Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Trump Meets Putin on Ukraine: On the Exclusion of the E.U.

Like proud male birds dancing for a female for the chance to reproduce, U.S. President Trump and Ukraine’s Zelensky engaged in public posturing ahead of the negotiations set to take place between Trump and Vlad the Impaler Putin of Russia in Alaska on August 15, 2025. For the public, to take the postures as real positions, set in stone, would be nothing short of depraved naivete. Missing in action in all this posturing was E.U. President Van der Leyen and the E.U.’s foreign minister. Instead, the governors of two, albeit large, E.U. states were busy making demands as if their respective political bases were more powerful than the E.U. as a whole. In short, Van der Leyen missed an opportunity to join the dance of posturing.

After a virtual meeting with Trump, Zelensky postured by saying, “Putin is bluffing that the sanctions do not work, that they are nothing. In fact, sanctions are hitting the Russian economy hard.”[1] The Ukrainian president added that Putin had not changed his military goal with respect to occupying “the whole of Ukraine.”[2] Meanwhile, Trump was rattling his saber by warning Putin that there would be “very severe consequences” if Putin does not agree to a ceasefire.[3] This warning is sheer posture; no one should assume that Trump was saying what would actually happen, so protests against Trump unleashing World War III would be unfounded and based on a failure to distinguish negotiating posturing from announcing a new policy.

Different from posturing were demands from the governor of a large E.U. state, including that a ceasefire “must be at the very beginning. Later, there may be a framework agreement. Third, . . .”[4] A leader of an E.U. state who was not to be included in the upcoming negotiation between Trump and Putin, whose respective federations are empire-scale and consist of states and regions, respectively, that are themselves the size of E.U. states, was making demands as if that leader were to be a participant in the negotiations, for otherwise to make demands would not make sense; all that could be offered would be suggestions.

As the de facto head of state for the E.U., and de jure president of its executive branch, the European Commission, President Von der Leyen would have had more sway with Trump and Putin were she to have made suggestions; it would have been improper for her as a non-participant to make demands. So E.U. foreign minister Kallas overstepped in stating, “Any deal between the US and Russia must have Ukraine and the EU included.”[5] Even though Kallis’s rationale, that “it is a matter of Ukraine’s and the whole of Europe’s security,”[6] is a valid argument for why the EU rather than a governor of even a large EU state should be included in the negotiations, her demand is but from the sidelines of the playing field on which negotiations take place, and thus her making a demand only shows her weakness as being situated as such. That the E.U. had stood a better chance of edging its way into the Trump-Putin negotiations was undone by state officials jumping in for Von der Leyen in meeting before the negotiations with Trump and by Kallas’s deference to state officials in her own meeting with them. That the E.U. state of Hungary blocked an E.U. foreign policy supporting Ukraine also reflects on the weakness of the E.U. in not having sufficiently resisted opposition by governors to getting rid of the necessity of unanimity on foreign-policy (and other significant) matters at the federal level.

Between the lack of respect for the federal officials by state-level governors and foreign ministers, and the continuing inherent weakness at the points of state involvement in federal institutions, blame for the E.U. being sidelined by Trump and Putin applies at least partially to the Europeans themselves. Merz and Macron should have made way for Von der Leyen stand for the EU being the European to meet vicariously with Trump a few days before the negotiation in Alaska, and the foreign ministers at the state level should have respected the necessary role of consensus, as unanimity is difficult to achieve with 27 states, so Kallas could have made E.U.-wide suggestions for Trump and Putin. There is indeed a very practical cost in world affairs that Europeans pay in refusing to expand qualified majority voting in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., and for not increasing the power of the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens rather than states. Although it would be unwise to cut state involvement off at the federal level as has happened in the U.S., that just one governor can paralyze the E.U. in foreign policy is indication enough that the state governments have too much power at the federal level—much more than is necessary to safeguard the interests of state government from being eclipsed by a much more powerful federal government, as has happened in the U.S., keine Zufall, especially after state governmental institutions ceased appointing U.S. senators to Congress in the early 20th century. The state governments in the E.U. could give up the ghost on the principle of unanimity at the federal level without worrying about unfettered encroachment from the federal institutions. State governments should continue to be represented in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., but on the basis of qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. The result, I contend, would be that the E.U. would be better able to muscle its way into negotiations between the E.U.’s counterparts: The U.S., Russia, and China.



1. Sacha Vakulina, “Putin Is Bluffing,’ Zelenskyy Tells Trump as European Leaders Push for Ukraine Ceasefire,” Euronews.com, August 13, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Sacha Vakulina, Aleksandar Brezar, and Alice Tidey, “Trump Warns of ‘Very Severe Consequences’ for Russia if Putin Does Not Stop War in Ukraine,” Euronews.com, August 13, 2025.
4. Sacha Vakulina, “’Putin Is Bluffing,’ Zelenskyy Tells Trump as European Leaders Push for Ukraine Ceasefire,” Euronews.com, August 13, 2025.
5. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Kallas Calls Snap Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on Ukraine on Monday,” August 10, 2025, italics added.
6. Ibid.

Tuesday, June 17, 2025

On the Role of Federalism in Foreign Policy on Israel and Iran

As U.S. President Trump was drawing a line in the proverbial sand by stating repeatedly that Iran cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons, E.U. foreign commissioner (i.e., minister) Kallas warned the world that military involvement by the U.S. in the military spat going on between Israel and Iran would “definitely drag” the entire Middle East into the conflict.[1] Accordingly, she “made clear the European Union would not back America’s armed intervention.”[2] By the way she came to that public statement, the U.S. could take a lesson in how to optimally utilize federalism such that all of its parts shine, rather than just those at the federal level.

The E.U.’s foreign minister made her public statement after having hosted a video conference with state officials—one from each state government—who could represent their respective states in affairs beyond the E.U. She had also called her U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Rubio, who “emphasized that it’s also not in their interest to be drawn into this conflict.”[3] Any daylight between Rubio’s position, that of the U.S. National Security Director, and President Trump is not relevant here; rather, that Kallas reached out not only to her counterpart in the U.S., but also to state officials in the E.U. can illustrate how federalism can be utilized in the formulation of a foreign policy in a federal system of public governance. Instead of being left out entirely, the E.U. state governments played a role without eclipsing Kallas’ role in the E.U. speaking with one voice. Even if some state officials in the meeting objected to the federal foreign minister’s statement, discerning a consensus would be sufficient for Kallas in her role. As a result, the E.U. could enjoy the benefits abroad from speaking with one voice.

In cases in which consensus on an issue does not exist, and some state officials are at loggerheads, Kallas could simply have abstained from commenting because the E.U. would not speak with one voice. Qualifying this quietism, however, is the condition in which the E.U. has an important strategic geopolitical or economic interest in an issue in foreign affairs and the interest of the E.U. should outweigh the lack of consensus at the state level, for the union is more than the aggregate of the political units (i.e., states) within the union. This judgment too should rest with Kallas in her capacity as a federal official.

