The E.U. as a Mediator between Russia and Ukraine: A Conflict of Interest

To be a neutral arbitrator of a conflict between two other countries, a government cannot favor one of the two; otherwise, the veneer of neutrality is undercut by the interest of preferring one position over the other. The duty to act neutrally, which the role of arbitrator includes or implies, can be exploited by the subterranean—or even explicit!—non-normative, private-benefits interest to support one of the two sides. To put one’s own private interest above a broader-benefitting interest, such as in entailed in a duty to act neutrally, is to exploit a conflict of interest. Governments can exploit conflicts of interest. With regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the E.U.’s foreign minister (or de facto commissioner) disabused the public of any thoughts that the E.U. could, and thus would, be a neutral arbitrator between Russia and Ukraine. Such transparency lies in stark contrast to the illusory impression by the U.S. that it was in any position to arbitrate between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, for the U.S. was firmly on the side of Israel.

As Russia was bombing civilian housing in Kiev, Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s federal foreign minister, explicitly ruled out a role for the E.U. in arbitrating negotiations between Kiev and Moscow. “One thing is very clear: Europe will never be a neutral mediator between Russia and Ukraine, because we are on Ukraine’s side and we are defending our own security interests,” Kallas said toward the end of May, 2026.[1] To mediate between two parties requires being neutral as to both sides and their respective positions; otherwise, credibility is zerstoert from day one of any negotiation session. To pretend to be neutral even just by assuming the air as a mediator, such as the U.S. had done not only with regard to Russia and Ukraine, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, to Israel and Gaza, is to exploit a conflict of interest, which is unethical. That proposals by the U.S. in either conflict would be regarded as credible requires a naivety that is itself enabling as to the exploitation. In its direct conflict with Iran, at least the U.S. was not pretending to be a mediator, for surely a direct combatant in a conflict cannot possibly be neutral.

Therefore, Kallas did the world a service in explicitly stating in regard to the Russian-Ukrainian War, “We can’t be neutral, treating them equally, because we have been clearly on Ukraine’s side.”[2] Such transparent frankness may seem unnecessary; however, given the attempts by the U.S. to claim neutrality in conflicts in which the Americans have hardly been neutral, Kallas’ statement is of value. The E.U. need not have assumed neutrality to be of assistance to Ukraine. That country’s foreign minister, Andrii Shyiiba, said that “the E.U. should focus on ‘precise, doable steps,’ such as the demilitarisation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and the establishment of humanitarian corridors.”[3] Therefore, Ukraine was not calling on the E.U. to be mediator. That the E.U. could not be; unfortunately, even helping Ukraine was a tall order—a needlessly difficult chore for the E.U.

To the extent that the U.S. was in favor of Russia gaining Ukrainian territory even though by illegal invasion, Shyyiiba’s instance that the E.U. “must represent one united European voice,” given the direct federal role of the governors of the 27 E.U. states in foreign policy, was important. Put another way, to the extent that the U.S. leaned toward Russian President Putin’s position that a land-grab is de facto valid internationally (possession being nine-tenths of ownership), Ukraine desperately needed the E.U. to take difficult decisions resulting in specific federal policies helpful to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. The reason for the difficulty can be tied to the requirement in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers), which represents the states (as the U.S. Senate represents states), that decisions on policy and law be unanimous. Just imagine if every U.S. senator could wield a veto on behalf of the residual sovereignty of one’s state!

Unanimity is inconsistent with the dual (or split) governmental sovereignty that is characteristic of early-modern federalism, as distinct from confederalism in which the states retain full sovereignty (nonplena foedus, as per Althusius’s 1603 theory of federalism). Whereas Althusius saw only the alternatives of full and not-full federalism—wherein the federal head or the states enjoy sovereignty, the American compromise of dual-sovereignty “split the atom” of unitary governmental sovereignty and the E.U., but not any of its states, is based on that compromise, rather than either of Althusius’ types of federalism.

With regard to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the foreign minister (i.e., Secretary of State) of the U.S., Marco Rubio, said, “The US stands ready and prepared to help to do whatever we can to help facilitate the end of this war, and hopefully the opportunity will present itself at some point.”[4] However, offers to facilitate, a word that connotes neutrality, do not usually stand back, waiting for an opportunity to arise. Such a tenuous position may implicitly say that the U.S. would step into a facilitating role whenever Putin, rather than Zelensky, wants it. Kallas’ position that the E.U. would complement the role of the U.S. not only is in tension with the E.U.’s partiality toward Ukraine, but also assumes that the U.S. was sufficiently neutral to have credibility in facilitating negotiations between the warring countries, but at least Kallas was transparent as to the stance of the E.U. being pro-Ukrainian—something from which the U.S. could take a lesson.

Just as a person who already has a girlfriend or boyfriend and is doing that one’s bidding should not be assumed to be neutral with respect to a potential usurper’s interests even though that new connection represents a potentially deeper flame of romance, President Trump’s “bromance” with Putin (and Netanyahu—irrespective of what the International Criminal Court had to say about those two “bad boys”) should not have been lost on Zelensky in his endeavors to influence Trump to distance himself from Putin and come closer to Ukraine’s side. Even the promise of a ring made of rare earths could not be assumed to be enough for the gold-loving Trump. If the proverbial card deck is stacked in favor of the existing relationship, the newcomer should look elsewhere for love, especially once he or she sees that the preference and indeed the loyalty of the person being sought lies with someone else who is actually calling the shots behind the scenes. “Distance yourself emotionally and physically from the potential usurper!” an existing boyfriend or girlfriend might say during a visit. From that point on, the usurper is easy prey, being emotionally vulnerable to the new beloved, and should flee from that person, who is actually an agent, to higher ground with haste. Hence, Zelensky turned to the E.U. from having beseeched the U.S. in vain. That deck had already been stacked in favor of Putin, so Zelensky didn’t have a chance. Go to Putin; he is your type, Zelensky could have told Trump before closing the door; I’m going to Von der Leyen. That she and her foreign minister had trouble getting the E.U. to speak with one voice at the federal level is thus truly a hindrance (but Trump would be jealous anyway). Too bad; you had your chance. You’re stuck with the other guy, who holds you at a distance as a trophy, Zelensky could have told Trump harmlessly from a distance. I believe the actual term in the Castro is trophy whore. The pains of hell await anyone who falls in love with such a creature; Zelensky was too smart for that. But enough of subterranean homoeroticism applied to politicians on the world stage; I'll leave to the reader the matter of whether the term translates over to Trump's wives.

