An E.U. Envoy to Russia

Should the E.U. appoint and send an envoy to Russia in spite of the fact that E.U. and state officials are not of one mind on a strategy to pressure Russia’s head, Putin, to the negotiating table to compromise? The power of the state governments at the federal level complicates efforts by Commission officials to present Putin with a specific list of sanctions because the governors are not on the same page even after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April, 2026. Ironically, desperately needed reforms to the E.U.’s federal system itself have been as politically difficult even to propose as has getting Putin to the negotiating table. Focusing on the latter while ignoring the former is a self-inflicted wound that has weakened the Europeans on the world stage. Incidentally, another self-inflicted state of denial involves assuming that such drastic cultural differences exist between two small E.U. states, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, while assuming that all of the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are basically the same, culturally. Recently, a European, who is actually a U.S. citizen, said as much to me! Denial is the main defense mechanism in the E.U. Even painstaking effort to render this political brain-sickness transparent is no match for the underlying ideological fervor that has so severely enervated the European Union from becoming a more perfect union.

Pointing to the intractable problem within the E.U. in formulating foreign policy, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, said in 2026, “Before we talk to the Russians, we should agree and talk amongst ourselves what we want to talk to the Russians about.”[1] She was undoubtedly referring to the direct involvement of state officials at the federal level in the Council of Ministers; agreement between relevant federal officials was not sufficient. In the U.S., the state governments’ official direct involvement at the federal level has been through the U.S. Senate, which, like the European Council and the Council of Ministers, represents states. Whereas the U.S. Senate’s filibuster (60 out of 100 vote threshold) is related back to the ongoing enumerated and residual governmental sovereignty of the U.S. states, the semi-sovereign E.U. states, which delegated significant governmental sovereignty to the E.U., have enjoyed veto power on federal foreign (and defense) policy—effectively choking off E.U. foreign (and defense) policy. It is for precisely this reason that in 2026, E.U. President von der Leyen and even the governor of one of the large states, (the E.U. state of Germany) publicly advocated applying qualified-majority voting to every proposed policy, E.U. law, and regulation/directive in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This eminently reasonable constitutional (or Basic Law) reform of the E.U.’s federal system had to contend with the formidable resistance of the Euroskeptic ideology that the E.U. states were still somehow sovereign. Backing up the denial was the ideological tendency to exaggerate cultural differences between small E.U. states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, while assuming that the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are culturally similar! Denial on top of denial to support the category mistake of comparing even a small E.U. state with the U.S. as a whole (while rejecting comparisons such as those between California and the E.U. and even between the two empire-scale unions!). The bad odor of denialism was, at least as of 2026, so ubiquitous in the E.U. that the smell may well have been likened instead to that of a freshly blooming flower. Bad air!

The ideological grip on the state-veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, held firmly by the states’ governors even though they were exploiting institutional and personal (i.e., power) conflicts of interest, was immune to the plea even of Ukraine’s president Zelensky, who said on May 17, 2026, “It is important for [the E.U.] to have a strong voice and presence in this process [regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine], and it is worth determining who will represent Europe specifically.”[2] The state veto in the councils inhibited the E.U. from speaking with one voice and even being able to sit at the negotiating table with Putin. Regarding whomever might represent the E.U., one implication is that the envoy could have sufficient discretion rather than be limited to the demands of one governor out of 27 who is skeptical. Indeed, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, admitted at the time that the relevant officials of the states had “vastly disparate views” on “concessions and conditions” for Russia.[3] Given this state of affairs at the state level, holding onto the principle of unanimity in the councils on foreign policy was quite foolish indeed.

Kallas also said that the E.U. “should not ‘humiliate’ itself by seeking direct talks” with Putin.[4] The humiliation feared was that of the E.U. not having sufficient power to avoid giving in at the very start of negotiations. To be sure, Putin is a touch negotiator, but the seeds of the E.U.’s weakness are within rather than bestowed by the Russian. To be sure, both Putin and Trump could smell political weakness even from a great distance. In 2025, for example, E.U. officials “found, through press reports, a 28-point plan drafted by US and Russian officials that included issues, such as sanctions and assets, that fell under [the E.U.’s] jurisdiction.”[5] Even though the Europeans could blame the Americans and the Russians, a more mature mentality would honestly confront the weakness in the E.U.’s federal system, by which I obviously have in mind the vetoes reserved to the states at the federal level. This is not to say that expunging the veto from E.U. federalism would be sufficient to redress the weakness in E.U. foreign policy. 

As governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán belied the Von der Leyen administration by going to visit Putin in Moscow. Direct involvement in foreign policy at the federal level must not permit such a betrayal by the governor of a state, for a house divided cannot stand. This is true, by the way, for couples wherein values clash and neither (or even one) side will compromise; tragically, such clashes blow up even love as if the two people had never even met. If the Europeans can figure out how to retain some direct involvement of the state governments in foreign policy without the veto and direct state involvement with foreign officials if prohibited by the Commission, then the Americans might want to consider how the state governments could have more direct involvement, especially since U.S. senators ceased to be appointed by the state governments, for being elected by the citizens of a state does not mean that the state government is represented, and does not necessarily give a senator a political incentive to represent the state government’s interests if the people thereof would prefer federal preemption. Of course, the European ideological bias would preclude such a comparison, and thus any such benefit obtained by studying the other union.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “High Risks, Pitfalls and Snubs: E.U. Envoy for Russia Talks Faces Job from Hell,” Euronews.com, 19 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

On Russia Erasing Ukrainian Children

Human rights are typically thought of as applying to individuals, even to groups, but do national-ethnic human rights exist? Do nations having a distinct ethnic culture have the right to their respective citizenries from being indoctrinated by other governments set on erasing even traces of the culture from the minds of citizens?  If so, then by 2026, Ukraine had a legitimate claim against Russia for having violated the rights of the Ukrainian state as protector of the Ukrainian ethnicity in the populous. In particular, as part of its multi-year invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government violated the human rights of Ukraine itself and Ukrainian children not only by kidnapping the kids to Russia, but also in indoctrinating them with the intent of ridding them of their distinctly Ukrainian cultural identity.

On May 11, 2026, the “European Union imposed sanctions on 16 Russian officials accused of helping Moscow in the abduction of tens of thousands of children from Ukraine.”[1] Ukraine’s government had verified the number at 20,500, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab estimated the number at 35,000, and Russia suggested that the number could be as high as 700,000.[2] Could it be that Moscow was bragging? That would reflect not well at all on the very notion of human rights internationally, as distinct from guidelines that governments need not be ashamed of violating.

Regardless of the number, the abduction and indoctrination of children is arguably among the worst of war crimes. “Of all the horrors inflicted by Russia’s war, the deportation and forced transfer of Ukrainian children is one of the worst crimes,” the E.U.’s foreign minister Kaja Kallas said at the time.[3] Russia’s actions include “indoctrination and militarized education, as well as their unlawful adoption and removal to Russia and within temporarily occupied territories.”[4] A statement by the European Council—rid of the recently defeated pro-Russia Viktor Orbán of Hungary—includes: “These actions constitute grave breaches of international law and a violation of the fundamental rights of the child and aim to erase Ukrainian identity and undermine the preservation of its future generations.”[5] Such preservation over generations arguably involves the interest of the Ukrainian state because the duration exceeds that of the children themselves. In other words, something more than the rights of the abducted and indoctrinated was being violated in the clash between the Russian and Ukrainian governments.

Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said, “This is a deliberate Russian policy aimed at destroying Ukrainian identity. Children are forced to forget who they are, where they come from, and even their language.”[6] Besides the horrific psychological, existential impact on the children in being effectively erased and reprogrammed as Russians, which makes being forced to live with foster parents in a strange land seem ordinary by comparison, the Russian intent is to use the children as part of a larger goal: that of erasing the Ukrainian ethnicity from the face of the Earth. This too reflects back on a legitimate right of the Ukrainian state to preserve that ethnicity. No national legislature would vote to voluntary extinguish its national culture unless forced to do so by another country’s government. In fact, the right is so fundamental that it rarely needs to be made transparent. This is why it may seem strange to refer to a human right of a nation.

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1. Sasha Vakulina, “EU Sanctions Russian Individuals Over Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Children,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Vendetta Violence: Israeli Settlers Sanctioned by the E.U.

