North Korea and the E.U. on Human Rights

In the Sermon on the Mount in the New Testament, Jesus uses the metaphor of a mere sliver of wood in another person’s eye being objected to by a person who has an entire plank in one’s own eye to criticize the hypocrisy that can occur with self-righteousness.[1] In international relations, it is much easier to see abuses of human rights in another country than in one’s own. Mixing metaphors, it can be said that people in glass houses should not throw stones because one may come back to bite. Generalizing from particular abuses of human rights, the refusal of national governments to give up some governmental sovereignty so an assembly “with teeth” could go in and arrest abusers within a country in violation of protecting its residents’ human rights means that we are all guilty of insufficient political action. The UN pales next to such an assembly, yet, at least as of 2026, it is the best we have.

In 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said “that human rights in North Korea” had “shown no improvement over the past decade and had in fact worsened in many cases.”[2] Nevertheless, on 5 November 2026, North Korea’s state media “lashed out at the European Union over its draft UN resolution addressing human rights” abuses in North Korea.[3] The fact that the country’s dictatorship had long been accused of “running prison camps and severely restricting freedom of expression and access to information” and the UN General Assembly had passed resolutions against North Korea every year since 2005 did not phase the North Korean government officials who accused the Europeans of submitting a draft resolution that is a “farce” and a “politically-motivation provocation” by “flagrantly distorting the human rights policy and situation of the DPRK.”[4] Even the use of such hyperbolic language discredits the Korean response. Even the veneer of official government-speak was lacking in Korean response: “The EU had better mind its own business, instead of hyping up the non-existent ‘human rights’ issues.”[5] The Koreans were on more solid ground, albeit again steeped in exaggeration, in retorting: “In cities across Europe, from Paris to Brussels . . ., streets are filled with demonstrators from all walks of life demanding such elementary rights as the rights to existence.”[6] Although the rioting has pointed to deep frustration, protesting the deplorable condition of some schools and for a livable wage is not comparable to protesting, were it allowed in North Korea, against so many citizens being held in political prison-camps in forced labor.

The response of the North Korean government would have been more credible had the media statement included the paralyzing impact on the E.U. of political differences between E.U. states on how (or even whether) to respond politically and economically to Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza and officially-condoned violence against Palestinian property-owners in the West Bank. Ironically, North Korea could claim the moral high ground in that respect. Whereas the E.U. had an ongoing trade agreement with Israel in 2026 even though Israel was violating the human-rights stipulation, North Korea did not recognize the state of Israel, and even considered it to be a “terror project” engaging militarily in crimes against humanity while being supported politically, financially and militarily by the U.S. so the crimes could go on with impunity. Even the E.U.’s lack of sufficient unity on Israel effectively enabled the genocide and violence by Israelis in the West Bank. North Korea could even have pointed to the stubborn refusal of the governors of E.U. states to give up the veto that each held in the European Council and the Council of Ministers as keeping the E.U. to adopt a policy critical of Israel with economic sanctions.

Therefore, North Korea’s reply to the E.U.’s draft resolution critical of North Korea could legitimately have suggested that the Europeans focus on standing against the genocide and, as a way to begin to take up that task, to reform the E.U.’s basic law by eliminating the state veto in the two federal councils that represent the state governments. The conflict of interest facing governors of states unwilling to give up their veto power at the federal level could have been exposed as itself unethical, and indirectly as standing in the way of the E.U. opposing Israel. As bad as the human right violations likely were in North Korea at the time, it is interesting that the North Korean dictatorship was out-performing the E.U. in regard to opposing the perpetuation of crimes against humanity by the Israeli government. That the U.S. was actively enabling Israel even militarily during the genocide and decimation of entire cities in Gaza supports North Korea’s point that the West did not hold a monopoly even just in standing for human rights. Rather than pointing fingers, the E.U. and North Korea, and even the U.S., could alternatively have been working together where practicable to take out or at least weaken state actors committing crimes against humanity within their borders with impunity. Because such cooperation was in short supply, whereas pointing fingers was more attractive at least through 2026, the rationale for an international, semi-sovereign political body with sufficient military muscle to combat abusers of human rights can be understood.

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1. See Matt. 7:3-5 and Luke 6:41.
2. Gavin Blackburn, “North Korea Tells EU to ‘Mind Its Own Business’ after Draft UN Resolution on Human Rights,” Euronews.com, 5 November 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Foreign Policy Alignment in E.U. Enlargement

Threating the E.U. or U.S. as a club and thus as having members rather than states is as erroneous as it is arrogant. Even though the E.U. states are members of the European Council and the U.S. states are members of the U.S. Senate because both federal bodies represent states rather than federal or state citizens, nether the U.S. nor the E.U. has members per se; rather both unions have states because those unions have federal systems. Nor is either political union a “bloc,” as the latter is actually a temporary group of sovereign countries rather than a federal government of semi-sovereign states or even just an alliance. Linguistic semantics matter because they can impact expectations; less is expected of a bloc than a federal union of states. For one thing, the latter, which is theoretically permanent, involves more of a bonding between the polities. To be united, states cannot not be so opposed to each other that passing federal law and regulations faces insurmountable ideological opposition in the chambers in which the states are represented and thus are the members, especially if each one wields a veto! Two words: Viktor Orban. The E.U. is justified, therefore, in insisting on general agreement with the E.U.’s foreign and military policies before approving the accession of a candidate state.  

Asked on 3 November 2026 about the prospect of Montenegro’s statehood in the E.U. including “a 15-year transition period,” Montenegro’s E.U. Minister Maida Gorcevic replied, “We don’t want second-grade membership inside the European Union, because that wouldn’t be fair and that wouldn’t be full membership as well.”[1] Even her aspirations for “full membership” were insufficient, for statehood is something more than being a member of a network or organization of countries. In implying that the E.U. constituted such an arrangement, Gorcevic was unwittingly undercutting the E.U., and in particular its potential in the areas of foreign and military policy. So too had Britain’s prime minister, David Cameron, when he said that the E.U. is just a network to which Britain happened to belong. States do not happen to belong as semi-sovereign states to a political union such as the E.U. or U.S., so Cameron committed a category mistake in how he characterized the European Union. So too was Georgia’s prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, in early November 2026, when he spoke on the open breach between his government and the European Commission: “We have to agree with each other, the European Union and Georgia, that we want to se a democratic rule of law-based, human-rights based, economically strong and sovereign Georgia in the European Union.”[2] He added that the Commission’s request that the Georgian government repeal laws that were at odds with the rule-of-law requirement of statehood “interfered with the principle of sovereignty.”[3] Even though Georgia was sovereign at the time, the Commission’s “interference” was in line with the fact that as an E.U. state, Georgia would no longer be fully sovereign because the E.U. itself holds a portion of governmental sovereignty in exclusive and even shared competencies.

Denying the dual-sovereignty feature of (early) modern federalism in either the E.U. or U.S. instantiates a political category mistake with respect to two different types of federalism, which Ken Wheare refers to as modern federalism and confederalism in his text, Federal Government. By the way, neither of Althusius’ plena and nonplena types of federalism, discussed in his text, Political Digest (1603), anticipates modern (dual-sovereignty) federalism, which would not be invented until 1787 in Philadelphia out of political compromise at the American Convention.

