Georgia and Georgia: Aspiring and Settled States

While one Georgia was secure as a member-state in the U.S., another Georgia was finding itself being frozen out of not only accession talks with the E.U., but also being invited as a “NATO partner” to attend the NATO meeting in June, 2026. It is ironic that whereas the first Georgia had delegated some of its sovereignty to the U.S. in 1789, the second Georgia was unhappy remaining fully sovereign outside of the E.U. rather than as one of the semi-sovereign E.U. states. Giving up some governmental sovereignty can be a “step up,” and, with that comes certain requirements in terms of good governance.

Although “Georgia’s ruling party representatives claimed that the [NATO] summit in Ankara did not include the type of meetings Georgia used to attend in the past . . ., Georgian Dream MP Irakli Kirtskhalia told the press in Tbilisi that ‘we have no problem attending the summit, (sic) ask the organizers why we are not represented.’”[1] The party representatives were artfully deflecting, whereas Kirkskhalia was pointing journalists to the real reason for Georgia’s absence. Georgia’s government had not been invited to the NATO meeting, even though other partners of NATO, including Qatar, UAE, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Ukraine, and Australia were. At the root of the problem was a lack of trust.

That Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili “travelled to Tehran to attend the funeral of the late Ayatolla Ali Khamenei” instead did not exactly win Georgia much trust in the West.[2] The signal that such an action sent outdid any positive words of potential partnership with NATO. A political analyst in Georgia, Paata Zakareishvili, “claimed that the absence of NATO’s invitation to its regional security debates represents what he called the loss of trust by Georgia’s partners.”[3] In fact, he went so far as to admit, “Georgia is being ignored.”[4] He added that Georgia had been aspiring to be part of the alliance, and that “Georgia and Ukraine used to move toward NATO membership together.”[5] Considering Russian President Putin’s strident opposition to Ukraine being in the international alliance, Georgia should have had an easier way in. Instead, he said, “Georgia is no longer being considered anywhere.”[6] Anywhere turns out to be important, for, according to Georgia’s former ambassador to NATO Levan Dolidze, “what is far more damaging is Georgia’s absence from discussions within the European Union.”[7] Such discussions pertained to Georgia possibly gaining statehood in the Union; and, yes, statehood does indeed imply the existence of a federal political system.

As is clear from Georgia in the U.S., being a member-state in a political union wherein both the union and states are semi-sovereign is much more significant than being invited as a partner to a meeting of an international alliance. Even though the U.S. Senate and the Council of the E.U. (and the European Council) are founded on principles of international law, neither union can be said to be an international organization. Indeed, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament are founded on national rather than international political principles (i.e., citizens rather than polities are represented, and by population). Both unions can be said to be hybrids forged from the hard political compromises made in the U.S. Constitutional Convention, when the arrangement of fully sovereign countries under the Articles of Confederation were dismissed as too suboptimal for political agency.

Although near the end of 2025, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze insisted that Georgia’s accession-path to statehood “remains steady and irreversible” such that becoming a state by 2030 was still “both realistic and attainable,” the E.U. froze Georgia mid-stream in June, 2026 after the Georgian government had passed a “foreign influence” law that the Commission “described as Russian-inspired and authoritarian against the backdrop of massive anti-government protests in Tbilisi.”[8] The trip to the funeral in Tehran in July didn’t exactly help speed Georgia along either. It did not matter, as Kobakhidze claimed, that Georgia was ahead of all other prospective, aspiring states in economic progress indicators; the problem was one of trust, both regarding democratic values at home and the choice of allies abroad. Even though technicians—pedestrians really—were doubtlessly focusing narrowly on whether the accession criteria were being met, it is important not to lose sight of the big picture.

Was the Georgia “Western” enough not merely to join in an international military alliance, but also to become a semi-sovereign state in a political, federal union? Or would the Georgian government be a “Trojan horse” whose strings would be pulled by Russia’s autocratic and militaristically aggressive Putin? Although from the strategic standpoint of the West, bringing in as many former Soviet Republics as possible may seem optimal because such a move would deprive Russia of being able to “bring them home,” filtering by applying the “sufficiently Western” test is better because then neither the Western military alliance nor the European Union (and the United States, indirectly) would be weakened from within. 