What a difference even just a month can make. On 11 May, 2026, the E.U. enacted sanctions against “Israeli settlers over their violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, a move enabled by backing from Hungary’s incoming government.”[1] A month earlier, Viktor Orbán was the sitting prime minister of the E.U. state of Hungary. As a supporter of U.S. President Trump, who in turn supported Israel even in its decimation of Gaza razing entire cities into leveled ground for real estate “properties,” Orbán would have wielded Hungary’s veto in the European Council.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, marveled at the time, “We move from political deadlock that was there for a long time. Violence and extremism carry consequences.”[2] The long time is likely a reference to Orbán’s 16 years in power in the E.U. state of Hungary, and her point overall is that with that governor out of the European Council, the E.U. can inflict consequences on foreign actors who engage in violence under the aegis of some extremist ideology. In the case of the Israeli settlers, the ideology is Zionism, which in coming from a religious text has overreached into the political domain, even circumventing international law.

That the violence occurred in the occupied West Bank renders Israel itself especially culpable, for under international law, “all settlements are considered illegal, with the International Court of Justice describing the State of Israel’s ‘continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ as ‘unlawful.’”[3] Both the unprovoked violence of the settlers and the Israeli government’s attempted holocaustic genocide of the population of Gaza are on top of the fact that Israel has no justified basis internationally to even be in Gaza and the West Bank. In other words, Israel is two degrees of separation from being a lawful state in terms of international law. That the Netanyahu government was able to ignore that law so easily suggests that there is no such thing as international law—that only guidelines were by then operating in the collapsed post-World War II global order. In a Hobbesian state of nature, no law exists because no international or global government exists. No world federation certainly, which Kant admitted in Perpetual Peace would only make world peace possible but not probable.

The recurrent violence and theft was being committed even in broad daylight by Israeli settlers against defenseless Palestinians—even walking into their houses and nonchalantly taking appliances and furniture!—because impunity must surely have been assured by means of the tacit approval of a government that, after all, had been determined by the UN to have committed a genocide in Gaza. The violations of human rights occurred on both the societal and interpersonal level. A counter-move international could therefore be expected beyond the E.U. sanctioning individual settlers and related organizations.

Given the harm that was being unleashed directly or indirectly by the Israeli government, Kallas’ claim that violence and extremism abroad would trigger negative consequences by the E.U. rings hollow because those consequences are so inadequate to meet the magnitude and depth of the suffering, both interpersonally and at the societal level (i.e., an entire people). So even though a month made a difference in the European Council, the global “community” was still holding back from enforcing international law. With no other enforcement mechanism, can such law even be called law?

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1. Maia de la Baume, “E.U. Approves Sanctions on Israeli Settlers after Hungarian Backing,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Religion and Politics: On the Catholic Church’s Just War Theory

In the Gospels, Jesus is portrayed as an idealist, even other-worldly, from the standpoint of the political domain. To be sure, he knows how to alienate the Temple hierarchy enough to be put to death, but he stays clear of the Zealots in their militaristic rebelliousness against the Roman occupation. Give what it Caesar’s unto Caesar. The just-war theory developed by Augustine and Aquinas seeks to bring that gap—to make the idealist of the Gospels more relevant practically to the politics of international relations. To be sure, Jesus’s refusal to join the Zealots—symbolized by Jesus including Romans among those whom he heals—could be used to argue convincingly that attention to compassion for one’s enemy makes impossible even any just war. Jesus is just as idealistic in the story of the rich man who will not give up his wealth to follow Jesus—it is harder for a camel to get through the eye of a needle than for a rich man (who will not give up his wealth to follow God) to enter the Kingdom of God, whose very substance spiritually is epitomized by compassion to one’s enemies, according to the American theologian, Samuel Hopkins. So, Pope Leo was on solid ground in April, 2026 in the midst of the U.S.-Iran War when he emphatically insisted that Jesus would oppose any war—not just any unjust one—but where does that leave the Catholic Church’s just war theory as promulgated by two theological giants, Augustine and Aquinas?

The full essay is at "Religion and Politics."

