Showing posts with label Serbia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Serbia. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Foreign Policy Alignment in E.U. Enlargement

Threating the E.U. or U.S. as a club and thus as having members rather than states is as erroneous as it is arrogant. Even though the E.U. states are members of the European Council and the U.S. states are members of the U.S. Senate because both federal bodies represent states rather than federal or state citizens, nether the U.S. nor the E.U. has members per se; rather both unions have states because those unions have federal systems. Nor is either political union a “bloc,” as the latter is actually a temporary group of sovereign countries rather than a federal government of semi-sovereign states or even just an alliance. Linguistic semantics matter because they can impact expectations; less is expected of a bloc than a federal union of states. For one thing, the latter, which is theoretically permanent, involves more of a bonding between the polities. To be united, states cannot not be so opposed to each other that passing federal law and regulations faces insurmountable ideological opposition in the chambers in which the states are represented and thus are the members, especially if each one wields a veto! Two words: Viktor Orban. The E.U. is justified, therefore, in insisting on general agreement with the E.U.’s foreign and military policies before approving the accession of a candidate state.  

Asked on 3 November 2026 about the prospect of Montenegro’s statehood in the E.U. including “a 15-year transition period,” Montenegro’s E.U. Minister Maida Gorcevic replied, “We don’t want second-grade membership inside the European Union, because that wouldn’t be fair and that wouldn’t be full membership as well.”[1] Even her aspirations for “full membership” were insufficient, for statehood is something more than being a member of a network or organization of countries. In implying that the E.U. constituted such an arrangement, Gorcevic was unwittingly undercutting the E.U., and in particular its potential in the areas of foreign and military policy. So too had Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, when he said that the E.U. is just a network to which Britain happened to belong. States do not happen to belong as semi-sovereign states to a political union such as the E.U. or U.S., so Cameron committed a category mistake in how he characterized the European Union. So too was Georgia’s prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, in early November 2026, when he spoke on the open breach between his government and the European Commission: “We have to agree with each other, the European Union and Georgia, that we want to se a democratic rule of law-based, human-rights based, economically strong and sovereign Georgia in the European Union.”[2] He added that the Commission’s request that the Georgian government repeal laws that were at odds with the rule-of-law requirement of statehood “interfered with the principle of sovereignty.”[3] Even though Georgia was sovereign at the time, the Commission’s “interference” was in line with the fact that as an E.U. state, Georgia would no longer be fully sovereign because the E.U. itself holds a portion of governmental sovereignty in exclusive and even shared competencies.

Denying the dual-sovereignty feature of (early) modern federalism in either the E.U. or U.S. instantiates a political category mistake with respect to two different types of federalism, which Ken Wheare refers to as modern federalism and confederalism in his text, Federal Government. By the way, neither of Althusius’ plena and nonplena types of federalism, discussed in his text, Political Digest (1603), anticipates modern (dual-sovereignty) federalism, which would not be invented until 1787 in Philadelphia out of political compromise at the American Convention.

Because states do not just happen to belong to a federal union that is both political and economic, as well as being active in social policy, looking out for a degree of basic ideological fit when accessing whether candidate states should be granted statehood is legitimate. The arduous negotiations that took place over years between 2016 and 2020 so Britain could secede from the Union, as well as Viktor Orbán’s use of Hungary’s veto in the European Council when the Commission was sanctioning the state for its rule-of-law violations at home as well as its violations of E.U. law attest to the importance of fit between an incoming state and the other states as well as their Union. A more perfect union means that the federal governmental machinery must not be stymied or even held ransom by a state’s government due to ideological disagreement with a federal policy or, even worse, a refusal to recognize the portion of governmental sovereignty that has been delegated through Basic Law to the Union.

The chair of the European Council, Antonio Costa, wrote in November, 2026 of enlargement in the following terms: “The ambition to join the European Union must help overcome historical grievances, reject nationalist rhetoric, and encourage countries to move towards genuine cooperation.”[4] So Gorcevic was clever to speak of Montenegro’s government as not wanting to “argue with Croatia.”[5] She added, “We want to solve the bilateral disputes.”[6] North Macedonia’s president, Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, however, was not so clever, assuming she was in favor of statehood, in saying North Macedonia’s “EU accession hopes” were “being held hostage by Bulgaria,” which was “demanding constitutional changes [in North Macedonia] to recognize the Bulgarian minority.”[7] To be sure, the E.U. state of Bulgaria’s concern for Bulgarians in North Macedonia did not take into account, and thus respect, the E.U.’s own requirements that rule-of-law safeguards exist in the states. Again, statehood involves more than merely membership; the constraints on states are greater. Also, the accession of states should not be leveraged by existing states to score points or remake another country’s system of government. For its part, the E.U. justifiably did not want to add a state that is in disputes with existing states, for such internecine “warfare” could impede unity in the Union, and thus block important federal foreign policy and legislation.