Meanwhile, Ukraine and especially Gaza were being ravaged by hostile aggressors with impunity and perhaps too much testosterone. Of course, Nietzsche claims that our natural instincts are best suited to the state of nature—that our species is “well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure” but that within society (and a world order), those instincts have been “disvalued and ‘suspended’” such that “all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man” have been “turned backward against man himself.”[5] Perhaps Nietzsche would applaud the collapse of the post-World-War-II world-order, with the reversion back to Hobbes’ state of nature being accomplished as if by fiat by aggressor states, for Putin, Netanyahu, and even Trump himself doubtlessly felt no “bad conscience” in having commenced unprovoked military maneuvers in the 2020s ironically amid the progress of the species technologically and thus in a narrow sense. Nietzsche would be the first to point out that human nature has not changed, and that our artificial societal/cultural cages are a problem rather than the solution; indeed, they have made humankind into a problem as externally-oriented instinctual urges have been turned inward. But what of the instinctual urge to be humane? What of that of compassion? What of love? Are these instincts not native to our species too? If so, why not restrain military aggressors from being free-wheeling actors jumping into the power-vacuum left by the impotent UN and ICC? Must life be short, nasty, and brutish, as it was for too many people in Ukraine and especially Gaza even when Kallas was making her statement in 2026 after having just met with divided state-level officials in the E.U. on Ukraine?

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “E.U. Will Never Be a Neutral Mediator Between Ukraine and Russia, Says Kallas,” Euronews.com, 28 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Trans and Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), Second Essay, Sec. 16, pp. 520-21.

An E.U. Envoy to Russia

Should the E.U. appoint and send an envoy to Russia in spite of the fact that E.U. and state officials are not of one mind on a strategy to pressure Russia’s head, Putin, to the negotiating table to compromise? The power of the state governments at the federal level complicates efforts by Commission officials to present Putin with a specific list of sanctions because the governors are not on the same page even after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April, 2026. Ironically, desperately needed reforms to the E.U.’s federal system itself have been as politically difficult even to propose as has getting Putin to the negotiating table. Focusing on the latter while ignoring the former is a self-inflicted wound that has weakened the Europeans on the world stage. Incidentally, another self-inflicted state of denial involves assuming that such drastic cultural differences exist between two small E.U. states, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, while assuming that all of the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are basically the same, culturally. Recently, a European, who is actually a U.S. citizen, said as much to me! Denial is the main defense mechanism in the E.U. Even painstaking effort to render this political brain-sickness transparent is no match for the underlying ideological fervor that has so severely enervated the European Union from becoming a more perfect union.

Pointing to the intractable problem within the E.U. in formulating foreign policy, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, said in 2026, “Before we talk to the Russians, we should agree and talk amongst ourselves what we want to talk to the Russians about.”[1] She was undoubtedly referring to the direct involvement of state officials at the federal level in the Council of Ministers; agreement between relevant federal officials was not sufficient. In the U.S., the state governments’ official direct involvement at the federal level has been through the U.S. Senate, which, like the European Council and the Council of Ministers, represents states. Whereas the U.S. Senate’s filibuster (60 out of 100 vote threshold) is related back to the ongoing enumerated and residual governmental sovereignty of the U.S. states, the semi-sovereign E.U. states, which delegated significant governmental sovereignty to the E.U., have enjoyed veto power on federal foreign (and defense) policy—effectively choking off E.U. foreign (and defense) policy. It is for precisely this reason that in 2026, E.U. President von der Leyen and even the governor of one of the large states, (the E.U. state of Germany) publicly advocated applying qualified-majority voting to every proposed policy, E.U. law, and regulation/directive in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This eminently reasonable constitutional (or Basic Law) reform of the E.U.’s federal system had to contend with the formidable resistance of the Euroskeptic ideology that the E.U. states were still somehow sovereign. Backing up the denial was the ideological tendency to exaggerate cultural differences between small E.U. states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, while assuming that the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are culturally similar! Denial on top of denial to support the category mistake of comparing even a small E.U. state with the U.S. as a whole (while rejecting comparisons such as those between California and the E.U. and even between the two empire-scale unions!). The bad odor of denialism was, at least as of 2026, so ubiquitous in the E.U. that the smell may well have been likened instead to that of a freshly blooming flower. Bad air!

The ideological grip on the state-veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, held firmly by the states’ governors even though they were exploiting institutional and personal (i.e., power) conflicts of interest, was immune to the plea even of Ukraine’s president Zelensky, who said on May 17, 2026, “It is important for [the E.U.] to have a strong voice and presence in this process [regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine], and it is worth determining who will represent Europe specifically.”[2] The state veto in the councils inhibited the E.U. from speaking with one voice and even being able to sit at the negotiating table with Putin. Regarding whomever might represent the E.U., one implication is that the envoy could have sufficient discretion rather than be limited to the demands of one governor out of 27 who is skeptical. Indeed, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, admitted at the time that the relevant officials of the states had “vastly disparate views” on “concessions and conditions” for Russia.[3] Given this state of affairs at the state level, holding onto the principle of unanimity in the councils on foreign policy was quite foolish indeed.

Kallas also said that the E.U. “should not ‘humiliate’ itself by seeking direct talks” with Putin.[4] The humiliation feared was that of the E.U. not having sufficient power to avoid giving in at the very start of negotiations. To be sure, Putin is a touch negotiator, but the seeds of the E.U.’s weakness are within rather than bestowed by the Russian. To be sure, both Putin and Trump could smell political weakness even from a great distance. In 2025, for example, E.U. officials “found, through press reports, a 28-point plan drafted by US and Russian officials that included issues, such as sanctions and assets, that fell under [the E.U.’s] jurisdiction.”[5] Even though the Europeans could blame the Americans and the Russians, a more mature mentality would honestly confront the weakness in the E.U.’s federal system, by which I obviously have in mind the vetoes reserved to the states at the federal level. This is not to say that expunging the veto from E.U. federalism would be sufficient to redress the weakness in E.U. foreign policy. 

As governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán belied the Von der Leyen administration by going to visit Putin in Moscow. Direct involvement in foreign policy at the federal level must not permit such a betrayal by the governor of a state, for a house divided cannot stand. This is true, by the way, for couples wherein values clash and neither (or even one) side will compromise; tragically, such clashes blow up even love as if the two people had never even met. If the Europeans can figure out how to retain some direct involvement of the state governments in foreign policy without the veto and direct state involvement with foreign officials if prohibited by the Commission, then the Americans might want to consider how the state governments could have more direct involvement, especially since U.S. senators ceased to be appointed by the state governments, for being elected by the citizens of a state does not mean that the state government is represented, and does not necessarily give a senator a political incentive to represent the state government’s interests if the people thereof would prefer federal preemption. Of course, the European ideological bias would preclude such a comparison, and thus any such benefit obtained by studying the other union.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “High Risks, Pitfalls and Snubs: E.U. Envoy for Russia Talks Faces Job from Hell,” Euronews.com, 19 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

On Russia Erasing Ukrainian Children

Human rights are typically thought of as applying to individuals, even to groups, but do national-ethnic human rights exist? Do nations having a distinct ethnic culture have the right to their respective citizenries from being indoctrinated by other governments set on erasing even traces of the culture from the minds of citizens?  If so, then by 2026, Ukraine had a legitimate claim against Russia for having violated the rights of the Ukrainian state as protector of the Ukrainian ethnicity in the populous. In particular, as part of its multi-year invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government violated the human rights of Ukraine itself and Ukrainian children not only by kidnapping the kids to Russia, but also in indoctrinating them with the intent of ridding them of their distinctly Ukrainian cultural identity.