Security Council Vetoes Styme the UN: Oil in the Strait of Hormuz

The United Nations was intended to obviate war, and failing in that mission, at least to safeguard economic trade especially if doing so staves off anticipated belligerent action by countries seeking to restore compromised trade. In 2026, when Iran’s stoppage of the one-fifth of the world’s oil that would otherwise go through the Strait of Hormuz triggered a military threat by the U.S., Russia and China vetoes a resolution in the Security Council aimed at reopening the strait and thereby obviating an escalation in the military fighting between the U.S. and Iran. Because not even a lopsided vote in favor—11 in favor, two against, and two abstentions—could activate the U.N. in its principle role of peremptorily obviating war by protecting trade, we can conclude that the organization had indeed effectively collapsed and could not be reformed from within, given that five members of the Security Council retained veto power. Meanwhile, military aggressors in the world were able to fill in the power-void left by the collapsing post-World War II world order to render might-makes-right the status quo in the twenty-first century.

At the time, an E.U. media outlet opined that it was doubtful that even if the resolution had been adopted, it “would have impacted the war” because the wording had been “significantly weakened in a bid to get Russia and China to abstain rather than veto it.”[1] In other words, the existence of the veto power in the Security Council was responsible for the impotence of the UN in protected trade and reducing pressures for war. Just that “Iran’s chokehold during the war . . . sent energy prices soaring around the world” should have been enough of a justification for UN protective action in the strait, but not even that rationale was enough for the UN to be able to use its own forces to protect oil tankers through the strait.[2]

Because higher oil prices were in Russia’s economic and thus military interests as that country continued its four-year invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s use of its veto exploited a conflict of interest, and yet the UN had no means of blocking such a use of a veto-power even though Russia’s invasion violated the UN’s charter, which bars offensive military action being inflicted by one country on another country. In other words, the UN could not even stand up to a blatant conflict of interest whose exploitation enabled further violations of the UN’s own charter.

With Israel continuing its holocaustic genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza, the U.S. having invaded Venezuela to capture its president, and Russia still invading Ukraine, the interest of the global family of nations in establishing an international governmental organization without vetoes and with its own enforcement power was so clear that the lack of any such formative action can itself be reckoned as signaling a problem. In other words, knowing that the post-1945 global order was collapsing while military aggressors were getting away with establishing might-makes-right as the new global default, governments nonetheless failed to actively create a new order institutionally so that could be the new default. That the very concept of international law was rapidly being treated as mere guideline rather than law demonstrates just how serious the UN’s de facto collapse was, and yet not even an informal coalition of governments seriously proposed an international institution—whether an organization or government—to pick up the slack and counter Putin, Netanyahu, and Trump. My point is that the inaction of the bystander governments is itself a choice, which could have been different, especially given the proliferation of war crimes and crimes against humanity being incurred at the time. The political inertia internationally favored malicious national leaders and the false belief that the UN was still operational as per its mission.  

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1. Gavin Blackburn, “Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Aimed at Reopening Hormuz Strait as US Deadline for Deal Looms,” Euronews.com, 7 April, 2026.
2. Ibid.

Vanquishing the Principle of Unanimity in E.U. Foreign Policy: On the Impact of Oil

There nothing like a sudden dramatic spike in the price of oil in Europe from a war in Iran to prompt E.U. leaders to make speeches as if hell is freezing over and drastic action is urgently needed in terms of federal rather than piecemeal-state foreign policy. Behind President Von der Leyen’s call for the E.U. to do more in foreign policy was her point that the union could no longer afford the principle of unanimity in the European Council in foreign policy. The Iran War had raised the price not only of oil, but also of the unanimity requirement in the Council not only in foreign policy, but also defense. With 27 states at the time and an increasingly belligerent international context, including military aggression against Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the E.U. could not rely on a world order regulated by international law. The spike in gas prices, even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, brought this point close to home.

As the U.S. began its military attacks in Iran, “European benchmark gas prices jumped 80% in two days while brent crude edged closer to 84 dollars a barrel.”[1] When oil prices surpassed €87 ($100) per barrel roughly a week into the war, Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary “called on the European Union to suspend sanctions on Russian energy imports.”[2] Never mind that Russia’s 4 year-old unimpeded invasion of Ukraine was a threat on the E.U.’s eastern border; restoring cheaper gas prices was more important, at least to Hungary. The E.U.’s geopolitical interests do not reduce to a state’s economic interests, however, and so President Von der Leyen spoke on the need for a more active E.U. foreign policy.