Regarding the E.U.’s legitimate interest in being “solid” in foreign policy, and thus able to have political power on the global stage, in an 2026 annual report, the Commission assessed Georgia, Turkey, and Serbia as standing out as candidate states “for their lack of alignment, which could limit their access to ‘gradual integration’.”[8] According to a senior E.U. official at the time, “Common security and defense policy has become an increasingly important dimension in the accession process.”[9] Although such policy included “border management, cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure,” alignment “with sanctions against Russia” was “seen as a key indicator.”[10] Therefore, even though “Gorcevic also said she was hopeful that the recent elections in Serbia would help the Western Balkans in the enlargement process,”[11] Serbia’s closeness to Russia in terms of foreign (and energy) policy relative to the E.U.’s negative stance on Russia means that the reformist Serbia’s Student List win in late October would not necessarily facilitate Serbia’s accession. The unlikelihood that Serbia would recognize Croatia also did not help matters, but political ties to Russia, especially in the midst of its militarily unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can be viewed as the kiss of death as far as accession is concerned.[12] 

My point is that the E.U.’s concern is entirely justified, given tremendous value of broad consensus on foreign policy inside the E.U, and therefore the Commission was not motivated to manipulate countries outside of the Union by leveraging the desire for statehood so the E.U. could have greater influence in the world. The continuance of the state veto mechanism in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, which together can be likened to the U.S. Senate and its committees, renders broad agreement on foreign policy among E.U. states, and thus candidate states too, as pruden and even perhaps even necessary in order to avoid paralysis at the federal level. Viktor Orban's affinity with Russia's Putin during his invasion of Ukraine weakened the E.U. in its ability to provide a united, federal response in defense of Ukraine. 

One of the chief benefits of the E.U. is that the states separately cannot wield such power internationally as the E.U. can. Enlargement should not be so valued by Europeans that it becomes an end in itself, by which means greater strategic-interest and ideological divergence between states, and thus in the European Council and the Council of the Ministers, can make its way in at the expense of a more perfect Union.



1. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
2. Luca Bertuzzi and Maria Tadeo, “Georgia PM Offers No Way Out of EU Accession Deadlock in Euronews Interview,” 3 November 2026, italics added.
3. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
6. Ibid.
7. Marta Pacheco, “North Macedonia Leader Hits Back at Bulgaria’s Demands for Constitutional Change,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
8. Luca Bertuzzi, “EU Tying Enlargement to Strategic Alignment Puts Serbia, Georgia and Turkey in a Tight Spot,” Euronews.com, 4 November 2026.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
12. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.

Sunday, June 1, 2025

Insulting Police in Georgia: Totalitarianism Criminalizing Politics

Whereas the Georgia in North America has been a member-state of the U.S. from that union’s beginning, the Georgia in Europe was still not annexed by the E.U. slightly more than 30 years after that Union’s beginning. Whether to join an empire-scale union of states is a political decision, as a union of states is a political animal. When a prospective state government criminalizes political protest and public discourse on that decision, such a government violates the federal requirement that the state governments adhere to democratic principles, which exclude criminalizing the political opposition. The government of Georgia in Europe crossed this line when a politician of the opposition was arrested for insulting the state police.

Just days after protests against the pro-Russian leanings of the ruling Georgian Dream group began in May, 2025, police detained Nika Melia, “one of the figureheads for Georgia’s pro-Western Coalition for Change” and who was in his car at the time rather than at a protest.[1] That “he was bundled away by a large group of people in civilian clothing . . . on charges of verbally insulting a law enforcement officer” undercuts the government’s claim that the arrest was of a criminal rather than a political nature.[2] Typically when a motorist is given a speeding ticket, a large number of people not wearing police uniforms does not deliver the ticket and haul the driver away.

