Massive AI Infrastructure Planned in the E.U. and U.S.: A Synergistic Opportunity

The relationship between human and artificial intelligence is a tantalizing but formidable investigative topic requiring much more intelligence than I can proffer. The likelihood of interlarding emotion and desire to warp the former under the gravitational pull of selfishness may render us the weaker party even though, at least as of 2026, we humans still held the strings. That the human mind is not far-reaching enough in its intellectual gaze may be why we are so afraid of the potential of AI as being able at some point to displease our desire to control it (and just about everything else under the Sun). The advent of planned AI gigafactories in the E.U. and giant data centers in the U.S. presented American and European elected officials in 2026 with a synergistic opportunity that, if successfully achieved, could cause a leap in AI while paradoxically showcasing the human mind and thus possibly increasing our confidence in ourselves while decreasing our corresponding fear of AI.

At the AI Action Summit in the E.U. in February, 2025, President von der Leyen announced a plan  to build “up to seven AI gigafactories . . . to train advance AI models and catch up with global tech companies.”[1] Gigafactories “are large-scale computing facilities equipped with state-of-the-art, highly specialised chips designed to train the next generation of AI technologies—notably the most advanced large language models, which require crunching trillions of data points.”[2] So many data points would present the need for huge data centers to house so much data. So it is highly relevant that over in the U.S., in late July, 2026, President Trump announced a plan to repurpose “large chunks of federal land to host enormous data centers and the power plants needed to run them” in order to “accelerate the development of artificial intelligence.”[3] The obvious yet politically challenging synergistic conclusion would be to open both the factories and data centers to both European and American tech companies.

The net gain from specialization and “trade” can be gleamed simply from reading Adam Smith’s famous text, The Wealth of Nations. Getting in the way of such a lucrative “marriage,” with both countries anxious to thwart China’s intent to dominate the tech sector, including AI, was the E.U.’s enormous fine against Google for having operated a search engine in preference to the company rather than its competitors. The Trump Administration’s defense of Google and the E.U.’s less business-friendly Digital Act clashed and this difference could quell any political interests in favor of linking the gigafactories and data centers in spite of the tremendous potential synergy.

Moreover, both the Commission’s “rhetoric about the urgency of catching up with the US and China” and U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright hoping that the U.S. “wins the A.I. race” evince a mercantile governmental position that is at odds with joint mega-projects. In his text, Smith argues that the economic advantages to two countries trading with each other as each takes advantage of its comparative advantage vastly exceed economic gain from countries being exclusively oriented to their own gain (and even trying to cause other countries to lose, economically and in terms of AI). Whether a government is trying to maximize its storage of gold and silver or its exclusive AI technology, the resulting technology achievable by E.U. and U.S. firms (and governments) by linking the planned gigafactories to the planned data centers can be anticipated to be much greater. 

Such a feat would take the enlightened self-interest that is in leadership oriented to the long-term. For both the E.U. and U.S., the threat of China’s dominance in AI—in particular, how the autocratic government might use its AI to spy on the West and even undermine Western tech companies and even governments—highlights the self-interest part of enlightened self-interest, which in turn is associated with visionary rather than exclusively transactional leadership. The presidents of the E.U. and U.S. (i.e., the respective heads of the respective executive branches, whom I contend can be regarded as the respective presidents of the respective unions) would have to look past the Commission’s fine against Google (without cancelling the fine, for no common ground on that score need be supposed or demanded as a precondition for broader synergistic relations).

Moreover, high officials of both the E.U. and U.S. would also have to look askance at the natural political interest of each administration to defend and look out for the interests of home tech companies while being unconcerned with or even hostile to giving greater access to tech companies based in the other union. A synergistic agreement with respect to sharing access to the gigafactories and data centers would benefit from a vision of Western civilization out in front on AI as geo-political foes Russia and China are forced to try to catch up rather than dominate and thwart from up front. In this way, foreign policy, trade policy, and tech policy can be seen as dovetailing, which itself implies some synergy. The question in mid-2026 was perhaps whether the human, all too human intelligence of the politicians in high office in the two unions would be enlightened enough over narrow self-interests (both of the unions and the respective politicians themselves!) for artificial intelligence to be able to leverage tremendous synergy. In this relationship, I am afraid that we are the weaker party.

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1. Luca Bertuzzi, “EU Opens Call for Seven ‘Gigafactories’ to Train Next-Generation AI Technologies,” Euronews.com, 30 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Brad Plumer, “Energy Dept. Wants to Put Data Centers on U.S. Land,” The New York Times, July 31, 2026. Print edition. Online: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/climate/trump-federal-data-centers.html 

European Priorities Regarding Ukraine

On 5 August, 2026, President Von der Leyen of the E.U. “announced that €1.4 billion in profits from immobilised Russian assets [held in the E.U. would] be allocated after Russia’s deadly strikes on Kyiv.”[1] This response sounds well and good, especially as Ukraine had failed to shoot down all of the missiles and thus was in vital need of American anti-missile weaponry. Yet in spite of this strategic vulnerability, “only €70 million” of the €1.4 billion would be “directed toward military assistance.” The lion’s share of the profits would “be used to repay G7 and EU loans.”[2] In other words, the E.U. Commission was seeing to it that almost all of the profits from Russian assets would go to creditors outside of Ukraine in the E.U. and elsewhere. Because Russia had been serially lobing missiles on civilian targets such as apartment buildings in Ukraine with overwhelming success, and, moreover, occupied at least 20 percent of Ukraine in the east at the time, the Commission’s decision to pay off loans rather than keep them outstanding so much more money than €70 million could be directed to Ukraine’s military defenses. Both ethically and geopolitically, getting the lent money back especially to creditors in the E.U. right away is problematic.

The Commission acting on behalf or in the interest of creditors that are in the E.U. has all the earmarks of an institutional, or structural conflict of interest even though the expedient politics are obvious behind the decision are obvious. In a conflict of interest, typically a relatively narrow, or confined (usually private) benefit is put before satisfying a wider benefit, which can even be viewed as being a duty. A duty to the public good, for example, is eclipsed by a desire to satisfy a more narrow or circumscribed private benefit, whether to oneself or a related party. In this case, the exploitation of the conflict of interest lies in the E.U. prioritizing the relatively narrow private financial benefit of E.U. creditors over the wider, public good of pushing the invading Russians out of Ukraine and thus standing up against military invasion itself.

Although most of the scholars on the conflict-of-interest scenario in ethics have argued that an unexploited institutional conflict of interest is not unethical, I contend that human nature renders such a temptation ethical even though the temptation is in the structure within an organization or inter-organizationally. For President Von der Leyen even to have the power to siphon off most of the profits to lenders in the E.U. is arguably unethical in itself, given the incentive of the underlying expedient politics of preferring one’s own over exogenous groups (e.g., Ukraine). Accordingly, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, and the E.U. Parliament should have passed a federal law mandating that all of the profits go to Ukraine to augment its military.

