European Priorities Regarding Ukraine

On 5 August, 2026, President Von der Leyen of the E.U. “announced that €1.4 billion in profits from immobilised Russian assets [held in the E.U. would] be allocated after Russia’s deadly strikes on Kyiv.”[1] This response sounds well and good, especially as Ukraine had failed to shoot down all of the missiles and thus was in vital need of American anti-missile weaponry. Yet in spite of this strategic vulnerability, “only €70 million” of the €1.4 billion would be “directed toward military assistance.” The lion’s share of the profits would “be used to repay G7 and EU loans.”[2] In other words, the E.U. Commission was seeing to it that almost all of the profits from Russian assets would go to creditors outside of Ukraine in the E.U. and elsewhere. Because Russia had been serially lobing missiles on civilian targets such as apartment buildings in Ukraine with overwhelming success, and, moreover, occupied at least 20 percent of Ukraine in the east at the time, the Commission’s decision to pay off loans rather than keep them outstanding so much more money than €70 million could be directed to Ukraine’s military defenses. Both ethically and geopolitically, getting the lent money back especially to creditors in the E.U. right away is problematic.

The Commission acting on behalf or in the interest of creditors that are in the E.U. has all the earmarks of an institutional, or structural conflict of interest even though the expedient politics are obvious behind the decision are obvious. In a conflict of interest, typically a relatively narrow, or confined (usually private) benefit is put before satisfying a wider benefit, which can even be viewed as being a duty. A duty to the public good, for example, is eclipsed by a desire to satisfy a more narrow or circumscribed private benefit, whether to oneself or a related party. In this case, the exploitation of the conflict of interest lies in the E.U. prioritizing the relatively narrow private financial benefit of E.U. creditors over the wider, public good of pushing the invading Russians out of Ukraine and thus standing up against military invasion itself.

Although most of the scholars on the conflict-of-interest scenario in ethics have argued that an unexploited institutional conflict of interest is not unethical, I contend that human nature renders such a temptation ethical even though the temptation is in the structure within an organization or inter-organizationally. For President Von der Leyen even to have the power to siphon off most of the profits to lenders in the E.U. is arguably unethical in itself, given the incentive of the underlying expedient politics of preferring one’s own over exogenous groups (e.g., Ukraine). Accordingly, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, and the E.U. Parliament should have passed a federal law mandating that all of the profits go to Ukraine to augment its military.

Also on 5 August, 2026, “Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy . . . called for allies to send more anti-ballistic air defence, after Russian strikes killed at least 17 people overnight.”[3] Von der Leyen’s response to this plea can be put in the following way: Even though we have €1.4 billion at our disposal now, we are giving you only €70 million. Zelensky could be forgiven for thinking, thanks a lot sarcastically even though being thankful for getting anything. For overnight, when the “Russian army sent 115 drones and fired 28 high-speed missiles, including ballistic ones, Ukraine’s military had been “unable to shoot down a single Russian missile” due to “a drastic shortage of anti-ballistic munitions.”[4] The opportunity cost in the Commission’s decision to pay off loans rather than devote the entire amount of profits to Ukrainian defenses was spelled out at the time by Ukraine’s president, who said, “Ballistics interceptors are something that could have saved the lives of those who died today. It is very important that partners realise that delays in their delivery or unwillingness to transfer anti-ballistics leads to such terrible victims and destruction.”[5] Moreover, the Russian advantage in missile offense says, in effect, that it is ok to invade another country that does not pose a threat; furthermore, military power decides geopolitical disputes with impunity. Lest that dogma become the default for international relations, international law can be relegated as an oxymoron in what is a return to a Hobbesian state of nature beyond the nation-state. With so much on the line—big picture—Von der Leyen’s decision to divert so much of the profits to Ukraine’s international creditors can be viewed as a case of Aristotle’s notion of misordered concupiscence: putting a lower good above a higher one. She would have been easily understood were she to have told those creditors that it was more important to buttress Ukraine’s anti-missile (and other) defence than even to make full interest payments because the world needed to show Russia’s President Putin that military aggression does not work in the twenty-first century—that war crimes won’t go unpunished, and of course Ukraine desperately needed anti-missile munitions and weaponry, and fortifying other weaponry wouldn’t hurt Ukraine’s position either.

