Before Infiltrating American Democracy, the Kremlin Had Curtailed Democracy (and Federalism) in Russia

Officials in the Russian government may have ordered computer hackers to infiltrate the U.S. presidential election in 2016 not only in order to influence the outcome to be more favorable to Russia, but also because those officials did not respect federalism and democracy, which, after all, had been so weak in Russia.  

 
For instance, when it looked like Igor Morozov, an insurgent candidate from within the local nomenklatura in Ryazan, might beat the Kremlin-appointed incumbent governor in 2012, the Kremlin summoned Morozov and the next day he announced that he was dropping out of the race. He would be appointed a senator instead. His campaign, he explained, had created the “threat of a split in society.”[1] In actuality, the success of his candidacy was undermining the federal government’s control of the governorship races and Putin's United Russia Party. Federalism, it would seem, was a facade, and thus easy to disrespect.

 Igor Morozov, campaigning before the Kremlin intervened.  Kommersant.

Sergei Salnikov, the deputy secretary of the United Russia Party in Ryazan, had crossed party lines to back Morozov. Salnikov pointed to weakening of democracy should the Kremlin be able to install the next governor. It’s “as if you have simply been raped,” he said.[2] Democracy was being raped, and it was so weak all it could do was take it. How can such a thing be worthy of respect in a one-party dictatorship? 

To be sure, Putin would not have likened his “presidential filter” of candidates to raping. The filter itself contained a structural conflict of interest because a candidate for governor had to secure the endorsement of 10 percent of the republic’s lawmakers, who were heavily dependent on the sitting governors. Incumbents could thus see to it that “paper tigers” were put up as the opposing candidate such that in actuality no real competition existed. 

From the stand point of federalism, a conflict of interest existed in the Kremlin’s “filter” for “criminality.” For the Kremlin to filter candidates for the highest office in a republic's election has rendered the “state level” as subordinate to the federal government. A trajectory can thus be drawn toward political consolidation and away from federalism, including its checks and balances.

Therefore, the Russian political elite has been able not only to enrich, but also ensconce, itself at the expense of democracy and federalism. The latter, in fact, is ideally suited to the inherent diversity between republics in an empire. Neither democracy nor federalism has been strong enough, even in terms of being popularly valued, for the dictatorial tradition of the Czars and Soviets to collapse along with the U.S.S.R. Similarly, the Arab Spring showed the world, and Russia, that even when popular passion lies with democracy, an authoritarian tradition can still be stronger. 

Viewing democracy (and federalism, which is also relevant in U.S. presidential elections) as weak, as well as inherently inferior in terms of power to one-party rule, the Russian officials who ordered the manipulation of the American electorate likely saw themselves as tinkering with an inferior breed, or at least political system. As much as democracy is valued at least in principle in the United States, the form of government can be disvalued elsewhere, particularly where dictatorship has been the norm. Even Plato and Aristotle theorize strong (demos) and weak (mob rule) manifestations of democracy, yet those philosophers also wrote of a weak form of dictatorship: the tyrant, who can be expected to disrespect democracy for its (ideally) decentralization of power. A tyrant would naturally view himself as a bird of prey seizing on disbursed individuals who together form a people, the popular sovereign, in a democracy. Yet as Nietzsche theorized, a bird of prey who resorts to manipulation and other forms of domination is actually weak rather than strong, for were such a creature strong, it would have no need of subterranean means of increasing its power over others. 

1. Ellen Barry, “Not in Script For Kremlin: A Real Race For Governor,” The New York Times, September 28, 2012.
2. Ibid.

The E.U.'s Membership in the U.N.'s General Assembly: An Oxymoron or Reality Catching Up?

On May 3, 2011, the United Nations’ General Assembly passed Resolution 65/276 by a vote of 120 to 0 (with two abstentions—countries subject to E.U. sanction). The resolution makes the European Union a non-voting member of the General Assembly. As such, the E.U. can “be inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups and be invited to participate in the Assembly’s general debate, in accordance with the order of precedence and the level of representation.” The E.U. is also “able to present oral proposals and amendments, which, however, would be put to a vote only at the request of [a voting member].” Hence, the E.U. membership is without the right to vote, co-sponsor resolutions or decisions, and put forward candidates. In other words, the E.U. has been granted a sort of “quasi” status commensurate with the world’s notion of the E.U. as a “regional organization”—whatever that means.  I contend that this misunderstanding of what the E.U. is has led to the resolution giving the union a quasi-status in the General Assembly even as another such union, the U.S., enjoys not only voting membership in the General Assembly, but also a veto on the Security Council. In short, the world is confused on the E.U. and the resolution bespeaks this condition.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.