The Georgia that has been a member of the U.S. since the beginning of that political union (and, even earlier, when the U.S. had just been a military alliance and then a confederation of sovereign countries), had tried to “Georexit” in 1861 but was subsequently brought back “into the fold.” Would the Georgia that was shut out of the E.U. in 2026 follow in the footsteps of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary at the expense of federal foreign policy and the defense of the E.U. itself from foreign threats, and ultimately even accomplish “Georexit”? Already Britain had seceded from that political union, and the vote in favor of secession was mainly a reaction against the fact that E.U. states are semi-sovereign rather than fully sovereign, which pertains instead to a confederation such as that of the American Articles. No significant difference with E.U. foreign policy was involved in Britain’s decision to secede. Georgia, on the other hand, would need to prove its loyalty not only to rule-of-law democracy, but also to the West (rather than to Russia or Iran), besides being willing to cede some of its sovereignty in order to be considered and ready for statehood in the E.U.

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1. Peter Barabas, “Georgia Left Off NATO Summit Partner List as Critics Decry Isolation,” Euronews.com, 10 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): Europe Living in the Past

In the midst of the ongoing military invasion by Russia in Ukraine, countries in Eastern Europe could hardly afford to dwell on the past and react against each other at the expense of being proactive and united in pushing Russia back to within its borders—coloring within the lines rather than unrestrained. Therefore, the E.U.’s parliament can be criticized for having spending time and effort on 8 July, 2026 on a resolution that criticizes Ukraine’s then-sitting president, Voladymyr Zelenskyy, for having renamed an elite military unit after the World War II-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Even though a large majority of representatives in the Parliament voted in favor of the resolution, the legislative chamber could have been oriented constructively to combatting Putin’s push into Ukraine rather than play into his hands by stoking division between Ukraine and the E.U. state of Poland. Generally speaking, European culture may be criticized for putting much weight on the past at the expense of the present and future. “The past will never change, but tomorrow is still open” should be taught in European classrooms as a maxim. In 2026, as in the immediately preceding few years, the E.U.’s self-handicap in responding sufficiently to helping Ukraine militarily can be chalked up to not letting go of the past to embrace the present in a way that is oriented to the future.

Regarding the resolution that a vast majority of elected representatives in the European Parliament viewed as being worth their time and effort, whereas in Ukraine, “the UPA is widely commemorated for its role in opposing Soviet rule and fighting for Ukrainian independence,” in the E.U. state of Poland the UPA “is widely associated with the Volyn massacre of 1943-45, during which tens of thousands of Poles were killed under Nazi occupation. Poland has recognized the massacre as a genocide, a label Ukraine has rejected.”[1] Debating whether it was or was not a genocide, and, moreover, how opposing Soviet rule stacks up against the Volyn massacre is a luxury that Europe’s anti-Russian powers could not afford when Ukraine was still being occupied by the invading Russian army and eastern E.U. states fretted that they might be next for dinner by the empire-hungry Russian bear. In fact, engaging in a historical obsession rather than moving on to the twenty-first century implies that the E.U.’s political elite was not taking Putin’s invasion seriously enough. It was not as if dislodging the Russian army from roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory would require just little thought and a bit of easy effort, so the opportunity cost to thrashing over the previous century was high. An opportunity cost (in economics) is the benefit that is given up from an alternative course of action that is not taken. Besides the opportunity cost in terms of lost time and energy devoted to thwarting Russia’s invasion, squabbles between Ukraine and a state of the E.U. stood to benefit Putin’s military position and strategy because both thrive if the opposition is divided. As the old adage goes, a house divided cannot stand.

Zelensky had recently admitted to some “difficulties in our history,” and yet urged all parties opposing Russia’s invasion to live more “in the future than in the past” by uniting against Russia rather than turning on each other.[2] To be sure, he could have easily obviated the diplomatic tension by not having renamed the elite military unit after the UPA; more important than a name is how well a military unit performs on the battlefield. Also, no shame goes with publicly admitting a mistake and moving on, for we are all human.