On May 11, 2026, the “European Union imposed sanctions on 16 Russian officials accused of helping Moscow in the abduction of tens of thousands of children from Ukraine.”[1] Ukraine’s government had verified the number at 20,500, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab estimated the number at 35,000, and Russia suggested that the number could be as high as 700,000.[2] Could it be that Moscow was bragging? That would reflect not well at all on the very notion of human rights internationally, as distinct from guidelines that governments need not be ashamed of violating.

Regardless of the number, the abduction and indoctrination of children is arguably among the worst of war crimes. “Of all the horrors inflicted by Russia’s war, the deportation and forced transfer of Ukrainian children is one of the worst crimes,” the E.U.’s foreign minister Kaja Kallas said at the time.[3] Russia’s actions include “indoctrination and militarized education, as well as their unlawful adoption and removal to Russia and within temporarily occupied territories.”[4] A statement by the European Council—rid of the recently defeated pro-Russia Viktor Orbán of Hungary—includes: “These actions constitute grave breaches of international law and a violation of the fundamental rights of the child and aim to erase Ukrainian identity and undermine the preservation of its future generations.”[5] Such preservation over generations arguably involves the interest of the Ukrainian state because the duration exceeds that of the children themselves. In other words, something more than the rights of the abducted and indoctrinated was being violated in the clash between the Russian and Ukrainian governments.

Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister, said, “This is a deliberate Russian policy aimed at destroying Ukrainian identity. Children are forced to forget who they are, where they come from, and even their language.”[6] Besides the horrific psychological, existential impact on the children in being effectively erased and reprogrammed as Russians, which makes being forced to live with foster parents in a strange land seem ordinary by comparison, the Russian intent is to use the children as part of a larger goal: that of erasing the Ukrainian ethnicity from the face of the Earth. This too reflects back on a legitimate right of the Ukrainian state to preserve that ethnicity. No national legislature would vote to voluntary extinguish its national culture unless forced to do so by another country’s government. In fact, the right is so fundamental that it rarely needs to be made transparent. This is why it may seem strange to refer to a human right of a nation.

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1. Sasha Vakulina, “EU Sanctions Russian Individuals Over Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Children,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Vendetta Violence: Israeli Settlers Sanctioned by the E.U.

What a difference even just a month can make. On 11 May, 2026, the E.U. enacted sanctions against “Israeli settlers over their violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, a move enabled by backing from Hungary’s incoming government.”[1] A month earlier, Viktor Orbán was the sitting prime minister of the E.U. state of Hungary. As a supporter of U.S. President Trump, who in turn supported Israel even in its decimation of Gaza razing entire cities into leveled ground for real estate “properties,” Orbán would have wielded Hungary’s veto in the European Council.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, marveled at the time, “We move from political deadlock that was there for a long time. Violence and extremism carry consequences.”[2] The long time is likely a reference to Orbán’s 16 years in power in the E.U. state of Hungary, and her point overall is that with that governor out of the European Council, the E.U. can inflict consequences on foreign actors who engage in violence under the aegis of some extremist ideology. In the case of the Israeli settlers, the ideology is Zionism, which in coming from a religious text has overreached into the political domain, even circumventing international law.

That the violence occurred in the occupied West Bank renders Israel itself especially culpable, for under international law, “all settlements are considered illegal, with the International Court of Justice describing the State of Israel’s ‘continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ as ‘unlawful.’”[3] Both the unprovoked violence of the settlers and the Israeli government’s attempted holocaustic genocide of the population of Gaza are on top of the fact that Israel has no justified basis internationally to even be in Gaza and the West Bank. In other words, Israel is two degrees of separation from being a lawful state in terms of international law. That the Netanyahu government was able to ignore that law so easily suggests that there is no such thing as international law—that only guidelines were by then operating in the collapsed post-World War II global order. In a Hobbesian state of nature, no law exists because no international or global government exists. No world federation certainly, which Kant admitted in Perpetual Peace would only make world peace possible but not probable.

The recurrent violence and theft was being committed even in broad daylight by Israeli settlers against defenseless Palestinians—even walking into their houses and nonchalantly taking appliances and furniture!—because impunity must surely have been assured by means of the tacit approval of a government that, after all, had been determined by the UN to have committed a genocide in Gaza. The violations of human rights occurred on both the societal and interpersonal level. A counter-move international could therefore be expected beyond the E.U. sanctioning individual settlers and related organizations.

Given the harm that was being unleashed directly or indirectly by the Israeli government, Kallas’ claim that violence and extremism abroad would trigger negative consequences by the E.U. rings hollow because those consequences are so inadequate to meet the magnitude and depth of the suffering, both interpersonally and at the societal level (i.e., an entire people). So even though a month made a difference in the European Council, the global “community” was still holding back from enforcing international law. With no other enforcement mechanism, can such law even be called law?

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1. Maia de la Baume, “E.U. Approves Sanctions on Israeli Settlers after Hungarian Backing,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Religion and Politics: On the Catholic Church’s Just War Theory

In the Gospels, Jesus is portrayed as an idealist, even other-worldly, from the standpoint of the political domain. To be sure, he knows how to alienate the Temple hierarchy enough to be put to death, but he stays clear of the Zealots in their militaristic rebelliousness against the Roman occupation. Give what it Caesar’s unto Caesar. The just-war theory developed by Augustine and Aquinas seeks to bring that gap—to make the idealist of the Gospels more relevant practically to the politics of international relations. To be sure, Jesus’s refusal to join the Zealots—symbolized by Jesus including Romans among those whom he heals—could be used to argue convincingly that attention to compassion for one’s enemy makes impossible even any just war. Jesus is just as idealistic in the story of the rich man who will not give up his wealth to follow Jesus—it is harder for a camel to get through the eye of a needle than for a rich man (who will not give up his wealth to follow God) to enter the Kingdom of God, whose very substance spiritually is epitomized by compassion to one’s enemies, according to the American theologian, Samuel Hopkins. So, Pope Leo was on solid ground in April, 2026 in the midst of the U.S.-Iran War when he emphatically insisted that Jesus would oppose any war—not just any unjust one—but where does that leave the Catholic Church’s just war theory as promulgated by two theological giants, Augustine and Aquinas?

The full essay is at "Religion and Politics."

