To be a neutral arbitrator of
a conflict between two other countries, a government cannot favor one of the
two; otherwise, the veneer of neutrality is undercut by the interest of preferring
one position over the other. The duty to act neutrally, which the role of arbitrator
includes or implies, can be exploited by the subterranean—or even explicit!—non-normative,
private-benefits interest to support one of the two sides. To put one’s own private
interest above a broader-benefitting interest, such as in entailed in a duty to
act neutrally, is to exploit a conflict of interest. Governments can exploit
conflicts of interest. With regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the E.U.’s
foreign minister (or de facto commissioner) disabused the public of any thoughts
that the E.U. could, and thus would, be a neutral arbitrator between Russia and
Ukraine. Such transparency lies in stark contrast to the illusory impression by
the U.S. that it was in any position to arbitrate between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority in Gaza, for the U.S. was firmly on the side of Israel.
As Russia was bombing civilian
housing in Kiev, Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s federal foreign minister, explicitly
ruled out a role for the E.U. in arbitrating negotiations between Kiev and
Moscow. “One thing is very clear: Europe will never be a neutral mediator
between Russia and Ukraine, because we are on Ukraine’s side and we are
defending our own security interests,” Kallas said toward the end of May, 2026.[1]
To mediate between two parties requires being neutral as to both sides and
their respective positions; otherwise, credibility is zerstoert from day
one of any negotiation session. To pretend to be neutral even just by assuming
the air as a mediator, such as the U.S. had done not only with regard to Russia
and Ukraine, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, to Israel and Gaza, is to
exploit a conflict of interest, which is unethical. That proposals by the U.S.
in either conflict would be regarded as credible requires a naivety that is itself
enabling as to the exploitation. In its direct conflict with Iran, at
least the U.S. was not pretending to be a mediator, for surely a direct combatant
in a conflict cannot possibly be neutral.
Therefore, Kallas did the
world a service in explicitly stating in regard to the Russian-Ukrainian War, “We
can’t be neutral, treating them equally, because we have been clearly on
Ukraine’s side.”[2]
Such transparent frankness may seem unnecessary; however, given the attempts by
the U.S. to claim neutrality in conflicts in which the Americans have hardly been
neutral, Kallas’ statement is of value. The E.U. need not have assumed neutrality
to be of assistance to Ukraine. That country’s foreign minister, Andrii
Shyiiba, said that “the E.U. should focus on ‘precise, doable steps,’ such as
the demilitarisation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and the establishment of
humanitarian corridors.”[3]
Therefore, Ukraine was not calling on the E.U. to be mediator. That the E.U.
could not be; unfortunately, even helping Ukraine was a tall order—a needlessly
difficult chore for the E.U.
To the extent that the U.S.
was in favor of Russia gaining Ukrainian territory even though by illegal invasion,
Shyyiiba’s instance that the E.U. “must represent one united European voice,”
given the direct federal role of the governors of the 27 E.U. states in foreign
policy, was important. Put another way, to the extent that the U.S. leaned toward
Russian President Putin’s position that a land-grab is de facto valid
internationally (possession being nine-tenths of ownership), Ukraine desperately
needed the E.U. to take difficult decisions resulting in specific federal
policies helpful to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. The reason for the
difficulty can be tied to the requirement in the European Council (and the
Council of Ministers), which represents the states (as the U.S. Senate represents
states), that decisions on policy and law be unanimous. Just imagine if every
U.S. senator could wield a veto on behalf of the residual sovereignty of one’s
state!
Unanimity is inconsistent with
the dual (or split) governmental sovereignty that is characteristic of
early-modern federalism, as distinct from confederalism in which the states
retain full sovereignty (nonplena foedus, as per Althusius’s 1603 theory
of federalism). Whereas Althusius saw only the alternatives of full and not-full
federalism—wherein the federal head or the states enjoy sovereignty, the
American compromise of dual-sovereignty “split the atom” of unitary
governmental sovereignty and the E.U., but not any of its states, is based on
that compromise, rather than either of Althusius’ types of federalism.
