weakened the E.U., risked American military involvement
once again, and strengthened Putin’s military position in Ukraine (because he
would not have to fear intervention by a federal E.U. army), but also reflected
badly on the U.S.’s federal system. Take the U.S. back to 1826, approximately 33
years after the Americans replaced the confederal Articles with a system of
modern, dual-sovereignty-based federalism (such as the E.U. has![6]), and the E.U.
at 33 looks a lot like that Union back then. By implication, Trump’s position
in 2026 in favor of Euroskeptic Hungary’s leader was in line with supporting anti-federalist
states prior to 1861 in the U.S. and completely ignoring the federal institutions
and their respective enumerated powers (i.e., competencies) in Washington. Because Trump and Rubio held federal rather than state offices at the time, the position thus reduces to a logical absurdity beyond merely being against multilateralism.