Security Council Vetoes Styme the UN: Oil in the Strait of Hormuz

The United Nations was intended to obviate war, and failing in that mission, at least to safeguard economic trade especially if doing so staves off anticipated belligerent action by countries seeking to restore compromised trade. In 2026, when Iran’s stoppage of the one-fifth of the world’s oil that would otherwise go through the Strait of Hormuz triggered a military threat by the U.S., Russia and China vetoes a resolution in the Security Council aimed at reopening the strait and thereby obviating an escalation in the military fighting between the U.S. and Iran. Because not even a lopsided vote in favor—11 in favor, two against, and two abstentions—could activate the U.N. in its principle role of peremptorily obviating war by protecting trade, we can conclude that the organization had indeed effectively collapsed and could not be reformed from within, given that five members of the Security Council retained veto power. Meanwhile, military aggressors in the world were able to fill in the power-void left by the collapsing post-World War II world order to render might-makes-right the status quo in the twenty-first century.

At the time, an E.U. media outlet opined that it was doubtful that even if the resolution had been adopted, it “would have impacted the war” because the wording had been “significantly weakened in a bid to get Russia and China to abstain rather than veto it.”[1] In other words, the existence of the veto power in the Security Council was responsible for the impotence of the UN in protected trade and reducing pressures for war. Just that “Iran’s chokehold during the war . . . sent energy prices soaring around the world” should have been enough of a justification for UN protective action in the strait, but not even that rationale was enough for the UN to be able to use its own forces to protect oil tankers through the strait.[2]

Because higher oil prices were in Russia’s economic and thus military interests as that country continued its four-year invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s use of its veto exploited a conflict of interest, and yet the UN had no means of blocking such a use of a veto-power even though Russia’s invasion violated the UN’s charter, which bars offensive military action being inflicted by one country on another country. In other words, the UN could not even stand up to a blatant conflict of interest whose exploitation enabled further violations of the UN’s own charter.

With Israel continuing its holocaustic genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza, the U.S. having invaded Venezuela to capture its president, and Russia still invading Ukraine, the interest of the global family of nations in establishing an international governmental organization without vetoes and with its own enforcement power was so clear that the lack of any such formative action can itself be reckoned as signaling a problem. In other words, knowing that the post-1945 global order was collapsing while military aggressors were getting away with establishing might-makes-right as the new global default, governments nonetheless failed to actively create a new order institutionally so that could be the new default. That the very concept of international law was rapidly being treated as mere guideline rather than law demonstrates just how serious the UN’s de facto collapse was, and yet not even an informal coalition of governments seriously proposed an international institution—whether an organization or government—to pick up the slack and counter Putin, Netanyahu, and Trump. My point is that the inaction of the bystander governments is itself a choice, which could have been different, especially given the proliferation of war crimes and crimes against humanity being incurred at the time. The political inertia internationally favored malicious national leaders and the false belief that the UN was still operational as per its mission.  

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1. Gavin Blackburn, “Russia and China Veto UN Resolution Aimed at Reopening Hormuz Strait as US Deadline for Deal Looms,” Euronews.com, 7 April, 2026.
2. Ibid.

Vanquishing the Principle of Unanimity in E.U. Foreign Policy: On the Impact of Oil

There nothing like a sudden dramatic spike in the price of oil in Europe from a war in Iran to prompt E.U. leaders to make speeches as if hell is freezing over and drastic action is urgently needed in terms of federal rather than piecemeal-state foreign policy. Behind President Von der Leyen’s call for the E.U. to do more in foreign policy was her point that the union could no longer afford the principle of unanimity in the European Council in foreign policy. The Iran War had raised the price not only of oil, but also of the unanimity requirement in the Council not only in foreign policy, but also defense. With 27 states at the time and an increasingly belligerent international context, including military aggression against Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the E.U. could not rely on a world order regulated by international law. The spike in gas prices, even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, brought this point close to home.

As the U.S. began its military attacks in Iran, “European benchmark gas prices jumped 80% in two days while brent crude edged closer to 84 dollars a barrel.”[1] When oil prices surpassed €87 ($100) per barrel roughly a week into the war, Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary “called on the European Union to suspend sanctions on Russian energy imports.”[2] Never mind that Russia’s 4 year-old unimpeded invasion of Ukraine was a threat on the E.U.’s eastern border; restoring cheaper gas prices was more important, at least to Hungary. The E.U.’s geopolitical interests do not reduce to a state’s economic interests, however, and so President Von der Leyen spoke on the need for a more active E.U. foreign policy.

It was not the first time that the president had warned that the traditional world order was “rapidly crumbling under mounting violations of international law.”[3] In her speech, she said, “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return.”[4] There had been too many cases of breaches of international law with impunity as the UN and the International Criminal Court stood by utterly impotent. E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas “pointed the finger at Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine . . . as the cataclysm that precipitated the ‘erosion of international law’ . . . and enabled the return of what she described as ‘coercive power politics.”[5] In her speech, Kallas said, “That (invasion) did not go unnoticed. Instead, it sent a signal around the world that there is no more accountability for one’s actions: the rulebook has been thrown out of the window.”[6] Netanyahu’s government in Israel could unleash a holocaustic genocide in Gaza with a presumption of impunity, and Trump’s government in the U.S. could forcibly remove the president of Venezuela and kill Iran’s highest figure without fear of being held accountable by the U.N. or the International Criminal Court. Militaristic aggression was gaining a foothold in the world as international organizations stood by in utter impotence. The very notion of law at the international level could be surmised to be a misnomer.

Finally, E.U. officials were feeling a sense of urgency from war abroad because the sudden spike in oil and gas prices in Europe from Trump’s military attacks in Iran could not be ignored. Kallas stressing “that a rules-based international order is vital to avoid the inevitable anarchy” was no longer enough.[7] “Von der Leyen added another key priority on which the EU should focus to reinforce its geopolitical clout: its internal decision-making rules.”[8] Problematically, the E.U.’s foreign policy was bound by the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. such that “the 27 member states must agree on a common line of action before moving forward.”[9] So it only took the E.U. state of Hungary to veto the $91 billion loan for Ukraine, and the E.U. was stymied in coming up with a foreign policy on Trump’s military attacks against Iran because of differences between the states. Alternatively, going by qualified-majority voting would have enabled a consensus (i.e., short of unanimous consent) that could have become the E.U.’s foreign policy, which would have been much stronger in the world than were the various positions of the 27 state governments.

The relationship is clear between calls for a rules-based international order “with teeth” and a stronger decision-making rule in the European Council in foreign policy (and defense): a more active E.U. in foreign policy (and defense) was necessary due to the increased militaristic aggression abroad because the latter could have a very significant detrimental economic affect in Europe. Political pressure was thus building for the E.U.’s 27 state governments to finally relinquish their veto-power in foreign policy (and defense). Power is not relinquished easily, so not even higher oil and gas prices could be enough pressure for the states to agree to apply qualified-majority voting to foreign policy (and defense).