With regard to the
Russian-Ukrainian war, the foreign minister (i.e., Secretary of State) of the
U.S., Marco Rubio, said, “The US stands ready and prepared to help to do whatever
we can to help facilitate the end of this war, and hopefully the opportunity will
present itself at some point.”[4]
However, offers to facilitate, a word that connotes neutrality, do not usually
stand back, waiting for an opportunity to arise. Such a tenuous position may
implicitly say that the U.S. would step into a facilitating role whenever Putin,
rather than Zelensky, wants it. Kallas’ position that the E.U. would complement
the role of the U.S. not only is in tension with the E.U.’s partiality toward
Ukraine, but also assumes that the U.S. was sufficiently neutral to have credibility
in facilitating negotiations between the warring countries, but at least Kallas
was transparent as to the stance of the E.U. being pro-Ukrainian—something from
which the U.S. could take a lesson.
Just as a person who already
has a girlfriend or boyfriend and is doing that one’s bidding should not be
assumed to be neutral with respect to a potential usurper’s interests even
though that new connection represents a potentially deeper flame of romance,
President Trump’s “bromance” with Putin (and Netanyahu—irrespective of what the
International Criminal Court had to say about those two “bad boys”) should not have
been lost on Zelensky in his endeavors to influence Trump to distance himself
from Putin and come closer to Ukraine’s side. Even the promise of a ring made
of rare earths could not be assumed to be enough for the gold-loving Trump. If
the proverbial card deck is stacked in favor of the existing relationship, the
newcomer should look elsewhere for love, especially once he or she sees that the
preference and indeed the loyalty of the person being sought lies with someone
else who is actually calling the shots behind the scenes. “Distance yourself emotionally
and physically from the potential usurper!” an existing boyfriend or girlfriend
might say during a visit. From that point on, the usurper is easy prey, being emotionally
vulnerable to the new beloved, and should flee from that person, who is
actually an agent, to higher ground with haste. Hence, Zelensky turned
to the E.U. from having beseeched the U.S. in vain. That deck had already been stacked
in favor of Putin, so Zelensky didn’t have a chance. Go to Putin; he is your
type, Zelensky could have told Trump before closing the door; I’m going
to Von der Leyen. That she and her foreign minister had trouble getting the
E.U. to speak with one voice at the federal level is thus truly a hindrance
(but Trump would be jealous anyway). Too bad; you had your chance. You’re
stuck with the other guy, who holds you at a distance as a trophy, Zelensky
could have told Trump harmlessly from a distance. I believe the actual term in
the Castro is trophy whore. The pains of hell await anyone who falls in
love with such a creature; Zelensky was too smart for that. But enough of subterranean
homoeroticism applied to politicians on the world stage.
Meanwhile, Ukraine and
especially Gaza were being ravaged by hostile aggressors with impunity
and perhaps too much testosterone. Of course, Nietzsche claims that our natural
instincts are best suited to the state of nature—that our species is “well adapted
to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure” but that within society
(and a world order), those instincts have been “disvalued and ‘suspended’” such
that “all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man” have been “turned backward
against man himself.”[5]
Perhaps Nietzsche would applaud the collapse of the post-World-War-II world-order,
with the reversion back to Hobbes’ state of nature being accomplished as if by
fiat by aggressor states, for Putin, Netanyahu, and even Trump himself doubtlessly
felt no “bad conscience” in having commenced unprovoked military maneuvers in
the 2020s ironically amid the progress of the species technologically
and thus in a narrow sense. Nietzsche would be the first to point out
that human nature has not changed, and that our artificial societal/cultural
cages are a problem rather than the solution; indeed, they have made humankind
into a problem as externally-oriented instinctual urges have been turned inward.
But what of the instinctual urge to be humane? What of that of
compassion? What of love? Are these instincts not native to our species
too? If so, why not restrain military aggressors from being free-wheeling actors
jumping into the power-vacuum left by the impotent UN and ICC? Must life be
short, nasty, and brutish, as it was for too many people in Ukraine and especially
Gaza even when Kallas was making her statement in 2026 after having just met with
divided state-level officials in the E.U. on Ukraine?
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, Trans and Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), Second Essay, Sec. 16, pp. 520-21.