Because states do not just happen to belong to a federal union that is both political and economic, as well as being active in social policy, looking out for a degree of basic ideological fit when accessing whether candidate states should be granted statehood is legitimate. The arduous negotiations that took place over years between 2016 and 2020 so Britain could secede from the Union, as well as Viktor Orbán’s use of Hungary’s veto in the European Council when the Commission was sanctioning the state for its rule-of-law violations at home as well as its violations of E.U. law attest to the importance of fit between an incoming state and the other states as well as their Union. A more perfect union means that the federal governmental machinery must not be stymied or even held ransom by a state’s government due to ideological disagreement with a federal policy or, even worse, a refusal to recognize the portion of governmental sovereignty that has been delegated through Basic Law to the Union.

The chair of the European Council, Antonio Costa, wrote in November, 2026 of enlargement in the following terms: “The ambition to join the European Union must help overcome historical grievances, reject nationalist rhetoric, and encourage countries to move towards genuine cooperation.”[4] So Gorcevic was clever to speak of Montenegro’s government as not wanting to “argue with Croatia.”[5] She added, “We want to solve the bilateral disputes.”[6] North Macedonia’s president, Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova, however, was not so clever, assuming she was in favor of statehood, in saying North Macedonia’s “EU accession hopes” were “being held hostage by Bulgaria,” which was “demanding constitutional changes [in North Macedonia] to recognize the Bulgarian minority.”[7] To be sure, the E.U. state of Bulgaria’s concern for Bulgarians in North Macedonia did not take into account, and thus respect, the E.U.’s own requirements that rule-of-law safeguards exist in the states. Again, statehood involves more than merely membership; the constraints on states are greater. Also, the accession of states should not be leveraged by existing states to score points or remake another country’s system of government. For its part, the E.U. justifiably did not want to add a state that is in disputes with existing states, for such internecine “warfare” could impede unity in the Union, and thus block important federal foreign policy and legislation.

Regarding the E.U.’s legitimate interest in being “solid” in foreign policy, and thus able to have political power on the global stage, in an 2026 annual report, the Commission assessed Georgia, Turkey, and Serbia as standing out as candidate states “for their lack of alignment, which could limit their access to ‘gradual integration’.”[8] According to a senior E.U. official at the time, “Common security and defense policy has become an increasingly important dimension in the accession process.”[9] Although such policy included “border management, cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure,” alignment “with sanctions against Russia” was “seen as a key indicator.”[10] Therefore, even though “Gorcevic also said she was hopeful that the recent elections in Serbia would help the Western Balkans in the enlargement process,”[11] Serbia’s closeness to Russia in terms of foreign (and energy) policy relative to the E.U.’s negative stance on Russia means that the reformist Serbia’s Student List win in late October would not necessarily facilitate Serbia’s accession. The unlikelihood that Serbia would recognize Croatia also did not help matters, but political ties to Russia, especially in the midst of its militarily unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can be viewed as the kiss of death as far as accession is concerned.[12] 

My point is that the E.U.’s concern is entirely justified, given tremendous value of broad consensus on foreign policy inside the E.U, and therefore the Commission was not motivated to manipulate countries outside of the Union by leveraging the desire for statehood so the E.U. could have greater influence in the world. The continuance of the state veto mechanism in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, which together can be likened to the U.S. Senate and its committees, renders broad agreement on foreign policy among E.U. states, and thus candidate states too, as pruden and even perhaps even necessary in order to avoid paralysis at the federal level. Viktor Orban's affinity with Russia's Putin during his invasion of Ukraine weakened the E.U. in its ability to provide a united, federal response in defense of Ukraine. 

One of the chief benefits of the E.U. is that the states separately cannot wield such power internationally as the E.U. can. Enlargement should not be so valued by Europeans that it becomes an end in itself, by which means greater strategic-interest and ideological divergence between states, and thus in the European Council and the Council of the Ministers, can make its way in at the expense of a more perfect Union.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
2. Luca Bertuzzi and Maria Tadeo, “Georgia PM Offers No Way Out of EU Accession Deadlock in Euronews Interview,” 3 November 2026, italics added.
3. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
6. Ibid.
7. Marta Pacheco, “North Macedonia Leader Hits Back at Bulgaria’s Demands for Constitutional Change,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
8. Luca Bertuzzi, “EU Tying Enlargement to Strategic Alignment Puts Serbia, Georgia and Turkey in a Tight Spot,” Euronews.com, 4 November 2026.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Sandor Zsiros, “Montenegro Rejects ‘Second-Class’ EU Membership as It Eyes 2028 Accession,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.
12. Luca Bertuzzi, “Progress and Pitfalls on the Path to a Bigger EU: Five Takeaways from the Euronews Enlargement Summit,” Euronews.com, 3 November 2026.

Trade or Foreign Policy: The E.U. on Illegal Israeli Settlements

During the summer of 2026, the E.U. found itself at one point trying to make the unnecessarily arduous and utterly artificial distinction between trade and foreign policy as if they were mutually exclusive. This task was foisted on the Council of Ministers due to the domain-specific application of the state veto, which is to say, the requirement of unanimity. The sheer artificiality was outdone only by the absurdity of any of 27 states still being able to veto proposed federal law and policy in some but not all policy domains, and thus hamstring the E.U. even when the good of the whole, supported by the vast majority of states and E.U. citizens, supported action on the federal level. The global context at the time with respect to international relations belied a stark separation of trade from foreign policy.

In declaring a recommencement of a naval blockade on Iranian ports on July 13, 2026, for example, U.S. President Trump also said the U.S. would “be reimbursed, at the rate of 20% on all cargo shipped for any and all costs necessary to do the job of providing safety and security” to ships passing through the Hormuz Strait.[1] As a countering move of rhetoric, “Iran’s military command insisted it would not allow the US to ‘interfere’ in the key conduit for oil and gas, while also warning its Gulf neighbours—who have borne the brunt of Tehran’s attacks—against cooperating” with the U.S.[2] Clearly, trade itself, and especially protecting its conduit, can be seen as being closely intertwined with foreign policy in this case. The rising price of oil was clearly on Trump’s mind, especially with the “midterm” elections less than four months away, but also standing up to the Iranian military attacks on ships in the strait was also a probable motive, rather than merely to make “toll” money on shipping in the Middle East. In other words, political economy, rather than just business and economics, best describes the interlacing of trade and foreign policy. 

In fact, historically, the field known today as economics spun out of political economy. Even in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, a non-mercantilist, regulative role of government in protecting competitive markets and even the role of the state in covering the “social” costs of capitalism, such as in providing housing and food to the unemployed, for example, are salient. Left to its own devises, a competitive market could concentrate into an oligopoly or even a monopoly as the refining industry did in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in North America, where oil was first discovered.

