Decolonializing the Baltic States: Exculpating a “Victim” Identity

On how to decolonize Eastern Europe, its states must disentangle themselves from the history of the U.S.S.R. and even Russia. This is not simply a matter of severing business and political ties; a more intangible disengagement “mentally” must also take place. Because most of us tend to dismiss the “soft” or paradigmatic side of international political economy, highlighting the “real” implications of not attending to this side is beneficial. In short, I have in mind the “victim” cultural identity that can easily stick to former colonies or parts of empires more generally.

During the early months of Russia’s unilateral invasion of Ukraine, the governments of countries in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, sought reassurance from the West of military protection should Russia continue its militaristic advance beyond Ukraine once that country has been subdued and firmly back in the Russian empire. Even Sweden and Finland, which had not been part of the U.S.S.R., quickly sought membership in NATO. Serbia and Georgia sought to expedite accession talks to become E.U. states even though from the E.U.’s standpoint those two states would be relatively pro-Russia along with Hungary in the E.U. and thus dilute its anti-Russian consensus.

All of those efforts could be said to be predicated on a “victim” identity. Running for protection from a bigger power against a former and yet baleful bully is classic “victim” behavior. This creates a dilemma in that running for cover might be in the existential interests of the governments living near such a bully as Russia, and yet doing so can be said to be from a “victim” self-identity.  Lamenting and trying to “work through” past imperial expansion does not seem very helpful to me. Instead, what is needed is to seek protection and then quickly pivot to non-victim policies, such as in taking an active role within the protection. For example, the Baltic states could have taken an active role in E.U. foreign-policy making, such as in capitalizing on their knowledge of Russia to target particular sanctions against certain Russian oligarchs. Internationally, those states could take an active role by agreeing to more of the alliance’s hardware being located in those states. Eastern Europe can thus both seek out the protection of the West and assert a non-victim stance toward Russia. 

India on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: On the Flawed Hegemony of Political Realism

India took an equivocal position on Russia’s invasion. This is surprising at first glance because India has been so concerned to protect its sovereign territory from baleful encroachments from China. What explains India looking the other way as Russia unilaterally invaded a sovereign state? I contend that the explanation supports the assertion that the world could no longer afford its system based on national sovereignty if political realism is in the driver’s seat at the national level.

According to Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University, one of my alma maters, the USSR was a vital partner of India during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was willing to sell weapons to India for cheap in order to keep China from expanding. For spare parts, India still has to go to Russia and is thus dependent on that country and the good will of its government. No country could ween itself away from a provider of military hardware quickly.

Furthermore, Ganguly noted in a talk in 2024 that India had a history of buying oil from Russia, and this continued during Russia’s invasion in spite of the Western embargos of Russian oil. The U.S. is in part to blame because it would sanction India were it to buy oil from Iran or Venezuela. At the time of the Russian War, India was still a poor country even as its high tech industry was expanding. Russian oil was relatively cheap. Also, India could point to the American hypocrisy in having relations with some sordid, autocratic regimes. This can explain why the government of India was well-aware during Russia’s war in Ukraine that by buying Russian oil and selling it to the EU and US, India was undermining the embargoes. Saudi Arabia was doing likewise, and yet the Biden administration held that both countries were allies of the United States. Everyone was looking primarily or even solely at their own interests.

Ganguly has also pointed out that in Indian culture, there is an obsession for multipolarity: there should be several global powers rather than just one biggie. Therefore, there is a willingness to work with Russia, which could serve as a check on hegemonic American power. This is not to say that Indian culture had any affinity whatsoever, Ganguly insists, with internal Russian politics. Nevertheless, India has had China as its principal long-term threat, and India’s government has recognized for a long time that Russia could act as a check on China.