It was not the first time that the president had warned that the traditional world order was “rapidly crumbling under mounting violations of international law.”[3] In her speech, she said, “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return.”[4] There had been too many cases of breaches of international law with impunity as the UN and the International Criminal Court stood by utterly impotent. E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas “pointed the finger at Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine . . . as the cataclysm that precipitated the ‘erosion of international law’ . . . and enabled the return of what she described as ‘coercive power politics.”[5] In her speech, Kallas said, “That (invasion) did not go unnoticed. Instead, it sent a signal around the world that there is no more accountability for one’s actions: the rulebook has been thrown out of the window.”[6] Netanyahu’s government in Israel could unleash a holocaustic genocide in Gaza with a presumption of impunity, and Trump’s government in the U.S. could forcibly remove the president of Venezuela and kill Iran’s highest figure without fear of being held accountable by the U.N. or the International Criminal Court. Militaristic aggression was gaining a foothold in the world as international organizations stood by in utter impotence. The very notion of law at the international level could be surmised to be a misnomer.

Finally, E.U. officials were feeling a sense of urgency from war abroad because the sudden spike in oil and gas prices in Europe from Trump’s military attacks in Iran could not be ignored. Kallas stressing “that a rules-based international order is vital to avoid the inevitable anarchy” was no longer enough.[7] “Von der Leyen added another key priority on which the EU should focus to reinforce its geopolitical clout: its internal decision-making rules.”[8] Problematically, the E.U.’s foreign policy was bound by the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. such that “the 27 member states must agree on a common line of action before moving forward.”[9] So it only took the E.U. state of Hungary to veto the $91 billion loan for Ukraine, and the E.U. was stymied in coming up with a foreign policy on Trump’s military attacks against Iran because of differences between the states. Alternatively, going by qualified-majority voting would have enabled a consensus (i.e., short of unanimous consent) that could have become the E.U.’s foreign policy, which would have been much stronger in the world than were the various positions of the 27 state governments.

The relationship is clear between calls for a rules-based international order “with teeth” and a stronger decision-making rule in the European Council in foreign policy (and defense): a more active E.U. in foreign policy (and defense) was necessary due to the increased militaristic aggression abroad because the latter could have a very significant detrimental economic affect in Europe. Political pressure was thus building for the E.U.’s 27 state governments to finally relinquish their veto-power in foreign policy (and defense). Power is not relinquished easily, so not even higher oil and gas prices could be enough pressure for the states to agree to apply qualified-majority voting to foreign policy (and defense).

The mechanism called “enhanced cooperation,” which I contend elsewhere is a misnomer for what is really increased federal authority for at least nine states but not all of them, could be a means to bring qualified majority voting to the E.U.’s foreign policy that would cover only those states that have agreed to relinquish their veto power in that domain. I suspect that eventually, all of the E.U. states would be included, so “enhanced cooperation” can be understood as a temporary device that gets around the conflict of interest facing the state governments in their decisions on whether to allow the E.U. to become more active in foreign policy (and defense) than the principle of unanimity would permit.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “Middle East War Shows ‘Europe Must Reinforce Its Autonomy’, EIB Chief Tells Euronews,” Euronews.com,  4 March 2026.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary Demands EU Lift Sanctions on Russian Energy as Prices Spike amid Iran War,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on Europe to Adapt to Chaotic, Coercive World Order,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

To be sure, U.S. President Trump’s political support of Orbán could be attributed in no small measure to the fact that Orbán had been “the only European leader who openly supported Trump’s re-election campaign.”[4] Rubio even stated at the joint press conference that the “person-to-person connection” that Orbán had “established with the president has made all the difference in the world in building this relationship.”[5] So was Trump willing to bypass the very existence of the E.U. on the strength of his political relationship with Orbán? If so, and if a strong E.U. was actually in the national interest of the U.S., was Trump putting too much emphasis on loyalty to Trump himself?