As for the charge of verbally insulting a police employee, which is distinct from assaulting such an employee, not even municipal employees are gods (although generals on a battlefield may come close). In fact, Nietzsche’s expression human, all too human sadly applies all too often to police around the world because such power as in being legally permitted to use a club, taser, or gun is all too tempting for human pride and presumptuousness to abuse. In other words, police itself can be said to be a necessary evil because human nature itself is not strong enough to responsibly and proportionally use police power.

Continuing on the distinction between verbally insulting and physically assaulting someone, only the former can fall under free speech (i.e., political speech). Only the former brings to mind the thought police in George Orwell’s book, 1984. In other words, to make insulting a state functionary a crime comes dangerously close to making certain thoughts or beliefs illegal if they are verbally expressed. Even criminalizing publicly insulting a deity, which no police employee has been, is, or ever will be, essentially makes certain thoughts or beliefs, which are interior to a mind and thus inherently beyond the reach of the state, verboten. The contradiction is in making something inherently beyond the reach of the state to control subject nonetheless to such control. Totalitarianism itself may be said to end in such a contradiction.

Georgia’s chances of being annexed by the E.U. were thus being lessened by the criminalizing of verbally insulting police employees, who are, after all, taxpayer funded, and the detention of Nika Melia in particular. His criticism of the pro-Russian ruling Georgian Dream group was also a criticism of that government putting on hold the annexation process. Russia’s President Putin had made no secret of his strong preference that the E.U. not extend eastward, and the Georgian Dream group in Georgia’s government may have been doing Putin’s bidding in literally arresting pro-E.U. political beliefs. If in fact the vast majority of residents in Georgia were in favor of their state being annexed by the E.U., then the Georgian Dream regime was on tenuous grounds from a democratic standpoint not only in unilaterally bringing that process to a stop, but also in arresting pro-E.U./anti-Russian politicians. Interestingly, most of Serbia’s residents may have been opposed then to Serbia being annexed by the E.U. because of the higher prices and decrease in population (and increase in immigration) that had occurred in Croatia since it had become an E.U. state; and yet, Serbians tended to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So being against annexation by the E.U. did not necessarily come from pro-Russia sentiment.



1. Euronews Georgia, “Georgia Arrests Second Opposition Figure in Days as Ruling Party Faces More Protests,” Euronews.com, May 30, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Saturday, February 24, 2018

The UN Court Obviating War: The Ruling on Kosovo's Independence

The UN’s highest court ruled in 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia did not break international law. President Hisashi Owada of the International Court of Justice said international law contains no ”prohibition on declarations of independence” and therefore Kosovo’s declaration ”did not violate general international law.” Kosovo’s statehood had been recognized by all of the United States and most of the States of the EU.

Critically, the court’s ruling is nonbinding.  Hence China and Russia are under no obligation to recognize it, though as both states are members of the UN one might suppose that the UN’s ruling is binding on them as members of the UN. What sanctions, one might surmise, could the UN issue against its members that do not recognize the rulings of its court? Short of cancelling their memberships, what could the UN assess that it could enforce?  Perhaps the UN could effectively withhold their voting privilege in the UN while maintaining their membership (and fees).  I contend that such “teeth” is necessary if the UN is to be an honest broker concerning questions of declarations of independence such that war is obviated. In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel argues that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch because it does not have control of the purse or an army.  A court whose rulings are nonbinding is to render it nearly impotent—nearly because just being a court carries with it some legitimacy and thus influence. Even so, as an improvement on the alternative (i.e., war), the UN’s court needs something more binding. To tout an absolutist theory of sovereignty of the nation-state as an obstacle to recognizing the UN court as binding would be enervate a possible improvement of mankind with respect to conflict in international relations.  Particularly in an age in which mass  human destructiveness is possible, we can ill-afford a Bodinean theory of sovereignty. In spite of the dangers in continuing the status quo in international conflict resolution, we advance at a snail’s pace—particularly as compared to technological development. I contend that it is high time for political development in international relations. Yet for this to occur it seems that human nature itself—particularly, its intractability—would have to be overcome, which might render the original problem moot.  Even so, it is worth a try. We may be closer than we think to being able to give the UN’s highest court a bindingness sufficient to reduce the likelihood of war appreciably.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/07/22/world/europe/AP-EU-World-Court-Kosovo.html?_r=1