Resolved: The E.U. Should Join NATO

I contend that the European Union rather than its states should be in NATO. Besides eliminating duplication from the E.U. having a nebulous observer status while the states are formally in the alliance, the increasing role in defense being played by the Commission, including there being a Defense commissioner (secretary/minister), calls for being formally in the alliance. Whereas the U.S. began as a military alliance of sovereign states, the E.U. can trace its beginnings to the European Economic Community. Both unions have since incorporated powers or competencies beyond the respective starting points. For the E.U. this has meant moving beyond economics and trade to include social policy and, last but not least, defense. It is in NATO’s interest to adapt to this change. Lastly, that the E.U. and U.S. are both instances of (early) modern federalism, which at its core has the attribute of dual-sovereignty wherein both the federal and the state levels enjoy at least some governmental sovereignty, whereas NATO, as an international alliance, is confederal in that all of the sovereignty resides in the members of the alliance, justifies the E.U. being a member of NATO rather than being misinterpreted as a comparable international organization as the state-rights Euroskeptics like to believe.

On November 6, 2024, at his confirmation hearing at the European Parliament, the Commission’s nominee to be the union’s first defense commissioner (defense secretary in American parlance), Andrius Kubilius (of the European People’s Party) said, “If we want to defend ourselves, we need to spend at least €10 billion up to 2028.”[1] In addition, €200 billion would be needed over the next decade to update infrastructure and €500 billion to build an air-defence shield. “We need to spend more,” he said, “not because it is a demand of President[-Elect] Trump, but because of Putin”, the President of Russia, who, not coincidentally, was in the second year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[2] Showing “that we’re able to defend ourselves” would “convince Putin not to start another military campaign” within the E.U.’s territory.[3] Strength comes in numbers, and at the time that meant 27 states united to thwart Putin’s military expansionism.

A united force would carry over into NATO, within which the E.U. would have more clout than any of the 27 E.U. states had ever had in the alliance. Furthermore, were the E.U. to replace its states in NATO, the seven E.U. states that still had not met the commitment to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense would be wiped clean because the only requirement would be that the E.U. spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense, and Kubilius was clearly signaling that the Commission was in favor of doing so.  Of course, whether the Parliament would go along is another story. For NATO, no longer would 27 states in Europe have to be watched as far as defense spending is concerned, and the integration of military infrastructure at the E.U. level would also be easier for NATO to connect to instead of doing so separately to 27 state military forces (militias in American parlance).

Perhaps most important, with the E.U. being a member of the NATO alliance and spending €200 billion over a decade on infrastructure that would integrate the fractured militaries at the state level, the chances would be lower that war would erupt within the E.U. between the states. Nineteenth-century American history reminds us that such a war is possible in an empire-scale federal system wherein the state governments are powerful, and twentieth-century European history contained two world wars that began in what would become the European Union. It may seem counter-intuitive, but it is very much in the interests of the U.S. that the E.U. not only be able to defend itself, and thus rely less on American money for the purpose and be better equipped to fend off Russian expansionism, but also join NATO. Having one voice rather than 27 to speak with would simplify the communicative tasks on both sides of the Atlantic. I suspect that the foremost obstacle to further European integration on the defence front is ideological in nature, and this resistance, not coincidentally, aligns quite well with the personal and short-run political interests of the heads of the state governments in the European Union, for it is human, all too human, to relish being in the spotlight.

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1. Paul Soler, “Boost E.U. Defence Capabilities Against Putin, Future Commissioner Warns,” Euronews.com, November 7, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Turkey Abusing Asylum-Seekers: Implications for E.U. Statehood

Over 90% of Turkey is not located in Europe, and yet for years the sovereign state has sought accession in the E.U. in spite of Turkey’s non-European culture. That the E.U. did not act in a timely way on Turkey’s application can be taken as a de facto “no.” Reports of abuse of political-asylum seekers in E.U.-funded centers in Turkey may suggest that the country’s government has interpreted the delay as a “no,” or that the country is unintentionally thwarting its own chances on becoming a state in the union. The E.U. was hardly blameless, as the Commission casted off any responsibility for enabling the abuse by funding the centers where it was occurring.