Also on 5 August, 2026, “Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy . . . called for allies to send more anti-ballistic air defence, after Russian strikes killed at least 17 people overnight.”[3] Von der Leyen’s response to this plea can be put in the following way: Even though we have €1.4 billion at our disposal now, we are giving you only €70 million. Zelensky could be forgiven for thinking, thanks a lot sarcastically even though being thankful for getting anything. For overnight, when the “Russian army sent 115 drones and fired 28 high-speed missiles, including ballistic ones, Ukraine’s military had been “unable to shoot down a single Russian missile” due to “a drastic shortage of anti-ballistic munitions.”[4] The opportunity cost in the Commission’s decision to pay off loans rather than devote the entire amount of profits to Ukrainian defenses was spelled out at the time by Ukraine’s president, who said, “Ballistics interceptors are something that could have saved the lives of those who died today. It is very important that partners realise that delays in their delivery or unwillingness to transfer anti-ballistics leads to such terrible victims and destruction.”[5] Moreover, the Russian advantage in missile offense says, in effect, that it is ok to invade another country that does not pose a threat; furthermore, military power decides geopolitical disputes with impunity. Lest that dogma become the default for international relations, international law can be relegated as an oxymoron in what is a return to a Hobbesian state of nature beyond the nation-state. With so much on the line—big picture—Von der Leyen’s decision to divert so much of the profits to Ukraine’s international creditors can be viewed as a case of Aristotle’s notion of misordered concupiscence: putting a lower good above a higher one. She would have been easily understood were she to have told those creditors that it was more important to buttress Ukraine’s anti-missile (and other) defence than even to make full interest payments because the world needed to show Russia’s President Putin that military aggression does not work in the twenty-first century—that war crimes won’t go unpunished, and of course Ukraine desperately needed anti-missile munitions and weaponry, and fortifying other weaponry wouldn’t hurt Ukraine’s position either.

In short, priorities, especially that interlace geopolitical, business, and military affairs, matter even in terms of what sort of global order might result amid the collapsing post-World War II order. Would international relations boil down to “dog eat dog,” or would even just informal coalitions of nation-states force back aggressive advocates of military might who scoff at international law and norms that constrain political realism (i.e., strategic state interests as hegemonic)? Priorities matter in terms of whether the overblown militaristic forays into Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran would eventually be able to become and even define the status quo in international relations.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “EU Releases €1.4 Billion to Ukraine from Frozen Russian AssetProfits after Kyiv Attacks,” Euronews.com, 5 August, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Sasha Vakulina, “Ukraine Failed to Shoot Down a Single Russian Missile Launchedin Overnight Barrage,” Euronews.com, 5 August, 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Chaos in Massive Illegal Crossings into the E.U.: The Case of Ceuta

Even though the default absolutist notion of national sovereignty has consistently undercut global efforts to combat climate change and rid the world of nuclear weapons and even war itself, to disregard territorial sovereignty altogether is also problematic. Interestingly, both extremes treat international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature, and disregarding national sovereignty even extends the state of nature to within a country such that even national government is presumed not to exist. Illegal immigration is a case in point. When sixty thousand North Africans illegally entered Ceuta in the E.U. on July 30, 2026, the utter disrespect for the rule of law as well as the E.U.’s territorial integrity and legitimacy was palpable.

The disregard for governmental sovereignty could be seen visually as videos taken at the time on Ceuta’s Tarajal beach “reveal the chaos that accompanied the crossings, showing large crowds running between the breakwater and the roads around the border area.”[1] Sixty thousand people swimming over to a small city of just 19 square kilometers provides a snapshot of just how easily illegal immigration can spiral into mob-rule. Both Plato and Aristotle situate mob-rule as democratic decadence, and thus, like tyranny, to be avoided. As Hobbes argues in Leviathan, there is a good reason for government, given human nature. His theory differs markedly from Locke’s theory of natural rights, save the right of self-preservation that is inalienable according to Hobbes even though a sovereign has even the exclusive right even to interpret divine writ. For Hobbes, no natural rights exist that would limit the authority of a sovereign. None of these four historical philosophers would claim that illegal immigration between modern nation-states is a natural right. In fact, I suspect the four would be appalled at the utter effrontery in ignoring a country’s territorial sovereignty.

The push-back from North Africa backs up the disregard evinced by the people who illegally crossed into Ceuta. That Morocco had regarded the cities of Ceuta and Melilla as “part of its own territory since its independence from France and Spain in 1956” does not justify the strategy of spinning the illegal crossings as part of a dispute on sovereignty, for the people crossing were not doing so to protest that issue.[2] Neither do the social and economic conditions in Morocco justify disregarding another country’s government as if being unemployed justifies illegally entering another country. “One of Morocco’s most popular news outlets Hespress wrote that ‘the waves of incursions into Ceuta and the attempts to cross that later extended to Melilla have brought back to the fore the debate on the social and economic situation in the areas bordering the two enclaves. . . . What happened once again shines a light on the cities’ connection with their Moroccan environment and the complexities of their historical and sovereignty dossier.’”[3] Dossier? The attempt to primp the statement using misplaced diplomatic language flies in the face of the sheer chaos on the ground in Ceuta on 30 July, 2026. Disagreements on a “dossier” do not justify tens of thousands of illegal crossings in utter disregard for the laws and government of the receiving city, state, and federal union.

The existence of the latter, the European Union, in which Spain, which in turn includes Ceuta, is a state, enabled the North Africans to exploit a vulnerability in the federal system, for states’ rights ideologues (i.e., Euroskeptics) had been successful in blocking a stronger federal role in patrolling the E.U.’s territorial borders. The extant state-centric bricolage of immigration laws could easily be exploited without the Commission being able to fill the gaps. The Schengen Agreement, which allows for the free movement of people within the E.U., is flimsy at best. In the wake of the chaos in Ceuta, “Italy’s Interior Ministry . . . ordered the closure of the [state’s] sea and air borders with Spain, temporarily suspending the Schengen free movement regime” between the two E.U. states.[4] Imagine if Texas were able to close its borders to people coming from California were its government to suddenly open the flood-gates to illegal immigrants coming up from Mexico to California. We don’t have to imagine the government of Texas sending illegal immigrants from that U.S. member-state to Illinois.[5] Were the U.S. border subject only to a Schengen-like agreement between some of the member-states, chaos could be expected not only by interlarding migrants, but also between the states. The refusal of the E.U. state of Italy to accept people arriving from another E.U. state undermines the E.U. itself, and demonstrates just how fragile its state-dominated federal system has was even the case in 2026.