Therefore, it can be regarded as a legal fiction of sorts that the E.U. would treat a legislative proposal to ban trade with Israeli settlements, such as covered most of the land in the West Bank by 2026, illegally according both to international and E.U. law, as a matter of trade rather than foreign policy so only qualified majority voting rather than the unanimous consent that is necessary on foreign-policy proposals would be needed to pass the Council of Ministers. Referring to that council, the E.U.’s federal foreign minister Kallas reported, “The option that got the most support was banning the trade with the illegal settlements.”[3] She was referring to the E.U.’s states, which are represented both in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, similar to U.S. states being represented in the U.S. Senate. In American parlance, the consensus among “senators” was to ban all trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, which by 2026 was down to the West Bank as Israel had razed Gaza to the ground in a holocaustic genocide. That the consensus was not instead to ban all trade with Israel as well as its illegal settlements, given the state-sponsored destruction of Gaza, is another question, which presumably would also qualify to be decided in the Council by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity, for trade even as foreign policy is still trade.

That the E.U. still made such a distinction as to the voting threshold in 2026 even as the Union was considering adding more states to the east even though foreign policy and trade had become so integrally related in international relations generally can be said to be artificial, and thus irrationally political rather than having merit in the functioning of the E.U.’s federal system. In fact, even at 27 states, the requirement of reaching unanimity on legislation and policy in the European Council and the Council of Ministers (aka Council of the E.U.) had already made it very difficult to pass even widely favored proposals due to Viktor Orbán’s “Euroskeptic” (i.e., anti-federalist) ideology. In other words, he was able to undercut the E.U. from within, and yet even months after his fall from power in the E.U. state of Hungary, the matter of subjecting the matter of deciding how to vote on whether to ban trade with illegal settlements was still arduous! Even though Kallas was the foreign minister of the E.U. (under the stealth misnomer of “High Representative” to satisfy anti-federalists), banning trade falls under trade primarily, and thus qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity. Perhaps a more robust, courageous, foreign-policy proposal worthy of human-rights and even just international-law proponents would have been to ban trade with Israel en toto, but even such a proposal would fall under trade and thus rightly be subject to qualified-majority voting. Moreover, with 27 states, and thus 27 political opinions of sitting governors, that the Councils still subjected any decision to unanimity especially after Viktor Orbán suggests that the need to distinguish trade from foreign policy anyway could and should have been obviated by common sense. 

That on 13 July, 2026, “a majority of member states . . . backed framing the measures as a trade rather than a foreign policy tool, which would avoid the need of all E.U. [state] governments to unanimously back the move” should have been enough because, simply put, banning trade is about trade, which is subject to qualified-majority voting.[4] The “move” should not have been needed in the first place, were enough Europeans convinced that the very existence of the state-veto in the Councils is an antiquated notion based on the former days before the E.U. when the states were fully sovereign, rather than semi-sovereign in a political union, which also has some governmental sovereignty. In fact, qualified-majority voting itself is an instance of such sovereignty because states on the losing end of such a vote must obey the decision nonetheless. 

Therefore, the very continuance of the state veto is predicated on denial. Put another way, the world was moving forward; why, then, were the E.U. state governments so utterly intractable, so beheld to their own power, even as the E.U. was poised to add even more states without first jettisoning the requirement of unanimity in the two councils that represent states? Perhaps the Parliament and the Commission should have been delegated more authority at the federal level until the states could get their act together in the two federal councils.

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1. Aleksandar Brezar and Peter Barabas, “Trump Reimposes U.S. Blockade and Demands 20% Hormuz Shipping Fee,” Euronews.com, 13 July 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Mared G. Jones, “Full Ban on Israeli Settlement Trade Gets ‘Most Support’ from EU Countries, Kallas Says,” Euronews.com, 13 July, 2026.
4. Ibid.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): Europe Living in the Past

In the midst of the ongoing military invasion by Russia in Ukraine, countries in Eastern Europe could hardly afford to dwell on the past and react against each other at the expense of being proactive and united in pushing Russia back to within its borders—coloring within the lines rather than unrestrained. Therefore, the E.U.’s parliament can be criticized for having spending time and effort on 8 July, 2026 on a resolution that criticizes Ukraine’s then-sitting president, Voladymyr Zelenskyy, for having renamed an elite military unit after the World War II-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Even though a large majority of representatives in the Parliament voted in favor of the resolution, the legislative chamber could have been oriented constructively to combatting Putin’s push into Ukraine rather than play into his hands by stoking division between Ukraine and the E.U. state of Poland. Generally speaking, European culture may be criticized for putting much weight on the past at the expense of the present and future. “The past will never change, but tomorrow is still open” should be taught in European classrooms as a maxim. In 2026, as in the immediately preceding few years, the E.U.’s self-handicap in responding sufficiently to helping Ukraine militarily can be chalked up to not letting go of the past to embrace the present in a way that is oriented to the future.

Regarding the resolution that a vast majority of elected representatives in the European Parliament viewed as being worth their time and effort, whereas in Ukraine, “the UPA is widely commemorated for its role in opposing Soviet rule and fighting for Ukrainian independence,” in the E.U. state of Poland the UPA “is widely associated with the Volyn massacre of 1943-45, during which tens of thousands of Poles were killed under Nazi occupation. Poland has recognized the massacre as a genocide, a label Ukraine has rejected.”[1] Debating whether it was or was not a genocide, and, moreover, how opposing Soviet rule stacks up against the Volyn massacre is a luxury that Europe’s anti-Russian powers could not afford when Ukraine was still being occupied by the invading Russian army and eastern E.U. states fretted that they might be next for dinner by the empire-hungry Russian bear. In fact, engaging in a historical obsession rather than moving on to the twenty-first century implies that the E.U.’s political elite was not taking Putin’s invasion seriously enough. It was not as if dislodging the Russian army from roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory would require just little thought and a bit of easy effort, so the opportunity cost to thrashing over the previous century was high. An opportunity cost (in economics) is the benefit that is given up from an alternative course of action that is not taken. Besides the opportunity cost in terms of lost time and energy devoted to thwarting Russia’s invasion, squabbles between Ukraine and a state of the E.U. stood to benefit Putin’s military position and strategy because both thrive if the opposition is divided. As the old adage goes, a house divided cannot stand.

Zelensky had recently admitted to some “difficulties in our history,” and yet urged all parties opposing Russia’s invasion to live more “in the future than in the past” by uniting against Russia rather than turning on each other.[2] To be sure, he could have easily obviated the diplomatic tension by not having renamed the elite military unit after the UPA; more important than a name is how well a military unit performs on the battlefield. Also, no shame goes with publicly admitting a mistake and moving on, for we are all human.

The proclivity in the European psyche—an admittedly cultured entity, which I admire “across the pond” as a native, gruff Midwesterner—to hold onto the past even when it is antiquated and thus obstructs a stronger present and future has impaired the European Union’s federal system. Most crucially generally and especially in terms of the foreign- and defense-policy domains, the E.U. really needed to reform itself by losing the paralyzing veto that the state governments still held in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. (i.e., the Council of Ministers) when the resolution against Zelensky was passed in the parliament (by qualified-majority). Because unanimity was still required for a federal policy or law to pass in foreign policy and defense, the E.U. can be said to be holding itself back, as if having one arm tied behind the back, from adequately supporting Ukraine’s military efforts, especially given the Trump Administration’s preoccupation with Iran, given the extraordinary power of Israeli money in Washington. How, then, is the state veto in the two Councils tied in with the European tendency to hold onto the past?

