On the Impact of Personalities on Diplomacy: The Case of Trump and Zelensky

One of the many advantages that democracy has over autocracy (i.e., dictatorship) is that the dispersion of political power among elected representatives and even between branches of government (i.e., checks and balances) reduces the impact that one personality can have on diplomacy. Even in a republic in which power is concentrated in a president or prime minister, one personality can matter. Given the foibles of human psychology, the risks associated with a volatile personality “at the top” in a nuclear age are significant. Kant’s advocacy of a world federation includes a caveat that world peace would only be possible rather than probable. Given the probability of anger and associated cognitive lapses in even an elected president or prime minister, a world order premised on absolute national sovereignty is itself risky; hence the value of a semi-sovereign world federation with enforcement authority. The impromptu press conference between U.S. President Trump and Ukraine’s President Zelensky on February 28, 2025 demonstrates the risks in countries being in a Hobbesian state of nature (i.e., not checked by any authority above them).

In the Oval Office at the White House, “a remarkable scene was unfolding. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance had begun berating their guest, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a hitherto unseen public implosion of a key global relationship.”[1] The implosion was between two people—the two presidents—rather than of the alliance itself, but the former was indeed capable of impacting the latter. Put another way, two people, rather than two countries, were arguing. “The state is moi” is not a relation of identity in a republic. That it was a host who was shouting and berating a guest went largely unnoticed in the press, in part because the host was on the offensive in pivoting from an (orchestrated?) question from a journalist; his question contained the insult that Zelensky’s wearing of his military uniform in the sacred Oval Office was disrespectful even though Elon Musk had worn t-shirts there even that month. Unlike Musk, Zelensky was at war—one caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Showing visual comradery with generals and troops by wearing a uniform is laudatory rather than indicative of an intent to disrespect other presidents. Ironically, Trump had installed flags of all of the U.S. military branches in the Oval Office.

In short, the Ukrainian president may have unwittingly walked into a pre-arranged “turkey shoot.” That Trump had his counterpart thrown out of the White House—the invitation to lunch notwithstanding—evinces not only anger, but sheer rudeness in place of hospitality. That such human foibles could upend a deal between two countries even though one stood to gain access to rare earth-minerals with commercial applications and the other country was in dire need of a third-party to broker an end to the devastating war. The political philosophy of international business, wherein commercial interests reduce the likelihood of war, was implicitly reputed as Trump shouted accusations at his guest.

What enraged Trump was Zelensky’s claim that if the U.S. (and the E.U.) don’t stand up to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia would not stop with that country. As in the case of World War II, an ocean could not keep the U.S. out of war as Hitler was invading countries. That Zelensky had a valid point was utterly missed by the angered American president. Adding insult to injury, Trump refused to let his guest speak, and Vice President Vance accused Zelensky of being ungrateful, even though the president had thanked America for its military aid on several occasions.[2] Any implicit disrespect in Zelensky’s military garb in the Oval Office was more than made up for by the dignity of that president in constraining himself from insulting Trump and Vance. In contrast, it was Vance’s rudeness and Trump’s verbal hostility toward a guest that were below the dignity of the American presidency and the sacred room.

Zelensky’s point that American could eventually be drawn into another European war is valid—this point should be made perfectly clear. It was not Zelensky who was risking another world war; rather, it was Trump’s lack of emotional self-control that made such an event more likely, for Trump’s rash cancelation of the agreement for U.S. military and diplomatic help in exchange for access to rare earth-minerals in Ukraine made it more likely that Russia would absorb the Ukraine militarily and perhaps then go into the Baltic states and perhaps even Poland. It was Hitler’s invasion of Poland that brought Britain into war with Germany, and that in turn involved the U.S. militarily in its lend-lease agreement with Britain. Trump did not grasp this point that Zelensky was making, and this cognitive lapse in turn triggered Trump’s temper. This is precisely why a world-order founded on absolute national sovereignty is dangerous.

As titillating as a brawl is to watch, I contend that a wise electorate looks beyond such flash-points to keep one eye on fundamental implications. The structure and foundation of the world order was vulnerable to rash personality conflicts between presidents of sovereign countries even in the context of war, especially since post-World War II institutions such as the UN were waning given their lack of enforcement authority. Fortunately, the world was shifting off of the bi-polar hegemony of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, and it was not lost on the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, who wrote on the day of the brawl, “Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”[3] She even reminded the world that Russia, not Ukraine, was the aggressor, as Trump implicitly contracted this point in accusing Zelensky of risking World War III by not being grateful. A world order in which the U.S. is the world’s “police department” was, fortunately, becoming antiquated, for, given President Trump’s lack of emotional self-control, such a unipolar structure with the U.S. at the hub was indeed dangerous, given the impact that personalities can have on diplomacy.

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1. Kevin Liptak and Jeff Zeleny,”Inside the 139 Minutes that Upended the US-Ukraine Alliance,” CNN.com, March 1, 2025, italics added.
2. Daniel Dale, “Fact Check: 33 Times Zelensky Thanked Americans and US Leaders,” CNN.com, February 28, 2025.
3. Malek Fouda, “European Leaders Unite Behind Ukraine Following Trump-Zelenskyy Confrontation,” Euronews, February 28, 2025.

Russian Electricity Hits a Financial Curtain

On February 8, 2025, the E.U. states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania turned off all electricity-grid connections to Russian and Belarussian supplies of electricity, thus reducing revenues for the belligerent country and its ally. Electricity would thenceforth merge with the Continental European and Nordic grids through links with the E.U. states of Finland, Sweden, and Poland. Europe was taking care of its own, for a price of course, while Russia was increasing trade with China and other countries to make up the difference from decreasing trade with Europe. In short, it can be concluded that unilaterally invading a country has economic consequences that diminish and reconfigure international business.