The statement at the time by Antonio Tajani, a state official of Italy, relates the state’s unilateral suspension of Schengen regarding the E.U. state of Spain to shoring up the E.U.’s borders: “The temporary suspension of Schengen with Spain is a necessary choice to safeguard the security of our citizens and defend the European borders.”[6] By “our citizens,” Tanjana was referring to those of the state of Italy, the interests of whom are not necessarily the same as those of E.U. citizens throughout the Union. This difference—between the interests of a part and the whole of which the part is just a part—is precisely why the protection of E.U. borders warranted more federal authority, rather than just the Schengen “patch-work” that could so easily be undone by “necessary” choices by state governments. In the U.S., the federalizing of regulating interstate commerce occurred because states such as New York and New Jersey were penalizing trade from each other by instituting duties under the Articles of Confederation. Whereas that confederation, which lasted from 1981-1789, consisted of fully sovereign countries, the E.U. states are semi-sovereign, just as U.S. states are because both the E.U. and U.S. have enumerated competencies or powers reserved for the federal level. By acting like a confederation with regard to border control, the E.U. played into the hands of Morocco and its citizens who illegally crossed into the E.U., such that E.U. citizens were vulnerable even to the excuse that bad economic conditions in a country outside of the E.U. gives rise to a natural right to enter the E.U. illegally as if no governments existed in Ceuta, Spain, and the E.U. itself even with respect to its borders.

Were unemployment a suitable justification to enter another country illegally, there would be chaos in both the E.U. and U.S. as it would be “open season” from Africa and Central America to cross international borders as if they did not exist. To disregard the laws of another country by entering without its government’s permission is so presumptuous in fact that the underlying mentality alone can be treated as a red-flag. The vulnerability in the E.U.’s state-centric federal system was particularly exposed because the government and state media of Morocco enabled such a mentality by citing a sovereignty dispute and bad domestic social and economic conditions as if these justify illegal immigration. In short, the E.U. should not have had to rely on the Schengen Agreement, which was as of 2026 only between some but not all E.U. states anyway. Even treating the sovereignty dispute as a Moroccan-Spanish concern belies the structural integrity of the E.U. as a federal union in which the E.U.’s borders are properly a matter of concern to the Union rather than just its states.

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1. Chaima Chihi, “Sovereignty, Sarcasm, Blame: How North Africa Reacted to Ceuta Crisis,” Euronews.com, 31 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Gabriele Barbati and Greta Ruffino, “Italy Suspends Schengen with Spain over Ceuta Migrant Crisis, Closes Air and Sea Borders,” Euronews.com, 31 July, 2026.
5. In fact, Chicago’s O’hare Airport closed its regional-bus transit facility to accommodate the incoming immigrants from Texas.
6. Gabriele Barbati and Greta Ruffino, “Italy Suspends Schengen with Spain over Ceuta Migrant Crisis, Closes Air and Sea Borders,” Euronews.com, 31 July, 2026.

Trade or Foreign Policy: The E.U. on Illegal Israeli Settlements

During the summer of 2026, the E.U. found itself at one point trying to make the unnecessarily arduous and utterly artificial distinction between trade and foreign policy as if they were mutually exclusive. This task was foisted on the Council of Ministers due to the domain-specific application of the state veto, which is to say, the requirement of unanimity. The sheer artificiality was outdone only by the absurdity of any of 27 states still being able to veto proposed federal law and policy in some but not all policy domains, and thus hamstring the E.U. even when the good of the whole, supported by the vast majority of states and E.U. citizens, supported action on the federal level. The global context at the time with respect to international relations belied a stark separation of trade from foreign policy.

In declaring a recommencement of a naval blockade on Iranian ports on July 13, 2026, for example, U.S. President Trump also said the U.S. would “be reimbursed, at the rate of 20% on all cargo shipped for any and all costs necessary to do the job of providing safety and security” to ships passing through the Hormuz Strait.[1] As a countering move of rhetoric, “Iran’s military command insisted it would not allow the US to ‘interfere’ in the key conduit for oil and gas, while also warning its Gulf neighbours—who have borne the brunt of Tehran’s attacks—against cooperating” with the U.S.[2] Clearly, trade itself, and especially protecting its conduit, can be seen as being closely intertwined with foreign policy in this case. The rising price of oil was clearly on Trump’s mind, especially with the “midterm” elections less than four months away, but also standing up to the Iranian military attacks on ships in the strait was also a probable motive, rather than merely to make “toll” money on shipping in the Middle East. In other words, political economy, rather than just business and economics, best describes the interlacing of trade and foreign policy. 

In fact, historically, the field known today as economics spun out of political economy. Even in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, a non-mercantilist, regulative role of government in protecting competitive markets and even the role of the state in covering the “social” costs of capitalism, such as in providing housing and food to the unemployed, for example, are salient. Left to its own devises, a competitive market could concentrate into an oligopoly or even a monopoly as the refining industry did in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in North America, where oil was first discovered.

Therefore, it can be regarded as a legal fiction of sorts that the E.U. would treat a legislative proposal to ban trade with Israeli settlements, such as covered most of the land in the West Bank by 2026, illegally according both to international and E.U. law, as a matter of trade rather than foreign policy so only qualified majority voting rather than the unanimous consent that is necessary on foreign-policy proposals would be needed to pass the Council of Ministers. Referring to that council, the E.U.’s federal foreign minister Kallas reported, “The option that got the most support was banning the trade with the illegal settlements.”[3] She was referring to the E.U.’s states, which are represented both in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, similar to U.S. states being represented in the U.S. Senate. In American parlance, the consensus among “senators” was to ban all trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, which by 2026 was down to the West Bank as Israel had razed Gaza to the ground in a holocaustic genocide. That the consensus was not instead to ban all trade with Israel as well as its illegal settlements, given the state-sponsored destruction of Gaza, is another question, which presumably would also qualify to be decided in the Council by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity, for trade even as foreign policy is still trade.

That the E.U. still made such a distinction as to the voting threshold in 2026 even as the Union was considering adding more states to the east even though foreign policy and trade had become so integrally related in international relations generally can be said to be artificial, and thus irrationally political rather than having merit in the functioning of the E.U.’s federal system. In fact, even at 27 states, the requirement of reaching unanimity on legislation and policy in the European Council and the Council of Ministers (aka Council of the E.U.) had already made it very difficult to pass even widely favored proposals due to Viktor Orbán’s “Euroskeptic” (i.e., anti-federalist) ideology. In other words, he was able to undercut the E.U. from within, and yet even months after his fall from power in the E.U. state of Hungary, the matter of subjecting the matter of deciding how to vote on whether to ban trade with illegal settlements was still arduous! Even though Kallas was the foreign minister of the E.U. (under the stealth misnomer of “High Representative” to satisfy anti-federalists), banning trade falls under trade primarily, and thus qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity. Perhaps a more robust, courageous, foreign-policy proposal worthy of human-rights and even just international-law proponents would have been to ban trade with Israel en toto, but even such a proposal would fall under trade and thus rightly be subject to qualified-majority voting. Moreover, with 27 states, and thus 27 political opinions of sitting governors, that the Councils still subjected any decision to unanimity especially after Viktor Orbán suggests that the need to distinguish trade from foreign policy anyway could and should have been obviated by common sense. 

That on 13 July, 2026, “a majority of member states . . . backed framing the measures as a trade rather than a foreign policy tool, which would avoid the need of all E.U. [state] governments to unanimously back the move” should have been enough because, simply put, banning trade is about trade, which is subject to qualified-majority voting.[4] The “move” should not have been needed in the first place, were enough Europeans convinced that the very existence of the state-veto in the Councils is an antiquated notion based on the former days before the E.U. when the states were fully sovereign, rather than semi-sovereign in a political union, which also has some governmental sovereignty. In fact, qualified-majority voting itself is an instance of such sovereignty because states on the losing end of such a vote must obey the decision nonetheless. 