The mechanism called “enhanced cooperation,” which I contend elsewhere is a misnomer for what is really increased federal authority for at least nine states but not all of them, could be a means to bring qualified majority voting to the E.U.’s foreign policy that would cover only those states that have agreed to relinquish their veto power in that domain. I suspect that eventually, all of the E.U. states would be included, so “enhanced cooperation” can be understood as a temporary device that gets around the conflict of interest facing the state governments in their decisions on whether to allow the E.U. to become more active in foreign policy (and defense) than the principle of unanimity would permit.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “Middle East War Shows ‘Europe Must Reinforce Its Autonomy’, EIB Chief Tells Euronews,” Euronews.com,  4 March 2026.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary Demands EU Lift Sanctions on Russian Energy as Prices Spike amid Iran War,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on Europe to Adapt to Chaotic, Coercive World Order,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

To be sure, U.S. President Trump’s political support of Orbán could be attributed in no small measure to the fact that Orbán had been “the only European leader who openly supported Trump’s re-election campaign.”[4] Rubio even stated at the joint press conference that the “person-to-person connection” that Orbán had “established with the president has made all the difference in the world in building this relationship.”[5] So was Trump willing to bypass the very existence of the E.U. on the strength of his political relationship with Orbán? If so, and if a strong E.U. was actually in the national interest of the U.S., was Trump putting too much emphasis on loyalty to Trump himself?

It can be argued that Viktor Orbán had been pursuing policies that were at odds with the E.U., and more specifically with the ability of the federal institutions to exercise their exclusive and shared competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). In fact, the Commission had withheld funds from the state of Hungary because Orbán’s state administration had violated E.U. law and breached rule-of-law and justice requirements. Furthermore, Orbán had been wielding his state’s veto in the European Council to keep Ukraine from being annexed to the European Union. In fact, the Hungarian leader’s oil-related coziness to Russia’s President Putin had undercut the E.U.’s support of Ukraine militarily and thus enabled Putin’s military aggression. Is the implication for Trump that Putin’s aggression should not be countered by the E.U., or perhaps he preferred that individual E.U. states aid Ukraine militarily? If so, the fruits of collective action, even just by mutual cooperation but more strongly by a federal army, would by implication be contrary to the American national interest, according to the Trump administration.

Relying on the E.U. states as if their mutual coordination would be enough to enable Ukraine to push back the occupying Russian troops and military hardware—a dubious assumption—opens up the possibility that those states could again turn on each other. To forestall or put out military conflicts being waged by the armies (i.e., militias) of the U.S. member-states, U.S. basic laws was made so that Union could have a federal army and the federal president could temporarily coopt a state army for use by the Union. Is it now in the American national interest that the E.U. be given comparable competencies by its states—especially given the astronomical American expense and lives given in the previous century to put out two World Wars, both of which were sourced in European conflicts?

Furthermore, given the policy of the Trump administration to pull back American military support to protect Europe, relying on E.U. states to remilitarize without any militarization of the E.U. itself along with that of its states seems to be counterproductive. Would not the American interest be in line with another Union being like the U.S. rather than the former Articles of Confederation, in which the American states were in a federal Union but still fully sovereign from 1781-1789? Before the Articles, the new republics (i.e., ex-colonies) in the U.S. were sovereign countries in a military alliance. In contrast to the latter two arrangements, the E.U. sports dual-sovereignty.

I contend that it is actually contrary to the strategic interest of the U.S. that the E.U. and its share of governmental competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) be diminished or ignored in favor of the U.S. going it alone with particular E.U. states as if they were still fully sovereign countries. Ignoring an aspect of political reality is not a good basis for going forward in international relations. Furthermore, a bottom-heavy federal system in which the federal governmental institutions are perpetually thwarted by Euroskeptic state governments (e.g., Slovakia and Hungary) even in the carrying out of existing federal competencies is inherently unstable, and thus such a Union could eventually collapse if unimpeded conflicts reach a sufficient severity between particular states, or even if states frustrated by paralysis at the federal level secede from the Union as Britain did, though the rationale for that state seceding arguably had more to do with resistance to the E.U. having any share of governmental sovereignty than with frustration over ineffective bureaucrats in Brussels.

Whereas David Cameron, a former prime minister in Britain preferred that the E.U. be based on something like the American Articles of Confederation (with each state remaining fully sovereign), the American national interest voiced by Rubio in supporting Viktor Orbán viewed the E.U. as a case of the dreaded multilateralism, and thus the E.U. as akin to an international organization like the UN or even NATO. In having a supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), a directly-elected parliament (i.e., the European Parliament), an executive branch headed by a president who could be considered to be the federal president (i.e., the Commission and Usula Von der Leyen, respectively), an upper chamber representing the states (i.e., the European Council and the Council of Ministers), the E.U. cannot be construed as only multilateral or even international in nature. So, Trump’s antipathy toward that Union is not only in error, but also reflects negatively on the basic structure of the American Union because both unions sport modern federalism (i.e., dual sovereignty rather than confederal fully-sovereign states).

That is, Rubio’s position in favor of Orbán not only weakened the E.U., risked American military involvement once again, and strengthened Putin’s military position in Ukraine (because he would not have to fear intervention by a federal E.U. army), but also reflected badly on the U.S.’s federal system. Take the U.S. back to 1826, approximately 33 years after the Americans replaced the confederal Articles with a system of modern, dual-sovereignty-based federalism (such as the E.U. has![6]), and the E.U. at 33 looks a lot like that Union back then. By implication, Trump’s position in 2026 in favor of Euroskeptic Hungary’s leader was in line with supporting anti-federalist states prior to 1861 in the U.S. and completely ignoring the federal institutions and their respective enumerated powers (i.e., competencies) in Washington. Because Trump and Rubio held federal rather than state offices at the time, the position thus reduces to a logical absurdity beyond merely being against multilateralism. 

1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Skip Worden, Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S. (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).

On America’s Dominance in NATO: The E.U. as a Contributory Factor

Just after the E.U. had successfully negotiated (mostly) free-trade treaties with India and a few South American state-level countries, the E.U. and U.S. were at odds on the ownership and control of Greenland to such an extent that the NATO alliance was strained if not fraught. The resulting power-vacuum with respect to military alliances could be filled by the E.U. strengthening its federal foreign policy and defense powers and forming a military alliance with India and even South America in order to put less reliance and thus pressure on the weakened NATO alliance.  This is not to say that new military alliances would necessarily or even probably form; rather, such alliances would be in line with the dynamics and logic of power itself at the international level. I contend that the unbalanced balance of federal-state power in foreign policy and defense in the E.U. was a major contributory factor of the dominance of the U.S. in NATO.