A risk in involving officials from each of the 27 states regards any one of them exceeding one’s role as a state official by speaking unilaterally for the union publicly. Kallas should thus have the authority to restrict such pronouncements for the good of the union. A benefit of holding a meeting with the state officials is that after a consensus has been discerned, Kallas could ask them for some analysis of the international problem. Once benefit of federalism is that a federal official can draw on the expertise of relevant state officials, both in the politics and in geopolitical analysis as foreign-policy experts.

For example, Kallas stated that no one would benefit from a widening of the conflict in the Middle East. This point may not be true. The plight of the Gaza residents under the thumb of the Israeli army at the time could benefit from Arab countries entering the fray because their armies could possibly assume control of Gaza to feed and protect its residents. Put another way, the genocide was so one-sided (it could hardly be called a war) that were the U.S. to engage militarily against Iran, other Muslim countries could also become engaged and, as a byproduct, provide some balance in favor of the Palestinians in Gaza. That the E.U. was arguably more pro-Gaza than the U.S. was at the time may have meant that Kallas had a political incentive to suggest to the Arab governments in the Middle East that they could possibly take advantage of U.S. involvement against Iran to step in themselves on behalf of Gaza. If the U.S. Government had been paying brides to Arab countries (or to key officials therein) to keep them from intervening militarily in Gaza, the military involvement of the U.S. against Iran could be a game-changer, in effect forcing the hands of the Arab states to take action even if it means less U.S. money. State officials meeting with Kallas could perhaps have supplied her and each other with such analysis that in turn could have improved the substance of her public statement in terms of any impact on the players and spectators in the Middle East.

Kallas’ consultations both abroad and with relevant state officials can be viewed as a strategic competitive advantage of the E.U. over the U.S. because American federal appointees have not been in the practice of consulting with state officials who may have expertise in foreign policy and could relay and reflect foreign-affairs positions of their respective states. As commander-in-chief of an army, the head of state of a U.S. state should include foreign affairs in campaigning for office, as well as in serving in office. The chief executive and head of state of Texas, for example, is the regular commander-in-chief of the Texas National Guard. Lest such an army be relegated as insignificant, California’s Newsom raised hell when the federal president of the union, Donald Trump, officially borrowed California’s army to engage against protesters in Los Angeles in June, 2025.

In short, Kallas’ utilization of the E.U. federal system may be more optimal than Rubio’s utilization of only federal officials in the U.S. on foreign policy, such that the latter could take a lesson from the former on how to optimize federalism in foreign policy by more fully engaging more of the parts of the system. To be sure, the involvement of state officials risks state governments diverging publicly from a federal policy and thus undercutting it. But such a tension is part of federalism. Being able to speak with one united voice yet while accommodating the differences that naturally exist within an empire-scale union is not cost- or risk-free, but I submit that federalism is the best system for such unions, which in scale and qualities are distinct from (early modern) kingdom-level states that have their own federal systems. The heterogeneity of culture and ideology within an empire-scale federal union dwarfs such differences that exist within a state thereof. Federalism is thus more of a benefit to the former than the latter.



1. Jorge Liboreiro, “US Action Against Iran Would Fuel ‘Broader Conflict” in the Middle East, Kallas Warns,” Euronews.com, June 17, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Monday, April 7, 2025

Tariffs as a Negotiating Tactic: Undercut by Wall Street Expediency

With all the economic and political turmoil from the anticipated American tariffs, it may be tempting, especially for financially-oriented CEOs and billionaires looking at quarterly reports, to call the whole thing off even though doing so would deflate the American attempt to renegotiate trade bilaterally with other countries. The concerns of the wealthy, whether corporations or individuals, have their place, but arguably should not be allowed to "lead the proverbial dog from behind, lest the dog run in circles and get nowhere." Moreover, the notion that any goal that is difficult and takes some time to materialize can or even should be vetoed by momentary passions at the outset is problematic and short-sighted. That U.S. President Trump's announcement of bilateral tariffs quickly brought fifty countries to the negotiating table is significant as a good sign for the United States, as long as that country's powerful business plutocracy (i.e., private concentrations of wealth that seek to govern) can be kept from vetoing the emergent trade policy, which at least in part is oriented to trade negotiation and ultimately to the notion that fair trade is conducive to increased free trade. 

As of 3:10 pm (CET) on April 7, 2025, the Euro STOXX 50 was down 5.27 percent, and the STOXX 600 lost 5.15 percent of its value. “The bloodbath is in full swing, and that’s exactly what you see when you look at the European markets. There is no safe haven; equity markets have entered a complete free-fall with no clear bottom in sight,” according to Zaye Capital Markets.[1] Meanwhile, the Dow Jones opened down 3.2 percent.[2] “The sheer volatility was enough to spook CEOs on that rainy Monday in New York. The Dow “briefly erased a morning loss of 1,700 points, shot up more than 800 points, then went back to a loss of 629 points.”[3] The S&P 500 “likewise made sudden up-and-down lurching movements”.[4]

U.S. President Trump had “announced a 20% across-the-board tariff on imports from the European Union, set to take effect on 9 April,” with steel, aluminum and cars being subject to a separate 25% rate; over all, over €380 billion in E.U.-made products could be affected.[5]

In that uneasy context, I contend that two markers are worthy of attention, only one of which is arguably productive.  E.U. President von der Leyen proposed to her counterpart, U.S. President Trump, that both unions cut their respective tariffs to zero; essentially, there would be a free-trade agreement on industrial goods. Just such an overture is in line with President’s intent that other countries get rid of their unfair trading practices, which, the president believed, had aggravated the U.S. trade deficits for decades. In this regard, President von der Leyen’s proposal can be viewed as an overture, which could lead to a counter-proposal that not only tariffs, but also non-tariff barriers of the E.U. be removed (or that the E.U. compensate the U.S. for those annually).

Adam Smith’s ideal of competitive free-trade rather than mercantilism presupposes trade that is free even of non-tariff barriers so comparative advantage can be a major factor in international trade. To be sure, national-security concerns are arguably legitimate constraints on Smith’s ideal of competitive advantage. Being dependent on China for computer chips would be risky for both the E.U. and U.S. because China could hold either or both unions hostage as Taiwan is invaded by China with impunity.

So von der Leyen’s response was in “the right direction,” if free and fair trade was among Trump’s goals in unilaterally imposing tariffs—that is to say, to the extent that the announcement of tariffs was geared to triggering real negotiations.

That the billionaire hedge fund manager, Bill Ackman, a supporter of President Trump, just one day earlier, had “urged the president to pause his sweeping new tariffs, warning they could economically devastate America if implemented, as planned,” can be likened to a driver unilaterally letting some air out of his own car’s tires just before a race.[vi] Ackman may have been rich, but his intelligence was lacking in his assumption that the tariffs would be permanent even though fifty governments were already willing to negotiate on trade with the American government. Also, his understanding of negotiation could have used a spare tire.

