Saturday, July 26, 2025

Passive Aggression on Campus: Redefining Hate-Speech

Besides using social pressure and anger to purge words that a student or faculty member deems unacceptable, the word police have found that they can get objectionable opinions criminalized. This runs 180 degrees from the sort of openness to different, even objectionable ideas that makes a college campus thrive with an academic rather than passive-aggressive atmosphere. Sometimes, getting the law to go against a pollical opinion that a fallible person deems to be intolerable can show just how dogmatic in the sense of being arbitrary the criminalizing of ideas can be. Here I have in mind the case of Marianne Hirsh, a genocide scholar at Columbia University. It is a sign of going too far that political corrective would be weaponized with criminal punishments that such a scholar, whose parents had died in the Nazi Holocaust, would think that she would have to teach at another university to be able to continue teaching material from the notable twentieth-century scholar, Hannah Arendt, who wrote on the banality of evil in that Holocaust (and, were she still alive in the next century, would probably also write of the Gaza Holocaust in such terms). Behind political correctness is the arrogance and related intolerance that stem from the sin of self-idolatry: taking oneself to be omniscient and omnipotent (but not omnibenevolent).

Hirsch had been using Hannah Arendt’s book about the trial of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem; he was convicted of the war crime of forcing Jews in Hungary to march to a death camp in Poland so as many as possible would die on the way and thus reduce the killing needing to be done at the camp. Arendt, a Jew, is critical in her book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, of Israel’s illegal kidnapping of Eichmann in Argentina. Even mentioning that text, or explaining why Arendt criticized Israel’s founding, could run afoul of Columbia’s 2025 revision of antisemitism, “which casts certain criticism of Israel as hate speech.”[1] That’s pretty heavy language, and the penalties would surely go beyond getting fired from the university. So it is worthwhile to unpack the claim that criticism of Israel constitutes hate-speech.

For criticism of Israel to be taken as antisemitic, hence anti-Jewish, speech, the criticism would have to pertain to Jews generally, but to criticize Israelis is not to criticize Jews who are American and live in the United States, for example, unless they hold dual citizenship. Moreover, to conflate citizenship, which is a political designation, with a religious or social designation is to commit a category mistake, for the categories are distinct. To criticize another country is not to criticize a world religion (or even religion itself, as it is a distinct category).

Once we have properly identified criticism of a foreign government (or country) as political in nature, we can see that such criticism is acceptable in international relations; people criticize other countries all the time. It can even be said to be the human condition, and we are all in trouble if that is criminalized. It would be like making the breathing of air illegal. In short, criticizing other countries is so normalized in international relations that to make criticizing only one country illegal while another other country or government thereof is “fair game,” would be highly unfair. It would be especially unfair were that country’s government exterminating a people within its territory, for to not criticize such a country could be considered inhuman or at least insensitive to the desperate plight of other human beings.

That both Hirsch and Arendt are/were Jewish and yet included criticism of Israel should be enough to dispel the notion that criticism of Israel is antisemitic. So it is ironic that Hirsch, whose very parents died in the 20th century holocaust, thought she might have to leave Columbia university to be able to continue to include Arendt’s political criticism of Israel in courses. This is not to say that Columbia’s new “definition” of antisemitism is itself antisemitic because both Hirsch and Arendt could be expunged for being in violation.

I contend that any government, and thus any country, is “fair game” in terms of being the recipient of political criticism, and that this does not constitute hate speech. In criticizing Israel’s role in the Gaza Holocaust, no hatred is being directed at or even implied to pertain to any Jews in America who are not Israelis. That Israelis in Israel can be criticized for their government’s policies and actions is fair because that country’s political system is democratic.  Even in an autocratic state such as Russia, the people can be criticized for not standing up sufficiently to an unprovoked invasion of another country. Perhaps Vatican City would be a closer parallel to Israel, but even in criticizing a political stance of the Pope or a public policy of Vatican City, a person is not criticizing being Catholic in terms of its religious culture or beliefs. Vatican City is recognized internationally as a country and thus as a political entity, and thus political criticism is fairly done without being labeled as hate speech against Catholics. Also, to criticize them for regarding the Virgin Mary as a divine being in being born without sin and being bodily assumed into heaven does not constitute a political criticism of the Vatican as political entity. It is not as if the Virgin Mary were president of Vatican City.

For the governments of Israel and the United States to wield antisemitism as a club so to curtail adverse political speech—and Columbia’s new definition doubtlessly came from pressure from the Trump Administration—represents a category mistake that is ethically and politically unfair, especially if a legitimate basis exists to criticize a policy and/or action of the Israeli government. The Gaza Holocaust evinces such a basis. In fact, ethically, it can be argued that it is the duty of every human being on the planet to criticize a government (or country) for being in the process of starving, shooting, and bombing an occupied population of people, who, unlike in the case of a war, could not fight back. In the 20th century as news of the Nazi holocaust broke, criticism of Nazi-Germany or even Germany itself was not “redefined” as anti-German hate speech because a legitimate reason for even harsh criticism existed. True to American culture, therefore, it is best to side with free political speech in international relations.



1. Jeff Offenhartz, “A Columbia Genocide Scholar Says She May Leave over University’s New Definition of Antisemitism,” The Associated Press, July 25, 2025.