It can be argued that Viktor Orbán had been pursuing policies that were at odds with the E.U., and more specifically with the ability of the federal institutions to exercise their exclusive and shared competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). In fact, the Commission had withheld funds from the state of Hungary because Orbán’s state administration had violated E.U. law and breached rule-of-law and justice requirements. Furthermore, Orbán had been wielding his state’s veto in the European Council to keep Ukraine from being annexed to the European Union. In fact, the Hungarian leader’s oil-related coziness to Russia’s President Putin had undercut the E.U.’s support of Ukraine militarily and thus enabled Putin’s military aggression. Is the implication for Trump that Putin’s aggression should not be countered by the E.U., or perhaps he preferred that individual E.U. states aid Ukraine militarily? If so, the fruits of collective action, even just by mutual cooperation but more strongly by a federal army, would by implication be contrary to the American national interest, according to the Trump administration.

Relying on the E.U. states as if their mutual coordination would be enough to enable Ukraine to push back the occupying Russian troops and military hardware—a dubious assumption—opens up the possibility that those states could again turn on each other. To forestall or put out military conflicts being waged by the armies (i.e., militias) of the U.S. member-states, U.S. basic laws was made so that Union could have a federal army and the federal president could temporarily coopt a state army for use by the Union. Is it now in the American national interest that the E.U. be given comparable competencies by its states—especially given the astronomical American expense and lives given in the previous century to put out two World Wars, both of which were sourced in European conflicts?

Furthermore, given the policy of the Trump administration to pull back American military support to protect Europe, relying on E.U. states to remilitarize without any militarization of the E.U. itself along with that of its states seems to be counterproductive. Would not the American interest be in line with another Union being like the U.S. rather than the former Articles of Confederation, in which the American states were in a federal Union but still fully sovereign from 1781-1789? Before the Articles, the new republics (i.e., ex-colonies) in the U.S. were sovereign countries in a military alliance. In contrast to the latter two arrangements, the E.U. sports dual-sovereignty.

I contend that it is actually contrary to the strategic interest of the U.S. that the E.U. and its share of governmental competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) be diminished or ignored in favor of the U.S. going it alone with particular E.U. states as if they were still fully sovereign countries. Ignoring an aspect of political reality is not a good basis for going forward in international relations. Furthermore, a bottom-heavy federal system in which the federal governmental institutions are perpetually thwarted by Euroskeptic state governments (e.g., Slovakia and Hungary) even in the carrying out of existing federal competencies is inherently unstable, and thus such a Union could eventually collapse if unimpeded conflicts reach a sufficient severity between particular states, or even if states frustrated by paralysis at the federal level secede from the Union as Britain did, though the rationale for that state seceding arguably had more to do with resistance to the E.U. having any share of governmental sovereignty than with frustration over ineffective bureaucrats in Brussels.

Whereas David Cameron, a former prime minister in Britain preferred that the E.U. be based on something like the American Articles of Confederation (with each state remaining fully sovereign), the American national interest voiced by Rubio in supporting Viktor Orbán viewed the E.U. as a case of the dreaded multilateralism, and thus the E.U. as akin to an international organization like the UN or even NATO. In having a supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), a directly-elected parliament (i.e., the European Parliament), an executive branch headed by a president who could be considered to be the federal president (i.e., the Commission and Usula Von der Leyen, respectively), an upper chamber representing the states (i.e., the European Council and the Council of Ministers), the E.U. cannot be construed as only multilateral or even international in nature. So, Trump’s antipathy toward that Union is not only in error, but also reflects negatively on the basic structure of the American Union because both unions sport modern federalism (i.e., dual sovereignty rather than confederal fully-sovereign states).

That is, Rubio’s position in favor of Orbán not only weakened the E.U., risked American military involvement once again, and strengthened Putin’s military position in Ukraine (because he would not have to fear intervention by a federal E.U. army), but also reflected badly on the U.S.’s federal system. Take the U.S. back to 1826, approximately 33 years after the Americans replaced the confederal Articles with a system of modern, dual-sovereignty-based federalism (such as the E.U. has![6]), and the E.U. at 33 looks a lot like that Union back then. By implication, Trump’s position in 2026 in favor of Euroskeptic Hungary’s leader was in line with supporting anti-federalist states prior to 1861 in the U.S. and completely ignoring the federal institutions and their respective enumerated powers (i.e., competencies) in Washington. Because Trump and Rubio held federal rather than state offices at the time, the position thus reduces to a logical absurdity beyond merely being against multilateralism. 

1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Skip Worden, Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S. (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).