The proclivity in the European psyche—an admittedly cultured entity, which I admire “across the pond” as a native, gruff Midwesterner—to hold onto the past even when it is antiquated and thus obstructs a stronger present and future has impaired the European Union’s federal system. Most crucially generally and especially in terms of the foreign- and defense-policy domains, the E.U. really needed to reform itself by losing the paralyzing veto that the state governments still held in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. (i.e., the Council of Ministers) when the resolution against Zelensky was passed in the parliament (by qualified-majority). Because unanimity was still required for a federal policy or law to pass in foreign policy and defense, the E.U. can be said to be holding itself back, as if having one arm tied behind the back, from adequately supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, especially given the Trump Administration’s preoccupation with Iran, given the extraordinary power of Israeli money in Washington. How, then, is the state veto in the two Councils tied in with the European tendency to hold onto the past?

The very existence of the veto can be viewed as a residual from when the E.U. states were fully sovereign, before they delegated some of their governmental sovereignty to the Union. Qualified-majority voting itself is such a delegation of sovereignty because a state on the losing side of such a vote is still subject to the federal policy, law, or regulation. Even in the case of having considerable discretion in how to implement directives, the states still have to implement them. Were the states still sovereign, as the U.S. states were before and under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the E.U. states could legally ignore even E.U. laws. Such a lapse in understanding of the dual-sovereignty feature of the E.U.’s federal system had been repeatedly demonstrated by Viktor Orbán when he governed the E.U. state of Hungary. It is no coincidence that he abused the power of his state’s veto in the federal councils, for the veto itself was established to reflect the sovereignty still retained by the state governments in the Union. Similarly, but not as extreme, the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, which is roughly equivalent to the Council of the E.U., is a hold-over from the full sovereignty that U.S. states enjoyed before 1789.

I contend that holding onto the time when E.U. states were fully sovereign countries, even though the future of E.U. decision-making could benefit greatly in turning to qualified majority voting instead of unanimity, is itself a significant problem. In other words, besides the obvious governmental conflict of interest that exists on questions of whether additional sovereignty should be delegated, the resistance of state-level officials to relinquishing the veto at the federal level can be said to at least be intensified because they hold onto the political past excessively. Because the E.U. stood to enlarge in 2026 by adding additional states in the future, the Union could ill-afford to hold onto the “old-sovereignty” veto because it had already been too obstructionist (e.g., Viktor Orbán) at the federal level in the councils. Just as division between the E.U. and Ukraine played into Putin’s hands, the historically-based rationale for retaining the veto power put the states at odds with the Union, essentially handicapping the E.U. from within. A self-inflicted wound predicated on not being willing to let go of the past, politically. Looking backwards while walking forwards, a person is likely to trip and fall. Similarly, self-inflicted political weakness is never good. In his text, On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche points to the self-imposed (i.e., voluntary) self-abnegation of impotent Catholic priests as the epitome of weakness. Relative to the U.S. Senate, which admittedly is too prone to political sloth and stalemate at the expense of action, the obstruction occasioned by the veto in the Council of the E.U. and the European Council beats that of the filibuster, which, incidentally, can be overridden by 60 out of 100 votes. Qualified-majority vote is thus consistent with a nod to state sovereignty—plena in the past and non-plena in the present. Perpetuating history need not stand in the way, especially while an invasion is in progress close to the eastern border.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “European Parliament Condemns Zelenskyy for Naming Military Unit after UPA Heroes,” Euronews.com, 8 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.

Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance

On 7 July, 2026, speaking at NATO’s Summit Defense Industry Forum in Turkey, Ukrainian President Zelensky made the case that Ukraine should be in the NATO military alliance even though that country was still being invaded by Russia, so the activation of the alliance’s article 5’s mutual-defense mandate would be dicey to say the least. Accepting an existing “hot spot” into the alliance would be risky not least because of any immediate expectations of having to join a fight already in progress, but also because of what Russia’s President Putin’s reaction might be. Zelensky’s remarks can thus be regarded as partial, or one-sided, from the standpoint of a full geo-political and military-strategic analysis.