It is one thing for a republic to be an open society, and quite another for a dog to be led by its own tail, meaning for the U.S. Government to be led by greedy and short-sighted finance managers and CEOs of even major corporations. The enlightened self-interest of whom would be focused on the wealth that could be obtained from fewer trading obstacles in other countries, for the money that an American-based (and owned) company can possibly be made on exports from the U.S. is hardly nugatory. The capture of legislative and regulatory bodies by private companies and billionaires is a danger not only to democracy itself, but also to a country’s pursuit of its long-term strategic interests globally. A dog that is led by its hungry tail doesn’t get very far, and an argument can be made that such a dog doesn’t deserve to get very far, for weakness within a polity is hardly laudatory. Put another way, that elected offices in a republic have terms of years rather than, say, just a few months, is an important impediment to short-term passions in society seeking to get their way in policy. Sometimes long-term goals require momentary sacrifice even if the measures are erroneously assumed to be permanent rather than negotiating tactics.


1. Angela Barnes, “European Markets Dive as Global Tariff Fears Shake Investor Confidence,” Euronews.com, April 7, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. The Associated Press, “Stocks Are Making Wild Swings as Markets Assess the Damage from Trump’s Trade War,” Apnews.com, April 7, 2025.
4. Ibid.
5. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen Offers Trump ‘Zero-For-Zero’ Tariffs Deal on All Industrial Goods,” Euronews.com, April 7, 2025.
6. Lee Moran, “Billionaire Trump Backer Warns America of ‘Self-Induced Economic Nuclear Winter.” The Huffington Post, April 7, 2025.

Saturday, March 15, 2025

On the E.U.'s Initiative for Ukraine

In March, 2025 after the U.S. had direct talks with Russia on ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the E.U. stepped up its game in helping Ukraine militarily. This was also in the context of a trade war between the E.U. and U.S., which did not make transatlantic relations any better. The E.U.’s increasing emphasis on military aid to Ukraine and the related publicity inadvertently showcased how federalism could be applied to defense and foreign policy differently that it has in the U.S., wherein the member states are excluded, since the Articles of Confederation, when the member states were sovereign within the U.S. confederation. Although both manifestations of early-modern federalism have their respective benefits and risks, I contend that the E.U.’s application of federalism to the two governmental domains of power is more in the spirit of (dual-sovereignty) federalism, even though serious vulnerabilities can be identified.


The full essay is at "The E.U. and U.S. on Defense and Foreign Policy."

Saturday, March 1, 2025

On the Impact of Personalities on Diplomacy: The Case of Trump and Zelensky

One of the many advantages that democracy has over autocracy (i.e., dictatorship) is that the dispersion of political power among elected representatives and even between branches of government (i.e., checks and balances) reduces the impact that one personality can have on diplomacy. Even in a republic in which power is concentrated in a president or prime minister, one personality can matter. Given the foibles of human psychology, the risks associated with a volatile personality “at the top” in a nuclear age are significant. Kant’s advocacy of a world federation includes a caveat that world peace would only be possible rather than probable. Given the probability of anger and associated cognitive lapses in even an elected president or prime minister, a world order premised on absolute national sovereignty is itself risky; hence the value of a semi-sovereign world federation with enforcement authority. The impromptu press conference between U.S. President Trump and Ukraine’s President Zelensky on February 28, 2025 demonstrates the risks in countries being in a Hobbesian state of nature (i.e., not checked by any authority above them).

In the Oval Office at the White House, “a remarkable scene was unfolding. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance had begun berating their guest, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a hitherto unseen public implosion of a key global relationship.”[1] The implosion was between two people—the two presidents—rather than of the alliance itself, but the former was indeed capable of impacting the latter. Put another way, two people, rather than two countries, were arguing. “The state is moi” is not a relation of identity in a republic. That it was a host who was shouting and berating a guest went largely unnoticed in the press, in part because the host was on the offensive in pivoting from an (orchestrated?) question from a journalist; his question contained the insult that Zelensky’s wearing of his military uniform in the sacred Oval Office was disrespectful even though Elon Musk had worn t-shirts there even that month. Unlike Musk, Zelensky was at war—one caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Showing visual comradery with generals and troops by wearing a uniform is laudatory rather than indicative of an intent to disrespect other presidents. Ironically, Trump had installed flags of all of the U.S. military branches in the Oval Office.

In short, the Ukrainian president may have unwittingly walked into a pre-arranged “turkey shoot.” That Trump had his counterpart thrown out of the White House—the invitation to lunch notwithstanding—evinces not only anger, but sheer rudeness in place of hospitality. That such human foibles could upend a deal between two countries even though one stood to gain access to rare earth-minerals with commercial applications and the other country was in dire need of a third-party to broker an end to the devastating war. The political philosophy of international business, wherein commercial interests reduce the likelihood of war, was implicitly reputed as Trump shouted accusations at his guest.

What enraged Trump was Zelensky’s claim that if the U.S. (and the E.U.) don’t stand up to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia would not stop with that country. As in the case of World War II, an ocean could not keep the U.S. out of war as Hitler was invading countries. That Zelensky had a valid point was utterly missed by the angered American president. Adding insult to injury, Trump refused to let his guest speak, and Vice President Vance accused Zelensky of being ungrateful, even though the president had thanked America for its military aid on several occasions.[2] Any implicit disrespect in Zelensky’s military garb in the Oval Office was more than made up for by the dignity of that president in constraining himself from insulting Trump and Vance. In contrast, it was Vance’s rudeness and Trump’s verbal hostility toward a guest that were below the dignity of the American presidency and the sacred room.

Zelensky’s point that American could eventually be drawn into another European war is valid—this point should be made perfectly clear. It was not Zelensky who was risking another world war; rather, it was Trump’s lack of emotional self-control that made such an event more likely, for Trump’s rash cancelation of the agreement for U.S. military and diplomatic help in exchange for access to rare earth-minerals in Ukraine made it more likely that Russia would absorb the Ukraine militarily and perhaps then go into the Baltic states and perhaps even Poland. It was Hitler’s invasion of Poland that brought Britain into war with Germany, and that in turn involved the U.S. militarily in its lend-lease agreement with Britain. Trump did not grasp this point that Zelensky was making, and this cognitive lapse in turn triggered Trump’s temper. This is precisely why a world-order founded on absolute national sovereignty is dangerous.

As titillating as a brawl is to watch, I contend that a wise electorate looks beyond such flash-points to keep one eye on fundamental implications. The structure and foundation of the world order was vulnerable to rash personality conflicts between presidents of sovereign countries even in the context of war, especially since post-World War II institutions such as the UN were waning given their lack of enforcement authority. Fortunately, the world was shifting off of the bi-polar hegemony of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, and it was not lost on the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, who wrote on the day of the brawl, “Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”[3] She even reminded the world that Russia, not Ukraine, was the aggressor, as Trump implicitly contracted this point in accusing Zelensky of risking World War III by not being grateful. A world order in which the U.S. is the world’s “police department” was, fortunately, becoming antiquated, for, given President Trump’s lack of emotional self-control, such a unipolar structure with the U.S. at the hub was indeed dangerous, given the impact that personalities can have on diplomacy.



