Threating the E.U. or U.S. as a club and thus as having members rather than states is as erroneous as it is arrogant. Even though the E.U. states are members of the European Council and the U.S. states are members of the U.S. Senate because both federal bodies represent states rather than federal or state citizens, nether the U.S. nor the E.U. has members per se; rather both unions have states because those unions have federal systems. Nor is either political union a “bloc,” as the latter is actually a temporary group of sovereign countries rather than a federal government of semi-sovereign states or even just an alliance. Linguistic semantics matter because they can impact expectations; less is expected of a bloc than a federal union of states. For one thing, the latter, which is theoretically permanent, involves more of a bonding between the polities. To be united, states cannot not be so opposed to each other that passing federal law and regulations faces insurmountable ideological opposition in the chambers in which the states are represented and thus are the members, especially if each one wields a veto! Two words: Viktor Orban. The E.U. is justified, therefore, in insisting on general agreement with the E.U.’s foreign and military policies before approving the accession of a candidate state.
Asked on 3 November 2026 about
the prospect of Montenegro’s statehood in the E.U. including “a 15-year
transition period,” Montenegro’s E.U. Minister Maida Gorcevic replied, “We don’t
want second-grade membership inside the European Union, because that wouldn’t
be fair and that wouldn’t be full membership as well.”[1]
Even her aspirations for “full membership” were insufficient, for statehood is something
more than being a member of a network or organization of countries. In implying
that the E.U. constituted such an arrangement, Gorcevic was unwittingly
undercutting the E.U., and in particular its potential in the areas of foreign
and military policy. So too had Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, when
he said that the E.U. is just a network to which Britain happened to belong.
States do not happen to belong as semi-sovereign states to a political
union such as the E.U. or U.S., so Cameron committed a category mistake in how
he characterized the European Union. So too was Georgia’s prime minister,
Irakli Kobakhidze, in early November 2026, when he spoke on the open breach
between his government and the European Commission: “We have to agree with each
other, the European Union and Georgia, that we want to se a democratic rule of
law-based, human-rights based, economically strong and sovereign Georgia
in the European Union.”[2]
He added that the Commission’s request that the Georgian government repeal laws
that were at odds with the rule-of-law requirement of statehood “interfered
with the principle of sovereignty.”[3]
Even though Georgia was sovereign at the time, the Commission’s “interference” was
in line with the fact that as an E.U. state, Georgia would no longer be fully
sovereign because the E.U. itself holds a portion of governmental sovereignty
in exclusive and even shared competencies.
Denying the dual-sovereignty feature
of (early) modern federalism in either the E.U. or U.S. instantiates a
political category mistake with respect to two different types of federalism,
which Ken Wheare refers to as modern federalism and confederalism in his text, Federal
Government. By the way, neither of Althusius’ plena and nonplena types
of federalism, discussed in his text, Political Digest (1603), anticipates
modern (dual-sovereignty) federalism, which would not be invented until 1787 in
Philadelphia out of political compromise at the American Convention.
Because states do not just
happen to belong to a federal union that is both political and economic, as
well as being active in social policy, looking out for a degree of basic
ideological fit when accessing whether candidate states should be granted
statehood is legitimate. The arduous negotiations that took place over years
between 2016 and 2020 so Britain could secede from the Union, as well as Viktor
Orbán’s use of Hungary’s veto in the European Council when the Commission was
sanctioning the state for its rule-of-law violations at home as well as its violations
of E.U. law attest to the importance of fit between an incoming state and the
other states as well as their Union. A more perfect union means that the
federal governmental machinery must not be stymied or even held ransom by a state’s
government due to ideological disagreement with a federal policy or, even
worse, a refusal to recognize the portion of governmental sovereignty that has
been delegated through Basic Law to the Union.
The chair of the European Council, Antonio Costa, wrote in November, 2026 of enlargement in the following terms: “The ambition to join the European Union must help overcome historical grievances, reject nationalist rhetoric, and encourage countries to move towards genuine cooperation.”[4] So Gorcevic was clever to speak of Montenegro’s government as not wanting to “argue with Croatia.”[5] She added, “We want to solve the bilateral disputes.”[6] North Macedonia’s president, Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, however, was not so clever, assuming she was in favor of statehood, in saying North Macedonia’s “EU accession hopes” were “being held hostage by Bulgaria,” which was “demanding constitutional changes [in North Macedonia] to recognize the Bulgarian minority.”[7] To be sure, the E.U. state of Bulgaria’s concern for Bulgarians in North Macedonia did not take into account, and thus respect, the E.U.’s own requirements that rule-of-law safeguards exist in the states. Again, statehood involves more than merely membership; the constraints on states are greater. Also, the accession of states should not be leveraged by existing states to score points or remake another country’s system of government. For its part, the E.U. justifiably did not want to add a state that is in disputes with existing states, for such internecine “warfare” could impede unity in the Union, and thus block important federal foreign policy and legislation.
Regarding the E.U.’s legitimate interest in being “solid” in foreign policy, and thus able to have political power on the global stage, in an 2026 annual report, the Commission assessed Georgia, Turkey, and Serbia as standing out as candidate states “for their lack of alignment, which could limit their access to ‘gradual integration’.”[8] According to a senior E.U. official at the time, “Common security and defense policy has become an increasingly important dimension in the accession process.”[9] Although such policy included “border management, cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure,” alignment “with sanctions against Russia” was “seen as a key indicator.”[10] Therefore, even though “Gorcevic also said she was hopeful that the recent elections in Serbia would help the Western Balkans in the enlargement process,”[11] Serbia’s closeness to Russia in terms of foreign (and energy) policy relative to the E.U.’s negative stance on Russia means that the reformist Serbia’s Student List win in late October would not necessarily facilitate Serbia’s accession. The unlikelihood that Serbia would recognize Croatia also did not help matters, but political ties to Russia, especially in the midst of its militarily unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can be viewed as the kiss of death as far as accession is concerned.[12]
My point is that the E.U.’s concern is entirely justified, given tremendous value of broad consensus on foreign policy inside the E.U, and therefore the Commission was not motivated to manipulate countries outside of the Union by leveraging the desire for statehood so the E.U. could have greater influence in the world. The continuance of the state veto mechanism in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, which together can be likened to the U.S. Senate and its committees, renders broad agreement on foreign policy among E.U. states, and thus candidate states too, as pruden and even perhaps even necessary in order to avoid paralysis at the federal level. Viktor Orban's affinity with Russia's Putin during his invasion of Ukraine weakened the E.U. in its ability to provide a united, federal response in defense of Ukraine.
One of the chief benefits of the E.U. is that the states separately cannot wield such power internationally as the E.U. can. Enlargement should not be so valued by Europeans that it becomes an end in itself, by which means greater strategic-interest and ideological divergence between states, and thus in the European Council and the Council of the Ministers, can make its way in at the expense of a more perfect Union.
2. Luca Bertuzzi and Maria Tadeo, “Georgia PM Offers No Way Out of EU Accession Deadlock in Euronews Interview,” 3 November 2026, italics added.
3. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
6. Ibid.
7. Marta Pacheco, “North Macedonia Leader Hits Back at Bulgaria’s Demands for Constitutional Change,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
8. Luca Bertuzzi, “EU Tying Enlargement to Strategic Alignment Puts Serbia, Georgia and Turkey in a Tight Spot,” Euronews.com, 4 November 2026.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
12. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