U.S. President’s politically aggressive threats regarding making Greenland a U.S. territory (but not a state) made the American dominance in NATO suddenly unsavory to the Europeans. At the end of January, 2026, the former European Council president Charles Michel was unusually blunt by European (but not American Midwestern) standards. “NATO chief Mark Rutte should stop being an ‘American agent’ and unite the fraught military alliance in the face of the United States’ ‘hostile rhetoric’ and ‘intimidation’,” Michel told Euronews.[1] Whereas his words, hostile rhetoric and intimidation, applied to President Trump were nothing new; it was the expression, American agent, that stood out. Even though the dominance of the mighty American military power in NATO was hardly news, that Michel said it out loud signaled the depth of the Europeans’ displeasure at Trump’s overt messaging on Greenland. Michel was just as blunt about Rutte himself. “I want to be clear, Mark Rutte is disappointing and I’m losing confidence. . . . I’m not expecting Mark Rutte to be an American agent. I’m expecting Mark to work for unity within NATO,” Michel said.[2]

Rutte’s claim that Trump was the “Daddy” of NATO was admittedly over the top (Trump’s ego hardly needed the accolade of Daddy), but Michel’s criticism is weaker concerning Rutte’s efforts to find “an off-ramp for Trump to climb down on his recent threats to trigger a trade war” with the E.U. over differences on Greenland.[3] Dissipating the related economic and political escalations between countries in NATO served the interests of unity in NATO, so Rutte deserves credit for providing Trump with an off-ramp.

Michel also claimed that the E.U. had been a “very loyal partner” to the U.S. and thus did not deserve Trump’s threats.[4] Instead of going on to analyze the relative validity of the positions of the E.U. and U.S. on which continent should own and control Greenland, the road less travelled by analysts concerns the argument that the E.U. would be more likely to reach a parity of power with the U.S. in NATO were the E.U. states willing to transfer more governmental sovereignty to the federal level in foreign policy and defense. This would include (but not be limited to) moving off reliance on the principle of unanimity to hold votes in the Council by qualified-majority. As the executive branch, the Commission would of course have more shared and exclusive competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) in foreign affairs and militarily (with control over more than the 60,000 troops). As in the U.S., both the states and the Union would have armies, and the Commission could temporarily borrow the state militias as needed. That the state governments have direct power in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, whereas the American states are only indirectly represented in the U.S. Senate, means that the E.U. would be less likely to abuse its federal police and even the federal borrowing of state armies as Trump was able to do.

Moreover, that the U.S. had become so violent, in part due to the astounding corruption in local police departments and in part due to the Trump administration is itself a reason why E.U. citizens and their elected representatives have good reason to bolster defense at the federal level. Gone were the days when America stood for the little guys rather than the bullies in the world. Unfortunately, the language that speaks most clearly to Trump, Netanyahu, and Putin is that of counter-force. Were the E.U. not so bottom-heavy militarily (i.e., reliant on the state armies), perhaps a federal force could have gone into Ukraine and Gaza to push the aggressors back. Might-Makes-Right would have suffered a set-back rather than stand to become the default in post post-World War II global order. Therefore, the Europeans could stand to do some navel gazing on why the U.S. has been so dominate in NATO.  

1. Mared G. Jones, “Mark Rutte Should Stop Being an ‘American Agent’ and Unite NATO, Charles Michel Says,” Euronews.com, January 30, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

E.U.-India Free Trade

Early in 2026, “(a)fter months of intense negotiations,” the E.U. concluded “a free-trade deal with India,” which, if ratified by the E.U.’s upper and lower chambers (the European Council and the European Parliament), would sharply reduce “tariffs on E.U. products from cars to wine as the world looks for alternative markets following President Donald Trump’s tariffs.”[1] Signaling that something more than trade was involved in the treaty, “(b)oth countries hailed a ‘new chapter in strategic relations’ as both sides” sought “alternatives to the US market.”[2] The E.U. had just engineered a free-trade treaty with four South American countries. Competition for better, cheaper, trade was reducing Trump’s bargaining power by means of tariffs. Using them to inflict geopolitical harm on other countries, including the E.U., would become less effective as free-trade deals excluding the U.S. materialized. The implications, and even the motive in the free-trade negotiations between the E.U. and India, extend beyond economics.

At the time, India was “facing tariffs of 50% from the Trump administration.”[3] Half of that percentage was a penalty on India for buying Russian oil. The tariffs “severely dented” India’s exports and thus gave India a huge incentive to negotiate with the Europeans. On the European side of the equation, Trump had just threatened to impose tariffs on any country opposing the American purchase of Greenland before relenting at Davos. Such market uncertainty had momentarily stirred Wall Street and shaken European export-oriented businesses. Quite understandably, given such uncertainty, E.U. President von der Leyen was emphatic when the India deal was reached. “We did it—we delivered the mother of all deals,” she said.[4] “This is the tale of two giants,” she added, “who choose partnership in a true win-win fashion. A strong message that cooperation is the best answer to global challenges.”[5] The American president, von der Leyen’s counterpart, was without doubt among the challenges, which also included Russia’s militaristically aggressive president and the wholly unrepentant genocidal state of Israel. The broader message from the E.U.-India trade announcement is that the bad boys can be obviated, and that really good trade deals can be reached as a result.

The E.U.’s trade minister Sefcovic observed that the pressing need to find other markets and thus insulate E.U. trade from whimsical American impediments to E.U.-U.S. trade gave an incentive for negotiations to proceed “with a new philosophy” of avoiding subjecting sensitive goods to free trade. “If this is sensitive for you, let’s not touch it,” he explained as the new modus operendi in the negotiations.[6] I contend the pressing mutual interests to render Trump’s threats powerless fostered this new strategy. That is, both countries looked “to de-risk their economies from the threat of Trump’s tariffs.”[7] The hurdles that had scuttled E.U.-India trade negotiations beginning in 2007 were thus obviated at least in part due to the erratic trade policies coming out of Washington.

It is significant that the E.U. characterized the deal with India as an instance of “rules-based cooperation.”[8] Russia and Israel were both severely breaching international rules, and even U.S. President Trump’s whimsical application and withdrawal of tariffs can be viewed as contrary to the constancy of rules. Business abhors such volatility, and so do most governments. The bad boys are the exception, and the good boys and girls were smart to work around the baddies. Given the extent and depth of corruption (i.e., lies and refusals to enforce criminal law with impunity) and the sheer, unprovoked aggressiveness in the police departments of too many of the U.S.'s member-states and at the federal level, where the aggression directed at Minnesota citizens was nothing short of animalistic in January, 2026, the challenge to a rules-based rather than power/whim-based order was a major American problem beyond “merely” Washington having supplied weapons to Israel to wipe Gaza and its people off the map—literally into cold, wet tents.  

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1. Peggy Corlin and Maria Tadeo, “EU Inks ‘Mother of All Deals’ with India Trade Agreement Amid Global Turmoil,” Euronews.com, January 27, 2026.
2. Ibid., italics added.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Ukraine’s Zelensky Nails the E.U.