1. Kevin Liptak and Jeff Zeleny,”Inside the 139 Minutes that Upended the US-Ukraine Alliance,” CNN.com, March 1, 2025, italics added.
2. Daniel Dale, “Fact Check: 33 Times Zelensky Thanked Americans and US Leaders,” CNN.com, February 28, 2025.
3. Malek Fouda, “European Leaders Unite Behind Ukraine Following Trump-Zelenskyy Confrontation,” Euronews, February 28, 2025.

Friday, November 15, 2024

Why a Stronger E.U. Is Needed in International Affairs

As 2023 and the following year made clear, the world still faced additional challenges in rebuffing incursions that violate human rights, including crimes against humanity. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s military incursion into Gaza both demonstrate how easy it had become, especially with advanced military technology, to kill civilians so as to decimate an entire population so the land could be filled with the people of the aggressors. If this sounds like Hitler’s policy to make room for the German people in Eastern Europe, you are not far from touching on the real motives behind the aggression. It would be a pity were such motives to become the norm while the world looks on. I contend that the U.S. enabling of Israel has unwittingly contributed to the establishment of such a norm, and that therefore a stronger E.U. was needed not only domestically, but also internationally, as a counter-weight in defense of the human rights of civilians in Gaza.

UNRWA Gaza director Scott Anderson, speaking on the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza as of November, 2024, said, “We haven’t been able to get food to those people for over a month. If we don’t do something quickly, it could devolve into a full-blown famine, which would be a manmade condition and something that could easily be corrected if we just get enough aid in to take care of everybody.”[1] The key here is the word, manmade, for as officials in the Israeli government had been openly admitted, including the president, everyone in Gaza is culpable and thus deserves to suffer the consequences. Ironically, as the case of Nazi Germany demonstrates, it is very easy to go from the supposition that a certain people is subhuman to the sordid instinctual urge to exterminate the group. The “meta-premise” is that identity-politics by group is valid and based on ontological rather than merely cultural differences.

A month earlier, the “Famine Review Committee [had] called the situation in the north of the Strip ‘extremely grave and rapidly deteriorating’ and said all actors in the war much take immediate action ‘within days not weeks’ to avert a humanitarian disaster.”[2] During that month, the amount of aid entering Gaza dropped dramatically due to yet another offensive by Israel’s military in the north of Gaza.[3] “By the end of October, an average of just 71 trucks a day were entering Gaza,” whose population at the time was over a million.[4]

Anderson’s assessment in mid-November suggests that his demand had not been heeded, especially by Israel, but also, and this is important, by its strongest ally, the United States. Even though less than a week before the U.S. presidential election, the Biden administration “accused Israel of ‘not doing enough’ to answer international concerns over indiscriminate strikes on Gaza,” which in turn was a factor in the reduction of food-aid getting into Gaza, “Israel’s military chief . . . said the Israel Force needs to be larger, as the war expands to different fronts.”[5] U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said of the Israeli government officials, “They are not doing enough to get us the answers that we have requested.”[6] Of course, the token U.S. resistance to Israel did not win Michigan for Harris, as Arabs in Grand Rapids did not take the bait.

A few weeks after the U.S. presidential election, the Biden administration declared that Israel was not violating U.S. law after all in terms of killing and limiting food-aid to the residents, who by then were almost all displaced, and thus homeless, of Gaza. Back in May, the administration had said “that Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in Gaza likely violated international humanitarian law.”[7] Of course, the administration provided for itself a caveat that would enable a reversal after the election: Wartime “conditions prevented U.S. officials from” collecting enough evidence to go beyond stating that Israel likely violated international humanitarian law, which, by the way, would mean that Israel had been violating U.S. law too. Even at the time, the media noticed that “the caveat that the administration wasn’t able to link specific U.S. weapons to individual attacks by Israeli forces in Gaza could give the administration leeway in any future decision on whether to restrict provisions of offensive weapons to Israel.”[8] In November, 2024, after the election, the Biden administration stated that the U.S. would continue to supply Israel with weapons. Exactly a week after the election, the administration announced “that it would not without weapon shipments to Israel,” even though the “30-day deadline” for Israel to “significantly alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza [had] expired.”[9] U.S. State Department spokesmn Vedant Patel said that Israel had not violated the U.S. law that “bars offensive weapons from being transferred to countries that block aid from reaching civilians.”[10] A report written by aid groups and requested by the Biden administration “determined that Israel had failed to meet the vast majority of the requirements laid out by” the administration—Israel having failed to comply with fifteen of the 19 measures that the U.S. had indicated must be met to avoid a delay in weapons shipments, and yet the administration announced that the U.S. would continue to ship weapons to Israel.[11] That this occurred just after the election is relevant, as this strongly suggests that the strategy was based on domestic U.S. politics—namely, trying to get as many votes as possible for Harris from Muslim Americans.

It is also significant that on the very same day, Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, “proposed formally to suspend political dialogue with Israel over the country’s alleged violations of human rights and international law in the Gaza Strip.”[12] Unlike the U.S., the E.U. was not politically beholden to AIPAC, the American Israeli Political Action Committee. Even by the report that the Biden administration had requested, the Israeli government had been violating humanitarian law by restricting humanitarian aid into Gaza, perhaps to rid the Strip of its remaining population as the final solution. The world needed an active E.U. with sufficient competencies (i.e., enumerated powers delegated to the E.U. by the states) to stand against U.S. policy in defense of humanitarian law—even that which had been enshrined in U.S. law! Especially with Russia invading Ukraine with many civilian casualties there, the world very much needed a world-power, which the E.U. could be, to push back on violators.

Clearly, the world could not count on the allies of violators, such as China and North Korea in the case of Russia, and the U.S. in the case of Israel; in fact, those allies went beyond merely standing quietly by to actively enable the aggressors. With regard to Muslims, I suspect that the U.S. Government was still too oriented to redressing the attack that took place on September 11, 2001, to accurately and fairly even perceive the one-sided over-kill being committed by Israel in Gaza.

The Israeli government’s perception was biased, which is why John Locke argued that government should exist to impartially judge cases of injury because victims tend to exact too much punishment by being swayed by emotion (hatred). Following Locke, Adam Smith wrote that the administration of justice should be “exact,” meaning not disproportional, and “equal and impartial.”[13] Victims who have been injured are in no position to determine and dispense justice in such a matter; hence the need for government. But what if governments are themselves the victims?

Holding onto resentment more than twenty years after the Muslim attack on the World Trade Tower in New York City may explain why the Biden administration was tacitly going along with Israel’s excessive “pay-back,” also known as punishment-as-vengeance, against the civilians residing in Gaza. Even allies should not be entrusted with being able to reasonably assess and contribute to punishment. Israel had been woefully excessive in inflicting suffering on the civilians in Gaza, acting with impunity in part because the E.U.’s states had not transferred enough sovereignty to the union in foreign policy and defense for the E.U. to be able to act as a counterweight to the United States.