In short, priorities, especially that interlace geopolitical, business, and military affairs, matter even in terms of what sort of global order might result amid the collapsing post-World War II order. Would international relations boil down to “dog eat dog,” or would even just informal coalitions of nation-states force back aggressive advocates of military might who scoff at international law and norms that constrain political realism (i.e., strategic state interests as hegemonic)? Priorities matter in terms of whether the overblown militaristic forays into Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran would eventually be able to become and even define the status quo in international relations.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “EU Releases €1.4 Billion to Ukraine from Frozen Russian AssetProfits after Kyiv Attacks,” Euronews.com, 5 August, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Sasha Vakulina, “Ukraine Failed to Shoot Down a Single Russian Missile Launchedin Overnight Barrage,” Euronews.com, 5 August, 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Rewarding Invaders with Profit: The Case of Russia in Ukraine

Operant Conditioning in Psychology, the theory advanced by B. F. Skinner in the 1930s, holds that punishment and reinforcement can change behavior. Positive reinforcement is more likely than punishment to see a given behavior repeated. With regard to the U.S.-Russian plan announced in November, 2025, to end the war in Ukraine, E.U. officials were concerned that if Russia would benefit from the plan, Putin would be more likely to stage other invasions in Eastern Europe. Positive reinforcement financially could make invading profitable, a point that would not be lost on government officials of countries desirous of territorial expansion.

At an international security conference held in Canada on November 22, 2025, some U.S. senators voiced concern that the plan worked out by Trump and Putin would reward aggression. U.S. Sen. Agnus King said as much during a panel discussion. The proposed plan, which the government of Ukraine was considering at the time, “rewards aggression. This is pure and simple. There’s no ethical, legal, moral, political justification for Russia claiming eastern Ukraine.”[1] Sen. McConnell, a former Majority Leader, put out a statement on the dangers of Putin viewing the plan as a win for him.

Besides what future responses Putin might have to the positive reinforcement in having gained territory in eastern Ukraine, the moral question of whether invaders should be rewarded politically and even financially for going to war seems simple enough, especially as it can be argued that a moral duty exists for every other government around the world to make Putin and Russia pay for having invaded Ukraine. As E.U. President Von der Leyen said, might should no longer be allowed to be the decider of rights to territory.

The switch from Russia paying a price to gaining financially (in additional to territorially) was apparent from the E.U.’s vantage-point concerning that Union’s plan to make Russia pay literally for Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction from the Russian financial assets blocked then in Europe. “In a dramatic reversal for the EU, the US-led plan suggests the Russian assets would be unblocked, releasee, and turned into an investment platform handled by [the U.S.]. The language implies the Kremlin would not only be spared from paying war damages in a future settlement but also benefit commercially.”[2] Two separate funds would be created from the €300 billion in “the immobilised assets of the Russian Central Bank.”[3] One fund would “finance Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and another [fund] shared by the US and Russia [would] develop ‘joint projects in specific areas’”, with both Russia and the US getting the profits.[4] 

That part of the American-Russian plan for peace directly contradicts the Von der Leyen’s position that Russia should not benefit from having invaded another country in Europe. Absent a strong UN that could have acted so as to remove the Russians from Ukrainian territory (and the Israelis from Gaza), relying on disincentives so Putin (and Netanyahu) and any other officials of other governments would think twice before sending troops out. If Putin’s government is allowed to profit and gain additional territory by invading Ukraine, which the internally-weakened E.U. seemed powerless to prevent in 2025, then the fact that both Putin and Netanyahu “won” at the expense of Ukraine and Gaza even in terms of profits from investments is itself a good argument that a stronger international order was needed to stave off the worst that goes with absolutist national-sovereignty. 

Put another way, with the E.U. hampered by the state-vetoes in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., and with the international organizations such as the UN without any governmental sovereignty whatsoever, a world in which so much harm has been unleased by national governments with utter impunity and even positive reinforcements may need a world federation as Kant advocated. Such a global body would have to be capable militarily of removing an invader and stopping a genocide, rather than merely delivering humanitarian aid to civilians.

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1. Rob Gillies, “US Senators Slam Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Peace Plan as Rewarding Aggression,” AP News.com, November 22, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Backing a Bear into a Corner: Falling Oil Prices Hit Russia Hard

Falling oil prices and economic sanctions in 2014 put the pressure on the Russian economy and its currency. The overall question may have been geo-political, however. Namely, would the twenty-first century see economic tools replace military response as the dominant means to “walk back” international aggressor states and restrict their further exploits? Such a question may be too broad, as even a newly-discovered devise that suddenly works is not likely to be applicable in every case. Even so, obviating war in the nuclear age would be no small feat.

On December 15, 2014, crude oil for February delivery fell $1.82, or 3.2 percent, to settle at $56.26 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange; oil had been as high as $107 the previous June.[1] The increase in American consumers’ disposable income was expected to boost the economy. Additionally, manufacturing output in the previous month “surpassed its prerecession peak as auto production rose.”[2] This proffered an “encouraging sign that America's factories are somewhat insulated from the global economic slowdown.”[3] The U.S. Government could afford to lead its informal coalition, including Saudi Arabia, against the Russian government’s incursions into Ukraine.