All of this goes to say, political realism was alive and well as the world adjusted to Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine. In realism, each government orients its foreign (and industrial) policy tightly to the national interest rather than also to cooperate with other governments in the interests of a global order in which international law can be more effectively enforced. The international system is just the aggregate of the self-interests of governments; aggregated parts make up the whole. With human rights suffering from a want of international enforcement in Ukraine as well as in Gaza, the want of international attention in a system of sovereign countries on tightening that system to enhance the enforcement of international law suggests that political realism has become insufficient. Climate change and the risk of nuclear war, which Russia has threatened in the context of Ukraine, only add to the argument that the world could no longer afford an international order that rests on national sovereignty to which political realism is the dominant operating system in governments.

Israeli Secret Ops Undermining the United States: Political Realism as Undercutting Allies

On September 14, 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was “giddy with excitement” after U.S. President Trump had communicated “the possibility of moving forward” with a mutual defense pact.[1] This communication was punctuated, however, by “cautious wording.”[2] Trump had recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s state capital and recognized Netanyahu’s annexation of the occupied Golan Heights. What accounts for the caution regarding a defense pact? Moreover, why had Trump been quiet concerning the Israeli election that was coming up in a week or so? Netanyahu was polling behind his contender, so vocal support from Trump, such as on Netanyahu’s campaign pledge to annex the Jordon Valley, would have been valuable to the sitting prime minister. At least part of the answer may have something to do with Israel’s undercutting military action in Iraq. American allies have their own geo-political agendas that can include undercutting the United States militarily.

There is the public relationship, which is all smiles, and there is what is really going on secretly. Which is real? 

First of all, just two days before Trump conveyed a vague interest in moving forward on a defense pack, Politico had broken the story that U.S. Government had determined over the last two years that Israel had been behind the "StingRay" cellphone surveillance units found around the White House.[3] Those machines could act as cell-phone towers and thus obtain cell-phone calls, texts, and data from people in the White House, as well as coming and going. Although Trump publicly claimed that he didn't believe that Israel had been spying on him, his reaction in secret may have been different, as he was known to be lax with his cellphone security and may have had personal information extracted. In public, the U.S. president and the Israeli prime minister denied the story, but in private, their relationship may have been damaged.
Secondly, according to the U.S., Israel had likely been involved in a strike near Baghdad in July, 2019. According to two U.S. officials, the strike complicated America’s relationship with Iraq.[4] It was in Israel’s interest to target militia groups with close ties to Iran. Pentagon spokesman Sean Robertson pointed out that the U.S. military has “repeated spoken out against any potential actions by neighbors that could lead to violence in Iraq.”[5] It is interesting that one of the closest U.S. allies would act so anyway. In an interview, Netanyahu, who also acted at the time as Israel’s defense minister, admitted that he had “given the security forces a free hand and the instruction to do what is needed to thwart” Iran’s plans “in Iran itself, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen.”[6] Whether Netanyahu merely relegated the fallout for the U.S. or had an interest in driving a wedge between the U.S. and Iraq goes beyond my intel. 
Thirdly, Israeli military forces, dressed as Iraqis, had secretly entered Iraq before, using complicit British guns to shoot at American soldiers and thus destabilize the situation in the eyes of the Americans and thus manipulate them to increase their involvement there. Both the British and Israeli states had an interest in keeping the U.S. mired in the Middle East, though I doubt the British interest was principally to weaken the dollar. Israel’s interest is rather obvious in having a powerful ally close by militarily. In any case, special relationships tend to get weakened by undermining actions on the ground.

Perhaps political realism, a theory that maintains that states pursue their respective interests rationally, really does explain how states act in secret. But is such a narrow preoccupation of interest rational? A single-minded privileging of immediate interests is not rational, I submit, because the longer-term benefits from a longer-term interest are discounted or ignored outright. Allies can realize such benefits unless either state puts short-term opportunism (from short-term interests) above the sort of self-restraining motivation that respects as binding the other state's interests. 
In secret, states may indeed be opportunists even in trying to weaken an ally while proffering supportive platitudes in public. After all, the present-value of money, which holds that having money today is worth more than having it tomorrow (hence interest on a savings account is compensation), stems from the importance of instant gratification in human nature. Given this genetic staple, trust simply does not exist between states, even allies. The maxim that a state will only act in concert with an ally when the immediate strategic interests are in line is not rational, I submit, because the benefits from self-constraining immediate interests are given up; such benefits, if allowed, would result in a more optimized state interest being realized. 