It is dangerous when a sovereign country, such as Israel, can act with the presumption of de facto impunity internationally. That the rest of the world had not acted with sufficient force to arrest Israel’s aggression and deflate the sense of impunity suggests that if the UN could not be given real power, at least the European Union should be strengthened at the federal level. More to the point, the delusion that the E.U. is but an international organization or alliance and thus should not be given more power by its states has cost not only the E.U., but also the world. 



1. Stefan Grobe, “UNRWA: Risk of Famine in Gaza without Swift Action,” Euronews.com, November 15, 2024.
2. Euronews, “UN Warns Famine Is ‘Imminent’ in Northern Gaza as Israel Siege Continues,” Euronews.com, September 11, 2024.
3. Euronews, “14 Killed in Israeli Strike on UNRWA School Used as Shelter for Displaced Gazans,” Euronews.com, August 11, 2024.
4. Ibid.
5. Euronews, “US Accuses Israel of ‘Not Doing Enough’ to Address Concerns over Strikes in Gaza,” Euronews.com, October 31, 2024.
6. Ibid.
7. Ellen Knickmeyer, Aamer Madhani, and Matthew Lee, “US Says Israel’s Use of US Arms Likely Violated International Law, but Evidence Is Incomplete,” The Associated Press, May 11, 2024.
8. Ibid.
9. Jacob Magid, “US Says It Won’t Withhold Weapons to Israel, as Deadline to Address AidCrisis Passes,” The Times of Israel, November 13, 2024.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Shona Murray and Jorge Liboreiro, “Borrell Proposes to Suspend E.U.-Israel Political Talks over Gaza War,” Euronews.com, November 13, 2024.
13. Peter Minowitz, Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith’s Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 38. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), V. i. b. 1, 15, and 25.


Monday, May 27, 2024

Euroskeptic Federalism: Obstructing the E.U.'s Recognition of Palestine

Just because U.S. federalism deposits foreign policy exclusively with governmental institutions at the federal level does not mean that that domain cannot be shared between state and federal governments in a federal system. This was precisely the case in the E.U. as it struggled to come up with a unified response to Israel having ignored the verdict of the World Court—the UN’s court—ordering Israel to cease and decease from invading Rafah from May 24, 2024 onward. Meanwhile, two of the E.U.’s states were poised to recognize Palestine. Such emphasis on the state governments playing the leading role is fraught with difficulties even though in theory there is on reason why foreign policy cannot be a competency, or domain, that is shared at the state and federal “levels.” In federalism, the federal and state governmental systems are on par, rather than one of the governmental systems being above the other, so “levels” is misleading. Even so, a lot can be said for delegating foreign policy to the federal level. This can be seen from the state and federal reactions in the E.U. as Israel continued its invasion of Rafah just after the World Court had ruled that Israel would be violating international law and the UN’s charter in continuing the offensive.

Two E.U. states, Ireland and Spain, were poised to recognize Palestine as a sovereign country—34,000 dead and 800,000 on the brink of starvation in Rafah had in the judgment of the two E.U. state governments paid sufficient dues to be recognized as a distinct nation rather than as a part of Israel. Rather than urging the European Council to meet to take a decision on a federal policy on Israel as it ignored the verdict of the World Court and even bombed a Palestinian re-settlement camp, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Josep Borrell, merely “threw his full weight to support the International Criminal Court,” whose prosecutor was “seeking an arrest warrant against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu” and Israel’s defense chief.[1] Borrell didn’t even mention the verdict of the UN’s court ordering Israel to cease its invasion of Rafah. Even so, Borrell’s criticism of the Israeli vitriol against the prosecutor may be sufficient to justify a federal response to Israel, especially considering its bombing of the resettlement camp. “The prosecutor of the [ICC] has been strongly intimidated and accused of antisemitism—as always when anybody, anyone does something that Netanyahu’s government does not like,” Borrell said.[2] Israel’s foreign policy chief even accused the government of Spain of continuing the Inquisition and even with “rewarding terror” in recognizing the Palestinian state.[3]

The accusation of “rewarding terror,” which alludes to the anti-occupation guerilla operation of Hamas on October 7, 2023, blatantly ignores the terror inflicted subsequently by Israel mainly on Palestinian civilians in Gaza that went well beyond the number of Israelis killed and taken hostage in October. The implication is that Israel had the right to inflict “collective justice” on an entire population many times over, and thus that any resistance internationally could only be borne of prejudice against Jews and an intention to reward Hamas for its October incursion. Were John Locke, a European philosopher of the seventeenth century, alive, he would doubtless tell the world, Look, I told you that a victim should not be entrusted with carrying out its notion of justice on a victimizer. I would add that the victimizer in this case had long been the victim because of the Israeli occupation of Gaza (and the West Bank). The E.U. could at least have taken a stance against Israel’s infliction of its warped notion of reciprocity, rather than leaving it to the state governments.

At this point, I need to get very precise to convey the depth of the sordid mentality that I contend calls out for both federal and state condemnation in the E.U. On May 24, 2024, the UN’s top court ordered: “Israel must immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in Rafah which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”[4] Months before, Michael Fakhri, the UN’s leading expert on food, had warned that Israel was intentionally starving Palestinians in Gaza by restricting aid even after the International Court of Justice had ruled that Israel could not do so. “Intentionally depriving people of food is clearly a war crime,” Fakhri said in February, 2024; “Israel has announced its intention to destroy the Palestinian people, in whole or in part, simply for being Palestinian.”[5] The Human Rights Watch organization had reported in December, 2023 that several Israeli cabinet ministers had made statements in public “expressing their aim to deprive civilians in Gaza of food, water, and fuel.”[6] Back in October after Hama’s attack, the president of Israel had publicly stated that every resident of Gaza could justifiably be blamed for the incursion. John Locke was right: given human nature, victims should not be allowed to enact their own sense of justice. In ignoring two rulings of the UN’s top court, the Israeli government demonstrates that Locke’s political theory can (and should) be extended to the international level.

Two degrees of separation exist between the ruling of the International Court of Justice on May 24, 2024 and Israel’s bombing of a resettlement camp just days later. “Footage obtained by CNN showed the camp in flames, with scores of men, women and children frantically trying to find cover from the nighttime assault. Burned bodies, including those of children, could be seen being pulled by rescuers from the wreckage.”[7] It should be stressed that the camp was for residents who had already been displaced. Literally, there was no where for the people already displaced to go. Because the attack, made incidentally without warning, occurred in clear violation of the UN court’s recent verdict—and the Israeli ambassador to the UN had just a week or so earlier shredded a copy of the UN charter at the podium of the General Assembly—the very validity of the UN itself and especially its court could not have suffered a more blatant defeat. The very notion of international law without an enforcement power had been reduced to being an oxymoron.