Sunday, July 20, 2025

Pope Leo on the Fallacy of Collective Justice: The Case of Israel in Gaza

One of the many pitfalls in the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, whereby government officials acting as government can literally get away with murder domestically given the lack of credible de jure and de facto enforcement of international “law,” is the ability to inflict collective punishment based on group-identity, including the ideologies that hinge on identity politics. Going the actual culprits of a crime or even a revolt, collective punishment inflicts harm and even mass murder on an entire group, including individuals thereof who are not at all culpable. Unlike “collateral damage,” the ideology of collective justice includes intentionally harming such individuals. It is an ideology because it is based on beliefs about a group rather than an ethic that would justify normatively the infliction of pain and suffering on the innocent. Furthermore, collective justice is an ideology because it includes the artificial elevation of a group (i.e., the collective) over the individual even though members of a group are arguably foremost individuals, who typically belong to more than one group or organization. To put the collective abstraction first ontologically is thus tenuous at best. A person may be a Texan, a Democrat, a Catholic, and a member of a football team, for example, so the claim that that person is essentially any one of these would be dogmatic in the sense of being arbitrary. In privileging a part over a whole, thus being partisan, an ideology is in a sense arbitrary, even in claiming that a state of affairs that is favored or desired is the present state of affairs, as if the statement were a fact of reason rather than a counter-factual statement.

It is one thing for intellectuals to debate and discuss ontological and ethical matters, and quite another when a leader on the world stage makes an explicit normative statement condemning collective punishment. The reason why such a public pronouncement by a person chosen to head a government or a global religious organization is important is that the Israeli government quickly discovered in 2023 that having its president state publicly that every resident of Gaza would be punished for being culpable in an atrocity committed by criminals in October of that year in Israel was not going over well in the media around the world. Because the collective-justice motive was from then on—for at least 21 months (and counting)—on stealth mode in the Israeli government even though the fingerprints were obvious in Gaza, to have a leader recognized globally state publicly that collective “justice” was being pursued by the Israeli government even though prohibited by international law. For some reason, facts on the ground, even when obvious, are not enough for human beings to think, Hmm, the Israelis really are pursuing collective justice on their subjugated people within Israel’s borders. Even with such a recognition and acknowledgement, the prerogative of absolute sovereignty can go on, unimpeded internationally.

Nevertheless, it is significant that Pope Leo of the Roman Catholic Church, whose billion-plus membership spans the globe, “said at the end of his Sunday Angelus prayer” on July 20, 2025, “I once again call for an immediate end to the barbarity of this war and for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.”[1] Typically, leaders on the global stage are satisfied to leave it at that; they condemn this or that without stating what actions in particular, or what ideologies behind those actions, are being castigated. In addition to bringing up the Israeli attack on the only Catholic church in Gaza just days earlier, the pontiff said, “I appeal to the international community to observe humanitarian law and respect the obligation to protect civilians as well as the prohibition of collective punishment, the indiscriminate use of force, and the forced displacement of populations.”[2] Together with the barbarity of that war, the collective punishment, which presumes the validity of collective justice unless punishment is inflicted without cause, such as randomly, can be said to be extreme in its severity, and not just in its scale. If in fact the Vatican had turned a blind eye to the Nazi Holocaust, the Church was not making the same mistake on the Israeli Holocaust in Gaza. Pope Leo was essentially telling the Israeli government officials:

We know what you’re trying to do; you’re trying to extinguish the Palestinian people who now live in the uninhabitable area that you created so to decimate the Gazans, whom you view not only as culpable collectively, but also sub-human—as “animals,” as it were. This is not the first time in human history that a government has considered a people in its territory to be subhuman. It is ironic, is it not? The Torah makes clear that being Yahweh’s chosen people does not spare you from God’s wrath. You are not divine, so it is not your place to fete out collective justice that God can do by virtue of being omniscient as well as omnipotent.

Whereas the Pope would have to acknowledge the validity of divine collective justice in the Old Testament, Nietzsche argues that the conception of the deity wherein it is both omnibenevolent and vengeful, for “Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord,” is discredited by whomever added that line, knowing that God must be perfect goodness. Perhaps collective justice is not vengeance, and a deity who knows all would only inflict collective punishment in cases in which everyone is in fact guilty of some injustice. Nietzsche was not an atheist; in fact, he may have been criticizing a flawed concept so that a new, healthier concept could be built.  An atheist would likely go further, arguing that collective justice is inherently unjust so positing it of a deity is wrongheaded, and in fact could do additional damage as Israeli officials could try to justify their heinous crimes against humanity by saying that Yahweh engages in collective justice in punishing Israel, such as by keeping the Hebrews in the wilderness for forty years and later by allowing them to be conquered for violating the covenant. Trying to exterminate a people who believe in the same deity—unlike the people in Jericho in the Bible story—is arguably such a violation. It would be ironic were Yahweh to apply collective justice on the Israelis by punishing Israel for having inflicted collective punishment on the Gazans as if every resident in Gaza in October, 2023 were a culprit. Whether collective justice rightfully applies to an omniscient deity or contradicts the very notion of divinity, the assumption that we mere mortals enjoy God’s prerogative is impious self-idolatry.  



1. The Associated Press, “Pope Repeats Call for Gaza Ceasefire as Israel Widens Evacuation Orders,” Euronews.com, July 20, 2025.
2. Ibid., italics added for emphasis.