The very existence of the veto can be viewed as a residual from when the E.U. states were fully sovereign, before they delegated some of their governmental sovereignty to the Union. Qualified-majority voting itself is such a delegation of sovereignty because a state on the losing side of such a vote is still subject to the federal policy, law, or regulation. Even in the case of having considerable discretion in how to implement directives, the states still have to implement them. Were the states still sovereign, as the U.S. states were before and under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the E.U. states could legally ignore even E.U. laws. Such a lapse in understanding of the dual-sovereignty feature of the E.U.’s federal system had been repeatedly demonstrated by Viktor Orbán when he governed the E.U. state of Hungary. It is no coincidence that he abused the power of his state’s veto in the federal councils, for the veto itself was established to reflect the sovereignty still retained by the state governments in the Union. Similarly, but not as extreme, the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, which is roughly equivalent to the Council of the E.U., is a hold-over from the full sovereignty that U.S. states enjoyed before 1789.

I contend that holding onto the time when E.U. states were fully sovereign countries, even though the future of E.U. decision-making could benefit greatly in turning to qualified majority voting instead of unanimity, is itself a significant problem. In other words, besides the obvious governmental conflict of interest that exists on questions of whether additional sovereignty should be delegated, the resistance of state-level officials to relinquishing the veto at the federal level can be said to at least be intensified because they hold onto the political past excessively. Because the E.U. stood to enlarge in 2026 by adding additional states in the future, the Union could ill-afford to hold onto the “old-sovereignty” veto because it had already been too obstructionist (e.g., Viktor Orbán) at the federal level in the councils. Just as division between the E.U. and Ukraine played into Putin’s hands, the historically-based rationale for retaining the veto power put the states at odds with the Union, essentially handicapping the E.U. from within. A self-inflicted wound predicated on not being willing to let go of the past, politically. Looking backwards while walking forwards, a person is likely to trip and fall. Similarly, self-inflicted political weakness is never good. In his text, On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche points to the self-imposed (i.e., voluntary) self-abnegation of impotent Catholic priests as the epitome of weakness. Relative to the U.S. Senate, which admittedly is too prone to political sloth and stalemate at the expense of action, the obstruction occasioned by the veto in the Council of the E.U. and the European Council beats that of the filibuster, which, incidentally, can be overridden by 60 out of 100 votes. Qualified-majority vote is thus consistent with a nod to state sovereignty—plena in the past and non-plena in the present. Perpetuating history need not stand in the way, especially while an invasion is in progress close to the eastern border.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “European Parliament Condemns Zelenskyy for Naming Military Unit after UPA Heroes,” Euronews.com, 8 July, 2026.
2. Ibid.

An E.U. Envoy to Russia

Should the E.U. appoint and send an envoy to Russia in spite of the fact that E.U. and state officials are not of one mind on a strategy to pressure Russia’s head, Putin, to the negotiating table to compromise? The power of the state governments at the federal level complicates efforts by Commission officials to present Putin with a specific list of sanctions because the governors are not on the same page even after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April, 2026. Ironically, desperately needed reforms to the E.U.’s federal system itself have been as politically difficult even to propose as has getting Putin to the negotiating table. Focusing on the latter while ignoring the former is a self-inflicted wound that has weakened the Europeans on the world stage. Incidentally, another self-inflicted state of denial involves assuming that such drastic cultural differences exist between two small E.U. states, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, while assuming that all of the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are basically the same, culturally. Recently, a European, who is actually a U.S. citizen, said as much to me! Denial is the main defense mechanism in the E.U. Even painstaking effort to render this political brain-sickness transparent is no match for the underlying ideological fervor that has so severely enervated the European Union from becoming a more perfect union.

Pointing to the intractable problem within the E.U. in formulating foreign policy, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, said in 2026, “Before we talk to the Russians, we should agree and talk amongst ourselves what we want to talk to the Russians about.”[1] She was undoubtedly referring to the direct involvement of state officials at the federal level in the Council of Ministers; agreement between relevant federal officials was not sufficient. In the U.S., the state governments’ official direct involvement at the federal level has been through the U.S. Senate, which, like the European Council and the Council of Ministers, represents states. Whereas the U.S. Senate’s filibuster (60 out of 100 vote threshold) is related back to the ongoing enumerated and residual governmental sovereignty of the U.S. states, the semi-sovereign E.U. states, which delegated significant governmental sovereignty to the E.U., have enjoyed veto power on federal foreign (and defense) policy—effectively choking off E.U. foreign (and defense) policy. It is for precisely this reason that in 2026, E.U. President von der Leyen and even the governor of one of the large states, (the E.U. state of Germany) publicly advocated applying qualified-majority voting to every proposed policy, E.U. law, and regulation/directive in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This eminently reasonable constitutional (or Basic Law) reform of the E.U.’s federal system had to contend with the formidable resistance of the Euroskeptic ideology that the E.U. states were still somehow sovereign. Backing up the denial was the ideological tendency to exaggerate cultural differences between small E.U. states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, while assuming that the U.S. states across a continent and beyond are culturally similar! Denial on top of denial to support the category mistake of comparing even a small E.U. state with the U.S. as a whole (while rejecting comparisons such as those between California and the E.U. and even between the two empire-scale unions!). The bad odor of denialism was, at least as of 2026, so ubiquitous in the E.U. that the smell may well have been likened instead to that of a freshly blooming flower. Bad air!

The ideological grip on the state-veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, held firmly by the states’ governors even though they were exploiting institutional and personal (i.e., power) conflicts of interest, was immune to the plea even of Ukraine’s president Zelensky, who said on May 17, 2026, “It is important for [the E.U.] to have a strong voice and presence in this process [regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine], and it is worth determining who will represent Europe specifically.”[2] The state veto in the councils inhibited the E.U. from speaking with one voice and even being able to sit at the negotiating table with Putin. Regarding whomever might represent the E.U., one implication is that the envoy could have sufficient discretion rather than be limited to the demands of one governor out of 27 who is skeptical. Indeed, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, admitted at the time that the relevant officials of the states had “vastly disparate views” on “concessions and conditions” for Russia.[3] Given this state of affairs at the state level, holding onto the principle of unanimity in the councils on foreign policy was quite foolish indeed.

Kallas also said that the E.U. “should not ‘humiliate’ itself by seeking direct talks” with Putin.[4] The humiliation feared was that of the E.U. not having sufficient power to avoid giving in at the very start of negotiations. To be sure, Putin is a touch negotiator, but the seeds of the E.U.’s weakness are within rather than bestowed by the Russian. To be sure, both Putin and Trump could smell political weakness even from a great distance. In 2025, for example, E.U. officials “found, through press reports, a 28-point plan drafted by US and Russian officials that included issues, such as sanctions and assets, that fell under [the E.U.’s] jurisdiction.”[5] Even though the Europeans could blame the Americans and the Russians, a more mature mentality would honestly confront the weakness in the E.U.’s federal system, by which I obviously have in mind the vetoes reserved to the states at the federal level. This is not to say that expunging the veto from E.U. federalism would be sufficient to redress the weakness in E.U. foreign policy. 

As governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán belied the Von der Leyen administration by going to visit Putin in Moscow. Direct involvement in foreign policy at the federal level must not permit such a betrayal by the governor of a state, for a house divided cannot stand. This is true, by the way, for couples wherein values clash and neither (or even one) side will compromise; tragically, such clashes blow up even love as if the two people had never even met. If the Europeans can figure out how to retain some direct involvement of the state governments in foreign policy without the veto and direct state involvement with foreign officials if prohibited by the Commission, then the Americans might want to consider how the state governments could have more direct involvement, especially since U.S. senators ceased to be appointed by the state governments, for being elected by the citizens of a state does not mean that the state government is represented, and does not necessarily give a senator a political incentive to represent the state government’s interests if the people thereof would prefer federal preemption. Of course, the European ideological bias would preclude such a comparison, and thus any such benefit obtained by studying the other union.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “High Risks, Pitfalls and Snubs: E.U. Envoy for Russia Talks Faces Job from Hell,” Euronews.com, 19 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Vendetta Violence: Israeli Settlers Sanctioned by the E.U.

What a difference even just a month can make. On 11 May, 2026, the E.U. enacted sanctions against “Israeli settlers over their violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, a move enabled by backing from Hungary’s incoming government.”[1] A month earlier, Viktor Orbán was the sitting prime minister of the E.U. state of Hungary. As a supporter of U.S. President Trump, who in turn supported Israel even in its decimation of Gaza razing entire cities into leveled ground for real estate “properties,” Orbán would have wielded Hungary’s veto in the European Council.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, marveled at the time, “We move from political deadlock that was there for a long time. Violence and extremism carry consequences.”[2] The long time is likely a reference to Orbán’s 16 years in power in the E.U. state of Hungary, and her point overall is that with that governor out of the European Council, the E.U. can inflict consequences on foreign actors who engage in violence under the aegis of some extremist ideology. In the case of the Israeli settlers, the ideology is Zionism, which in coming from a religious text has overreached into the political domain, even circumventing international law.

That the violence occurred in the occupied West Bank renders Israel itself especially culpable, for under international law, “all settlements are considered illegal, with the International Court of Justice describing the State of Israel’s ‘continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ as ‘unlawful.’”[3] Both the unprovoked violence of the settlers and the Israeli government’s attempted holocaustic genocide of the population of Gaza are on top of the fact that Israel has no justified basis internationally to even be in Gaza and the West Bank. In other words, Israel is two degrees of separation from being a lawful state in terms of international law. That the Netanyahu government was able to ignore that law so easily suggests that there is no such thing as international law—that only guidelines were by then operating in the collapsed post-World War II global order. In a Hobbesian state of nature, no law exists because no international or global government exists. No world federation certainly, which Kant admitted in Perpetual Peace would only make world peace possible but not probable.

The recurrent violence and theft was being committed even in broad daylight by Israeli settlers against defenseless Palestinians—even walking into their houses and nonchalantly taking appliances and furniture!—because impunity must surely have been assured by means of the tacit approval of a government that, after all, had been determined by the UN to have committed a genocide in Gaza. The violations of human rights occurred on both the societal and interpersonal level. A counter-move international could therefore be expected beyond the E.U. sanctioning individual settlers and related organizations.

Given the harm that was being unleashed directly or indirectly by the Israeli government, Kallas’ claim that violence and extremism abroad would trigger negative consequences by the E.U. rings hollow because those consequences are so inadequate to meet the magnitude and depth of the suffering, both interpersonally and at the societal level (i.e., an entire people). So even though a month made a difference in the European Council, the global “community” was still holding back from enforcing international law. With no other enforcement mechanism, can such law even be called law?

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1. Maia de la Baume, “E.U. Approves Sanctions on Israeli Settlers after Hungarian Backing,” Euronews.com, 11 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Vanquishing the Principle of Unanimity in E.U. Foreign Policy: On the Impact of Oil

There nothing like a sudden dramatic spike in the price of oil in Europe from a war in Iran to prompt E.U. leaders to make speeches as if hell is freezing over and drastic action is urgently needed in terms of federal rather than piecemeal-state foreign policy. Behind President Von der Leyen’s call for the E.U. to do more in foreign policy was her point that the union could no longer afford the principle of unanimity in the European Council in foreign policy. The Iran War had raised the price not only of oil, but also of the unanimity requirement in the Council not only in foreign policy, but also defense. With 27 states at the time and an increasingly belligerent international context, including military aggression against Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran, the E.U. could not rely on a world order regulated by international law. The spike in gas prices, even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, brought this point close to home.

As the U.S. began its military attacks in Iran, “European benchmark gas prices jumped 80% in two days while brent crude edged closer to 84 dollars a barrel.”[1] When oil prices surpassed €87 ($100) per barrel roughly a week into the war, Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary “called on the European Union to suspend sanctions on Russian energy imports.”[2] Never mind that Russia’s 4 year-old unimpeded invasion of Ukraine was a threat on the E.U.’s eastern border; restoring cheaper gas prices was more important, at least to Hungary. The E.U.’s geopolitical interests do not reduce to a state’s economic interests, however, and so President Von der Leyen spoke on the need for a more active E.U. foreign policy.

It was not the first time that the president had warned that the traditional world order was “rapidly crumbling under mounting violations of international law.”[3] In her speech, she said, “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, for a world that has gone and will not return.”[4] There had been too many cases of breaches of international law with impunity as the UN and the International Criminal Court stood by utterly impotent. E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas “pointed the finger at Russia’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine . . . as the cataclysm that precipitated the ‘erosion of international law’ . . . and enabled the return of what she described as ‘coercive power politics.”[5] In her speech, Kallas said, “That (invasion) did not go unnoticed. Instead, it sent a signal around the world that there is no more accountability for one’s actions: the rulebook has been thrown out of the window.”[6] Netanyahu’s government in Israel could unleash a holocaustic genocide in Gaza with a presumption of impunity, and Trump’s government in the U.S. could forcibly remove the president of Venezuela and kill Iran’s highest figure without fear of being held accountable by the U.N. or the International Criminal Court. Militaristic aggression was gaining a foothold in the world as international organizations stood by in utter impotence. The very notion of law at the international level could be surmised to be a misnomer.