On a day when “(a)pproximately 4,000 building in Kyiv lacked heating . . . as temperatures plunged to -20C amid Ukraine’s coldest winter in years, almost four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “delivered a scathing critique of European inaction at the World Economic Forum . . . , declaring that the continent ‘looks lost’ and remains trapped in endless repetition of failing to defend itself or decisively support Ukraine.”  Zelensky lamented, “Repeating the same thing for weeks, months, and of course, years. And yet that is exactly how we live now.”  In particular, he was referring to the fact that just as the U.S. had been sinking drug boats, the E.U. could have been sinking Russian oil tankers even near Greenland. “We will solve this problem with Russian ships,” he said. “They can sink near Greenland just like they sink near Crimea.”  Why was Europe repeating the same “day” over and over again, as in the film starring Bill Murry, Groundhog’s Day? Zelensky had the presence of mind to identify the root problem though his wording was antiquated.

Contrasting the U.S. with the E.U., Zelensky lamented, “The fact remains, Maduro is on trial in New York. Sorry, but Putin is not on trial. . . . The man who started it is not only free, he’s still fighting for his frozen money in Europe.”  Questioning “why Trump could seize shadow fleet tankers and oil while Europe could not, noting that oil funds the war against Ukraine,” Zelensky said, “If Putin has no money, there’s no war for Europe.”  The point is that the E.U. could have acted to thwart Putin’s military might by cutting off oil revenue. Such action even years earlier seems like a no-brainer, given Zelensky’s logic: “Today they target Ukraine. Tomorrow it could be any NATO country,” he said. “Wouldn’t it be easier and cheaper to cut Russia off from components making missiles, or destroy factories making them?”  That could be done directly by bombing the factories and boycotting Russia, and indirectly by bombing Russian oil in tankers, whether Russian or not. It was, in other words, in the interest of the Europeans in the E.U. to cut off the Russian war-machine rather than appease it with inaction. 

As for the E.U.’s reliance on a few of its states to defend Greenland amid U.S. President Trump’s intention to invade or purchase the island, Zelensky noted the significance of the weak response by saying, ‘If you send 14 or 40 soldiers to Greenland, what is that for? What message does it send? What is the message to Putin, to China? And even more importantly, what message does it send to Denmark, your close ally? Forty soldiers will not protect anything.”  Even as Zelensky was insightful in drawing out these wider implications, he made a political category mistake in mischaracterizing one E.U. state, Denmark, as an ally in the E.U., for a state in a federal union is neither an ally (i.e., equivalent) to the union itself nor an ally to other such states. Unlike allies, E.U. states have delegated a portion of their respective governmental sovereignty to a federal level (e.g., exclusive competencies, as well as qualified-majority voting).  In fact, Zelensky was undercutting his own argument in so doing.

In particular, and here we get to the main point, “Zelenskyy criticized Europe’s fragmented response to global challenges, declaring the continent ‘still feels more like geography, history, tradition, not a great political power’ and ‘remains a fragmented kaleidoscope of small and middle powers.’”  Even in sending a few thousand troops from a few E.U. states rather than a federal response going beyond loose cooperation, the E.U. showed itself in relief as having succumbed to its parts (i.e., states). Zelensky actually fed the undergirding Euroskeptic, anti-federalist European ideology by referring not to states or even member-states, but to small and middle powers as if the E.U. did not even exist. If he was referring to small and large E.U. states as “small and middle powers,” Zelensky was missing the point that whether large or small, an E.U. state is an E.U. state. Mischaracterizing E.U. states as small and middle powers, and the E.U. as the unnamed large power not only ignores the E.U.’s immense weakness, especially with regard to its own states, but also ignores that in a federation, there are only two levels: the state level and the federal level. 

In short, if Zelensky wanted a stronger, more perfect Union in Europe, a “great power,” he should have said so, explicitly: the E.U. needs more competencies, or enumerated powers, in foreign policy and defense, subject to qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Instead, the way he described “small and middle” powers in his speech at Davos undermined his own goal. He claimed that Europe needed to learn at least how to defend itself, but since his last address at Davos a year earlier, “nothing has changed.”  He lamented that in Europe, everyone “turned attention to Greenland and its clear most leaders [in Europe] are not sure what to do about it.”  Meanwhile, Europe’s “small and middle” powers were reluctant to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons systems. Relying on the U.S. had become foolish, and yet the E.U. was still not stepping up to the plate (an expression from baseball) to bat in foreign policy and defense. 

It was long since time for structural change be made in the division of competencies between the federal and state systems of government in the E.U., especially with the U.S. eyeing Greenland and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine having been going on for nearly four years by early 2026 when Zelensky delivered his speech to the world’s economic and political elite in Davos. It was time, in other words, for the governors of the states to “step up to the plate” and agree to federalize more authority in foreign affairs and defense. After all, those state governments had enough direct power at the federal level in the European Council and the Council of Ministers to act as a check, even under qualified-majority vote, on federalized foreign policy and defense. The U.S. could take a lesson in this respect and replace elected U.S. senators with governors in that union’s higher legislative chamber to step federal encroachment on the retained and residual governmental sovereignty of the member-states there.  

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1. Aleksandar Brezar, “Zelenskyy Says Europe ‘Looks Lost’ and Living in ‘Groundhog Day’ in Scathing Davos Address,” Euronews.com, January 22, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

On the Global Order: Experts Missing the Big Picture

Although the reasoning of government officials in foreign policy can be impeccable, they are susceptible to being so oriented to the intricacies of the “chess” playing that they may actually be rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, a ship that sank in the icy Atlantic in 1912. At a talk by American foreign-policy experts at Yale’s School of Global Affairs in March, 2025, Ely Ratner, who served as an assistant secretary of defense, and Celeste Wallander, who was also an assistant secretary, joined Andrea Kendall-Taylor of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) to speak mainly on U.S. foreign policy in regard to Russia and China; only scant mention was made of the situation in Gaza even though a holocaustic genocide was well underway there. What the speakers said about the post-World War II world order was most telling; what they did not say, however, spoke volumes.

The talk was incredibly timely. On the very same day, Oscar-winning filmmaker, Hamdan Ballal, who had won for the film, “No Other Land,” was allegedly beaten by Israeli settlers in the West Bank, after which he—not the Israeli thugs—was arrested and detained by the Israeli military, ostensibly so he could get medical attention.[1] Were he in Gaza, where the Israeli military had recently bombed two hospitals, he might well have died getting medical treatment. On the very next day, Euronews reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had told U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, “I fully share your loathing of European free-loading. It’s pathetic.”[2] Hegseth was doubtlessly referring to Europe’s reliance on the U.S. militarily since the end of World War II. With Russia invading Ukraine, the Trump Administration was urging the E.U., including its state governments, to increase their defense-spending. Hegseth said nothing about Israel’s crimes against humanity in the occupied Gaza territory.

