An E.U. Envoy to Russia

Should the E.U. appoint and send an envoy to Russia in spite of the fact that E.U. and state officials are not of one mind on a strategy to pressure Russia’s head, Putin, to the negotiating table to compromise? The power of the state governments at the federal level complicates efforts by Commission officials to present Putin with a specific list of sanctions because the governors are not on the same page even after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April, 2026. Ironically, desperately needed reforms to the E.U.’s federal system itself have been as politically difficult even to propose as has getting Putin to the negotiating table. Focusing on the latter while ignoring the former is a self-inflicted wound that has weakened the Europeans on the world stage. Incidentally, another self-inflicted state of denial involves assuming that such drastic cultural differences exist between two small E.U. states, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, while assuming that all of the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are basically the same, culturally. Recently, a European, who is actually a U.S. citizen, said as much to me! Denial is the main defense mechanism in the E.U. Even painstaking effort to render this political brain-sickness transparent is no match for the underlying ideological fervor that has so severely enervated the European Union from becoming a more perfect union.

Pointing to the intractable problem within the E.U. in formulating foreign policy, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, said in 2026, “Before we talk to the Russians, we should agree and talk amongst ourselves what we want to talk to the Russians about.”[1] She was undoubtedly referring to the direct involvement of state officials at the federal level in the Council of Ministers; agreement between relevant federal officials was not sufficient. In the U.S., the state governments’ official direct involvement at the federal level has been through the U.S. Senate, which, like the European Council and the Council of Ministers, represents states. Whereas the U.S. Senate’s filibuster (60 out of 100 vote threshold) is related back to the ongoing enumerated and residual governmental sovereignty of the U.S. states, the semi-sovereign E.U. states, which delegated significant governmental sovereignty to the E.U., have enjoyed veto power on federal foreign (and defense) policy—effectively choking off E.U. foreign (and defense) policy. It is for precisely this reason that in 2026, E.U. President von der Leyen and even the governor of one of the large states, (the E.U. state of Germany) publicly advocated applying qualified-majority voting to every proposed policy, E.U. law, and regulation/directive in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This eminently reasonable constitutional (or Basic Law) reform of the E.U.’s federal system had to contend with the formidable resistance of the Euroskeptic ideology that the E.U. states were still somehow sovereign. Backing up the denial was the ideological tendency to exaggerate cultural differences between small E.U. states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, while assuming that the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are culturally similar! Denial on top of denial to support the category mistake of comparing even a small E.U. state with the U.S. as a whole (while rejecting comparisons such as those between California and the E.U. and even between the two empire-scale unions!). The bad odor of denialism was, at least as of 2026, so ubiquitous in the E.U. that the smell may well have been likened instead to that of a freshly blooming flower. Bad air!

The ideological grip on the state-veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, held firmly by the states’ governors even though they were exploiting institutional and personal (i.e., power) conflicts of interest, was immune to the plea even of Ukraine’s president Zelensky, who said on May 17, 2026, “It is important for [the E.U.] to have a strong voice and presence in this process [regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine], and it is worth determining who will represent Europe specifically.”[2] The state veto in the councils inhibited the E.U. from speaking with one voice and even being able to sit at the negotiating table with Putin. Regarding whomever might represent the E.U., one implication is that the envoy could have sufficient discretion rather than be limited to the demands of one governor out of 27 who is skeptical. Indeed, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, admitted at the time that the relevant officials of the states had “vastly disparate views” on “concessions and conditions” for Russia.[3] Given this state of affairs at the state level, holding onto the principle of unanimity in the councils on foreign policy was quite foolish indeed.