Finally, E.U. officials were feeling a sense of urgency from war abroad because the sudden spike in oil and gas prices in Europe from Trump’s military attacks in Iran could not be ignored. Kallas stressing “that a rules-based international order is vital to avoid the inevitable anarchy” was no longer enough.[7] “Von der Leyen added another key priority on which the EU should focus to reinforce its geopolitical clout: its internal decision-making rules.”[8] Problematically, the E.U.’s foreign policy was bound by the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. such that “the 27 member states must agree on a common line of action before moving forward.”[9] So it only took the E.U. state of Hungary to veto the $91 billion loan for Ukraine, and the E.U. was stymied in coming up with a foreign policy on Trump’s military attacks against Iran because of differences between the states. Alternatively, going by qualified-majority voting would have enabled a consensus (i.e., short of unanimous consent) that could have become the E.U.’s foreign policy, which would have been much stronger in the world than were the various positions of the 27 state governments.

The relationship is clear between calls for a rules-based international order “with teeth” and a stronger decision-making rule in the European Council in foreign policy (and defense): a more active E.U. in foreign policy (and defense) was necessary due to the increased militaristic aggression abroad because the latter could have a very significant detrimental economic affect in Europe. Political pressure was thus building for the E.U.’s 27 state governments to finally relinquish their veto-power in foreign policy (and defense). Power is not relinquished easily, so not even higher oil and gas prices could be enough pressure for the states to agree to apply qualified-majority voting to foreign policy (and defense).

The mechanism called “enhanced cooperation,” which I contend elsewhere is a misnomer for what is really increased federal authority for at least nine states but not all of them, could be a means to bring qualified majority voting to the E.U.’s foreign policy that would cover only those states that have agreed to relinquish their veto power in that domain. I suspect that eventually, all of the E.U. states would be included, so “enhanced cooperation” can be understood as a temporary device that gets around the conflict of interest facing the state governments in their decisions on whether to allow the E.U. to become more active in foreign policy (and defense) than the principle of unanimity would permit.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “Middle East War Shows ‘Europe Must Reinforce Its Autonomy’, EIB Chief Tells Euronews,” Euronews.com,  4 March 2026.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary Demands EU Lift Sanctions on Russian Energy as Prices Spike amid Iran War,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on Europe to Adapt to Chaotic, Coercive World Order,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Russia Benefits from Flawed E.U. Federalism

In the E.U., the 27 state governments are able to wield a veto on most important policy proposals in the European Council. Expecting unanimity where not even consensus is enough is so utterly unrealistic at 27 that it may be time to reconsider whether the E.U. can afford such an easy (and tempting) means by which state governors can exploit the E.U. by essentially holding it hostage. To be sure, like the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, the veto in the European Council represents the residual sovereignty that states in both unions enjoy, but extortion for financial gain by means of threatening or exercising a veto in the European Council (and the committees of the Council of the E.U.) suggests that the continued use of a veto by state governments is too problematic to be continued. Residual sovereignty can find adequate representation by qualified majority voting, which is closer the threshold needed to maintain a filibuster in the U.S. Senate. That the E.U. state of Slovakia maintained its veto on a proposed number of federal sanctions against Russia on July 9, 2025 when the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia had violated international law in invading Ukraine is a good indication that the veto had outlived its usefulness and was being used by governors for sordid purposes by using the E.U. rather than strengthening it in foreign affairs.

The full essay is at "Russia Benefits from Flawed E.U. Federalism." 

The E.U. as a Bystander on the Global Stage: A Self-Inflicted Wound

Why has the E.U. been sidelined amid the military tensions in the Middle East? The answer lies with the E.U.’s federal system, rather than the size of its economy or of its population. The E.U. certainly could have more geopolitical sway abroad were it not for a vulnerability being exploited within its own federal system. The vulnerability stems from a refusal by some state officials to recognize and respect the qualitative and quantitative differences between the federal and the state levels of the E.U. Specifically, when the governor (i.e., chief executive and/or head of state) of a state operates as if a federal-level official, especially that of a federal president, the authority of the actual federal president is undercut, hence weakening that person’s ability to convince the heads of foreign governments to include the E.U. president or foreign minister in multilateral negotiations centered on the Middle East, for example. Even unconsciously, foreign leaders may say to themselves, why should we respect the president of the E.U. if she is so easily upstaged by the leader of an E.U. state who is acting as if he were president of the European Commission?  To speak with one voice, and to be able to speak for the E.U. rather than just one state thereof, an E.U. official must be the speaker. Macron of the E.U. state of France cannot speak for the E.U., but Von der Leyen could, provided her space is respected by the governors of the states. This is not to say that this is the only reason why the E.U. has been sidelined from negotiations on Middle East warfare; rather, my contention is that this reason is typically overlooked due to the Euroskeptic ideological delusion that the E.U. does not have a federal system of government even though since 1993, governmental sovereignty has indeed been split between the states and the Union. Perhaps the underlying question here is whether continuing to clutch at the anti-federalist ideology is worth the E.U. continuing to be weakened unnecessarily from within, and thus sidelined from international negotiations that do not center on Europe. Making such blind-spots transparent is indeed a valuable occupation, even if it can be infuriating to people whose interests and ideology are served best if societies look the other way.

The full essay is at "The E.U. as a Bystander on the Global Stage." 

A European Army: A More Perfect Union

At the Munich Security Conference in February, 2025, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy bluntly asserted, “I really believe that the time has come that the armed forces of Europe must be created.”[1] He could have said in 2023 after Russia’s President Putin had sent tanks and bombs into Ukraine; instead, the inauguration of President Trump in the U.S. that was the trigger. “Let’s be honest,” Zelenskyy continued, “now we can’t rule out that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that might threaten it.”[2] At the time, Trump was planning to meet with Putin to end the war without Britain and a number of E.U. states at the table. After all, they had failed to push Putin off Crimea in 2014, and even in 2025, they were not on the same page on how to defend Ukraine militarily. Amid the political fracturing in Europe, Ukraine’s president was urging that the E.U. itself have an army, rather than merely the 60,000 troops for which the union was dependent on the states. Even on being able to borrow on its own authority, the E.U. was hamstrung by the state governments that were more interested in retaining power than in benefitting from collective action. It is difficult to analyze Zelenskyy’s plea without including the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology that was still eclipsing the E.U. from realizing a more perfect union.

At the security conference, Zelenskyy put is finger on the problem: “Europe has everything it takes. Europe just needs to come together and start acting in a way that no one can say ‘no’ to Europe, boss it around, or treat it like a pushover.”[3] With foreign policy splintered—still residing primary at the state level—the E.U. could only stand by while Trump and Putin easily excluded Europe from at least the initial talks to end the war. Instead of throwing darts at the two easy external targets, Europeans could alternatively look inward in order to get the root of the problem as to why Europe was not as powerful as the size of its population would warrant. Europe just needs to come together. Even what seems like Europe coming together may really just be a perpetuation of the splintering, or fracturing, motivated by a states’ rights ideology that has compromised the E.U. since its beginning in the early 1990s.

Rather than meeting in the European Council to respond to Trump’s upcoming talks with Putin, the E.U. state of France invited ten “European leaders” to Paris “to discuss Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and strengthen their common position amid the accelerated peace process being promoted by [Trump].”[4] With Britain included, the meeting could not even be considered to be of the E.U.; in fact, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the E.U.’s Commission, and Antonio Costa, the president of the European Council were to be merely on hand, rather than chairing the meeting. Even if the two were in charge of the meeting, the inclusion of Britain would at the very least be awkward.