Even medium-term benefits may not be realized. Netanyahu, for instance, may find that his desire to be re-elected is not sufficiently supported when a “trusted” ally is more hesitant than usual in offering support. From the American standpoint, it may not even make sense to have a mutual-defense pact with an ally that takes cell-phone data from near the White House and plows ahead militarily at the detriment of the United State's costly work in Iraq. Why would the U.S. agree to spend money and lives to defend Israel unless America were itself attacked? To be in a mutual military pact, both sides must be capable of and willing to recognize and act on obligation even when the immediacy of interest could benefit by acting contrarily even if in secret.

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1. Oren Liebermann, “Trump May No Longer Be the Gift that Keeps on Giving for Netanyahu,” CNN.com, September 16, 2019 (accessed on the same day).

2. Ibid.

3. Daniel Lippman, "Israel Accused of Planting Mysterious Spy Devices Near the White House," Politico, September 12, 2019.
4. Barbara Starr et al, “Israel Likely Had a Role in Iraq Airstrike that Has Roiled US-Iraqi Relations,” CNN.com, August 23, 2019 (accessed on September 16, 2019)

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

The Kurds Betrayed: Iraq Retakes Kirkuk with U.S. Backing

For some reason, people tend to assume that the status quo has been around for a very, very long time—that it enjoys the perk of longevity. To mess with it even in part is typically assumed to “upset the apple cart.” The fear is excessive. A century after World War I, the fact that many of the extant countries in the Middle East had been artificially crafted by Britain and France paled under the presumption that those countries had been around for much, much longer. Accordingly, the fact that the Kurds voted overwhelmingly in 2017 to secede from Iraq was ignored or dismissed not only by Iraq, but also by other countries in the region and the United States. “Baghdad and most countries in the region had condemned the vote, fearing it would fuel ethnic divisions, lead to the breakup of Iraq and hobble the fight against the Islamic State.”[1] I submit that the fear was overblown and mistaken.

Firstly, ethnic divisions had been crippling Iraq since the United States toppled Saddam Hussain. An independent Kurdistan in the northern third of Iraq would have relieved the pressure such that the Iraqi government would only have to deal with the Sunni-Shiite struggle for power.

Secondly, even if Iraq itself would break-up completely, even this outcome would not be so much to fear, as Iraq itself had been artificially formed by the British after World War I. Put another way, the salience of the ethnic divisions in Iraq can be taken as an indication of the sheer artificiality of the state itself. The very notion of a nation goes along with ethnic clusters rather than forcing such clusters to form one political culture (to say nothing of getting along).

Thirdly, the pesh merga forces of the Kurds had fought quite well against the Islamic State, so invigorating the Kurds by supporting the formation of their own state would have been in the interests of the United States. Betraying the Kurds by enabling the Iraqi forces to take Kirkuk and its valuable oil region could be expected to have the opposite effect. In ignoring the clear will of the Kurds as per the decisive result of the referendum for secession, the United States betrayed itself, moreover, given that country’s preachments on behalf of democracy, which entails the self-determination of We the People.

A century after World War I, the world had an opportunity to remember that victorious European powers redrew the political map in the Middle East without taking into account the ethnic clusters that are naturally so integral to having nation-states. That such states enjoy a monopoly of power in international relations—the international realm literally being inter-national—suggests that the crafting of coherent rather than artificial nations is very important. Hence, a century out from WWI, the world of nations need not simply assume that even the break-up of a Middle Eastern country would somehow be the collapse of something that has always been around and would therefore be catastrophic. Put another way, a country formed by a European power should not enjoy default status because the formation itself can be viewed as problematic, evidenced by the ensuing ethnic strife. Admittedly, this does not hold in every country formed by Britain or France (e.g. Jordan), but where a country is strife-ridden, the application of nation itself is problematic; ethnic pushes for independence should not have to face the inertia of the status quo in such a case.