In 2024, “Lighthouse Reports found systematic mistreatment across the removal centres managed by the Turkish government and backed by €213 million in E.U. funds.”[1] The investigation reported, The E.U. “is aware that it is funding this abusive system, with its own staff raising alarm about it internally—yet senior officials choose to turn a blind eye.”[2] Even though the E.U. had provided almost €10 billion to support the operation of the centres, the European Commission replied, “It is the responsibility of the Turkish authorities to thoroughly investigate allegations of wrongdoing and we urge them to do so.”[3] Absent was any recognition that funding the centres renders the E.U. responsible for the ongoing abuse too. Pointing to someone else to take responsibility for “unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in the facilities, instances of abuse and torture against migrants, and a patter of coercion to force detainees to sign documents of ‘voluntary’ returns to their war-torn nations” is too convenient to be ethically sound.[4]

The Commission’s claim that “all E.U. money provided for managing removal centres and voluntary returns in Turkey was ‘in full respect of E.U. and international standards” implies that the E.U. had a responsibility to see that the standards were being met.[5] “The E.U. executive [branch], however, insisted the ultimate responsibility to probe and crack down on violations of fundamental rights was up to the Turkish authorities.”[6] In short, the E.U. was trying to have it both ways. That Turkey had “its own set of legislation when it comes to recognition of refugees and migration management” does not mean that “the enforcement and protection of these formal rights remain the responsibility” of Turkey, even though a Commission spokesperson said that the responsibility follows from the legislation.[7]

That the E.U. was funding refugee centres outside of the E.U. suggests that the E.U. had done an insufficient job in handling asylum-seekers within the borders of the E.U.; essentially, the union was outsourcing its responsibility to protect its borders. That some E.U. states had recently violated the Shengen Agreement by setting up land-border check-points, to which residents in other states would be subject, also implies that federal action was insufficient. The insufficiency thus caused a weakening of the union’s rule of law, as state governments felt free to violate the Agreement.

Turkey was also working at cross-purposes with itself. If the Turkish government had any desire remaining for statehood in the E.U., using E.U. funds to violate international human rights, which the E.U. ostensibly values and works in support of, adds support to the argument that Turkey’s culture is too different to fit within a European union. Given internal threats by state governments to the E.U.’s decision-making process and rule of law, the union could ill-afford a leap in the magnitude of interstate differences in (political) culture. The continuance of the principle of unanimity applying to a significant number of federal competencies (i.e., enumerated domains of authority for E.U. law and regulations) was already running up against the recalcitrant will of Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary. At the very least, that principle would need to be retired were Turkey to accede, which ironically would take unanimity to be changed to qualified majority voting on all matters at the federal level. In short, Turkey needed to get all of its ducks in a row, rather than to work against itself.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Brussels Urges Turkey to ‘Thoroughly’ Probe Alleged Abuse in EU-Funded Migration Centres,” Euronews.com, October 11, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Chinese President Xi Exploits a Vulnerability of the E.U.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe in May, 2024 “amid concerns in Europe over Chinese support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and European markets being flooded with cheap Chinese electric vehicles.”[1] Although these matters were at the time properly matters for the E.U. rather than its states, Xi oriented his visit to the state level, and in particular to states including France and Hungary that had “special bilateral relationships” with China.[2] In other words, the Chinese leader sought to exploit the E.U.’s vulnerability wherein state governments have sufficient sovereignty to undermine the federal level. I contend that the state leaders should have refused to meet with Xi, redirecting him to meet with federal officials.

There were indeed “growing suspicions that China” was “seeking to take advantage of divisions in Europe,” which could weaken the E.U. even in its competencies (i.e., enumerated powers).[3] According to Bertram Lang, a research associate at Goethe University, China had “gradually divided Europe into two groups, ‘those friendly and unfriendly to China.’”[4] Accordingly, Xi began his trip in France to speak with that state’s president, Emmanuel Macron, even though discussions on trade imbalances with the E.U. should have taken place with E.U. officials. “Macron sought to demonstrate European unity by including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,” as if the E.U. Commission were a guest or third party on the E.U.’s trade.[v] In other words, Macron’s accommodation could hardly count as deference.

It is not as if the E.U. were incompetent in one of its own competencies. Von der Leyen “took direct aim at what she called China’s ‘market distortion practices’ with massive subsidies for electric vehicle and steel industries.”[6] In fact, the Commission announced that “it would launch anti-subsidy probes into Chinese electronic vehicles and solar panels to determine whether to impose punitive tariffs on them.”[7] Neither Macron nor any other official at the state level pertained to the probe, and yet Macron agreed to meet with Xi.

The undermining of European unity and the E.U. itself by state officials agreeing to play into the divisive tactics of foreign governments is a good argument for E.U. institutions having the authority to limit the involvement of the state governments in foreign policy as concerns E.U. matters, or competencies. Especially as the E.U. was at the time looking at enlargement sometime in the future, the vulnerability of too much state power in federal matters, including the need for unanimity, was something that the E.U. strongly needed to address before enlargement. That Xi was able to exploit the weakness only adds to need to seek a more balanced dual sovereignty in the E.U. It runs against human nature to rely on the deference of state leaders to E.U. officials on federal matters when foreign leaders lure the limelight in front of the state politicians. Therefore, I contend that the E.U. Commission’s president should have had the power to redirect Xi from Macron and other state leaders on E.U. trade.

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1. Yuchen Li and Wesley Rahn, “Did China’s Xi Jinping Expose Disunity in Europe?” Deutsch Welle (DW.de), May 10, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.