Kallas also said that the E.U. “should not ‘humiliate’ itself by seeking direct talks” with Putin.[4] The humiliation feared was that of the E.U. not having sufficient power to avoid giving in at the very start of negotiations. To be sure, Putin is a touch negotiator, but the seeds of the E.U.’s weakness are within rather than bestowed by the Russian. To be sure, both Putin and Trump could smell political weakness even from a great distance. In 2025, for example, E.U. officials “found, through press reports, a 28-point plan drafted by US and Russian officials that included issues, such as sanctions and assets, that fell under [the E.U.’s] jurisdiction.”[5] Even though the Europeans could blame the Americans and the Russians, a more mature mentality would honestly confront the weakness in the E.U.’s federal system, by which I obviously have in mind the vetoes reserved to the states at the federal level. This is not to say that expunging the veto from E.U. federalism would be sufficient to redress the weakness in E.U. foreign policy. 

As governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán belied the Von der Leyen administration by going to visit Putin in Moscow. Direct involvement in foreign policy at the federal level must not permit such a betrayal by the governor of a state, for a house divided cannot stand. This is true, by the way, for couples wherein values clash and neither (or even one) side will compromise; tragically, such clashes blow up even love as if the two people had never even met. If the Europeans can figure out how to retain some direct involvement of the state governments in foreign policy without the veto and direct state involvement with foreign officials if prohibited by the Commission, then the Americans might want to consider how the state governments could have more direct involvement, especially since U.S. senators ceased to be appointed by the state governments, for being elected by the citizens of a state does not mean that the state government is represented, and does not necessarily give a senator a political incentive to represent the state government’s interests if the people thereof would prefer federal preemption. Of course, the European ideological bias would preclude such a comparison, and thus any such benefit obtained by studying the other union.

---

1. Jorge Liboreiro, “High Risks, Pitfalls and Snubs: E.U. Envoy for Russia Talks Faces Job from Hell,” Euronews.com, 19 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Russia’s Bottom-Line on Ukraine

As American, Ukrainian, and Russian negotiating delegations were flying around the world in early December, 2025 to conduct various negotiating sessions, all the while without the presidents of Russia and Ukraine meeting, it was difficult for bystanders to keep an eye on the proverbial ball as it was being kicked around by offers and counter-offers, and complicated by the high-profiled presence of the businessman, Jared Kushner, who happened to be married to one of U.S. President Trump’s daughters. Kushner was also highly visible in the negotiations on Gaza, which almost certainly included real-estate development. To be sure, commercial and investment deals can easily remain subterranean while the public discourse stays on the political relations between nations, and even just the latter may lack transparency. Democratic accountability in democratic republics as concerning the conduct and results of foreign policy can be difficult. Especially difficult to gauge was the hand being closely held by Russia’s President Putin. I contend that his willingness to negotiate was consistently overestimated by the West and Ukraine.

After a meeting at the Kremlin with an American delegation led by special envoy Steve Witkoff, who had recently been caught coaching Kremlin officials on how to win over U.S. President Trump, Putin arrived in India on December 4, 2025 while Ukrainian officials were travelling to the U.S. to hold talks with an American delegation on a proposal to end Russia’s invasion. How close the Russians and Ukrainians were to deal was at the time unknown likely even to themselves. To an extent, they may have been talking past each other and relying too much on surrogates, some of which, the Europeans, were not even at the negotiating table on behalf of Ukraine.

As a case in point on how badly the negotiating was going, Putin’s statement, which he made in India, that Russia would “liberate Donbas and Nororossiya in any case-by military or other means” went along with his stated intention that Russia would finish the special operation in Ukraine “when we achieve the goals set at the beginning of the special operation, when we free these territories. That’s all.”[1] To be sure, such determination and certainty can be taken as a negotiating tactic, but the statements are consistent with Putin’s pattern of ignoring overtures for peace. It is no accident that Putin could afford to do so because Russia was “negotiating” throughout from a position of strength on the battlefield. The law of political physics applied, Putin and Russia stood to gain little if anything by unilaterally giving up the Ukrainian territory that, as U.S. President had said, had been won. Lest it be assumed that Crimea and even Donbas regions would be enough, it is highly significant that Putin “revived the term” Novorossiya that referred historically “to territories toward the west during the Russian empire.”[2] This is just the sort of move that made Poland and the Balkans nervous, and legitimately gave the E.U. a stake at the negotiating table. In short, Putin’s vision of renewing the historical Russian Empire, which predates the U.S.S.R., gives his statements made in India more substance than merely that of being negotiating rhetoric. A historical vision with the political realism of a position of military strength rendered Putin’s real stance rock solid.

