Like proud male birds dancing
for a female for the chance to reproduce, U.S. President Trump and Ukraine’s
Zelensky engaged in public posturing ahead of the negotiations set to take
place between Trump and Vlad the Impaler Putin of Russia in Alaska on August
15, 2025. For the public, to take the postures as real positions, set in stone,
would be nothing short of depraved naivete. Missing in action in all this
posturing was E.U. President Van der Leyen and the E.U.’s foreign minister.
Instead, the governors of two, albeit large, E.U. states were busy making
demands as if their respective political bases were more powerful than the E.U.
as a whole. In short, Van der Leyen missed an opportunity to join the dance of
posturing.
After a virtual meeting with
Trump, Zelensky postured by saying, “Putin is bluffing that the sanctions do
not work, that they are nothing. In fact, sanctions are hitting the Russian
economy hard.”[1]
The Ukrainian president added that Putin had not changed his military goal with
respect to occupying “the whole of Ukraine.”[2]
Meanwhile, Trump was rattling his saber by warning Putin that there would be “very
severe consequences” if Putin does not agree to a ceasefire.[3]
This warning is sheer posture; no one should assume that Trump was saying what
would actually happen, so protests against Trump unleashing World War III would
be unfounded and based on a failure to distinguish negotiating posturing from
announcing a new policy.
Different from posturing were demands
from the governor of a large E.U. state, including that a ceasefire “must be at
the very beginning. Later, there may be a framework agreement. Third, . . .”[4]
A leader of an E.U. state who was not to be included in the upcoming
negotiation between Trump and Putin, whose respective federations are empire-scale
and consist of states and regions, respectively, that are themselves the size
of E.U. states, was making demands as if that leader were to be a
participant in the negotiations, for otherwise to make demands would not make
sense; all that could be offered would be suggestions.
As the de facto head of state
for the E.U., and de jure president of its executive branch, the European
Commission, President Von der Leyen would have had more sway with Trump and
Putin were she to have made suggestions; it would have been improper for
her as a non-participant to make demands. So E.U. foreign minister
Kallas overstepped in stating, “Any deal between the US and Russia must have
Ukraine and the EU included.”[5]
Even though Kallis’s rationale, that “it is a matter of Ukraine’s and the whole
of Europe’s security,”[6]
is a valid argument for why the EU rather than a governor of even a large EU state
should be included in the negotiations, her demand is but from the
sidelines of the playing field on which negotiations take place, and thus her
making a demand only shows her weakness as being situated as such. That the
E.U. had stood a better chance of edging its way into the Trump-Putin
negotiations was undone by state officials jumping in for Von der Leyen in
meeting before the negotiations with Trump and by Kallas’s deference to state
officials in her own meeting with them. That the E.U. state of Hungary blocked
an E.U. foreign policy supporting Ukraine also reflects on the weakness of the
E.U. in not having sufficiently resisted opposition by governors to getting rid
of the necessity of unanimity on foreign-policy (and other significant) matters
at the federal level.
Between the lack of respect
for the federal officials by state-level governors and foreign ministers, and
the continuing inherent weakness at the points of state involvement in federal
institutions, blame for the E.U. being sidelined by Trump and Putin applies at
least partially to the Europeans themselves. Merz and Macron should have made
way for Von der Leyen stand for the EU being the European to meet vicariously
with Trump a few days before the negotiation in Alaska, and the foreign
ministers at the state level should have respected the necessary role of consensus,
as unanimity is difficult to achieve with 27 states, so Kallas could have made
E.U.-wide suggestions for Trump and Putin. There is indeed a very
practical cost in world affairs that Europeans pay in refusing to expand qualified
majority voting in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., and for
not increasing the power of the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens
rather than states. Although it would be unwise to cut state involvement off at
the federal level as has happened in the U.S., that just one governor can
paralyze the E.U. in foreign policy is indication enough that the state
governments have too much power at the federal level—much more than is
necessary to safeguard the interests of state government from being eclipsed by
a much more powerful federal government, as has happened in the U.S., keine
Zufall, especially after state governmental institutions ceased appointing
U.S. senators to Congress in the early 20th century. The state
governments in the E.U. could give up the ghost on the principle of unanimity
at the federal level without worrying about unfettered encroachment from the
federal institutions. State governments should continue to be
represented in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., but on the
basis of qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. The result, I
contend, would be that the E.U. would be better able to muscle its way into
negotiations between the E.U.’s counterparts: The U.S., Russia, and China.
2. Ibid.
3. Sacha Vakulina, Aleksandar Brezar, and Alice Tidey, “Trump Warns of ‘Very Severe Consequences’ for Russia if Putin Does Not Stop War in Ukraine,” Euronews.com, August 13, 2025.
4. Sacha Vakulina, “’Putin Is Bluffing,’ Zelenskyy Tells Trump as European Leaders Push for Ukraine Ceasefire,” Euronews.com, August 13, 2025.
5. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Kallas Calls Snap Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers on Ukraine on Monday,” August 10, 2025, italics added.
6. Ibid.