Therefore, the very continuance of the state veto is predicated on denial. Put another way, the world was moving forward; why, then, were the E.U. state governments so utterly intractable, so beheld to their own power, even as the E.U. was poised to add even more states without first jettisoning the requirement of unanimity in the two councils that represent states? Perhaps the Parliament and the Commission should have been delegated more authority at the federal level until the states could get their act together in the two federal councils.

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1. Aleksandar Brezar and Peter Barabas, “Trump Reimposes U.S. Blockade and Demands 20% Hormuz Shipping Fee,” Euronews.com, 13 July 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Mared G. Jones, “Full Ban on Israeli Settlement Trade Gets ‘Most Support’ from EU Countries, Kallas Says,” Euronews.com, 13 July, 2026.
4. Ibid.

Georgia and Georgia: Aspiring and Settled States

While one Georgia was secure as a member-state in the U.S., another Georgia was finding itself being frozen out of not only accession talks with the E.U., but also being invited as a “NATO partner” to attend the NATO meeting in June, 2026. It is ironic that whereas the first Georgia had delegated some of its sovereignty to the U.S. in 1789, the second Georgia was unhappy remaining fully sovereign outside of the E.U. rather than as one of the semi-sovereign E.U. states. Giving up some governmental sovereignty can be a “step up,” and, with that comes certain requirements in terms of good governance.

Although “Georgia’s ruling party representatives claimed that the [NATO] summit in Ankara did not include the type of meetings Georgia used to attend in the past . . ., Georgian Dream MP Irakli Kirtskhalia told the press in Tbilisi that ‘we have no problem attending the summit, (sic) ask the organizers why we are not represented.’”[1] The party representatives were artfully deflecting, whereas Kirkskhalia was pointing journalists to the real reason for Georgia’s absence. Georgia’s government had not been invited to the NATO meeting, even though other partners of NATO, including Qatar, UAE, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Ukraine, and Australia were. At the root of the problem was a lack of trust.

That Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili “travelled to Tehran to attend the funeral of the late Ayatolla Ali Khamenei” instead did not exactly win Georgia much trust in the West.[2] The signal that such an action sent outdid any positive words of potential partnership with NATO. A political analyst in Georgia, Paata Zakareishvili, “claimed that the absence of NATO’s invitation to its regional security debates represents what he called the loss of trust by Georgia’s partners.”[3] In fact, he went so far as to admit, “Georgia is being ignored.”[4] He added that Georgia had been aspiring to be part of the alliance, and that “Georgia and Ukraine used to move toward NATO membership together.”[5] Considering Russian President Putin’s strident opposition to Ukraine being in the international alliance, Georgia should have had an easier way in. Instead, he said, “Georgia is no longer being considered anywhere.”[6] Anywhere turns out to be important, for, according to Georgia’s former ambassador to NATO Levan Dolidze, “what is far more damaging is Georgia’s absence from discussions within the European Union.”[7] Such discussions pertained to Georgia possibly gaining statehood in the Union; and, yes, statehood does indeed imply the existence of a federal political system.

As is clear from Georgia in the U.S., being a member-state in a political union wherein both the union and states are semi-sovereign is much more significant than being invited as a partner to a meeting of an international alliance. Even though the U.S. Senate and the Council of the E.U. (and the European Council) are founded on principles of international law, neither union can be said to be an international organization. Indeed, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament are founded on national rather than international political principles (i.e., citizens rather than polities are represented, and by population). Both unions can be said to be hybrids forged from the hard political compromises made in the U.S. Constitutional Convention, when the arrangement of fully sovereign countries under the Articles of Confederation were dismissed as too suboptimal for political agency.

Although near the end of 2025, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze insisted that Georgia’s accession-path to statehood “remains steady and irreversible” such that becoming a state by 2030 was still “both realistic and attainable,” the E.U. froze Georgia mid-stream in June, 2026 after the Georgian government had passed a “foreign influence” law that the Commission “described as Russian-inspired and authoritarian against the backdrop of massive anti-government protests in Tbilisi.”[8] The trip to the funeral in Tehran in July didn’t exactly help speed Georgia along either. It did not matter, as Kobakhidze claimed, that Georgia was ahead of all other prospective, aspiring states in economic progress indicators; the problem was one of trust, both regarding democratic values at home and the choice of allies abroad. Even though technicians—pedestrians really—were doubtlessly focusing narrowly on whether the accession criteria were being met, it is important not to lose sight of the big picture.

Was the Georgia “Western” enough not merely to join in an international military alliance, but also to become a semi-sovereign state in a political, federal union? Or would the Georgian government be a “Trojan horse” whose strings would be pulled by Russia’s autocratic and militaristically aggressive Putin? Although from the strategic standpoint of the West, bringing in as many former Soviet Republics as possible may seem optimal because such a move would deprive Russia of being able to “bring them home,” filtering by applying the “sufficiently Western” test is better because then neither the Western military alliance nor the European Union (and the United States, indirectly) would be weakened from within. 

The Georgia that has been a member of the U.S. since the beginning of that political union (and, even earlier, when the U.S. had just been a military alliance and then a confederation of sovereign countries), had tried to “Georexit” in 1861 but was subsequently brought back “into the fold.” Would the Georgia that was shut out of the E.U. in 2026 follow in the footsteps of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary at the expense of federal foreign policy and the defense of the E.U. itself from foreign threats, and ultimately even accomplish “Georexit”? Already Britain had seceded from that political union, and the vote in favor of secession was mainly a reaction against the fact that E.U. states are semi-sovereign rather than fully sovereign, which pertains instead to a confederation such as that of the American Articles. No significant difference with E.U. foreign policy was involved in Britain’s decision to secede. Georgia, on the other hand, would need to prove its loyalty not only to rule-of-law democracy, but also to the West (rather than to Russia or Iran), besides being willing to cede some of its sovereignty in order to be considered and ready for statehood in the E.U.

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1. Peter Barabas, “Georgia Left Off NATO Summit Partner List as Critics Decry Isolation,” Euronews.com, 10 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance

On 7 July, 2026, speaking at NATO’s Summit Defense Industry Forum in Turkey, Ukrainian President Zelensky made the case that Ukraine should be in the NATO military alliance even though that country was still being invaded by Russia, so the activation of the alliance’s article 5’s mutual-defense mandate would be dicey to say the least. Accepting an existing “hot spot” into the alliance would be risky not least because of any immediate expectations of having to join a fight already in progress, but also because of what Russia’s President Putin’s reaction might be. Zelensky’s remarks can thus be regarded as partial, or one-sided, from the standpoint of a full geo-political and military-strategic analysis.