Not coincidentally just ahead of the full NATO meeting, Zelensky claimed that the Ukrainian military had become a “source of extraordinary defensive capability” in Europe due to the country’s rapid advance in military technology involving drones.[1] Ukraine had even become a provider of advanced drone technology as Gulf states sought it to intercept Iranian missiles. “We have completely eliminated the very idea of Russia having a strategic rear,” Zelensky said.[2] One day earlier, according to Euronews, “Ukrainian forces carried out  drone strike on an oil refinery in the city of Omsk, hitting the country’s most important fuel production site more than 2,500km from the Russia-Ukraine border.”[3] In his speech, Zelensky said of the successful military strike, “this is not an exception. It’s the new reality and there is no major oil refinery left in Russia that has not been struck by Ukraine.”[4] Indeed, videos of Russians physically fighting at gas stations amid the resulting gas shortage were being shared on social media around the world.

Nevertheless, U.S. President Trump had ruled out Ukraine joining the military alliance, though the interest of Middle Eastern countries in Ukraine’s drone technology to fight against Iran could find a receptive ear in the White House. Even though Trump had a reputation for engaging in transactional rather than transformational leadership, his opposition to Ukraine being in the alliance could stem from concern as to how the sitting Russian president might react. The invasion was at least in part motivated out of concern that Ukraine would bring NATO to Russia’s door step. Were this to become a reality, Putin might decide to reinvigorate his invasion rather than sue for peace. Rather than joining a Western military alliance, Ukraine could strike a good compromise with Russia by becoming a state in the European Union, which is a political union that is economically rather than militarily oriented, unlike the United States. Furthermore, Putin had little to fear in 2026 from a coordinated and concerted E.U. military intervention in Ukraine, given the veto power retained by the states in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. due to the principle of unanimity applying in matters of defense and foreign policy. That the E.U. had outgrown every state government holding a potential veto, the internal resistance to even necessary reform of the E.U. could be counted on to hold the union back from being a united military threat to Russia.

In short, Russia’s President Putin would be more comfortable with the E.U. moving eastward, as the U.S. moved westward in the nineteenth century, than with Ukraine joining an international military alliance. To the extent that President Trump’s objection to Ukraine joining NATO was based on how Putin would be likely to react, and that Ukraine could become an E.U. state instead, Zelensky’s speech can be viewed as one-sided, and thus as vulnerable to its blind side. In fact, if the first President Bush had promised Russia that reunifying Germany would not result in NATO reaching the Russian border, Putin could become especially obstinate were Ukraine to become a member of the Western military alliance because that would mean that the U.S. will have reneged on its promise. It is best not to provoke a bear even with passive aggression. Were NATO to enter Ukrainian territory militarily to fight against the invasion directly, active aggression would be overlaid on the passive aggression that is inherent to reneging unilaterally on a promise without cause. Zelensky’s citing of the utility to NATO that Ukraine could bring to the alliance in terms of military technology “on the cutting edge” can therefore be viewed as missing the big picture in which Ukraine and NATO can be situated even including an historical context. Whereas narrow, “valued added” utility may suffice for a private business, the political domain is much broader.

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1. Sasha Vakulina, “Zelenskyy Renews Call for Ukraine’s NATO Membership Citing Military Might Ahead of Summit,” Euronews.com, 7 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Russian Patriarch Kirill: A Case of Religion Overreaching