Of course, Russia’s position could change were the E.U. to begin in earnest to hold some of its own wayward states back at the federal level and aid Ukraine militarily to an extent that the balance of power between Russia and Ukraine could finally be swayed toward Ukraine’s advantage, but the E.U. remained mired in its own state-centric federal system as the American, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations were moving around and talking in various, indirect combinations.

It is precisely in this context that the following statement made by Ukraine’s President Zelensky as Putin arrived in India can be criticized: “Our task now is to obtain full information about what was said in Russia, what other reasons Putin found to prolong the war and put pressure on Ukraine, on us, on our independence.”[3] Putin was not finding reasons to prolong the war; rather, he stated that he would not stop until his initial military goals have been accomplished. He had no intention of giving up those goals in a negotiated peace.

To be sure, commercial deals spearheaded by Jared Kushner, involving Russian rare earth minerals for instance, could potentially lure Putin into accepting territory less than the whole of Donbas, but such a political-commercial nexus would be a hard sell given Putin’s vision of resurrecting the Russian Empire of old in Eastern Europe. At best, a commercial mega-deal would likely serve as a resting stop for the Russian dictator. Of course, political forecasting is such a plight that smart analysts remain aloof from that occupation. The Europeans could surprise the world and proffer Ukraine with a spurt of military assistance capable of pushing Russian troops back in spite of Ukraine’s shortage of troops. Russia, whose territory was already empire-scale, versus Ukraine, a kingdom-scale country, was never a fair fight. This has been Putin’s advantage all along, and his statements in India are consistent with it. The problem is that Zelensky’s statement seems to display a lack of political realism regarding Putin’s strategy and objectives, given the Ukrainian territory “won” by Putin without being dislodged by Ukraine and the European Union. This doesn’t even count the possible commercial deals being quietly negotiated by Jared Kushner on behalf of silent investors unknown to nearly everyone, including Zelensky.

The invasion was occurring during, and even abetting, the ascendence of militarized political realism at the expense of international constraints on naked power-aggression. It seems that the Europeans, including Zelensky, had not received this memo, and were still expending Putin to give and take as if Ukraine and Russia could reach justice as equals. It bears remembering Nietzsche’s point that justice is only achievable between parties equal in power. That equality itself is an illusion is a point made by Hume. At any rate, the disparity of military power between Russia and Ukraine as 2025 was drawing to a close should dispel any idyllic thoughts that Putin might give in on his initial military objectives not only with respect to Ukraine, but also with the broader Novorossiya too. It bears remembering that appeasement with Hitler didn’t work, and that that strategy gave not only Britain, but also Germany time to militarize. The E.U.’s self-inflicted handicap of the veto-power of its states, and the refusal of the Europeans to make the necessary structural/procedural correction even in spite of the anticipated enlargement, but also Russia’s ongoing aggression to the east, can be viewed as tacit appeasement even though Trump’s enabling of Putin’s government went far beyond appeasement. Indeed, the stance of the Trump administration alone should have bolted the Europeans into reforming their own federal system even though state officials quite obviously didn’t want to give up (i.e., delegate) more power even for collective action to push back Russia’s invasion in Eastern Europe. All of this only fortified Putin in staying the course.  