Not coincidentally just ahead of the full NATO meeting, Zelensky claimed that the Ukrainian military had become a “source of extraordinary defensive capability” in Europe due to the country’s rapid advance in military technology involving drones.[1] Ukraine had even become a provider of advanced drone technology as Gulf states sought it to intercept Iranian missiles. “We have completely eliminated the very idea of Russia having a strategic rear,” Zelensky said.[2] One day earlier, according to Euronews, “Ukrainian forces carried out  drone strike on an oil refinery in the city of Omsk, hitting the country’s most important fuel production site more than 2,500km from the Russia-Ukraine border.”[3] In his speech, Zelensky said of the successful military strike, “this is not an exception. It’s the new reality and there is no major oil refinery left in Russia that has not been struck by Ukraine.”[4] Indeed, videos of Russians physically fighting at gas stations amid the resulting gas shortage were being shared on social media around the world.

Nevertheless, U.S. President Trump had ruled out Ukraine joining the military alliance, though the interest of Middle Eastern countries in Ukraine’s drone technology to fight against Iran could find a receptive ear in the White House. Even though Trump had a reputation for engaging in transactional rather than transformational leadership, his opposition to Ukraine being in the alliance could stem from concern as to how the sitting Russian president might react. The invasion was at least in part motivated out of concern that Ukraine would bring NATO to Russia’s door step. Were this to become a reality, Putin might decide to reinvigorate his invasion rather than sue for peace. Rather than joining a Western military alliance, Ukraine could strike a good compromise with Russia by becoming a state in the European Union, which is a political union that is economically rather than militarily oriented, unlike the United States. Furthermore, Putin had little to fear in 2026 from a coordinated and concerted E.U. military intervention in Ukraine, given the veto power retained by the states in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. due to the principle of unanimity applying in matters of defense and foreign policy. That the E.U. had outgrown every state government holding a potential veto, the internal resistance to even necessary reform of the E.U. could be counted on to hold the union back from being a united military threat to Russia.

In short, Russia’s President Putin would be more comfortable with the E.U. moving eastward, as the U.S. moved westward in the nineteenth century, than with Ukraine joining an international military alliance. To the extent that President Trump’s objection to Ukraine joining NATO was based on how Putin would be likely to react, and that Ukraine could become an E.U. state instead, Zelensky’s speech can be viewed as one-sided, and thus as vulnerable to its blind side. In fact, if the first President Bush had promised Russia that reunifying Germany would not result in NATO reaching the Russian border, Putin could become especially obstinate were Ukraine to become a member of the Western military alliance because that would mean that the U.S. will have reneged on its promise. It is best not to provoke a bear even with passive aggression. Were NATO to enter Ukrainian territory militarily to fight against the invasion directly, active aggression would be overlaid on the passive aggression that is inherent to reneging unilaterally on a promise without cause. Zelensky’s citing of the utility to NATO that Ukraine could bring to the alliance in terms of military technology “on the cutting edge” can therefore be viewed as missing the big picture in which Ukraine and NATO can be situated even including an historical context. Whereas narrow, “valued added” utility may suffice for a private business, the political domain is much broader.

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1. Sasha Vakulina, “Zelenskyy Renews Call for Ukraine’s NATO Membership Citing Military Might Ahead of Summit,” Euronews.com, 7 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Europe: Over- and Under-Represented in the G7

I contend that in having both federal and state-level officials attending the G7 international meetings, Europe is over-represented even as the E.U. itself is sidelined. At least this was the case at the meeting in June, 2026 in the E.U. state of France. The staying power of the seven countries comprising the Group could be considered as antiquated, given the relevance and importance of the E.U. in international relations. The very intractability of institutional arrangements (i.e., structures) even in the face of a changing political environment can thus be viewed as problematic. By implication, the exclusion of the E.U. from the United Nations international organization can be viewed as effectively relegating the UN as a structurally-frozen “has been” by the 2020s.

The relevance of the E.U. being at the G7 meeting in Evian-les-Bains can be ascertained by the public statements of federal officials just before the meeting. Speaking on E.U. sanctions against Iran, E.U. President Von der Leyen said that they would remain in force unless or until “real change” occurs “on the ground.”[1] The Iran War was on the itinerary at the G7 meeting, and so too was the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a topic very much on the E.U.’s radar screen.  Nevertheless, at a pre-meeting press conference with the head of the E.U. state of France, Emmanuel Macron rather than with the federal president, U.S. federal President Trump said that his administration would return its diplomatic focus back to Russia’s invasion now that the U.S.’s conflict with Iran had been at least temporarily discontinued. An implication from the visuals of Trump being at a joint press conference with the head of an E.U. state is that the latter could legitimately undermine Von der Leyen in negotiating independently with Russia on the matter of Ukraine. Of course, visuals have nothing to do with politics (i.e., political reality), I write heavily with sarcasm.

Furthermore, even though Macron was “keen to portray the G7 as united in the face of unfair Chinese competition,” international trade is an exclusive competency (i.e., enumerated power) of the E.U. rather than its states. In fact, on the very day on which the G7 meeting began, “E.U. Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said . . . that EU-China relations needed a ‘reset’ and that engagement with Beijing had to deliver ‘concrete outcomes.’”[2] Noting that the status quo was no longer sustainable, Sefcovic said, “Our trading relationship with China has reached a point that requires a reset, not confrontation, but rebalancing.”[3] Macron would not be in charge of the rebalancing. To quote from the disgraced former head of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, Macron missed an opportunity to shut up; Sarkozy had made the statement in regard to a governor of one of the E.U.’s eastern states as if they were inferior. Such is the danger in the media giving the governors of large states such prominent positioning. It is thus no small measure that E.U. President Von der Leyen spoke before the meeting on the E.U.’s trade deficit with China; interestingly, even she tacitly undermined her position as a federal official in noting “that 2025was the first time in history that all 27 [member states of the E.U.] had recorded a trade deficit with China.”[4] It was the Commission, rather than the state of France, that was “currently looking into ways to diversity supply chains, boost domestic production of strategic sectors and address trade distortions, such as subsidies and coercion” by China.[5] Accordingly, Von der Leyen rather than Macron of France should have been prominent both publicly and at the meeting on the topic of trade with China from the standpoint of the E.U., of which France, as a state, is but a part. That Macron said at the time that he was “’optimistic’ that G7 leaders would reach an agreement on critical raw materials” can thus safely be relegated, for trade is an exclusive E.U. competency. If, as read it, Macron was referring only to the leaders of the seven countries and thus excluding his own federal president (whose competencies include trade!), then something was indeed amiss with the official membership list at G7 meetings. A strong argument can thus be made that the E.U. president, rather than any governors of E.U. states, should have been on the membership list.