Just because U.S. federalism deposits foreign policy exclusively with governmental institutions at the federal level does not mean that that domain cannot be shared between state and federal governments in a federal system. This was precisely the case in the E.U. as it struggled to come up with a unified response to Israel having ignored the verdict of the World Court—the UN’s court—ordering Israel to cease and decease from invading Rafah from May 24, 2024 onward. Meanwhile, two of the E.U.’s states were poised to recognize Palestine. Such emphasis on the state governments playing the leading role is fraught with difficulties even though in theory there is on reason why foreign policy cannot be a competency, or domain, that is shared at the state and federal “levels.” In federalism, the federal and state governmental systems are on par, rather than one of the governmental systems being above the other, so “levels” is misleading. Even so, a lot can be said for delegating foreign policy to the federal level. This can be seen from the state and federal reactions in the E.U. as Israel continued its invasion of Rafah just after the World Court had ruled that Israel would be violating international law and the UN’s charter in continuing the offensive.

Two E.U. states, Ireland and Spain, were poised to recognize Palestine as a sovereign country—34,000 dead and 800,000 on the brink of starvation in Rafah had in the judgment of the two E.U. state governments paid sufficient dues to be recognized as a distinct nation rather than as a part of Israel. Rather than urging the European Council to meet to take a decision on a federal policy on Israel as it ignored the verdict of the World Court and even bombed a Palestinian re-settlement camp, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Josep Borrell, merely “threw his full weight to support the International Criminal Court,” whose prosecutor was “seeking an arrest warrant against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu” and Israel’s defense chief.[8] Borrell didn’t even mention the verdict of the UN’s court ordering Israel to cease its invasion of Rafah. Even so, Borrell’s criticism of the Israeli vitriol against the prosecutor may be sufficient to justify a federal response to Israel, especially considering its bombing of the resettlement camp. “The prosecutor of the [ICC] has been strongly intimidated and accused of antisemitism—as always when anybody, anyone does something that Netanyahu’s government does not like,” Borrell said.[9] Israel’s foreign policy chief even accused the government of Spain of continuing the Inquisition and even with “rewarding terror” in recognizing the Palestinian state.[10]

The accusation of “rewarding terror,” which alludes to the anti-occupation guerilla operation of Hamas on October 7, 2023, blatantly ignores the terror inflicted subsequently by Israel mainly on Palestinian civilians in Gaza that went well beyond the number of Israelis killed and taken hostage in October. The implication is that Israel had the right to inflict “collective justice” on an entire population many times over, and thus that any resistance internationally could only be borne of prejudice against Jews and an intention to reward Hamas for its October incursion. Were John Locke, a European philosopher of the seventeenth century, alive, he would doubtless tell the world, Look, I told you that a victim should not be entrusted with carrying out its notion of justice on a victimizer. I would add that the victimizer in this case had long been the victim because of the Israeli occupation of Gaza (and the West Bank). The E.U. could at least have taken a stance against Israel’s infliction of its warped notion of reciprocity, rather than leaving it to the state governments.

At this point, I need to get very precise to convey the depth of the sordid mentality that I contend calls out for both federal and state condemnation in the E.U. On May 24, 2024, the UN’s top court ordered: “Israel must immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in Rafah which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”[11] Months before, Michael Fakhri, the UN’s leading expert on food, had warned that Israel was intentionally starving Palestinians in Gaza by restricting aid even after the International Court of Justice had ruled that Israel could not do so. “Intentionally depriving people of food is clearly a war crime,” Fakhri said in February, 2024; “Israel has announced its intention to destroy the Palestinian people, in whole or in part, simply for being Palestinian.”[12] The Human Rights Watch organization had reported in December, 2023 that several Israeli cabinet ministers had made statements in public “expressing their aim to deprive civilians in Gaza of food, water, and fuel.”[13] Back in October after Hama’s attack, the president of Israel had publicly stated that every resident of Gaza could justifiably be blamed for the incursion. John Locke was right: given human nature, victims should not be allowed to enact their own sense of justice. In ignoring two rulings of the UN’s top court, the Israeli government demonstrates that Locke’s political theory can (and should) be extended to the international level.

Two degrees of separation exist between the ruling of the International Court of Justice on May 24, 2024 and Israel’s bombing of a resettlement camp just days later. “Footage obtained by CNN showed the camp in flames, with scores of men, women and children frantically trying to find cover from the nighttime assault. Burned bodies, including those of children, could be seen being pulled by rescuers from the wreckage.”[14] It should be stressed that the camp was for residents who had already been displaced. Literally, there was nowhere for the people already displaced to go. Because the attack, made incidentally without warning, occurred in clear violation of the UN court’s recent verdict—and the Israeli ambassador to the UN had just a week or so earlier shredded a copy of the UN charter at the podium of the General Assembly—the very validity of the UN itself and especially its court could not have suffered a more blatant defeat. The very notion of international law without an enforcement power had been reduced to being an oxymoron.

Meanwhile, the E.U. was hamstrung at the federal “level,” thus leaving it to a few state governments to take the heat from Israel—vitriol that itself could be characterized as reverse-prejudice. In no way, form, or manner could objections to Israel’s warped notion of collective “justice” and its abject dismissal of the two verdicts of the UN’s top court be characterized as anything akin to the Nazi prejudice against the Jews. Accordingly, the moral impetus of the German government to defend Israel had been paid in full and so even that state could act salubriously in recognizing a Palestinian state and castigating Israel’s government as an ongoing instance of state-sponsored terror. German guilt no longer needed to forestall a federal E.U. policy, and the stakes in terms of the severity of the Israeli government’s dangerous mentality practically demanded such a policy. For the E.U. could hardly count on the U.S. to be the world’s “policeman”; the Biden administration and the Congress had squandered that role in aiding and abetting Israel’s overkill. The U.S. president’s claim that prosecution of Netanyahu at the ICC would be “outrageous” is startling enough; Netanyahu’s need to one-up the president by claiming that such prosecution would be “beyond outrageous” just shows how right Locke was. The world should have the means to enforce international law against a government that is out of control, whose self-awareness is so abjectly warped in defensiveness, and such a government’s ally should by no means be tasked internationally with being the world’s policeman just because it carries a big stick. Indeed, the U.S. was enervating international law by shipping weapons to Israel and thus enabling a bruised bully on the world stage, thanks to the campaign war-chest of the AIPAC (American Israeli Political Action Committee) and the unprincipled fecklessness of the American federal government and the vast majority of its electorate. Clearly, the E.U. could no longer count on the U.S. to police the world, for the “policeman” had become an accomplice.

In short, if even such atrocious behavior as regard the International Court of Justice and the civilians in Gaza as Israel’s Netanyahu and his government relentlessly evinced with utter impunity could not bring forth a foreign policy at the federal level of the E.U., then something must surely have been wrong regarding the ability of the E.U. to have foreign policy at all. Making such policy too difficult at the federal level risks Europe being torn asunder by a foreign evil when it can be claimed that the E.U. has a moral imperative to act as the “adult in the room” to stop an evil power abroad, especially given the fecklessness of international law and courts at the time.  


