Jamal Khashoggi: A Double-Agent Killed in Istanbul by Saudi Operatives

The New York Times labeled Jamal Khashoggi “a journalist critical of the Saudi government.”[1] His day job was being a contributing columnist to The Washington Post. Articles he wrote “included criticism of Saudi Arabia’s government. On [October 2, 2018], he entered the [Saudi] consulate in Istanbul and never emerged.”[2] Khashoggi was also a double agent, and it is for this rather than merely critical articles that he was really killed and cut into pieces in the consulate.

After “weeks of Saudi insistence that Mr. Khashoggi had left the consulate, unharmed, hours after entering,” Saudi Arabia’s government announced the “Khashoggi had been killed in a brawl inside the [Saudi] consulate [in Turkey].”[3] According to Turkish officials, the Saudi version was that “Khashoggi [had] died in a botched attempt at interrogation and abduction.”[4] Turkish officials even claimed to have recordings of the torture and killing.”[5]

The whole thing had been a “’’tremendous mistake’ by Saudi operatives acting ‘outside the scope of their authority,” said Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister. [6] What “compounded the mistake,” he continued, would be the attempt to try to cover up.”[7]

It is highly improbable, I submit, that 15 operatives would be sent without the approval of the Saudi government at its highest level. Turkish government officials firmly believed that Khashoggi’s death was ordered at the highest level of the [Saudi] kingdom.”[8] They told the media anonymously “that a team of 15 Saudis flew to Istanbul on Oct. 2 to kill Mr. Khashoggi, most likely on the orders of the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman.”[9] Additionally, the former head of Britain’s foreign intelligence service (MI6), John Sawers, observed at the time, “It’s very hard not to point a finger at [the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia].”[10] So, why would the highest level of the Saudi government go so far as to kill a Saudi journalist living in Virginia? Why all the lies? The Turkish Prime Minister picked up on them from the beginning.

I contend, from an anonymous American source, that Jamal Khashoggi was a double agent whom the Saudis killed and cut up into pieces (so as to sneak the remains out of the consulate in Istanbul). Just months earlier, the world witnessed the attempted assassination on British soil of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy who acted as a double agent.[11] So the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia could have considered killing Jamal Khashoggi as the appropriate response.
By implication, the world’s public could see only the lies meant ultimately to hide the fact that the Saudi Government killed a man who was not just a critical journalist who had left the kingdom in more ways than one. Behind the scenes lies the real story in more cases than the public could imagine. Such secrecy has always been a part of governing (and campaigning), but at some level the lies must surely impede democracy. Of course, autocratic governments would naturally be unmoved by such a constraint, but what about the U.S. Government, or at least its military, in keeping the real story hidden even from Americans?

1. Carlotta Gall and Ben Hubbard, “Turkey’s President Vows to Detail Khashoggi Death ‘in Full Nakedness,” The New York Times, October 21, 2018.

2. Emily Rauhala and Anton Troianovski, “The World Has a Question for the White House: When Do Murders Matter?” The Washington Post, October 19, 2018.

3. Carlotta Gall and Ben Hubbard, “Turkey’s President Vows to Detail Khashoggi Death ‘in Full Nakedness,” The New York Times, October 21, 2018.

4. Ibid.

5.Ibid.

6.Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Mary Papenfuss, “’Compelling Evidence’ Points to Saudi Prince in Khashoggi Death, Says Ex-MI6 Chief,” The Huffington Post, October 20, 2018.

11. Emily Rauhala and Anton Troianovski, “The World Has a Question for the White House: When Do Murders Matter?” The Washington Post, October 19, 2018.

Saudi Arabia Beheads a Member of the Royal Family: Justice for All, Atrociously

On October 18, 2016, Saudi Arabia executed a member of the royal family for committing murder during a brawl. Prince Turki bin Saud bin Turki bin Saud al-Kabeer was put to death most likely by beheading in a public square—as this was the usual method at the time. As horrific as such an execution is, the point that law applies to everyone is laudable—especially “on point” for countries in which the rich can “get away with murder” by hiring the best (and most expensive) lawyers.  The atrocious means of execution coupled with the dictum that the law really does apply to everyone renders this case particularly difficult to analyze from an ethical perspective.

“The greatest thing is that the citizen sees the law applied to everyone, and that there are not big people and other small people,” Abdul-Rahman al-Lahim, a prominent Saudi lawyer wrote.[1] In other words, the verdict and sentence sent the message that no one is above the law. To be sure, thousands of people are in the Saudi royal family enjoying perks not available to the rest of Saudi Arabia’s 20 million people; yet that the member executed was from a prestigious arm of the family sufficiently makes the point that no one is above the law.