As rational as such an argument may be, the staying power of existent institutional arrangements is formidable. The E.U. could thus enjoy being represented several times over by governors of E.U. states at international meetings and even organizations including the United Nations. Governmentally, the fact that the E.U.’s federal system includes dual sovereignty, wherein both the states and the Union enjoy some governmental sovereignty, just as in the case of the U.S. wherein its states too hold residual sovereignty, means that the president of the E.U. should have an official place at the table and sit opposite U.S. President Trump at pre-meeting press conferences. Furthermore, that the U.S. could not be represented in multiples by having governors of large states also have official places at international meetings means that it is only fair that the governors of large E.U. states also be excluded. My argument is thus based as much on the fairness that is implicit in symmetry as on the relevance of the E.U. on the topics of the G7 itinerary at the meeting that ironically took place in the E.U. in June, 2026.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro et al, “G7 Summit: US to Focus Again on Ukraine after Deal with Iran, Trump Says,” Euronews.com, 15 June 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

The E.U. as a Mediator between Russia and Ukraine: A Conflict of Interest

To be a neutral arbitrator of a conflict between two other countries, a government cannot favor one of the two; otherwise, the veneer of neutrality is undercut by the interest of preferring one position over the other. The duty to act neutrally, which the role of arbitrator includes or implies, can be exploited by the subterranean—or even explicit!—non-normative, private-benefits interest to support one of the two sides. To put one’s own private interest above a broader-benefitting interest, such as in entailed in a duty to act neutrally, is to exploit a conflict of interest. Governments can exploit conflicts of interest. With regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the E.U.’s foreign minister (or de facto commissioner) disabused the public of any thoughts that the E.U. could, and thus would, be a neutral arbitrator between Russia and Ukraine. Such transparency lies in stark contrast to the illusory impression by the U.S. that it was in any position to arbitrate between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, for the U.S. was firmly on the side of Israel.

As Russia was bombing civilian housing in Kiev, Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s federal foreign minister, explicitly ruled out a role for the E.U. in arbitrating negotiations between Kiev and Moscow. “One thing is very clear: Europe will never be a neutral mediator between Russia and Ukraine, because we are on Ukraine’s side and we are defending our own security interests,” Kallas said toward the end of May, 2026.[1] To mediate between two parties requires being neutral as to both sides and their respective positions; otherwise, credibility is zerstoert from day one of any negotiation session. To pretend to be neutral even just by assuming the air as a mediator, such as the U.S. had done not only with regard to Russia and Ukraine, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, to Israel and Gaza, is to exploit a conflict of interest, which is unethical. That proposals by the U.S. in either conflict would be regarded as credible requires a naivety that is itself enabling as to the exploitation. In its direct conflict with Iran, at least the U.S. was not pretending to be a mediator, for surely a direct combatant in a conflict cannot possibly be neutral.

Therefore, Kallas did the world a service in explicitly stating in regard to the Russian-Ukrainian War, “We can’t be neutral, treating them equally, because we have been clearly on Ukraine’s side.”[2] Such transparent frankness may seem unnecessary; however, given the attempts by the U.S. to claim neutrality in conflicts in which the Americans have hardly been neutral, Kallas’ statement is of value. The E.U. need not have assumed neutrality to be of assistance to Ukraine. That country’s foreign minister, Andrii Shyiiba, said that “the E.U. should focus on ‘precise, doable steps,’ such as the demilitarisation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and the establishment of humanitarian corridors.”[3] Therefore, Ukraine was not calling on the E.U. to be mediator. That the E.U. could not be; unfortunately, even helping Ukraine was a tall order—a needlessly difficult chore for the E.U.

To the extent that the U.S. was in favor of Russia gaining Ukrainian territory even though by illegal invasion, Shyyiiba’s instance that the E.U. “must represent one united European voice,” given the direct federal role of the governors of the 27 E.U. states in foreign policy, was important. Put another way, to the extent that the U.S. leaned toward Russian President Putin’s position that a land-grab is de facto valid internationally (possession being nine-tenths of ownership), Ukraine desperately needed the E.U. to take difficult decisions resulting in specific federal policies helpful to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. The reason for the difficulty can be tied to the requirement in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers), which represents the states (as the U.S. Senate represents states), that decisions on policy and law be unanimous. Just imagine if every U.S. senator could wield a veto on behalf of the residual sovereignty of one’s state!

Unanimity is inconsistent with the dual (or split) governmental sovereignty that is characteristic of early-modern federalism, as distinct from confederalism in which the states retain full sovereignty (nonplena foedus, as per Althusius’s 1603 theory of federalism). Whereas Althusius saw only the alternatives of full and not-full federalism—wherein the federal head or the states enjoy sovereignty, the American compromise of dual-sovereignty “split the atom” of unitary governmental sovereignty and the E.U., but not any of its states, is based on that compromise, rather than either of Althusius’ types of federalism.

With regard to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the foreign minister (i.e., Secretary of State) of the U.S., Marco Rubio, said, “The US stands ready and prepared to help to do whatever we can to help facilitate the end of this war, and hopefully the opportunity will present itself at some point.”[4] However, offers to facilitate, a word that connotes neutrality, do not usually stand back, waiting for an opportunity to arise. Such a tenuous position may implicitly say that the U.S. would step into a facilitating role whenever Putin, rather than Zelensky, wants it. Kallas’ position that the E.U. would complement the role of the U.S. not only is in tension with the E.U.’s partiality toward Ukraine, but also assumes that the U.S. was sufficiently neutral to have credibility in facilitating negotiations between the warring countries, but at least Kallas was transparent as to the stance of the E.U. being pro-Ukrainian—something from which the U.S. could take a lesson.

Just as a person who already has a girlfriend or boyfriend and is doing that one’s bidding should not be assumed to be neutral with respect to a potential usurper’s interests even though that new connection represents a potentially deeper flame of romance, President Trump’s “bromance” with Putin (and Netanyahu—irrespective of what the International Criminal Court had to say about those two “bad boys”) should not have been lost on Zelensky in his endeavors to influence Trump to distance himself from Putin and come closer to Ukraine’s side. Even the promise of a ring made of rare earths could not be assumed to be enough for the gold-loving Trump. If the proverbial card deck is stacked in favor of the existing relationship, the newcomer should look elsewhere for love, especially once he or she sees that the preference and indeed the loyalty of the person being sought lies with someone else who is actually calling the shots behind the scenes. “Distance yourself emotionally and physically from the potential usurper!” an existing boyfriend or girlfriend might say during a visit. From that point on, the usurper is easy prey, being emotionally vulnerable to the new beloved, and should flee from that person, who is actually an agent, to higher ground with haste. Hence, Zelensky turned to the E.U. from having beseeched the U.S. in vain. That deck had already been stacked in favor of Putin, so Zelensky didn’t have a chance. Go to Putin; he is your type, Zelensky could have told Trump before closing the door; I’m going to Von der Leyen. That she and her foreign minister had trouble getting the E.U. to speak with one voice at the federal level is thus truly a hindrance (but Trump would be jealous anyway). Too bad; you had your chance. You’re stuck with the other guy, who holds you at a distance as a trophy, Zelensky could have told Trump harmlessly from a distance. I believe the actual term in the Castro is trophy whore. The pains of hell await anyone who falls in love with such a creature; Zelensky was too smart for that. But enough of subterranean homoeroticism applied to politicians on the world stage; I'll leave to the reader the matter of whether the term translates over to Trump's wives.