The political separation of “Church and State” in U.S. constitutional law, a doctrine that is of jurisprudence (judicial decision) rather than theology and thus does not straddle and therefore demarcate the political and religious domains as qualitatively distinct from a neutral standpoint. Furthermore, the question of what makes the religious domain distinct (and unique) from all others is the pole from which a religious functionary’s (or religionist) leap into the political garden from the Garden of Eden can be detected. The trouble worsens if the criteria from one domain in imposed and overlaid in the overreaching into another domain, as if the criteria that is determinative in one domain were valid in another. In fact, the eclipsing itself of the other’s own criteria on their own “turf” is unethical. The legitimate sovereignty of a domain’s own criteria in that domain over criteria indigenous to other domains yet superimposed renders any supervening overreaching as both erroneous—as in going off-sides in football (soccer)—and unethical because the criteria indigenous to a given domain should not be disrespected within their own domain. In other words, encroaching is presumptuous. If these ideas strike the reader as novel, even strange perhaps, then I am keeping within the confines of my mission in writing, as I look to a new dawn in which the ideational tyranny of hitherto reigning yet questionable assumptions ist zerstört because they have been discredited, which is not to say that every extant assumption should be eviscerated and expunged for lack of substance. Unfortunately, Russia’s Patriarch Kirill, the head of Russia’s Orthodox Church, went out on a tree limb, far from his religious tree’s trunk, by formulating and spreading “revisionist propaganda to justify the war in Ukraine” while the invasion was underway.[1] The history and legitimacy of a bygone Russian empire (not the U.S.S.R.) properly belong to the political rather than to the religious domain. Being schooled in theology does not give even a high religious functionary the knowledge on which to presume to be an expert in political history and international relations. The resentment in the E.U. and U.S. at the patriarch’s intrusion into a domain that is not an extension of the religious domain was not merely from opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but also from an intuitive sense that the domains of religion/theology and politics/government are distinct and thus require different knowledge-sets and have their own respective criteria and distinctiveness.

The full essay is at "Russian Patriarch Kirill."

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Oil, Cod, Kirill: Friction Points Emerge in New E.U. Sanctions Against Russia,” Euronews.com, 26 June, 2026.

Starmer Resigns as British Prime Minister: A Post-Mortem

Two years after winning in a landslide, with his Labour group being given its largest majority in Parliament in decades, PM Starmer found himself polling as the least favored PM on record and was forced by the political reality of his political group to resign. Why? I contend that the actual reason, behind and obfuscated by the headlines, is rather basic, or fundamental.

Unlike Tony Blair, Starmer did not join an unpopular foreign war, and unlike Boris Johnson, Starmer did not hold parties during a pandemic. Neither did Starmer ruin an economy; the secession of the E.U. state of Britain could be blamed for that. According to CNN, Starmer’s “missteps were more mundane: an attempt to make wealthier pensioners pay more to heat their homes; a plan to cut some benefits to disabled people; accepting freebies; and, . . . a scandal over his appointment of Jeffrey Epstein-linked politician Peter Mandelson to the role of UK ambassador.”[1] Even though such policy “missteps alone cannot explain Starmer’s fall,” according to CNN, the American media company conveniently ignores a glaring, and perhaps the glaring, reason for Starmer’s stunning unpopularity.

It turns out that Starmer, who is Jewish, exploited a personal conflict of interest not only in standing up for Israel as it cut off power and water in Gaza, but also in having pro-Gaza protesters in Britain arrested as if they were aiding and abetting terrorists. Enabling a holocaustic genocide and impairing democracy at home are damning moves that the American media company utterly ignores in its post-mortem of Starmer. The combination of defending an apartheid state engaged in decimating Gazan cities and treating protesting British citizens as criminals rather than as heroes for standing up for other people’s human rights resulted in the prime minister falling like a rock in a pond in terms of popularity. When John Kennedy was campaigning for the U.S. presidency in 1960, not a few Americans feared that he, a Roman Catholic, would do the bidding of a foreign state—Vatican City—at the expense of American interests. The fear turned out to be overblown, but Starmer’s unfettered defense of Israel as it was destroying populated cities in Gaza arguably evinces the exploitation of a personal conflict of interest because Starmer is Jewish. This is not to say that every Jew is a Zionist. Noam Chomsky, for example, publicly stated that Israel no longer had the right to exist. U.S. Sen. Burnie Sanders lambasted Israel for its crimes against humanity. In utter contrast, Starmer was ignoring international law abroad and democratic principles of free speech at home. This is why he was forced out by his own political group. That CNN is silent on this rather obvious point speaks volumes about the relationship between giant American media companies and American foreign policy.