The Russian economy was not least among the contributors to the downturn. “Given Russia's huge dependence on oil revenues, the . . . sharp falls in the price of oil has hit the Russian economy hard. That's exacerbated by the fact that the Russian economy [was not at the time] diversified enough to withstand the shock.”[4] In other words, “the drop in crude prices . . . hurt Russia since the country [was at the time] a major oil exporter and [thus depended] heavily on oil for tax revenue.”[5] In refusing to reduce its supply of oil, OPEC was squeezing Russian competitors particularly hard, as well as the Russian government (and that of Iran).

That E.U. and U.S. officials were “contemplating tougher economic sanctions against Moscow” for geo-political reasons centering on Russia’s incursion into Ukraine suggests that the Russian economy might have more to worry about than lower oil prices and a weakening currency.[6] The situation in Ukraine was not getting any better, suggesting that further sanctions could come to pass. The United Nations human rights office had just announced its findings of a "very close link" between the inflow of fighters and sophisticated weaponry, "including from the Russian Federation," and a total breakdown of law and order in eastern Ukraine.[7] According to Gianni Magazzeni, head of the division of the United Nations human rights office that deals with Europe and Central Asia, “the situation around the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, under the control of pro-Russian armed groups,” could be characterized in terms of "killings, abductions, torture, ill treatment, sexual violence, rape, forced labor, ransom, extortion,".[8] Considering that even all of this does not take into account the fate of Crimea, which Russia had invaded and absorbed, the prospect of any sort of overall geopolitical resolution with a let-up on the economic vice-grips on Russia seemed dismal at the time.

The toll on Russia’s currency, the ruble, could not be missed. In its steepest drop in 16 years, the currency sank more than 10 percent to about 64 to the dollar on December 15, 2014.[9] The rise of inflation pressures from more expensive imports had already prompted Russia’s central bank to gradually increase its main interest rate from 5.5 percent early in 2014 to 9.5 percent. On December 11th, the central bank “tried unsuccessfully to stem the ruble's slide by boosting its key rate by 1 percentage point to 10.5 percent. The decision to raise the rate to 17 percent from 10.5 percent on December 15th “represented a desperate attempt to prop up the troubled currency,” according to the Associated Press.[10] Of course, the currency itself was not the real problem. Accordingly, the attempt fell on its face, at least initially. “In the first hours after the increase, the ruble staged a rebound, recovering almost all of its [previous day] losses. But the optimism soon dissipated and the ruble was down another 20 percent to 77 to the dollar by 3.30 p.m. in Moscow (1230GMT).”[11] The next day, FXMC, an online trading company, halted ruble trades—anticipating capital controls on the enervated currency.

Moreover, although the higher interest rate could eventually have a positive impact on the ruble, especially as long as the rates on the E.U. euro and U.S. dollar stay near zero, the higher rate was also “likely to cause much hardship in an economy [that was] already heading for recession.”[12] Americans need only remember Paul Volcker’s rate hikes in 1981 and the subsequent harsh recession to get this point. Indeed, Russian stocks were “moderately declining” on the morning after the rate hike to 17 percent, “with the MICEX benchmark 1.5 percent lower, reflecting the rate hike's pressure on businesses.” [13] Neil Shearing, chief economist for emerging markets at London-based Capital Economics, predicted "a further tightening of credit conditions for households and businesses and a deeper downturn in the real economy in 2015."[14] Such tightening—and Americans need only look back to September 2008 to grasp the seriousness of this move—could easily outweigh any increase in exports from the lower currency.

In conclusion, this case study presents us with an interesting intersection of international relations and international political economy. One major lesson may be that the coordinated economic policies of a coalition of states can effectively replace war as a means of going after governments that are militarily aggressive internationally. Of course, the geo-political and economic strategy is not full-proof, as a hegemon may still be able to get away with such behavior (e.g., the U.S. invading Iraq with impunity). Also, pushing a bear into a corner may have unanticipated consequences both within Russia and in its foreign policy. That is to say, applying such strident pressure, whether financial or militarily, is risky in a nuclear world.

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[1] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling, and So Are the Markets,” The New York Times, December 16, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The Associated Press, “Russia’s Ruble Slides to Historic Lows,” The Huffington Post, December 16, 2014.

[5] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling.”

[6] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Hardships Grow in Ukraine, U.N. Says,” The New York Times, December 16, 2014.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Associated Press, “Oil Still Falling.”

[10] The Associated Press, “Russia’s Ruble Slides.”

