There nothing like a sudden
dramatic spike in the price of oil in Europe from a war in Iran to prompt E.U.
leaders to make speeches as if hell is freezing over and drastic action is urgently
needed in terms of federal rather than piecemeal-state foreign policy. Behind President
Von der Leyen’s call for the E.U. to do more in foreign policy was her point
that the union could no longer afford the principle of unanimity in the
European Council in foreign policy. The Iran War had raised the price not only of
oil, but also of the unanimity requirement in the Council not only in foreign
policy, but also defense. With 27 states at the time and an increasingly belligerent
international context, including military aggression against Ukraine, Gaza, and
Iran, the E.U. could not rely on a world order regulated by international law.
The spike in gas prices, even more than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, brought
this point close to home.
As the U.S. began its military
attacks in Iran, “European benchmark gas prices jumped 80% in two days while
brent crude edged closer to 84 dollars a barrel.”[1]
When oil prices surpassed €87 ($100) per barrel roughly a week into the war,
Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary “called on the European Union to
suspend sanctions on Russian energy imports.”[2]
Never mind that Russia’s 4 year-old unimpeded invasion of Ukraine was a threat on
the E.U.’s eastern border; restoring cheaper gas prices was more important, at
least to Hungary. The E.U.’s geopolitical interests do not reduce to a state’s
economic interests, however, and so President Von der Leyen spoke on the need
for a more active E.U. foreign policy.
It was not the first time that
the president had warned that the traditional world order was “rapidly crumbling
under mounting violations of international law.”[3]
In her speech, she said, “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world
order, for a world that has gone and will not return.”[4]
There had been too many cases of breaches of international law with impunity as
the UN and the International Criminal Court stood by utterly impotent. E.U.’s
foreign minister, Kaja Kallas “pointed the finger at Russia’s decision to
launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine . . . as the cataclysm that
precipitated the ‘erosion of international law’ . . . and enabled the return of
what she described as ‘coercive power politics.”[5]
In her speech, Kallas said, “That (invasion) did not go unnoticed. Instead, it
sent a signal around the world that there is no more accountability for one’s
actions: the rulebook has been thrown out of the window.”[6]
Netanyahu’s government in Israel could unleash a holocaustic genocide in Gaza with
a presumption of impunity, and Trump’s government in the U.S. could forcibly remove
the president of Venezuela and kill Iran’s highest figure without fear of being
held accountable by the U.N. or the International Criminal Court. Militaristic
aggression was gaining a foothold in the world as international organizations
stood by in utter impotence. The very notion of law at the international
level could be surmised to be a misnomer.
Finally, E.U. officials were
feeling a sense of urgency from war abroad because the sudden spike in oil and
gas prices in Europe from Trump’s military attacks in Iran could not be ignored.
Kallas stressing “that a rules-based international order is vital to avoid the
inevitable anarchy” was no longer enough.[7]
“Von der Leyen added another key priority on which the EU should focus to
reinforce its geopolitical clout: its internal decision-making rules.”[8]
Problematically, the E.U.’s foreign policy was bound by the principle of
unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. such that “the 27
member states must agree on a common line of action before moving forward.”[9]
So it only took the E.U. state of Hungary to veto the $91 billion loan for
Ukraine, and the E.U. was stymied in coming up with a foreign policy on Trump’s
military attacks against Iran because of differences between the states.
Alternatively, going by qualified-majority voting would have enabled a
consensus (i.e., short of unanimous consent) that could have become the E.U.’s
foreign policy, which would have been much stronger in the world than were the
various positions of the 27 state governments.
The relationship is clear
between calls for a rules-based international order “with teeth” and a stronger
decision-making rule in the European Council in foreign policy (and defense): a
more active E.U. in foreign policy (and defense) was necessary due to the
increased militaristic aggression abroad because the latter could have a very
significant detrimental economic affect in Europe. Political pressure was thus
building for the E.U.’s 27 state governments to finally relinquish their veto-power
in foreign policy (and defense). Power is not relinquished easily, so not even higher
oil and gas prices could be enough pressure for the states to agree to apply
qualified-majority voting to foreign policy (and defense).
The mechanism called “enhanced
cooperation,” which I contend elsewhere is a misnomer for what is really increased
federal authority for at least nine states but not all of them, could be a
means to bring qualified majority voting to the E.U.’s foreign policy that
would cover only those states that have agreed to relinquish their veto power
in that domain. I suspect that eventually, all of the E.U. states would be
included, so “enhanced cooperation” can be understood as a temporary device
that gets around the conflict of interest facing the state governments in their
decisions on whether to allow the E.U. to become more active in foreign policy
(and defense) than the principle of unanimity would permit.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary Demands EU Lift Sanctions on Russian Energy as Prices Spike amid Iran War,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen and Kallas Call on Europe to Adapt to Chaotic, Coercive World Order,” Euronews.com, 9 March 2026.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