In short, the parts of the federal system were in charge, while the representatives of the whole were being treated as mere appurtenances. This structure itself belies collective action whose benefits could rival those of the U.S. Rather than defer to von der Leyen and Costa, the governor of the E.U. state of France presumed that his state should take the lead in uniting Europe militarily even beyond the European Union. Concerning any resolved future military action to help Ukraine against Russia, not even von der Leyen could be relied on to reconcile any disagreements on implementation that include Britain, and as merely one of the parts, France’s Macron was in no position to weld authority over the other parts and Britain beyond chairing the meeting.  

It is no wonder that Trump and Putin decided to exclude Europe. In fact, had the two men wanted to sideline the usual fractured suspects in Europe, von der Leyen and Costa could have been invited instead of the governors of the E.U. states. In such a scenario, it would really be indicative of a problem if the governors of some of the E.U. states would meet on their own anyway—even though two of the E.U. presidents would have seats at the talks. This sordid, self-aggrandizing mentality has benefitted from the political agitation of Euroskeptics (i.e., states’ rights in American parlance), but the problem is that of state officials—and their respective governments—too desirous of holding onto power rather than agreeing to delegate some of it to the federal level—by which I mean along with qualified majority voting there rather than unanimity wherein the states can retain their power at the expense of collective action, and the benefits thereof.

Zelenskyy was on target: a European—meaning the E.U.—army was needed, and not just because of Trump or Putin. A federal system in which state officials relegate federal officials—presidents no less—not only puts the interests of (some of) the parts before that of the whole, but also imperils the federal system itself from being able to sustain itself as a going concern. For Europeans, its well past time to look within rather than focus on Trump in utter disgust.

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1. Joshua Posaner, “Zelenskyy: ‘The Time Has Come’ for a European Army,” Politico, February 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Jorge Liboreiro, “Macron Hosts European Leaders in Paris as Trump Pushes for Peace Talks on Ukraine,” Euronews.com, February 17, 2025.

Turkey’s President Enables Euroskeptic Ideologues

The European Union is not a military alliance, like NATO or the ancient Spartan League. Nor is the E.U. merely a free-trade agreement like NAFTA. In terms of the history of federalism, the E.U. instantiates “modern federalism,” wherein governmental sovereignty is split between federal and state levels, rather than confederalism, wherein all such sovereignty is retained by the states. Both the U.S. and E.U. instantiate modern federal systems, although ironically the U.S. was originally a confederal system of sovereign states. In likening the E.U. to NATA in 2023, President Erdogan of Turkey unwittingly committed a category mistake. This in turn weakened his attempt to leverage his power in approving Sweden as a country in NATO with his demand that the E.U. admit Turkey as a state.

Just prior to the NATO meeting in June, 2023, Erdogan stated at a news conference, “First, let’s clear Turkey’s way in the European Union, then let’s clear the way for Sweden, just as we paved the way for Finland.”[1] Becoming a state in a political union, whether it is the U.S. or E.U., is qualitatively different than joining a military alliance. Joining the latter does not involve a transfer of some governmental sovereignty to a federal executive branch (e.g., the E.U. Commission), legislative branch (e.g., the Council of the E.U. and the E.U. Parliament), and judicial branch (e.g., the European Court of Justice). A state in such a federal system is qualitatively different than a country being in a military alliance because an alliance itself has no governmental institutions and sovereignty.

To characterize a state in a union and a country in a military alliance both as “member states” is misleading. In fact, efforts to do so may stem from an ideological “state’s rights” (or Euroskeptic) effort to deny that the E.U. is in fact an instance of modern federalism rather than confederalism. In remarking that “almost all NATO member countries are European member countries,” Erdogan unwittingly fell into the trap of the ideologues who refuse to recognize that the E.U. and U.S. fall within the same genre of unions of states (i.e., modern federalism rather than confederalism).[2] Because the term country implies full sovereignty, both E.U. and U.S. members are states in the sense of being semi-sovereign political units in a federal system. The U.S. states are members of the U.S., because they joined the U.S. from being formerly sovereign countries (or assumed to have been of such status) and the members of the U.S. Senate, which is based on international rather than national law. The Council of the E.U. is also founded on international principles, wherein political units rather than citizens are the members.

It follows that the countries that are members of UNESCO, the UN, and other international organizations are not states thereof, and should not be referred to as member states. To do so in an attempt to imply that the E.U., unlike the U.S., is also an international organization flies in the face of the very existence of the E.U. Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. International organizations do not have legislatures and high courts and executive branches to implement law and federal judicial rulings. That the Euroskeptic ideology denies this just shows the downside of ideology in general as being intellectually dishonest as regards empirical facts. To want to remake things as they presently are is one thing; to claim or insinuate that things are already different than they are is quite another. I contend that the Turkish president fell into the trap laid by the intellectually dishonest ideologues in Europe.

1. Hande A. Alam and Christian Edwards, “Erdogan Links Sweden’s NATO Bid to Turkey Joining the EU,” CNN.com, July 10, 2023.
2. Ibid.

Russian Economic Cooperation as a Eurasian Union Rivaling the E.U.?

At the end of May, 2014, Russia signed an economic treaty with Belarus and Kazakhstan that “forges closer trade and labor ties among the former Soviet republics.”[1] Even though the new economic ties fall short of another European Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the new trading relationships as the Eurasian Economic Union, which I contend is deliberately misleading. Being implicitly part of the category mistake, the E.U. itself could be further misunderstood as a consequence.

“Today, we are creating . . . a major regional market,” Putin said at the signing ceremony. In addition to establishing a common market characterized by free trade, the economic treaty coordinates the financial systems of the three countries and coordinates their respective industrial and agricultural—but not energy—policies along with their labor markets and transport systems.[2] Such an arrangement harkens back to the European Coal and Steel Cooperative, which was formed by six European countries in the wake of World War II in order to keep an eye on German iron production and possible re-militarization. Indeed, cooperative is a more fitting label than is union; as Bakytzhan Sagintayev, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister pointed out, “We fought over every letter of the agreement to make sure there was no political integration. . . . If Russia wants anything in the agreement, it needs our consent.” Therefore, the enhanced economic coordination falls short of the dual-sovereignty that characterize both the E.U. and U.S.

In the European case, qualified-majority-voting means that a state may find itself on the losing side of a vote in the European Council. That is to say, France may find itself bound by a federal law in spite of having voted against it. In fact, representatives in the European Parliament who live in the state of France may have voted for the new law! The E.U. goes far beyond any treaty between (and obliging) governments. Indeed, the exclusive competencies of the E.U. mean that some governmental sovereignty has been transferred to the federal level.

Similarly, the residual sovereignty remaining with the American states means that the U.S. federal authority is also delegated. Additionally, the Russian economic cooperative does not establish a legislative body directly elected by citizens without respect to their respective states, such as the European Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives. Strictly speaking, treaties are limited in that they can bind only states, rather than forging direct effect, or a direct political relation between individuals and a federal institution. Hence Putin’s economic treaty differs fundamentally from the E.U. basic law and the U.S. constitutional law.