I contend that the impunity that both aggressive Russia and Israel were enjoying are but symptoms of the slow demise of the post-World War II global order. Although Ratner agreed with this conclusion, and the other two speakers at Yale agreed, they all pointed out that elements of the existing order were still working and should be retained. However, such elements were no match for the obvious impunity that by 2025 came with military invasion and none of the speakers proffered an alternative to the existing world order, even though Ratner warned that President Trump’s “spheres of influence” basis for international relations was dangerous, for it could mean that the U.S. could take Greenland and Russia could subjugate Ukraine with impunity.

That none of the speakers mentioned the United Nations at all is significant because that international organization’s utter failure to enforce its own resolutions and even kick out countries that had willfully and repeatedly violated resolutions (e.g., Russia and Israel) attests to dire need for a new international order. That the UN had allowed certain members of the Security Council to shamelessly exploit a conflict of interest in wielding the veto on their own behalf or to protect their allies strongly suggests that a new global organization was urgently needed by 2025. Nevertheless, none of the three speakers at Yale even mentioned the UN. Instead, they were essentially rearranging deck-chairs on the Titanic.

People who work too closely within a given institutional order can easily succumb to missing the forest for the trees—focusing minutely on even the design of a leaf and thus missing the forest-fire going on even nearby. Meanwhile, radicals with no vested vocational and monetary interest in the existing order can easily become so utopian that their proposals simply cannot be taken seriously.  In the rise and fall of world orders, people at credible vantage-points issuing realistic proposals that go beyond tweaking existing institutions are needed. A former undersecretary of the UN who spoke at Harvard in 2025 agreed with me that the UN could not be adequately reformed because none of the five veto-powers on the Security Council would agree to give up their power even though doing so would enable the UN to pass resolutions against even governments committing crimes against humanity. Even extirpating the vetoes from the Security Council would not be sufficient; the UN would need military power of its own with which to enforce its resolutions on recalcitrant national governments. Fears of a world government coming from populist fringes, which would likely include religion over-reaching, could shout over realistic explanations that a semi-sovereign federation would not be a world government in the sense of dominating national governments. At the regional level, both the E.U. and U.S. demonstrate that governmental sovereignty can indeed by divided between federal and state governmental systems within a federal system.

Given the human-caused breach of the climate by excessive carbon-pollution, the existence of nuclear bombs many times over, and both the scale and severity made possible by modern technology of crimes against humanity—as perpetrated for instance by Nazi Germany and then Israel—continuing to rely on a global system based on an absolutist version of national sovereignty absent any global-level accountability is nothing short of reckless. In my experience at both Harvard and Yale, I heard nothing said either by the faculty or visiting officials on how humanity could realistically move on from the antiquated world order. Meanwhile, Israel and Russia continued with their toxic military activities unabated.

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1. Elise Morton, “Oscar Winning Palestinian Director Hamdan Ballal Allegedly Attacked by Israeli Settlers,” Euronews.com, March 25, 2025.
2. Tamsin Paternoster, “’Pathetic European Free-Loading’: US Officials Slam Europe in Leaked Chat,” Euronews.com, March 25, 2025.

Mixing Trade and Defense Policy: The E.U.-U.S. Bilateral Relationship

Trade and war have historically been related, as, for example, money from recurring surplus balances of trade—an alternative to debt—has facilitated military build-ups prior to going to war in the Europe. In threatening to take Greenland by military force if the E.U. state of Denmark continued to refuse to sell the island and then issuing 10% tariffs against Denmark and other E.U. states, as well as two sovereign European states for having sent troops to defend Greenland in case the U.S. were to invade, President Trump closely wielded trade and military policy. The E.U.’s response was unbalanced, being oriented only to the trade element of the E.U.-U.S. bilateral relationship, due to weaknesses in the E.U.’s federal system.

In January, 2026, President Trump’s announced that “a 10% tariff on all products coming from eight European countries”—the E.U. states of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, and Germany plus Britain, which had seceded from the E.U., and stand-alone Norway—would begin on February 1^st and increase substantially months later “until a deal is reached for the ‘complete and total purchase of Greenland’.”[1] Those states had just sent troops to Greenland as doing so would prevent Trump from using military force to invade the island. The E.U. itself was inactive on this military front even though the independent coordination between a few states in sending troops lacked not only the united action, but also the political leverage that the E.U. could have provided in pushing back against Trump’s threats. That the E.U. is more than the sum of its parts (i.e., states) seems perpetually to be lost on Europeans, whose primary political instinct would be called “states’ rights” in American terms. In fact, the Euroskeptic ideology has gone so far as to misconceive of the E.U. itself as merely a trading “bloc,” such that adding competencies, or enumerated powers, in foreign policy and defense would by implication seem taboo.

Accordingly, rather than the European Commission, the Parliament, and the Council coordinating legislative and even “basic law” action to bolster the E.U.’s military reaction to Trump’s threats, calls were instead for the E.U. to “deploy its ultimate anti-coercion tool against the US . . .”[2] That instrument had been adopted by the E.U. in 2023 “to combat political blackmail through trade” and “would allow the E.U. to restrict third countries from participating in public procurement tenders. Limit trade licenses and shut off access to the single market.”[3] The use of the instrument would be in accord with the mistaken, ideologically convenient view that the E.U. is primarily a trade organization. Besides misconstruing the E.U.’s three pillars as exclusively economic in nature, the “geopolitical ramifications” of using the legislative instrument to “severely impact U.S. services and products” would be extrinsic. Furthermore, if those ramifications would cause the U.S. to militarily invade Greenland, the E.U. would have to rely on its states to respond militarily. I submit that such a military response would be suboptimal relative to a federal response.

President Trump’s geopolitical close linkage of trade policy and military strategy with respect to Greenland demonstrates just how deficient and costly the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology has been with respect to the E.U. being thought of as primarily economic in nature. That the states sending troops to Greenland “reiterated their ‘full solidarity’” with the E.U. state of Denmark is not the same as a foreign-policy statement coming from the E.U.’s foreign minister. Even concerning the E.U.’s anti-coercion law, that the E.U. states of Germany and France were planning on pushing “their European partners to use all tools at their disposal” rather than work through the E.U.’s Council, which represents the states, demonstrates the anti-federalist, states’ rights ideology at work at the expense of federal action.[4] To be sure, it is difficult for governors of states to give up power to a federal level. The question is perhaps how deficient the E.U. must become in a changing world in which trade is increasingly intertwined with geopolitical and even military interests and activity before the E.U.’s state governments are willing to delegate enough competencies, or enumerated powers, to the Union in foreign policy and defense so the benefits of collective action can be realized. It is significant that, “across the pond” from the E.U., U.S. President Trump was happy to pit E.U. states against each other without any pushback with teeth from President Von der Leyen.

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1. Maria Tadeo, “Pressure Grows on the E.U. to Deploy Trade Bazooka against Trump’s Greenland Tariff Threat,” Euronews.com, 18 January 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Eleonora Vasques and Mared Gwyn Jones, “France and Germany Push to Use EU Anti-Coercion Tools If Trump’s New Tariffs Become Reality,” Euronews.com, 19 January, 2026.