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[1] David Zucchino, “Iraqis Capture Key Kurdish City with Little Fight,” The New York Times, October 17, 2017.

E.U. Defense Post-Britain: Beyond Multinational Military Cooperation

Just months after the British voted to secede from the Union, the E.U.’s Counsel of Ministers discussed “proposals for increased military cooperation” amid concerns from the British state government as well as those of some eastern States that “such collaboration could undermine” NATO.[1] The proposals being discussed were “part of a push by European officials and diplomats to strengthen European ties” after Britain’s vote to secede.[2] I submit that both the expression, “military cooperation,” and Britain’s involvement in the discussion are ill-fitting and inappropriate, respectively.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

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[1] Julian E. Barnes, “EU Pushes for Deeper Defense Cooperation,” The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

The U.S. Military in Europe: On the Tyranny of the Status Quo

On January 14, 2012, the American media reported that the U.S. Pentagon would bring home two brigades from Europe. That would reduce the U.S. Army presence by 10,000 to 30,000. “During the height of the cold war, when America’s heavily armored and nuclear-tipped force in Europe comforted allies and deterred the Soviet Union, the Army reached a peak of 277,342 troops on the Continent.”[1] A mere 30,000 might seem trite in comparison, and thus palatable, unless it be noticed that the cold war ended with the fall of the USSR. So it is perplexing that the “reductions come as some European leaders and analysts make their case for a sustained American presence on the Continent to deal with uncertainties, including a rambunctious Russia — even as these same NATO allies are unable or unwilling to increase spending for their own defense.”[2] There it is then—a military subsidy of sorts. To be sure, Russia is uneasy about Eastern European countries becoming states in the E.U., but this hardly counts as rambunctiousness—at least at the level justifying a military defense. It is democracy, rather than Europe, that needs defense in terms of Russia, given the hegemony of the United Russia party in Russian politics. As one senior European official said, “We don’t need a massive presence of U.S. troops. After all, we don’t see Russia anymore as an enemy or an adversary, but even as a partner, if a difficult one.”[3] The shift from adversary to ally has perhaps not fully sunk in—human perception being slow to let go of long-held assumptions.

In my opinion, the uncertainty in Europe in the wake of the Pentagon’s announcement involved more than a bit of overreaction. “Philip H. Gordon, the State Department’s assistant secretary for European affairs, already was visiting capitals on the Continent, reassuring an audience in Berlin . . .  that ‘the United States remains committed to a strong Europe, the collective defense of our NATO allies, and to building and maintaining the capacity and partnerships that allow us to work together on a global scale.’”[4] Such reassurance was hardly needed. In fact, it would not be needed were the remaining 30,000 troops pulled out. That would not be tantamount to the United States leaving NATO, after all. Yet strangely, the perception would be exactly that, and in politics perception can create its own effects, even reality.

Beyond the matter of military strategy (in the context of a $15 trillion U.S. Government debt), the fact that the U.S. is leaving 30,000 troops in Europe may itself point to the staying power in the status quo as an object or worship. Beyond lapses in “readjusting,” it may be that the adage, “same old, same old” gets too much air time, particularly given that the twenty-first century is not the twentieth. Thomas Jefferson advocated a new constitution every twenty years, or at least a decision on the matter. It might not be a bad thing were a little “spring cleaning” done  in the first few decades of any new century—rather than simply continuing so much on the books from the last century. The U.S. as protector of Europe is from the standpoint of the twenty-first century so antiquated that a pathological aversion to change can be suspected, with justification itself being presumed to be in the sheer existence of a practice. In other words, it’s always been done that way, so why question it? Under the tyranny of the status quo, layers of old laws and regulations pile up like old clothes in a basement. New clothes are instantly labeled as “extreme” and are therefore eliminated from serious consideration. The inertia of ongoing practices stifle even thought itself and render human experience far too constricted, even regimented. To break on through to the other side, where there is fresh air to breath and room to flex one’s muscles as nature intended, the entire order must have collapsed, and this seems hardly necessary.

1. Tom Shanker and Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe,” The New York Times, January 13, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.