In short, Putin’s use of the word union to describe a treaty that coordinates trade between three sovereign countries is erroneous at best, and in all probability disingenuous too. The category mistake is doubtless an attempt at propaganda to resurrect the notion of the old Russian empire even as Ukraine was leaning to the West rather than back into the fold. The real damage from Putin charade of diction may occur to the west, where too many Europeans were still under the illusion that their states too were still sovereign even as they were subject to E.U. rules, directives, and regulations. This misimpression has weakened the E.U. even as its responsibilities have increased. Imagine a parent saying to a teenager, “we expect you to take on the responsibilities of being a young adult, but we are still going to treat you like a child.” The teenager would quite understandably be confused and utterly frustrated at the sheer unfairness of the mischaracterization. “I’m not a kid anymore!”

At the crux of the matter of Putin’s incorrect use of the word union, dual-sovereignty and direct-effect, as in the establishment of direct citizen-federal relations, separate the E.U. and the U.S. as unions from economic coordinative treaties, and even from alliances, between sovereign governments. Put another way, the U.S. is more than the U.S. Senate and the E.U. is more than the European Council. Both federal levels have legislative, judicial, and executive machinery that goes beyond the intergovernmental sort that a treaty could establish. Nice try, Mr. Putin.

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[1] This and all other quotes in this essay are taken from: Anna Arutunyan, “Russia, 2 Other Nations Sign Pact,” USA Today, May 30, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

E.U. Federalism Enabling Russian Expansionism

The visuals alone in the closing news conference of the EU-US “summit” held in Brussels, which President Barroso denoted as “the capital of Europe,” on March 26, 2014, must have struck Europeans and Americans alike as novel, if not rather bizarre; we are not yet accustomed to seeing the EU and US presidents on the same stage, for we are mired in the paradigm of another epoch. The failure to "catch up" may tacitly enable the expansion of another empire-level federation.

Were the original 12-star US flag used, the similarity would be too striking to ignore. This is not to say that the EU and US are identical in basic law. Whereas the US has one federal president, the EU has two. A council of presidents in the US had been considered in 1787 and dropped in favor of the energy that only a "single executive" could have. (Image Source: Reuters)

The old mental framework may sense itself already out of place—that is to say, on borrowed time in the new century and millennium. Clutching tight to one word, country, as if the global system were exhausted by it (and reduces to it), may suggest just such a felt insecurity as a houseguest might feel once his or her relations have moved away and only strangers remain.

In the stage with EU Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso, US President Obama probably had no sense of the ambiguity latent in his reference to “the countries represented here today.”[1] To the overstayed houseguest, Obama was referring to the EU’s states and to the US but not to its states. The mental staying-power of a framework firmly ensconced in the global (collective, which is to say, shared) consciousness rides headlong over the silent category mistake that inheres in thinking of the states in one empire-scale union as each corresponding to another such union rather than to its states. Both in terms of scale and governmental sovereignty (i.e., dual-sovereignty), the states are states and the unions are unions—the situs of foreign policy, whether at the state or federal level, not being decisive as to the ontological nature of the unions as federal empire-scale unions-of-semi-sovereign states.

President Van Rompuy, chairman of the European Council—which like the US Senate is based on intergovernmental principles as polities rather than citizens are represented—had only his chamber’s half of modern federalism in mind when he stated, “We have to coordinate [sanctions] among our member states; they are not all in the same position as far as trade, energy, financial services is concerned; so we have to coordinate among us and of course with the United States.”[2] By implication, the United States is on par with the “member states” in the European Union. 

President Obama had already laid the perfect groundwork for his counterpart by observing that there “has been excellent coordination between the United States and Europe.”[3] To be sure, Obama was on more solid ground in stating that Russia has not driven a wedge “between the United States and the European Union,” and that over the years, “we have been able to deepen the ties between the European Union and the United States.” [4] Yet he quickly reverted to treating the EU as if it were like NATO instead. “The twenty-eight members of the European Union are united; the twenty-eight members of NATO are united.”[5] Well, the fifty members of the United States were united too; hence the name, whose use in the singular rather than plural only became definitive nearly a century after the Declaration of Independence declared to the world thirteen sovereign states, or countries.

The American president’s uses of Europe and members are both logically problematic (especially at an EU-US Summit!). Furthermore, the rhetoric played into the European president’s institutional and prejudicial agenda in privileging the EU’s states at the expense of not only the US’s states but also the EU itself.

Put in terms of the development of federalism both historically (and relatedly) in terms of the theory, Van Rompuy was reducing modern federalism, which contains both national and intergovernmental governmental institutions at the federal level, to the much older confederal, alliance-based, sort of federalism that is entirely intergovernmental at the federal level.  Excluded from the mythic paradigm wherein the EU is like the ancient Athenian Alliance and Spartan League are EU institutions such as the European Parliament (which like the US House of Representatives is founded on national-government principles), the European Commission (also national rather than intergovernmental), and the European Court of Justice.

In practical terms, President Van Rompuy’s antiquated vantage-point reinforces a major weakness of the EU. En fait, Van Rompuy’s council of the EU state governments could not get past their commercial differences to arrive at a formidable array of sanctions “with sharp teeth” to impose on Russia in the wake of its invasion of the Crimea region of Ukraine, an independent state between two empire-scale federations. Whereas the governments of the republics and regions of the Russian Federation did have sufficient power to thwart Putin’s adventurism at the federal level, the EU’s states had enough power in the EU’s federal system to obstruct a united response with enough “teeth” to push Putin back into Russia and keep him from further incursions at the expense of neighboring independent states.  

As it stood, Ukrainian lawmakers could only lament Ukraine’s agreement with Russia and the US to give up the third-largest stock of nuclear weapons in exchange for the counterparties respecting Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. “We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement,” Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, said in the wake of the Russian invasion. “Now there’s a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake.”[6] As if unable to part with his partial (intergovernmental) understanding of the EU as something akin to NATO or the Athenian Alliance rather than Russia, China, and the US, President Van Rompuy reflected in his remarks the institutional bias of his own chamber at the expense not only of the EU itself, but also the world. 

The failure of the whole (i.e., the EU) to relativize the particular state interests in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) to the overarching interests of the EU (as represented in the Commission and the European Parliament as a body) informed Rizanenko’s reservations and thus tacitly sent the message that reducing nuclear proliferation does not pay. Add in the message to Putin that he could invade Ukraine with virtually no cost to Russia and we can conclude that the imbalance in the EU in favor of the state governments at the expense of the Union (and its foreign policy) has already made the world a much more dangerous place. The antiquated, and indeed mistaken view of the EU as comparable to NATO and thus of the EU’s member states though little united states of Europe (while the US states are somehow like European provinces) is not merely an ideologically convenient (i.e., self-serving) series of category mistakes; the resulting fecklessness in the EU had had a direct impact in weakening global security.

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[1] Closing News Conference, “EU-US Summit,” March 26, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Oren Dorell, “Ukraine Lawmaker Laments Giving Up Nuclear Arsenal,” USA Today, March 11, 2014.