While one Georgia was secure
as a member-state in the U.S., another Georgia was finding itself being frozen
out of not only accession talks with the E.U., but also being invited as a “NATO
partner” to attend the NATO meeting in June, 2026. It is ironic that whereas
the first Georgia had delegated some of its sovereignty to the U.S. in 1789,
the second Georgia was unhappy remaining fully sovereign outside of the E.U.
rather than as one of the semi-sovereign E.U. states. Giving up some
governmental sovereignty can be a “step up,” and, with that comes certain requirements
in terms of good governance.
Although “Georgia’s ruling
party representatives claimed that the [NATO] summit in Ankara did not include
the type of meetings Georgia used to attend in the past . . ., Georgian Dream
MP Irakli Kirtskhalia told the press in Tbilisi that ‘we have no problem
attending the summit, (sic) ask the organizers why we are not
represented.’”[1] The
party representatives were artfully deflecting, whereas Kirkskhalia was pointing
journalists to the real reason for Georgia’s absence. Georgia’s government had
not been invited to the NATO meeting, even though other partners of NATO,
including Qatar, UAE, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Ukraine, and Australia
were. At the root of the problem was a lack of trust.
That Georgian President Mikheil
Kavelashvili “travelled to Tehran to attend the funeral of the late Ayatolla
Ali Khamenei” instead did not exactly win Georgia much trust in the West.[2]
The signal that such an action sent outdid any positive words of potential
partnership with NATO. A political analyst in Georgia, Paata Zakareishvili, “claimed
that the absence of NATO’s invitation to its regional security debates
represents what he called the loss of trust by Georgia’s partners.”[3]
In fact, he went so far as to admit, “Georgia is being ignored.”[4]
He added that Georgia had been aspiring to be part of the alliance, and that “Georgia
and Ukraine used to move toward NATO membership together.”[5]
Considering Russian President Putin’s strident opposition to Ukraine being in
the international alliance, Georgia should have had an easier way in. Instead,
he said, “Georgia is no longer being considered anywhere.”[6]
Anywhere turns out to be important, for, according to Georgia’s former
ambassador to NATO Levan Dolidze, “what is far more damaging is Georgia’s
absence from discussions within the European Union.”[7]
Such discussions pertained to Georgia possibly gaining statehood in the Union;
and, yes, statehood does indeed imply the existence of a federal political
system.
As is clear from Georgia in
the U.S., being a member-state in a political union wherein both the union and
states are semi-sovereign is much more significant than being invited as a
partner to a meeting of an international alliance. Even though the U.S. Senate
and the Council of the E.U. (and the European Council) are founded on
principles of international law, neither union can be said to be an
international organization. Indeed, both the U.S. House of Representatives and
the European Parliament are founded on national rather than international
political principles (i.e., citizens rather than polities are represented, and
by population). Both unions can be said to be hybrids forged from the hard
political compromises made in the U.S. Constitutional Convention, when the arrangement
of fully sovereign countries under the Articles of Confederation were dismissed
as too suboptimal for political agency.
Although near the end of 2025, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze insisted that Georgia’s accession-path to statehood “remains steady and irreversible” such that becoming a state by 2030 was still “both realistic and attainable,” the E.U. froze Georgia mid-stream in June, 2026 after the Georgian government had passed a “foreign influence” law that the Commission “described as Russian-inspired and authoritarian against the backdrop of massive anti-government protests in Tbilisi.”[8] The trip to the funeral in Tehran in July didn’t exactly help speed Georgia along either. It did not matter, as Kobakhidze claimed, that Georgia was ahead of all other prospective, aspiring states in economic progress indicators; the problem was one of trust, both regarding democratic values at home and the choice of allies abroad. Even though technicians—pedestrians really—were doubtlessly focusing narrowly on whether the accession criteria were being met, it is important not to lose sight of the big picture.
Was the Georgia “Western” enough not merely to join in an international military alliance, but also to become a semi-sovereign state in a political, federal union? Or would the Georgian government be a “Trojan horse” whose strings would be pulled by Russia’s autocratic and militaristically aggressive Putin? Although from the strategic standpoint of the West, bringing in as many former Soviet Republics as possible may seem optimal because such a move would deprive Russia of being able to “bring them home,” filtering by applying the “sufficiently Western” test is better because then neither the Western military alliance nor the European Union (and the United States, indirectly) would be weakened from within.
The Georgia that has been a member of the U.S. since the beginning of that political union (and, even earlier, when the U.S. had just been a military alliance and then a confederation of sovereign countries), had tried to “Georexit” in 1861 but was subsequently brought back “into the fold.” Would the Georgia that was shut out of the E.U. in 2026 follow in the footsteps of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary at the expense of federal foreign policy and the defense of the E.U. itself from foreign threats, and ultimately even accomplish “Georexit”? Already Britain had seceded from that political union, and the vote in favor of secession was mainly a reaction against the fact that E.U. states are semi-sovereign rather than fully sovereign, which pertains instead to a confederation such as that of the American Articles. No significant difference with E.U. foreign policy was involved in Britain’s decision to secede. Georgia, on the other hand, would need to prove its loyalty not only to rule-of-law democracy, but also to the West (rather than to Russia or Iran), besides being willing to cede some of its sovereignty in order to be considered and ready for statehood in the E.U.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