Meanwhile, Ukraine and especially Gaza were being ravaged by hostile aggressors with impunity and perhaps too much testosterone. Of course, Nietzsche claims that our natural instincts are best suited to the state of nature—that our species is “well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure” but that within society (and a world order), those instincts have been “disvalued and ‘suspended’” such that “all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man” have been “turned backward against man himself.”[5] Perhaps Nietzsche would applaud the collapse of the post-World-War-II world-order, with the reversion back to Hobbes’ state of nature being accomplished as if by fiat by aggressor states, for Putin, Netanyahu, and even Trump himself doubtlessly felt no “bad conscience” in having commenced unprovoked military maneuvers in the 2020s ironically amid the progress of the species technologically and thus in a narrow sense. Nietzsche would be the first to point out that human nature has not changed, and that our artificial societal/cultural cages are a problem rather than the solution; indeed, they have made humankind into a problem as externally-oriented instinctual urges have been turned inward. But what of the instinctual urge to be humane? What of that of compassion? What of love? Are these instincts not native to our species too? If so, why not restrain military aggressors from being free-wheeling actors jumping into the power-vacuum left by the impotent UN and ICC? Must life be short, nasty, and brutish, as it was for too many people in Ukraine and especially Gaza even when Kallas was making her statement in 2026 after having just met with divided state-level officials in the E.U. on Ukraine?

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “E.U. Will Never Be a Neutral Mediator Between Ukraine and Russia, Says Kallas,” Euronews.com, 28 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Trans and Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), Second Essay, Sec. 16, pp. 520-21.

Vendetta Violence: Israeli Settlers Sanctioned by the E.U.

What a difference even just a month can make. On 11 May, 2026, the E.U. enacted sanctions against “Israeli settlers over their violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, a move enabled by backing from Hungary’s incoming government.”[1] A month earlier, Viktor Orbán was the sitting prime minister of the E.U. state of Hungary. As a supporter of U.S. President Trump, who in turn supported Israel even in its decimation of Gaza razing entire cities into leveled ground for real estate “properties,” Orbán would have wielded Hungary’s veto in the European Council.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, marveled at the time, “We move from political deadlock that was there for a long time. Violence and extremism carry consequences.”[2] The long time is likely a reference to Orbán’s 16 years in power in the E.U. state of Hungary, and her point overall is that with that governor out of the European Council, the E.U. can inflict consequences on foreign actors who engage in violence under the aegis of some extremist ideology. In the case of the Israeli settlers, the ideology is Zionism, which in coming from a religious text has overreached into the political domain, even circumventing international law.

That the violence occurred in the occupied West Bank renders Israel itself especially culpable, for under international law, “all settlements are considered illegal, with the International Court of Justice describing the State of Israel’s ‘continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ as ‘unlawful.’”[3] Both the unprovoked violence of the settlers and the Israeli government’s attempted holocaustic genocide of the population of Gaza are on top of the fact that Israel has no justified basis internationally to even be in Gaza and the West Bank. In other words, Israel is two degrees of separation from being a lawful state in terms of international law. That the Netanyahu government was able to ignore that law so easily suggests that there is no such thing as international law—that only guidelines were by then operating in the collapsed post-World War II global order. In a Hobbesian state of nature, no law exists because no international or global government exists. No world federation certainly, which Kant admitted in Perpetual Peace would only make world peace possible but not probable.

The recurrent violence and theft was being committed even in broad daylight by Israeli settlers against defenseless Palestinians—even walking into their houses and nonchalantly taking appliances and furniture!—because impunity must surely have been assured by means of the tacit approval of a government that, after all, had been determined by the UN to have committed a genocide in Gaza. The violations of human rights occurred on both the societal and interpersonal level. A counter-move international could therefore be expected beyond the E.U. sanctioning individual settlers and related organizations.

Given the harm that was being unleashed directly or indirectly by the Israeli government, Kallas’ claim that violence and extremism abroad would trigger negative consequences by the E.U. rings hollow because those consequences are so inadequate to meet the magnitude and depth of the suffering, both interpersonally and at the societal level (i.e., an entire people). So even though a month made a difference in the European Council, the global “community” was still holding back from enforcing international law. With no other enforcement mechanism, can such law even be called law?

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1. Maia de la Baume, “E.U. Approves Sanctions on Israeli Settlers after Hungarian Backing,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Vanquishing the Principle of Unanimity in E.U. Foreign Policy: On the Impact of Oil

There nothing like a sudden dramatic spike in the price of oil in Europe from a war in Iran to prompt E.U. leaders to make speeches as if hell is freezing over and drastic action is urgently needed in terms of federal rather than piecemeal-state foreign policy. Behind President Von der Leyen’s call for the E.U. to do more in foreign policy was her point that the union could no longer afford the principle of unanimity in the European Council in foreign policy. The Iran War had raised the price not only of oil, but also of the unanimity requirement in the Council not only in foreign policy, but also defense. With 27 states at the time and an increasingly belligerent international context, including military aggression against Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the E.U. could not rely on a world order regulated by international law. The spike in gas prices, even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, brought this point close to home.

As the U.S. began its military attacks in Iran, “European benchmark gas prices jumped 80% in two days while brent crude edged closer to 84 dollars a barrel.”[1] When oil prices surpassed €87 ($100) per barrel roughly a week into the war, Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary “called on the European Union to suspend sanctions on Russian energy imports.”[2] Never mind that Russia’s 4 year-old unimpeded invasion of Ukraine was a threat on the E.U.’s eastern border; restoring cheaper gas prices was more important, at least to Hungary. The E.U.’s geopolitical interests do not reduce to a state’s economic interests, however, and so President Von der Leyen spoke on the need for a more active E.U. foreign policy.

It was not the first time that the president had warned that the traditional world order was “rapidly crumbling under mounting violations of international law.”[3] In her speech, she said, “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return.”[4] There had been too many cases of breaches of international law with impunity as the UN and the International Criminal Court stood by utterly impotent. E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas “pointed the finger at Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine . . . as the cataclysm that precipitated the ‘erosion of international law’ . . . and enabled the return of what she described as ‘coercive power politics.”[5] In her speech, Kallas said, “That (invasion) did not go unnoticed. Instead, it sent a signal around the world that there is no more accountability for one’s actions: the rulebook has been thrown out of the window.”[6] Netanyahu’s government in Israel could unleash a holocaustic genocide in Gaza with a presumption of impunity, and Trump’s government in the U.S. could forcibly remove the president of Venezuela and kill Iran’s highest figure without fear of being held accountable by the U.N. or the International Criminal Court. Militaristic aggression was gaining a foothold in the world as international organizations stood by in utter impotence. The very notion of law at the international level could be surmised to be a misnomer.