 

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1. Christian Edwards, “Why Is Starmer Resigning, Two Years after Winning in a Landslide,” CNN.com, June 22, 2026.

Israel in Lebanon: On the Hubris of Hatred

Hatred warps reasoning as well as ethical judgment along the lines of a warped time-space fabric around a large mass. In other words, the sheer gravitational pull of self-centeredness can bend both thought and judgment. As essentially egoist, this phenomenon can itself be considered to be unethical, for what are actually equivalent ethical harms are perceived as unequal at the expense of other people or peoples. Even though Israel’s military attacks in, and invasion of, Lebanon in 2026 could be said to be in violation of international law, Israel’s national security minister said on June 19^th that all of Lebanon must burn because four Israeli soldiers had just been killed in combat when their tank was hit near Kfar Tebnit. The official’s statement is significant in that it lays bare the false equivalence of the lives of four Israelis and the entire population of Lebanon. The warped judgment and related ratiocination behind such a baseless equivalence can be grasped from the standpoint of utilitarianism.

Along with saying, “all of Lebanon must burn,” Itamar Ben-Gvir added, “For every tear of an Israeli mother, a thousand Lebanese mothers must weep.”[1] That four Israeli soldiers lost their lives is thus more of a loss than the eighteen Lebanese who died in that particular military action. Moreover, wiping out Gaza, whose Palestinian population stood at more than 1.5 million, is “ethically” justified by Hamas’ attack in which 1,200 Israelis had been killed and a few hundred taken hostage by a subjugated political group. More than Ben-Gvir “taunting detained activists from the Global Sumud Flotilla” whom Israel had kidnapped in international waters, his claims regarding the worth of human lives depending on group-identification are astonishing in their directness in showing the distorting impact of his ideology (and related group-identification as an Israeli) on his judgment on what is ethical and unethical.[2]

The claim that the death of one Israeli justifies the death of a thousand Lebanese runs directly counter to Jeremy Bentham’s ethical theory of utilitarianism, wherein the greatest good to the greatest number is the ethical rubric. If anything, saving the lives of a thousand Lebanese would justify killing four Israelis. That the latter were part of an illegal military invasion renders this verdict all the more justified and legitimate ethically, for violating international law is itself unethical and the government of Lebanon had not invaded Israel.

Such a warped, unethical perspective as a senior government official in Israel voiced can itself be taken as support for the argument that either the UN should be given its own military force (not subject to any vetoes in the Security Council), or a new, semi-sovereign international federation should be created with enough military power to counter unethical actions stemming from ethically-warped mentalities at the national level. Even with such a reform, Kant’s claim that a world federation would make peace possible rather than probable can be read both as a bit of realism as to the reform and an indictment on just how sordid even high government officials can be in their reasoning and ethical judgment. Indeed, Ben-Gvir’s statements fly in the face of Kant’s ethical imperative formulated as the Kingdom of Ends, wherein rational beings should be treated not just as means (e.g. to Israel’s interests), but also as ends in themselves. Moreover, because human beings are rational beings, the life of a person of one nationality is not worth more than the life of a person of another, even conflicting, nationality. This imperative is like a straight stick against which the warping of Ben-Gvir’s mind can be perceived and measured. Given the severity of the warping, a world order with enough teeth, or enforcement power, to restrain national governments was both needed and justified by 2026.

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1. Nathan Rennolds, “’All of Lebanon Must Burn,’ Israeli Minister Says after IDF Reports Four Soldiers Killed,” Euronews, 19 June, 2026.

2. Ibid.

Europe: Over- and Under-Represented in the G7

I contend that in having both federal and state-level officials attending the G7 international meetings, Europe is over-represented even as the E.U. itself is sidelined. At least this was the case at the meeting in June, 2026 in the E.U. state of France. The staying power of the seven countries comprising the Group could be considered as antiquated, given the relevance and importance of the E.U. in international relations. The very intractability of institutional arrangements (i.e., structures) even in the face of a changing political environment can thus be viewed as problematic. By implication, the exclusion of the E.U. from the United Nations international organization can be viewed as effectively relegating the UN as a structurally-frozen “has been” by the 2020s.

