I contend that in having both
federal and state-level officials attending the G7 international meetings, Europe is over-represented even as the E.U. itself is sidelined. At least this
was the case at the meeting in June, 2026 in the E.U. state of France. The
staying power of the seven countries comprising the Group could be considered
as antiquated, given the relevance and importance of the E.U. in international
relations. The very intractability of institutional arrangements (i.e.,
structures) even in the face of a changing political environment can thus be
viewed as problematic. By implication, the exclusion of the E.U. from the United
Nations international organization can be viewed as effectively relegating the
UN as a structurally-frozen “has been” by the 2020s.
The relevance of the E.U.
being at the G7 meeting in Evian-les-Bains can be ascertained by the public statements
of federal officials just before the meeting. Speaking on E.U. sanctions against
Iran, E.U. President Von der Leyen said that they would remain in force unless
or until “real change” occurs “on the ground.”[1]
The Iran War was on the itinerary at the G7 meeting, and so too was the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, a topic very much on the E.U.’s radar screen. Nevertheless, at a pre-meeting press
conference with the head of the E.U. state of France, Emmanuel Macron rather
than with the federal president, U.S. federal President Trump said that his
administration would return its diplomatic focus back to Russia’s invasion now
that the U.S.’s conflict with Iran had been at least temporarily discontinued. An
implication from the visuals of Trump being at a joint press conference with
the head of an E.U. state is that the latter could legitimately undermine Von
der Leyen in negotiating independently with Russia on the matter of Ukraine. Of
course, visuals have nothing to do with politics (i.e., political reality), I
write heavily with sarcasm.
Furthermore, even though
Macron was “keen to portray the G7 as united in the face of unfair Chinese
competition,” international trade is an exclusive competency (i.e., enumerated
power) of the E.U. rather than its states. In fact, on the very day on which
the G7 meeting began, “E.U. Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said . . . that
EU-China relations needed a ‘reset’ and that engagement with Beijing had to
deliver ‘concrete outcomes.’”[2]
Noting that the status quo was no longer sustainable, Sefcovic said, “Our
trading relationship with China has reached a point that requires a reset, not
confrontation, but rebalancing.”[3]
Macron would not be in charge of the rebalancing. To quote from the disgraced
former head of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, Macron missed an opportunity to shut
up; Sarkozy had made the statement in regard to a governor of one of the E.U.’s
eastern states as if they were inferior. Such is the danger in the media giving
the governors of large states such prominent positioning. It is thus no small
measure that E.U. President Von der Leyen spoke before the meeting on the E.U.’s
trade deficit with China; interestingly, even she tacitly undermined her
position as a federal official in noting “that 2025was the first time in
history that all 27 [member states of the E.U.] had recorded a trade deficit
with China.”[4]
It was the Commission, rather than the state of France, that was “currently
looking into ways to diversity supply chains, boost domestic production of
strategic sectors and address trade distortions, such as subsidies and coercion”
by China.[5]
Accordingly, Von der Leyen rather than Macron of France should have been prominent
both publicly and at the meeting on the topic of trade with China from the standpoint
of the E.U., of which France, as a state, is but a part. That Macron said at
the time that he was “’optimistic’ that G7 leaders would reach an agreement on
critical raw materials” can thus safely be relegated, for trade is an exclusive
E.U. competency. If, as read it, Macron was referring only to the leaders
of the seven countries and thus excluding his own federal president (whose
competencies include trade!), then something was indeed amiss with the official
membership list at G7 meetings. A strong argument can thus be made that the
E.U. president, rather than any governors of E.U. states, should have been on
the membership list.
As rational as such an
argument may be, the staying power of existent institutional arrangements is
formidable. The E.U. could thus enjoy being represented several times over by governors
of E.U. states at international meetings and even organizations including the United
Nations. Governmentally, the fact that the E.U.’s federal system includes dual
sovereignty, wherein both the states and the Union enjoy some governmental
sovereignty, just as in the case of the U.S. wherein its states too hold
residual sovereignty, means that the president of the E.U. should have an
official place at the table and sit opposite U.S. President Trump at
pre-meeting press conferences. Furthermore, that the U.S. could not be
represented in multiples by having governors of large states also have official
places at international meetings means that it is only fair that the governors
of large E.U. states also be excluded. My argument is thus based as much on the
fairness that is implicit in symmetry as on the relevance of the E.U. on the topics
of the G7 itinerary at the meeting that ironically took place in the E.U. in
June, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