---

1. Jessie Yeung, “Putin Vows Russia Will Seize Donbas Region by any Means, as Ukrainians Prepare for More Peace Talks with US,” CNN.com, December 4, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The E.U. on Ukraine: On the Human, All Too Human

On August 17, 2025, Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with Ursula von der Leyen, president of the E.U., as a precursor to both of them meeting with Don Trump, president of the U.S. on ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. President Von der Leyen had decided to accompany Zelensky to Washington in part to potentially play interference should the U.S. president again publicly berate Zelensky to his face and in part to protect Zelensky should Trump’s position/pressure be too pro-Russia (i.e., pro-Putin). To virtually all Europeans and to many Americans, Trump’s verbal outburst at Zelensky in the Oval Office had been shocking, especially as it seemed to be pre-meditated and orchestrated. Taking emotional advantage of the head of a state being invaded by the empire-scale Russia can assuredly be reckoned as being a bad host, and even low class for the president of the empire-scale United States. International relations do indeed contain a very human element, and in fact leaving it out of an analysis of an international situation is nothing short of negligent.

Our political entities are, after all, artifacts made by us and thus can at best restrain our most base instincts. Even as such, as Hobbes points out in Leviathan, living under a sovereign is much preferable to being in the brutish state of nature. It is important to remember in assessing international relations that Hobbes’ state of nature is not completely extinguished or blocked by the establishment and maintaining of government. As for Hobbes’ social contract, I would be surprised if there even was a group of humans living in proximity without some hierarchy of power, and thus de facto government, in which case the scenario of a number of free individuals social-contracting from nothing, ex nihilo, to form a government is, as Aristotle wrote of Plato’s theory of the Forms, “beautiful but false.” By the way, Plato eventually rejected his own theory wherein forms, or pure ideas, are metaphysically real.

Lest I be presumed to have digressed, my point with all of the historical philosophy was not to put you to sleep; rather, I contend that Von der Leyen’s presence with Zelensky in Washington is not only to be analyzed in terms of Europe’s geo-political interests in countering any plans that Russia’s president might develop to invade any of the E.U.’s eastern states, but also of the human, all too human—to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche—element. The latter is also highly relevant to the E.U. president’s trouble with the governor of the E.U. state of France, whose efforts to upstage the federal president as the figurehead of the E.U., including in speaking for the E.U. rather than just for his own state, have not gone unnoticed in Europe. By the way, the U.S. avoids such a pitfall by making foreign policy an exclusive competency, or enumerated power, of the U.S., such even the governor of California or Texas cannot publicly state a foreign policy for the United States.

In stating after his meeting with Von der Leyen that Europe “needs to stand united in any further negotiations to stop Moscow’s all-out war in Ukraine, Zelensky was essentially saying that the governors of even large E.U. states should get behind the president and foreign minister of the E.U. rather than go it alone in foreign policy with respect to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Moreover, because Russia is on the scale of an empire whereas E.U. states are “kingdom”-level, the E.U. is needed to face off against President Putin of Russia, especially of the president of the empire-scale U.S. leaned in Putin’s favor to end the invasion even if that means rewarding an invasion with additional territory. On this point, Von der Leyen stated, “Our position is clear: international borders cannot be changed by force; these are decisions to be made by Ukraine . . . and not without Ukraine at the table.”[1] To be sure, this statement can be viewed as naïve, for it omits any mention of the E.U.’s role in safeguarding Zelensky from being faced with intense political pressure from Trump and military threats from Putin to “help” Zelensky make the “right” decision. Considerable military and political pressure from two empire-scale polities can be brought to bear on a single kingdom-level polity. Hence, Zelensky also said after his meeting with Von der Leyen, “It’s crucial that Europe is as united now as it was at the very beginning, as it was in 2022 when the full-scale war began.”[2] Ukraine desperately needed the support of at least one empire-scale polity, especially if the American and Russian empires were actually on the same side. 

American support for Putin would mean that America was at the time in favor of two invaders: Russia and Israel. There was a time when the U.S. stood for freedom-fighters rather than bullies. Whether a person or the head of a militarized polity, a bully is a bully. That is to say, the human, all too human element should not be left out of the equation. 