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

China’s Increasing International Role: A Historical Departure

Historically, China was isolationist. The Opium Wars in the mid-19^th century is a good illustration of why. From this context, China’s announcements of a series of international trade and finance initiatives by which China would assume a larger leadership role internationally are stunning. Doubtless the enhanced role is in line with China’s geopolitical and economic interests. After all, political realism is hardly a dead theory in the 21^st century. Even so, the impact of the reversal on the culture is significant, and thus worthy of study. Specifically, the traditional mistrust of foreigners is likely to diminish. As it does, the Chinese will be more likely to consider and even advocate for economic and political principles, such as liberty and rights, that are valued elsewhere in the world but not so much in China. The result could be increased political instability. In short, the initiatives timed to coincide with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2014 could eventually weaken the Chinese government’s grip on power.

In the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), relations with non-Chinese peoples were conducted by “a variety of bureaus and agencies that, in different ways, implied or stated the cultural inferiority and geographical marginality of foreigners, while also defending the state against them.”[1] Even though countries such as Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam “shared many of the basic values of Chinese culture,” the emissaries “were expected to make a formal acknowledgement of China’s cultural and political prestige by [using] a language of subservience in diplomatic documents and by making the ritual prostrations (kowtow) before the Chinese emperor in royal audiences. In return, these countries were allowed to conduct a controlled volume of trade with China.”[2] Interestingly, a certain subservience and even inferiority may have been implied at the APEC meeting in Beijing in 2014 to the extent that China held huge quantities of foreign currencies in reserve (which could be used to invest in other economies) and foreign government debt (e.g., U.S. Treasuries). In this sense, China’s enhanced leadership role internationally is in line with the history. Even the taking on of a leadership role implies that the resulting increased trade and foreign economic relations more generally would be controlled in their contours, as the leadership was oriented to designing international economic infrastructure, and no system-design is perfectly neutral.

Just before the APEC meeting, the Chinese government announced a free-trade agreement with South Korea; both the timing of the announcement and the taking of initiative on the agreement imply significant—though not complete—control. Additionally, Chinese regulators “approved a plan to open Chinese stock markets wider to foreign investors by linking exchanges in Hong Kong and Shanghai.”[3] Simply in having a plan, the Chinese government was controlling how foreign investors would relate to the stock exchanges. Put another way, control is implied in having a plan, rather than alternatively watching foreign investors come in do as they will (e.g., speculate by selling-short, thereby trashing even some sound companies). Lastly, the Chinese government announced a $40 billion Chinese-financed fund to improve trade links between Asian economies. The money alone implies control. At the very least, the Chinese would have a big say in how the links are made.

The extent of the Chinese involvement in international economic relations is startling from a historical perspective, but the degree of control implied is not. Historically, the Chinese had good reason to distrust foreign governments. On August 29, 1842, the Chinese signed the British treaty of Nanjing in what is now known as the first opium war. Facing an epidemic of addiction, the Qing government had outlawed trade in the drug. In the treaty, British opium merchants could live and operate in five Chinese cities—Canton, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai. Although only the latter was a boom town, illegal opium would come into China at a rate of at least 20,000 chests a year.[4] Additionally, the island of Hong Kong was to possessed in perpetuity by the British.[5] The United States, France, and a host of other countries also extracted concessions. All told, the Qing “had lost control of vital elements of China’s commercial, social, and foreign policies.”[6] As if this were not enough, the Tianjin treaty in 1858 opened all Chinese ports to British opium traders in spite of the fact that the possession and sale of the narcotic was still illegal under Chinese law. To pressure the Qing into signing the treaty that implied deep disrespect for Chinese law within China, the British burnt down the Yuan Ming Yuan, the exquisite summer palace on October 18, 1860. The Chinese were humiliated at such a disgrace.[7]

Deep scares inexorably become etched in the subterranean contours of a society’s perspective of the world. An insistence or at least a proclivity to control relations with foreign powers naturally goes along with an inner sense of insecurity masked as an insistence to relate only from a position of power—whether it be militarily or in having massive reserves of foreign currencies or debt as assets. What has changed is the extent of China’s interaction with other countries, economically and politically. Ironically, from the controlled design of international economic regimes, increased exchange can be expected—not only of economic goods and services under free trade, but also of ideological principles. In this sense, the Chinese government risks opening China up beyond what that governing party can control.

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1. Jonathon Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2^nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 117.

2. Ibid, p. 118.

3. Joe McDonald and Youkyung Lee, “Asia-Pacific Leaders Agree to Work Toward Possible Adoption of Trade Deal,” The Associated Press, November 11, 2014.

4. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 164.

5. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

6. Ibid., p. 163.

7. Ibid., p. 182.