This lesson is a valuable one for the United States, as financiers got away with fraudulently mislabeling the risk of sub-prime mortgage-based bonds before the financial crisis of 2008. Yet, interestingly, the Saudis could look to the United States for a lesson on how to execute people humanely. I submit that this combination of lessons demonstrates that a country can be very ethical in one sense yet abysmal in another. This point in turn impedes claims that some countries are more humane, or advanced ethically, than others. Within a culture, insistence on justice in one sense can coexist with toleration for injustice in another sense. Put another way, the human mind seems able to compartmentalize justice, without realizing the cognitive dissidence involved.

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1. Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Prince Is Executed for Murder,” The New York Times, October 19, 2016.

Backing a Bear into a Corner: Falling Oil Prices Hit Russia Hard

Falling oil prices and economic sanctions in 2014 put the pressure on the Russian economy and its currency. The overall question may have been geo-political, however. Namely, would the twenty-first century see economic tools replace military response as the dominant means to “walk back” international aggressor states and restrict their further exploits? Such a question may be too broad, as even a newly-discovered devise that suddenly works is not likely to be applicable in every case. Even so, obviating war in the nuclear age would be no small feat.

On December 15, 2014, crude oil for February delivery fell $1.82, or 3.2 percent, to settle at $56.26 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange; oil had been as high as $107 the previous June.[1] The increase in American consumers’ disposable income was expected to boost the economy. Additionally, manufacturing output in the previous month “surpassed its prerecession peak as auto production rose.”[2] This proffered an “encouraging sign that America's factories are somewhat insulated from the global economic slowdown.”[3] The U.S. Government could afford to lead its informal coalition, including Saudi Arabia, against the Russian government’s incursions into Ukraine.

The Russian economy was not least among the contributors to the downturn. “Given Russia's huge dependence on oil revenues, the . . . sharp falls in the price of oil has hit the Russian economy hard. That's exacerbated by the fact that the Russian economy [was not at the time] diversified enough to withstand the shock.”[4] In other words, “the drop in crude prices . . . hurt Russia since the country [was at the time] a major oil exporter and [thus depended] heavily on oil for tax revenue.”[5] In refusing to reduce its supply of oil, OPEC was squeezing Russian competitors particularly hard, as well as the Russian government (and that of Iran).

That E.U. and U.S. officials were “contemplating tougher economic sanctions against Moscow” for geo-political reasons centering on Russia’s incursion into Ukraine suggests that the Russian economy might have more to worry about than lower oil prices and a weakening currency.[6] The situation in Ukraine was not getting any better, suggesting that further sanctions could come to pass. The United Nations human rights office had just announced its findings of a "very close link" between the inflow of fighters and sophisticated weaponry, "including from the Russian Federation," and a total breakdown of law and order in eastern Ukraine.[7] According to Gianni Magazzeni, head of the division of the United Nations human rights office that deals with Europe and Central Asia, “the situation around the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, under the control of pro-Russian armed groups,” could be characterized in terms of "killings, abductions, torture, ill treatment, sexual violence, rape, forced labor, ransom, extortion,".[8] Considering that even all of this does not take into account the fate of Crimea, which Russia had invaded and absorbed, the prospect of any sort of overall geopolitical resolution with a let-up on the economic vice-grips on Russia seemed dismal at the time.

The toll on Russia’s currency, the ruble, could not be missed. In its steepest drop in 16 years, the currency sank more than 10 percent to about 64 to the dollar on December 15, 2014.[9] The rise of inflation pressures from more expensive imports had already prompted Russia’s central bank to gradually increase its main interest rate from 5.5 percent early in 2014 to 9.5 percent. On December 11th, the central bank “tried unsuccessfully to stem the ruble's slide by boosting its key rate by 1 percentage point to 10.5 percent. The decision to raise the rate to 17 percent from 10.5 percent on December 15th “represented a desperate attempt to prop up the troubled currency,” according to the Associated Press.[10] Of course, the currency itself was not the real problem. Accordingly, the attempt fell on its face, at least initially. “In the first hours after the increase, the ruble staged a rebound, recovering almost all of its [previous day] losses. But the optimism soon dissipated and the ruble was down another 20 percent to 77 to the dollar by 3.30 p.m. in Moscow (1230GMT).”[11] The next day, FXMC, an online trading company, halted ruble trades—anticipating capital controls on the enervated currency.