I submit that militaries around the world, whether voluntarily or through a semi-sovereign world federalism, as discussed by Kant in Perpetual Peace and has seemed definitively necessary after Russia’s unimpeded invasion and Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, should try to counter rather than enable or ignore the worst of human nature. We cannot assume that Hobbes’ infamous state of nature has been, or even would be, replaced by the institution of government, especially in international relations, but our species could do much better, and it is not at all utopian to say so.

---

1. Malek Fouda, Sacha Vakulina, and Aleksandar Brezar, “Zelenskyy Urges Europe to Remain United Against Russia’s ‘Anti-European’ War in Ukraine,” Euronews.com, August 17, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Tariffs as a Negotiating Tactic: Undercut by Wall Street Expediency

With all the economic and political turmoil from the anticipated American tariffs, it may be tempting, especially for financially-oriented CEOs and billionaires looking at quarterly reports, to call the whole thing off even though doing so would deflate the American attempt to renegotiate trade bilaterally with other countries. The concerns of the wealthy, whether corporations or individuals, have their place, but arguably should not be allowed to "lead the proverbial dog from behind, lest the dog run in circles and get nowhere." Moreover, the notion that any goal that is difficult and takes some time to materialize can or even should be vetoed by momentary passions at the outset is problematic and short-sighted. That U.S. President Trump's announcement of bilateral tariffs quickly brought fifty countries to the negotiating table is significant as a good sign for the United States, as long as that country's powerful business plutocracy (i.e., private concentrations of wealth that seek to govern) can be kept from vetoing the emergent trade policy, which at least in part is oriented to trade negotiation and ultimately to the notion that fair trade is conducive to increased free trade. 

As of 3:10 pm (CET) on April 7, 2025, the Euro STOXX 50 was down 5.27 percent, and the STOXX 600 lost 5.15 percent of its value. “The bloodbath is in full swing, and that’s exactly what you see when you look at the European markets. There is no safe haven; equity markets have entered a complete free-fall with no clear bottom in sight,” according to Zaye Capital Markets.[1] Meanwhile, the Dow Jones opened down 3.2 percent.[2] “The sheer volatility was enough to spook CEOs on that rainy Monday in New York. The Dow “briefly erased a morning loss of 1,700 points, shot up more than 800 points, then went back to a loss of 629 points.”[3] The S&P 500 “likewise made sudden up-and-down lurching movements”.[4]

U.S. President Trump had “announced a 20% across-the-board tariff on imports from the European Union, set to take effect on 9 April,” with steel, aluminum and cars being subject to a separate 25% rate; over all, over €380 billion in E.U.-made products could be affected.[5]

In that uneasy context, I contend that two markers are worthy of attention, only one of which is arguably productive.  E.U. President von der Leyen proposed to her counterpart, U.S. President Trump, that both unions cut their respective tariffs to zero; essentially, there would be a free-trade agreement on industrial goods. Just such an overture is in line with President’s intent that other countries get rid of their unfair trading practices, which, the president believed, had aggravated the U.S. trade deficits for decades. In this regard, President von der Leyen’s proposal can be viewed as an overture, which could lead to a counter-proposal that not only tariffs, but also non-tariff barriers of the E.U. be removed (or that the E.U. compensate the U.S. for those annually).

Adam Smith’s ideal of competitive free-trade rather than mercantilism presupposes trade that is free even of non-tariff barriers so comparative advantage can be a major factor in international trade. To be sure, national-security concerns are arguably legitimate constraints on Smith’s ideal of competitive advantage. Being dependent on China for computer chips would be risky for both the E.U. and U.S. because China could hold either or both unions hostage as Taiwan is invaded by China with impunity.

So von der Leyen’s response was in “the right direction,” if free and fair trade was among Trump’s goals in unilaterally imposing tariffs—that is to say, to the extent that the announcement of tariffs was geared to triggering real negotiations.