At the time, European media played up the “geopolitical and symbolic significance” of the “severing of electricity ties.”[1] To these, economic significance could be added. No longer could officials in Russia’s government count on the stable revenue to help finance the military incursion into Ukraine. The economic interdependence between Russia and the E.U. was decreasing. Moreover, the philosophy of international business, which maintains that increasing commercial ties, including trade and foreign direct-investment, reduces the probability of war because such conflict would come with a financial cost. In fact, decreasing economic interdependence can itself make war more probable as there is less to lose financially from going to war.

Moreover, taking the E.U. and Russia as empire-scale countries that in themselves can be viewed as regions in the world, a financial curtain replacing the Iron Curtain of the Cold War could be said to be the “big picture” of which cutting off supplies of Russian electricity is just a part. In the age of nuclear weapons, a financial divide between the E.U. and Russia (and Belarus) could give rise to dangers of much greater magnitude than even Russia’s threats to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Even though the view that if enough international business is established between two or more countries, war can finally be obviated has been shown to be faulty, eliminating trade and foreign direct-investment makes it easier politically for countries to go to war over other matters.

In short, the severing of business relationships can be viewed on the macro economic-geopolitical level on which the severing of ongoing business contracts can itself be viewed as a political weapon and, together with other severings, as part of larger economic wedge between even regions of the world. At that scale, as the world wars of the twentieth century demonstrate and perhaps pre-figure, war can be of a magnitude that the weapons unleased are nothing short of horrendous. Drawing an economic line roughly between Europe and Asia can have very significant geopolitical and military implications. Perhaps it is owing to human nature that we are more prone to drawing such lines in which economic relations are severed than to reinforcing economic interdependencies in spite of the fact that they do not obviate war. It takes some time for a spider to weave its web, especially if the spider happens to be named Charlotte, but only a moment for such a web to be destroyed.

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1. Daniel Bellamy, “Baltic States Cut Russian Electricity Ties, Ending Decades of Reliance,” Euronews.com, February 8, 2025.

India on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: On the Flawed Hegemony of Political Realism

India took an equivocal position on Russia’s invasion. This is surprising at first glance because India has been so concerned to protect its sovereign territory from baleful encroachments from China. What explains India looking the other way as Russia unilaterally invaded a sovereign state? I contend that the explanation supports the assertion that the world could no longer afford its system based on national sovereignty if political realism is in the driver’s seat at the national level.

According to Sumit Ganguly of Indiana University, one of my alma maters, the USSR was a vital partner of India during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was willing to sell weapons to India for cheap in order to keep China from expanding. For spare parts, India still has to go to Russia and is thus dependent on that country and the good will of its government. No country could ween itself away from a provider of military hardware quickly.

Furthermore, Ganguly noted in a talk in 2024 that India had a history of buying oil from Russia, and this continued during Russia’s invasion in spite of the Western embargos of Russian oil. The U.S. is in part to blame because it would sanction India were it to buy oil from Iran or Venezuela. At the time of the Russian War, India was still a poor country even as its high tech industry was expanding. Russian oil was relatively cheap. Also, India could point to the American hypocrisy in having relations with some sordid, autocratic regimes. This can explain why the government of India was well-aware during Russia’s war in Ukraine that by buying Russian oil and selling it to the EU and US, India was undermining the embargoes. Saudi Arabia was doing likewise, and yet the Biden administration held that both countries were allies of the United States. Everyone was looking primarily or even solely at their own interests.

Ganguly has also pointed out that in Indian culture, there is an obsession for multipolarity: there should be several global powers rather than just one biggie. Therefore, there is a willingness to work with Russia, which could serve as a check on hegemonic American power. This is not to say that Indian culture had any affinity whatsoever, Ganguly insists, with internal Russian politics. Nevertheless, India has had China as its principal long-term threat, and India’s government has recognized for a long time that Russia could act as a check on China.

All of this goes to say, political realism was alive and well as the world adjusted to Russia’s aggressive invasion of Ukraine. In realism, each government orients its foreign (and industrial) policy tightly to the national interest rather than also to cooperate with other governments in the interests of a global order in which international law can be more effectively enforced. The international system is just the aggregate of the self-interests of governments; aggregated parts make up the whole. With human rights suffering from a want of international enforcement in Ukraine as well as in Gaza, the want of international attention in a system of sovereign countries on tightening that system to enhance the enforcement of international law suggests that political realism has become insufficient. Climate change and the risk of nuclear war, which Russia has threatened in the context of Ukraine, only add to the argument that the world could no longer afford an international order that rests on national sovereignty to which political realism is the dominant operating system in governments.

Applying Justice to Nazi Jurists in the Context of the Cold War

Judgment at Nuremberg (1961) is a serious film that enables the viewers to wrestle with the demands of justice for atrocities enabled by German jurists in NAZI Germany and the post-war emerging Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., for which the American military needed the support of the German people against the Soviet Union. The film accepts the need of such support as being vital in 1947, when the actual trial took place (the film has it as 1948). To the extent that acceptance of this assumption is deemed spurious, the viewers would likely view the tension as being between the need for justice, a virtue, and expediency, a vice. Accordingly, the pressure from an American general on the prosecutor to recommend light sentences so not to turn the German people against the Americans and thus from helping them in the Cold War can be viewed as being astute political calculation in the political realist sense of international relations, or else undue influence or even corruption of a judicial proceeding. 

The full essay is at "Judgment at Nuremberg."