1. Raf Casert, “E.U. Ties with Israel Nosedive Ahead of Spain, Ireland Recognizing Palestinian State,” The Huffington Post, May 27, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Abbas Al Lawati, “UN’s Top Court Orders Israel to ‘Immediately’ Halt Its Operation in Rafah,” CNN.com, May 24, 2024 (accessed on May 27, 2024).
5. Nina Lakhani, “Israel Is Deliberately Starving Palestinians, UN Rights Expert Says,” The Guardian, February 27, 2024.
6. Israel: Starvation Used as Weapon of War in Gaza,” Human Rights Watch, December 18, 2023.
7. Mohammad Al Sawalhi et al, “Israeli Strike that Killed 45 at Camp for Displaced Palestinians in Rafah a ‘Tragic Mistake,’ Netanyahu Says,” CNN.com, May 27, 2024.
8.Raf Casert, “E.U. Ties with Israel Nosedive Ahead of Spain, Ireland Recognizing Palestinian State,” The Huffington Post, May 27, 2024.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11.Abbas Al Lawati, “UN’s Top Court Orders Israel to ‘Immediately’ Halt Its Operation in Rafah,” CNN.com, May 24, 2024 (accessed on May 27, 2024).
12. Nina Lakhani, “Israel Is Deliberately Starving Palestinians, UN Rights Expert Says,” The Guardian, February 27, 2024.
13. “Israel: Starvation Used as Weapon of War in Gaza,” Human Rights Watch, December 18, 2023.

Wednesday, October 9, 2019

The U.S. Enabled Turkey to Invade Syria: Absent the U.N.

Turkey invaded Syria on October 9, 2019 “to flush Kurds allied with the US out of northeastern Syria.”[1] Strategically, Turkey wanted to distance the Kurds from Turkey so they could not aid Kurdish separatists in Turkey should the latter rise up in attempting to establish Kurdistan. U.S. President Don Trump, who had just cleared American troops from northeastern Syria, had advanced knowledge from Turkish President Recep Erdogan that he planned to invade the area once the American troops were out. A rare bipartisan unity in Congress criticized the removal of American troops and the president’s acquiescence on Turkey’s plan to attach the Kurds, an American ally—a plan that could possibly give ISIS a toehold in the region. Both the Congress and the president had their respective rationales, yet neither side looked past the apparent dichotomy to arrive at a solution consistent with the points made by both sides.

Backing up the arguments made by the bipartisan critics in Congress, “Pentagon and State Department officials had advised Trump against making the move, arguing a US presence is needed to counter ISIS and keep Iran and Russia, both influential inside Syria, in check.”[2] Rep. Ro Khanna asked why the president would not at least have asked for a concession from Turkey. That the U.S. was turning its back on “allies who [had] died fighting for a US cause” was also objectionable.[3] Certainly some erosion of trust could be expected. Help the Americans on one of their causes and the next administration may turn on you anyway. To put friends in harm’s way and disavow any responsibility that goes with having received help points to a deep character flaw. While less obvious than is the mentality in preemptively invading another state, the U.S. President’s treatment of the Kurds was also culpable (and the U.S. Government had also preemptively invaded another state—Iraq).

President Trump’s rationale stemmed from his opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the long, senseless war that ensued. He pointed, moreover, to the eight trillion dollars spent by the U.S. and all the dead and wounded American soldiers “fighting and policing in the Middle East.”[4] He had campaigned on getting out of such long, senseless wars whose benefits to the U.S. do not justify the costs in lives and money. His solution in gradually pulling out American forces involved leaving a power-void that could be exploited or filled by adversaries. For example, ISIS could establish more of a presence in northeastern Syria under Turkish occupation. The Syrian Democratic Forces wrote that they were suspending military operations against ISIS in northern Syria following the “Turkish aggression.”[5]

I submit that both the concerns of the Congressional critics and President Trump could have been obviated had the U.S., a major financial contributor to the United Nations, sponsored a resolution in the Security Council for U.N. peacekeeping troops to replace the American forces in northeastern Syria. A contingent coalition could have been put together should Turkey have invaded anyway. American geopolitical interests would have favored a peace-keeping force over a force that could enable the spread of ISIS (like Turkey).

In general terms, the more the world organization of countries can step into troubled areas in peace-keeping roles, the less the world will have to rely on self-interested large countries, such as the U.S., to act as a global policeman. A conflict of interest exists in having one of the state-actors to be such a policeman because the temptation will be to put the state-actor’s own strategic interests above peace-keeping. I contend elsewhere that even if the state does not indulge such a temptation, the conflict-of-interest arrangement, which includes such temptation, is inherently unethical because of the existence of the temptation, given human nature.[6] In northeastern Syria, the U.S. was oriented to rooting out (and preventing) ISIS more than keeping the peace. Even if the official American objective had been peace-keeping, the U.S. would have been tempted to attack new ISIS outposts. Especially in political realism (but also in neorealism), to assume that a state would not act in its own strategic interests is naive. 

Had the U.S. pursued the U.N. option, the tension between the Congressional critics and the administration could have been avoided. This type of problem-resolution—a third way—is particularly beneficial in cases in which both sides to a dispute have good points. I suspect the human mind, whether from nature or nurture, goes to either-or dichotomies too readily. The back-and-forth in a debate is supposed to come to the better answer, but what if a third is even better?

[1] Nicole Gaouette, “Republican Anger at Trump Grows as Turkey Launches ‘Sickening’ Attack on US Allies,” CNN.com, October 9, 2019 (accessed same day).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Skip Worden, Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon. 


Thursday, July 4, 2019

President Obama's Justification for Limited Military Intervention in Libya: Driving a Wedge between the Bushes