The relevance of the E.U. being at the G7 meeting in Evian-les-Bains can be ascertained by the public statements of federal officials just before the meeting. Speaking on E.U. sanctions against Iran, E.U. President Von der Leyen said that they would remain in force unless or until “real change” occurs “on the ground.”[1] The Iran War was on the itinerary at the G7 meeting, and so too was the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a topic very much on the E.U.’s radar screen.  Nevertheless, at a pre-meeting press conference with the head of the E.U. state of France, Emmanuel Macron rather than with the federal president, U.S. federal President Trump said that his administration would return its diplomatic focus back to Russia’s invasion now that the U.S.’s conflict with Iran had been at least temporarily discontinued. An implication from the visuals of Trump being at a joint press conference with the head of an E.U. state is that the latter could legitimately undermine Von der Leyen in negotiating independently with Russia on the matter of Ukraine. Of course, visuals have nothing to do with politics (i.e., political reality), I write heavily with sarcasm.

Furthermore, even though Macron was “keen to portray the G7 as united in the face of unfair Chinese competition,” international trade is an exclusive competency (i.e., enumerated power) of the E.U. rather than its states. In fact, on the very day on which the G7 meeting began, “E.U. Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said . . . that EU-China relations needed a ‘reset’ and that engagement with Beijing had to deliver ‘concrete outcomes.’”[2] Noting that the status quo was no longer sustainable, Sefcovic said, “Our trading relationship with China has reached a point that requires a reset, not confrontation, but rebalancing.”[3] Macron would not be in charge of the rebalancing. To quote from the disgraced former head of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, Macron missed an opportunity to shut up; Sarkozy had made the statement in regard to a governor of one of the E.U.’s eastern states as if they were inferior. Such is the danger in the media giving the governors of large states such prominent positioning. It is thus no small measure that E.U. President Von der Leyen spoke before the meeting on the E.U.’s trade deficit with China; interestingly, even she tacitly undermined her position as a federal official in noting “that 2025was the first time in history that all 27 [member states of the E.U.] had recorded a trade deficit with China.”[4] It was the Commission, rather than the state of France, that was “currently looking into ways to diversity supply chains, boost domestic production of strategic sectors and address trade distortions, such as subsidies and coercion” by China.[5] Accordingly, Von der Leyen rather than Macron of France should have been prominent both publicly and at the meeting on the topic of trade with China from the standpoint of the E.U., of which France, as a state, is but a part. That Macron said at the time that he was “’optimistic’ that G7 leaders would reach an agreement on critical raw materials” can thus safely be relegated, for trade is an exclusive E.U. competency. If, as read it, Macron was referring only to the leaders of the seven countries and thus excluding his own federal president (whose competencies include trade!), then something was indeed amiss with the official membership list at G7 meetings. A strong argument can thus be made that the E.U. president, rather than any governors of E.U. states, should have been on the membership list.

As rational as such an argument may be, the staying power of existent institutional arrangements is formidable. The E.U. could thus enjoy being represented several times over by governors of E.U. states at international meetings and even organizations including the United Nations. Governmentally, the fact that the E.U.’s federal system includes dual sovereignty, wherein both the states and the Union enjoy some governmental sovereignty, just as in the case of the U.S. wherein its states too hold residual sovereignty, means that the president of the E.U. should have an official place at the table and sit opposite U.S. President Trump at pre-meeting press conferences. Furthermore, that the U.S. could not be represented in multiples by having governors of large states also have official places at international meetings means that it is only fair that the governors of large E.U. states also be excluded. My argument is thus based as much on the fairness that is implicit in symmetry as on the relevance of the E.U. on the topics of the G7 itinerary at the meeting that ironically took place in the E.U. in June, 2026.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro et al, “G7 Summit: US to Focus Again on Ukraine after Deal with Iran, Trump Says,” Euronews.com, 15 June 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.