That the billionaire hedge fund manager, Bill Ackman, a supporter of President Trump, just one day earlier, had “urged the president to pause his sweeping new tariffs, warning they could economically devastate America if implemented, as planned,” can be likened to a driver unilaterally letting some air out of his own car’s tires just before a race.[vi] Ackman may have been rich, but his intelligence was lacking in his assumption that the tariffs would be permanent even though fifty governments were already willing to negotiate on trade with the American government. Also, his understanding of negotiation could have used a spare tire.

It is one thing for a republic to be an open society, and quite another for a dog to be led by its own tail, meaning for the U.S. Government to be led by greedy and short-sighted finance managers and CEOs of even major corporations. The enlightened self-interest of whom would be focused on the wealth that could be obtained from fewer trading obstacles in other countries, for the money that an American-based (and owned) company can possibly be made on exports from the U.S. is hardly nugatory. The capture of legislative and regulatory bodies by private companies and billionaires is a danger not only to democracy itself, but also to a country’s pursuit of its long-term strategic interests globally. A dog that is led by its hungry tail doesn’t get very far, and an argument can be made that such a dog doesn’t deserve to get very far, for weakness within a polity is hardly laudatory. Put another way, that elected offices in a republic have terms of years rather than, say, just a few months, is an important impediment to short-term passions in society seeking to get their way in policy. Sometimes long-term goals require momentary sacrifice even if the measures are erroneously assumed to be permanent rather than negotiating tactics.

---

1. Angela Barnes, “European Markets Dive as Global Tariff Fears Shake Investor Confidence,” Euronews.com, April 7, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. The Associated Press, “Stocks Are Making Wild Swings as Markets Assess the Damage from Trump’s Trade War,” Apnews.com, April 7, 2025.
4. Ibid.
5. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen Offers Trump ‘Zero-For-Zero’ Tariffs Deal on All Industrial Goods,” Euronews.com, April 7, 2025.
6. Lee Moran, “Billionaire Trump Backer Warns America of ‘Self-Induced Economic Nuclear Winter.” The Huffington Post, April 7, 2025.

Did Obama Press Israel to Compromise for Peace?

Seeing to “capture a moment of epochal change in the Arab world,” U.S. President Obama delivered a foreign policy speech on May 19, 2011 in which, according to the New York Times, he sought “to break the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” by “setting out a new starting point for negotiations.” In particular, he suggested that the Israelis go back to the 1967 borders, adjusted somewhat to account for settlements on the West Bank. Meeting with Obama on the following day, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “We can’t go back” to the 1967 borders, according to MSNBC.com. This put the U.S. at odds with one of its foremost allies. Considering the amount of financial and military aid involved, Netanyahu could have been accused of biting the hand that was feeding Israel. Yet due to lobbying no doubt, the Obama administration did not fully play its hand in pressuring the ally.

Before the president’s speech, according to the New York Times, Netanyahu “held an angry phone conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton” to demand that the president’s references to 1967 borders be cut. White House officials said that nothing was changed from Israeli pressure. In spite of the billions in aid to Israel from the U.S., the Israeli government had ignored the president’s request that settlements be halted—only to reject the 1967 borders proposal.  Given the position of Israel in the Middle East and its financial support from the U.S., the Israeli government’s rejection of the American proposals is perplexing. In fact, the refusals, as well as the pressure, could be taken as presumptuous, given Israel’s intransience in negotiating with the Palestinians.

So why, one might ask, didn’t the American president freeze aid to Israel? Although Jews in the U.S. are only about 2% of the total population, as donors to political candidates and the Democratic Party, the Jewish influence is disproportionate. Congress would hardly support real pressure on Israel, so realistically the president’s hand was probably tied.

In fact, I would not be surprised if Netanyahu had threatened Obama that if he kept the 1967 border proposal in his speech, he would lose Florida in 2012. It would be unfortunate if Americans who happen to be Jewish would put another country before their own in voting for president. In fact, I submit that it is in the Jewish interest, whether in Florida or Israel, that additional pressure be applied to Israel so a comprehensive peace deal may be achieved. Indeed, the reaction to the speech in the E.U. was that finally the U.S. Government was standing up to Israel.  A spokesperson for E.U. foreign policy minister Catherine Ashton said she "warmly welcomes President Obama's confirmation that the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with the mutually agreed swaps, with secured and recognized borders on both sides," according to Zawya.com. Perhaps the E.U. and U.S. could combine forces to pressure Israel to comrpromise.