In the early evening of March 28, 2011, President Barak Obama addressed the American people and the world to explain his administration’s involvement in the international coalition that had been implementing a no fly zone over Libya while protecting Libyan civilians from their own ruler. He sounded much more like the first President Bush than the second in terms of foreign policy.  Similar to how the elder Bush had restrained himself from going all the way to Baghdad after he had joined an international coalition in removing the Iraqis from Kuwait, Obama said that directing American troops to forcibly remove Colonel Qaddafi from power would be a step too far, and would “splinter” the international coalition that had imposed the no fly zone and protected civilians in rebel areas of Libya. Interestingly, in taking the elder Bush’s route, Obama came out strongly against that of Bush II. Referring to the alternative of extending the U.S. mission to include regime change, Obama stated, “To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq . . . regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.”[1] In effect, Obama was exposing a fundamental difference between George H.W. Bush and his son by saying essentially the same thing as the elder Bush had done while excoriating the foreign invasion of his son. Yet Obama did not stop there. He added a theoretical framework that the elder Bush could well have used.
The New York Times put the theory quite well. “The president said he was willing to act unilaterally to defend the nation and its core interests. But in other cases, he said, when the safety of Americans is not directly threatened but where action can be justified — in the case of genocide, humanitarian relief, regional security or economic interests — the United States should not act alone. His statements amounted both to a rationale for multilateralism and another critique of what he has all along characterized as the excessively unilateral tendencies of the George W. Bush administration.”[2] In other words, even in providing a basic framework, Obama was able to distance Bush the father from Bush the son.  Interestingly, Obama had awarded the senior Bush with the Metal of Freedom over a month earlier. I would be very surprised if Obama would award Bush the Son such a prize. In terms of foreign policy, the philosophical line in the sand clearly distinguishes the second Bush from both his own father and Barak Obama.
Of course, the President’s speech left his audience hanging in other respects. For instance, averting a large-scale massacre in Libya is in the U.S. strategic or national interest because of our humanitarian values as well as the proximity of Libya to the nascent upheavals in Tunisia in Egypt. So would not protecting a mass protest in Yemen, which is next to Saudi Arabia, or in Syria, which has particular strategic interest to the U.S. on account of Syria’s connection with Lebanon (and thus relevant for Israel) and Iran, also be in the American national interest?  The President could argue that neither Yemen (or Bahrain) nor Syria had come to the point where the civilians in a major city were at risk—but it could still be asked, what if?  Must there be a baleful hint of genocide in a city commensurate to the Libyan city of Benghazi for protesters to warrant invoking principled leadership with or without allies when a ruler has effectively lost his right to rule by having turned on his own people?
I contend that the President treated the U.S. strategic interest quite broadly by including the protection of large numbers of civilians against their own ruler, particularly when even the portent of carnage could destabilize emergent republics next door. Such interest is broader than questions such as, how the civilians would view the U.S. were they to gain power? and what effect would a new government have on Iran and Israel? Such questions pertain to a narrower conception of national interest—one that is much less of value to a country. Viewing the good will of protesters as an opportunity—essentially taking on the wider, humanitarian-inclusive, notion of national interest—Syria, Bahrain and Yemen become like Libya as soon as their respective protests and prospect of government brutality reach a certain threshold that Libya had surpassed. What that threshold is—meaning in terms of scale as well as brutality—is something the American Congress and President needed to decide. For had that been set, attention could have turned to the mechanism involved in forming an international coalition should a country cross the line.
Differing from Obama, I submit that the establishment of a threshold can be relied up such that principled leadership could be invoked by the U.S. even in the absence of partners at the outset. Such unilateralism would differ appreciably from that of Bush the Younger, whose invasion of Iraq was based on a criterion used for that one case alone (WMD).  In other words, unilateralism need not mean capriciousness or impulsiveness. A humanitarian threshold undergirded by a strategic interest in there being a world wherein rulers serve rather than violently turn on their own people can justify not only international coalitions, but also instances of principled leadership.

[1] Helene Cooper, “Obama Cites Limits of U.S. Role in Libya,” The New York Times, March 28, 2011.
[2] Ibid.

Saturday, May 18, 2019

Israel and the United States on Palestinian Democracy

I contend that the furtherance of democracy in general and more specifically in the Middle East can be regarded as a strategic pathway toward regional peace. The philosopher Kant wrote a treatise on a global federation as a means toward achieving world peace. The founders of the United States reckoned that all the republics within that regional federation must be democratic for the Union itself to be sustained. A United States of the Middle East would also stand a better chance were it's states republics in form. It follows that especially when democratic bystanders put short-term tactical and strategic advantage above furthering or just permitting the development of a young, unstable democracy, the hypocrisy puts off rather than furthers peace. The reactions of Israel and the United States to a Palestinian achievement in 2011 are a case in point. 

The two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, announced on April 27, 2011 “that they were putting aside years of bitter rivalry to create an interim unity government and hold elections within a year, a surprise move that promised to reshape the diplomatic landscape of the Middle East. The deal, brokered in secret talks by the caretaker Egyptian government, was announced at a news conference in Cairo where the two negotiators referred to each side as brothers and declared a new chapter in the Palestinian struggle for independence, hobbled in recent years by the split between the Fatah-run West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza. It was the first tangible sign that the upheaval across the Arab world, especially the Egyptian revolution, was having an impact on the Palestinians . . . Israel, feeling increasingly surrounded by unfriendly forces, denounced the unity deal as dooming future peace talks since Hamas seeks [Israel's] destruction. ‘The Palestinian Authority has to choose between peace with Israel and peace with Hamas,’ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a televised statement. The Obama administration warned that Hamas was a terrorist organization unfit for peacemaking.”[1]

An agreement that puts aside years of bitter rivalry is in itself morally praiseworthy not only because of the heightened possibility for peace, but also because just achieving such an agreement is not easy; rather, this is the road less traveled. As reported at the time, “A desire for unity has been one goal that ordinary Palestinians in both areas have consistently said they sought. Until now it has proved elusive and leaders of the two factions have spoken of each other in vicious terms and jailed each other’s activists.”[2] Tit for tat much more conformable to human nature than putting faith in trust where none has existed.

More specifically, an agreement by rival parties in a young democracy to have common elections furthers the ideal of representative self-government. Putting an ideal before partisan advantage is also morally (and politically) laudable because such a priority is not easy given human nature (nature and nurture). 

This is not to say that the results of an election agreed to by rivals (assuming a fair and transparent one) are pleasing to interested bystanders nearby or halfway around the world who gave their own agendas. If such bystanders brandish themselves as beacons of democracy to the world and yet act on their own agendas, the charge of self-serving hypocrisy can stick. 

To be sure, both Israel and the United States had at the time a long-term interest in the furtherance of the democratic form of government, so assuming a stance of enlightened self-interest would have avoided the noxious cloud of hypocrisy. Unfortunately, the two bystanders, who still claimed to value representative democracy, held the furtherance of the form hostage to their hostility to an enemy. It can be said, in fact, that democratic governments that refuse an opportunity to permit a young and not yet stable democracy to strengthen are not themselves worthy of self-government, for they are not sufficiently mature, politically, in putting their respective partisan agendas first. 

Both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed in retirement after the American Revolution that a self-governing citizenry must be educated and virtuous to sustain a viable republic. I submit that both formal education and virtue require and strengthen self-discipline, as well as foster maturity. To skip class and not study for tests, for example, flaunt self-discipline, whereas to follow the rigors of a course of study requires (and builds) self-discipline and thus maturity. The relationship between self-discipline and virtue is more widely understood. 

To the Israeli government, the sheer possibility of unity among the Palestinians translated into having a more formidable opponent in bargaining. Surely, however, more was at stake than jostling for strategic advantage. As it turned out, such a concern dominated at the expense of peace. Even the increasing dominance of Israel itself over the Palestinian Authority did not bring peace any closer.  

1. Ethan Bronner and Isabel Kershner, “Fatah and Hamas Announce Outline of Deal,” The New York Times, April 28, 2011, p. A1.
2. Ibid.