Moreover, although the higher interest rate could eventually have a positive impact on the ruble, especially as long as the rates on the E.U. euro and U.S. dollar stay near zero, the higher rate was also “likely to cause much hardship in an economy [that was] already heading for recession.”[12] Americans need only remember Paul Volcker’s rate hikes in 1981 and the subsequent harsh recession to get this point. Indeed, Russian stocks were “moderately declining” on the morning after the rate hike to 17 percent, “with the MICEX benchmark 1.5 percent lower, reflecting the rate hike's pressure on businesses.” [13] Neil Shearing, chief economist for emerging markets at London-based Capital Economics, predicted "a further tightening of credit conditions for households and businesses and a deeper downturn in the real economy in 2015."[14] Such tightening—and Americans need only look back to September 2008 to grasp the seriousness of this move—could easily outweigh any increase in exports from the lower currency.

In conclusion, this case study presents us with an interesting intersection of international relations and international political economy. One major lesson may be that the coordinated economic policies of a coalition of states can effectively replace war as a means of going after governments that are militarily aggressive internationally. Of course, the geo-political and economic strategy is not full-proof, as a hegemon may still be able to get away with such behavior (e.g., the U.S. invading Iraq with impunity). Also, pushing a bear into a corner may have unanticipated consequences both within Russia and in its foreign policy. That is to say, applying such strident pressure, whether financial or militarily, is risky in a nuclear world.

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[1] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling, and So Are the Markets,” The New York Times, December 16, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The Associated Press, “Russia’s Ruble Slides to Historic Lows,” The Huffington Post, December 16, 2014.

[5] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling.”

[6] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Hardships Grow in Ukraine, U.N. Says,” The New York Times, December 16, 2014.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling.”

[10] The Associated Press, “Russia’s Ruble Slides.”

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

Diplomatic Pressure and Human Rights: The Case of Assad in Syria

It is perhaps telling that the world was more or less content, as of 2011, to rely on diplomatic pressure in the idyllic hope that it is sufficient to remove a tyrant from power, even if a tyrant were unleasing the weapons of war, including chemical weapons, on his own people I have Bashar Assad of Syria.

In August 2011, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement condemning Assad’s offensive within Syria against his own people. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council also denounced Assad’s violence. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain withdrew their respective ambassadors. Meanwhile, the Obama administration praised the increased diplomatic pressure and urged that more was needed. Washington was looking to Turkey to use its influence. “Historically, concerted multilateral pressure and sanctions have the greatest impact on the Assad regime’s calculations,” Andrew Tabler of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said. We “know that sanctions impact the regime, given its terrible economic situation and the regime’s worsening finances,” he added.[1] Yet an expert from the International Crisis Group admits that it may not matter to the very top.

I contend that even though a “calculations” approach in response to Assad may match his tactical-oriented or strategic approach to governance, the “tit-for-tat” level is grossly insufficient not only for removing a tyrant from power, but also in terms of dealing with human rights abuses. In other words, calculated effect is too wan for a domain such as human rights in which people are literally losing their lives.

LA Times (2011)

For example, relying on Saudi Arabia to pressure Assad because he has been going after Sunni tribes with ties to the kingdom naively assumes that the dictator would simply walk away from power simply from external pressure. Even in spite of opposition from the Arab League, Gadhafi was able to hold on to power at least as of August of 2011. Even bombing Tripoli and aiding the opposition had not achieved enough external pressure to remove the tyrant from power. Was Assad to simply walk away from solely diplomatic pressure?

If Gadhifi had lost the right to rule by international agreement, then to do anything less than remove him from power by force makes the international position look weak, if not impotent. For someone such as Barak Obama to say, “Gadahi must leave,” and then for the tyrant to remain makes Obama look foolish (and impotent).  That is to say, Obama ought not over-reach. More generally, if the international consensus is that a tyrant has lost the legitimacy to rule, the parties of that consensus are obliged to remove that tyrant unless an international mechanism is set up to do remove rulers who have been “ruled” illegitimate. In other words, governmental sovereignty is not an absolute, and the world ought not reply on diplomatic pressure to enforce transgressors. The duty arises out of the declaration and because the citizens being abused are not in a position to remove their dictator themselves.

1. Borzou Daragahi, "Arab Nations Add to Pressure on Syrian Regime," LA Times, August 9, 2011.