However, was making a proposal not to Israel’s liking standing up to the Israelis? I contend that the most intractable problem in the Middle East requires more than words. Accordingly, President Obama should find the will to put money behind his words. Specifically, he should give the Israeli government a deadline for a peace deal, after which American aid would be frozen. If Congress’s approval is necessary, the president should make the recommendation, agreeing to take the heat. 

Coming off his victory over Osama Bin Laden, Obama has some political capital to burn, and he should not be afraid of retaliation from Americans who happen to be Jewish—whom I would think would be against occupation wherever it is going on, given the history of Jewish suffering under occupation. Surely Jewish Americans realize that two wrongs do not make a right, and, moreover, that Israel’s future will not be secured until it compromises with those whom it is occupying. Borne of occupied resistance, the United States itself ought to be for the occupied rather than the occupiers, and Jewish Americans are part of the United States, are they not?

In any case, the way to win a presidential election is to keep one’s eyes on the prize rather than deferring in order not to offend particular interest groups. Paradoxically, if winning re-election is the predominant factor in every major presidential decision, the likelihood of a win is diminished accordingly because there are inevitably costs borne more by some than others as a leader puts his money where his mouth is in order to achieve any truly worthwhile accomplishment. Relatedly, a benefit of a representative democracy rather than a direct democracy is that in the former representatives have a period of time insulating them from the immediate passions of the people so they can go out on a limb to bring home the bacon that might involve a bit of discomfort.

Sources:

Mark Lander and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama sees ’67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal,” The New York Times, May 20, 2011.

MSNBC.com, “’We Can’t Go Back’: Israeli PM Rejects 1967 Border Proposal,” May 20, 2011.

Zawya.com, "EU 'Welcomes' Obama Call to Respect Pre-1967 Borders," May 20, 2011.

European Officials at the G20 Grapple with a New American Trading Position: Beyond the Joint Communiqué

It is perhaps only natural---only human—for us to take ourselves and our produced artifacts too seriously. Diplomats and other government officials, for example, fret arduously over mere words. When those words are etched in governmental or treaty parchment, the effort is understandable. The flaw of excess is evident in all the time and effort that go into the joint communiques of international conferences and meetings. I submit that the real politic at such occasions is much more significant even if nothing shows from it for some time.

At the March 18, 2017 meeting of the Group of 20, which includes the E.U. and U.S., the joint statement “became an unlikely focus of controversy” issuing in “a tortured compromise stating, in effect, that trade is a good thing.”[1] I submit that the use of such language is spurious—certainly much less than the attendees and even their principals back home supposed. The real politic was instead that the U.S. was “overturning long-held assumptions about international commerce,” and such transformational change takes time even just to register in minds ensconced in the status quo. That is to say, the real shift in power would need to play out in actual negotiations on trade, rather than in how to word a meeting’s joint statement.

A European official, Wolfgang Schauble, perhaps straining at the meeting to understand the new American position. (source: NYT)

“We thought that it was very important for the communiqué to reflect what we discussed here,” Steven Mnuchin, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, said at the time.[2] He added that the historical language was not relevant. I submit that neither was it important that the joint statement reflect what was actually discussed, for such discussions—laying out the initial bargaining positions for upcoming negotiations—had legitimate importance. Yet even such importance was only as “the first shots,” for the true importance lie in the arduous negotiations to come, for the tyranny of the status quo never gives up without a struggle. At that G20 meeting, the American government’s “lack of reverence for existing norms and treaties” was “particularly unsettling to the change-averse Europeans.”[3] It is precisely such a struggle that is so important—for real shifts in power must somehow be accommodated or defeated. In relative terms, the importance of what to hand to the press after an initial meeting is but a napkin dwarfed by the real politics underneath.