Finally, E.U. officials were feeling a sense of urgency from war abroad because the sudden spike in oil and gas prices in Europe from Trump’s military attacks in Iran could not be ignored. Kallas stressing “that a rules-based international order is vital to avoid the inevitable anarchy” was no longer enough.[7] “Von der Leyen added another key priority on which the EU should focus to reinforce its geopolitical clout: its internal decision-making rules.”[8] Problematically, the E.U.’s foreign policy was bound by the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. such that “the 27 member states must agree on a common line of action before moving forward.”[9] So it only took the E.U. state of Hungary to veto the $91 billion loan for Ukraine, and the E.U. was stymied in coming up with a foreign policy on Trump’s military attacks against Iran because of differences between the states. Alternatively, going by qualified-majority voting would have enabled a consensus (i.e., short of unanimous consent) that could have become the E.U.’s foreign policy, which would have been much stronger in the world than were the various positions of the 27 state governments.

The relationship is clear between calls for a rules-based international order “with teeth” and a stronger decision-making rule in the European Council in foreign policy (and defense): a more active E.U. in foreign policy (and defense) was necessary due to the increased militaristic aggression abroad because the latter could have a very significant detrimental economic affect in Europe. Political pressure was thus building for the E.U.’s 27 state governments to finally relinquish their veto-power in foreign policy (and defense). Power is not relinquished easily, so not even higher oil and gas prices could be enough pressure for the states to agree to apply qualified-majority voting to foreign policy (and defense).

The mechanism called “enhanced cooperation,” which I contend elsewhere is a misnomer for what is really increased federal authority for at least nine states but not all of them, could be a means to bring qualified majority voting to the E.U.’s foreign policy that would cover only those states that have agreed to relinquish their veto power in that domain. I suspect that eventually, all of the E.U. states would be included, so “enhanced cooperation” can be understood as a temporary device that gets around the conflict of interest facing the state governments in their decisions on whether to allow the E.U. to become more active in foreign policy (and defense) than the principle of unanimity would permit.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “Middle East War Shows ‘Europe Must Reinforce Its Autonomy’, EIB Chief Tells Euronews,” Euronews.com,  4 March 2026.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary Demands EU Lift Sanctions on Russian Energy as Prices Spike amid Iran War,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on Europe to Adapt to Chaotic, Coercive World Order,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

To be sure, U.S. President Trump’s political support of Orbán could be attributed in no small measure to the fact that Orbán had been “the only European leader who openly supported Trump’s re-election campaign.”[4] Rubio even stated at the joint press conference that the “person-to-person connection” that Orbán had “established with the president has made all the difference in the world in building this relationship.”[5] So was Trump willing to bypass the very existence of the E.U. on the strength of his political relationship with Orbán? If so, and if a strong E.U. was actually in the national interest of the U.S., was Trump putting too much emphasis on loyalty to Trump himself?

It can be argued that Viktor Orbán had been pursuing policies that were at odds with the E.U., and more specifically with the ability of the federal institutions to exercise their exclusive and shared competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). In fact, the Commission had withheld funds from the state of Hungary because Orbán’s state administration had violated E.U. law and breached rule-of-law and justice requirements. Furthermore, Orbán had been wielding his state’s veto in the European Council to keep Ukraine from being annexed to the European Union. In fact, the Hungarian leader’s oil-related coziness to Russia’s President Putin had undercut the E.U.’s support of Ukraine militarily and thus enabled Putin’s military aggression. Is the implication for Trump that Putin’s aggression should not be countered by the E.U., or perhaps he preferred that individual E.U. states aid Ukraine militarily? If so, the fruits of collective action, even just by mutual cooperation but more strongly by a federal army, would by implication be contrary to the American national interest, according to the Trump administration.

Relying on the E.U. states as if their mutual coordination would be enough to enable Ukraine to push back the occupying Russian troops and military hardware—a dubious assumption—opens up the possibility that those states could again turn on each other. To forestall or put out military conflicts being waged by the armies (i.e., militias) of the U.S. member-states, U.S. basic laws was made so that Union could have a federal army and the federal president could temporarily coopt a state army for use by the Union. Is it now in the American national interest that the E.U. be given comparable competencies by its states—especially given the astronomical American expense and lives given in the previous century to put out two World Wars, both of which were sourced in European conflicts?

Furthermore, given the policy of the Trump administration to pull back American military support to protect Europe, relying on E.U. states to remilitarize without any militarization of the E.U. itself along with that of its states seems to be counterproductive. Would not the American interest be in line with another Union being like the U.S. rather than the former Articles of Confederation, in which the American states were in a federal Union but still fully sovereign from 1781-1789? Before the Articles, the new republics (i.e., ex-colonies) in the U.S. were sovereign countries in a military alliance. In contrast to the latter two arrangements, the E.U. sports dual-sovereignty.

I contend that it is actually contrary to the strategic interest of the U.S. that the E.U. and its share of governmental competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) be diminished or ignored in favor of the U.S. going it alone with particular E.U. states as if they were still fully sovereign countries. Ignoring an aspect of political reality is not a good basis for going forward in international relations. Furthermore, a bottom-heavy federal system in which the federal governmental institutions are perpetually thwarted by Euroskeptic state governments (e.g., Slovakia and Hungary) even in the carrying out of existing federal competencies is inherently unstable, and thus such a Union could eventually collapse if unimpeded conflicts reach a sufficient severity between particular states, or even if states frustrated by paralysis at the federal level secede from the Union as Britain did, though the rationale for that state seceding arguably had more to do with resistance to the E.U. having any share of governmental sovereignty than with frustration over ineffective bureaucrats in Brussels.

Whereas David Cameron, a former prime minister in Britain preferred that the E.U. be based on something like the American Articles of Confederation (with each state remaining fully sovereign), the American national interest voiced by Rubio in supporting Viktor Orbán viewed the E.U. as a case of the dreaded multilateralism, and thus the E.U. as akin to an international organization like the UN or even NATO. In having a supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), a directly-elected parliament (i.e., the European Parliament), an executive branch headed by a president who could be considered to be the federal president (i.e., the Commission and Usula Von der Leyen, respectively), an upper chamber representing the states (i.e., the European Council and the Council of Ministers), the E.U. cannot be construed as only multilateral or even international in nature. So, Trump’s antipathy toward that Union is not only in error, but also reflects negatively on the basic structure of the American Union because both unions sport modern federalism (i.e., dual sovereignty rather than confederal fully-sovereign states).

That is, Rubio’s position in favor of Orbán not only weakened the E.U., risked American military involvement once again, and strengthened Putin’s military position in Ukraine (because he would not have to fear intervention by a federal E.U. army), but also reflected badly on the U.S.’s federal system. Take the U.S. back to 1826, approximately 33 years after the Americans replaced the confederal Articles with a system of modern, dual-sovereignty-based federalism (such as the E.U. has![6]), and the E.U. at 33 looks a lot like that Union back then. By implication, Trump’s position in 2026 in favor of Euroskeptic Hungary’s leader was in line with supporting anti-federalist states prior to 1861 in the U.S. and completely ignoring the federal institutions and their respective enumerated powers (i.e., competencies) in Washington. Because Trump and Rubio held federal rather than state offices at the time, the position thus reduces to a logical absurdity beyond merely being against multilateralism. 

1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Skip Worden, Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S. (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).