Therefore, we need not be distraught that the best the Group of 20 could come up with on that Saturday was this: “We are working to strengthen the contribution of trade to our economies.”[4] Such an obvious statement is worth only scant time. Much more important were efforts of the Europeans to understand—in the sense of comprehending—just what the new American perspective was, for something new that does not fit within the existing modus operendi takes effort to be understood, and only from this basis can real negotiations begin.

1. Jack Ewing, “U.S. Breaks With Allies Over Trade Issues Amid Trump’s ‘America First’ Vows,” The New York Times, March 18, 2017.

2.  Ibid.

3.  Ibid.

4.  Ibid.

Refusing for its Own Sake: Israel on the Palestinian Unity Government

President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority reached a deal for a unity government with Hamas on February 6, 2012—which was also the sixtieth anniversary of the Accession Day of Queen Elizabeth II of Britain. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had warned that a unity government with Hamas would rule out any chance of making peace with Israel. Meanwhile, the E.U. and U.S., as well as the state of Israel, had conditioned recognition and aid to Hamas on that party renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and agreeing to previous agreements reached between the P.L.O. and Israel. In short, for all that achieving a unity government requires in terms of hard decisions and effort, the accomplishment was not exactly valued by Israel and the West. Aside from the baleful consequences in refusing to recognize something of value out of stubbornness and inflexibility, Israel and the West may have been hurting themselves by ruling out a chance for peace at the outset.

“Hamas is an enemy of peace,” Netanyahu said. “It’s an Iranian-backed terror organization committed to Israel’s destruction.”[1] Doubtless that description reflects Hamas historically, but in sticking to the description, it was the Prime Minister rather than Hamas that was cutting off any chance of peace. He was ignoring or dismissing the possibility that Hamas could change as a result of negotiations and a deal. Part of what happens as two parties negotiate and reach a deal is that the parties’ respective perspectives and interests can also change. To condition the negotiations themselves on the other party already having changed is illogical, besides being utterly unfair to that party irrespective of whatever its past may or may not have been. It is essentially to presume that that which takes place during negotiations must somehow occur beforehand—and for only one of the parties. In continuing to build settlements, Israel has not exactly been kosher going into the negotiations; Abbas’s unity government could insist that Israel itself change as a condition for negotiations to begin.

Ironically, Abbas’s unity government may be requisite to any agreement, for otherwise Hamas would be outside any such deal. Presumably everyone concerned must be part of a peace deal for peace to ensue. Therefore, Israel as well as the U.S. and E.U. would be wiser not to look the gift horse in the mouth—meaning complain about that which is really a gift to them. Abbas has undoubtedly had to swallow hard to accept a unity government with his rival. He is due credit for this, and his action should be recognized for what it is: a necessary step on the way to a definitive agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. At the time of Abbas’s announcement, it would have been wise for Israel and the West to seize the opportunity of the unity government rather than view it as ending any chance of an agreement.

The lack of change projected onto Hamas was really in its adversaries. “Give peace a chance” means being willing to relax one’s stubbornness such that one can change. The change needed is ultimately in oneself—not the other guy. With this on one’s plate, to worry oneself with the other’s change involves a rather presumptuous overreaching that one can ill-afford. This is not to say that the other guy has been an angel. Hamas has been far from it, but the same could be said of Israel. It takes two to tangle, and angels have no need for peace talks. Sometimes appearances can be deceiving here on earth. The smallest excuse may easily be made use of by the party most interested in sustaining a feud. If there is anything that must change before negotiations can begin, it is this: a refusal to come to the table, presumably conditioned on some change in the other guy other than his refusal to come to the table. The refusal usually says much more about the refuser than the refusee.

1. Ethan Bronner, “Abbas Will Lead thePalestinians in a Unity Pact,” The New York Times, February 7, 2012.