Friday, November 15, 2024

Why a Stronger E.U. Is Needed in International Affairs

As 2023 and the following year made clear, the world still faced additional challenges in rebuffing incursions that violate human rights, including crimes against humanity. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s military incursion into Gaza both demonstrate how easy it had become, especially with advanced military technology, to kill civilians so as to decimate an entire population so the land could be filled with the people of the aggressors. If this sounds like Hitler’s policy to make room for the German people in Eastern Europe, you are not far from touching on the real motives behind the aggression. It would be a pity were such motives to become the norm while the world looks on. I contend that the U.S. enabling of Israel has unwittingly contributed to the establishment of such a norm, and that therefore a stronger E.U. was needed not only domestically, but also internationally, as a counter-weight in defense of the human rights of civilians in Gaza.

UNRWA Gaza director Scott Anderson, speaking on the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza as of November, 2024, said, “We haven’t been able to get food to those people for over a month. If we don’t do something quickly, it could devolve into a full-blown famine, which would be a manmade condition and something that could easily be corrected if we just get enough aid in to take care of everybody.”[1] The key here is the word, manmade, for as officials in the Israeli government had been openly admitted, including the president, everyone in Gaza is culpable and thus deserves to suffer the consequences. Ironically, as the case of Nazi Germany demonstrates, it is very easy to go from the supposition that a certain people is subhuman to the sordid instinctual urge to exterminate the group. The “meta-premise” is that identity-politics by group is valid and based on ontological rather than merely cultural differences.

A month earlier, the “Famine Review Committee [had] called the situation in the north of the Strip ‘extremely grave and rapidly deteriorating’ and said all actors in the war much take immediate action ‘within days not weeks’ to avert a humanitarian disaster.”[2] During that month, the amount of aid entering Gaza dropped dramatically due to yet another offensive by Israel’s military in the north of Gaza.[3] “By the end of October, an average of just 71 trucks a day were entering Gaza,” whose population at the time was over a million.[4]

Anderson’s assessment in mid-November suggests that his demand had not been heeded, especially by Israel, but also, and this is important, by its strongest ally, the United States. Even though less than a week before the U.S. presidential election, the Biden administration “accused Israel of ‘not doing enough’ to answer international concerns over indiscriminate strikes on Gaza,” which in turn was a factor in the reduction of food-aid getting into Gaza, “Israel’s military chief . . . said the Israel Force needs to be larger, as the war expands to different fronts.”[5] U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said of the Israeli government officials, “They are not doing enough to get us the answers that we have requested.”[6] Of course, the token U.S. resistance to Israel did not win Michigan for Harris, as Arabs in Grand Rapids did not take the bait.

A few weeks after the U.S. presidential election, the Biden administration declared that Israel was not violating U.S. law after all in terms of killing and limiting food-aid to the residents, who by then were almost all displaced, and thus homeless, of Gaza. Back in May, the administration had said “that Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in Gaza likely violated international humanitarian law.”[7] Of course, the administration provided for itself a caveat that would enable a reversal after the election: Wartime “conditions prevented U.S. officials from” collecting enough evidence to go beyond stating that Israel likely violated international humanitarian law, which, by the way, would mean that Israel had been violating U.S. law too. Even at the time, the media noticed that “the caveat that the administration wasn’t able to link specific U.S. weapons to individual attacks by Israeli forces in Gaza could give the administration leeway in any future decision on whether to restrict provisions of offensive weapons to Israel.”[8] In November, 2024, after the election, the Biden administration stated that the U.S. would continue to supply Israel with weapons. Exactly a week after the election, the administration announced “that it would not without weapon shipments to Israel,” even though the “30-day deadline” for Israel to “significantly alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza [had] expired.”[9] U.S. State Department spokesmn Vedant Patel said that Israel had not violated the U.S. law that “bars offensive weapons from being transferred to countries that block aid from reaching civilians.”[10] A report written by aid groups and requested by the Biden administration “determined that Israel had failed to meet the vast majority of the requirements laid out by” the administration—Israel having failed to comply with fifteen of the 19 measures that the U.S. had indicated must be met to avoid a delay in weapons shipments, and yet the administration announced that the U.S. would continue to ship weapons to Israel.[11] That this occurred just after the election is relevant, as this strongly suggests that the strategy was based on domestic U.S. politics—namely, trying to get as many votes as possible for Harris from Muslim Americans.

It is also significant that on the very same day, Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign minister, “proposed formally to suspend political dialogue with Israel over the country’s alleged violations of human rights and international law in the Gaza Strip.”[12] Unlike the U.S., the E.U. was not politically beholden to AIPAC, the American Israeli Political Action Committee. Even by the report that the Biden administration had requested, the Israeli government had been violating humanitarian law by restricting humanitarian aid into Gaza, perhaps to rid the Strip of its remaining population as the final solution. The world needed an active E.U. with sufficient competencies (i.e., enumerated powers delegated to the E.U. by the states) to stand against U.S. policy in defense of humanitarian law—even that which had been enshrined in U.S. law! Especially with Russia invading Ukraine with many civilian casualties there, the world very much needed a world-power, which the E.U. could be, to push back on violators.

Clearly, the world could not count on the allies of violators, such as China and North Korea in the case of Russia, and the U.S. in the case of Israel; in fact, those allies went beyond merely standing quietly by to actively enable the aggressors. With regard to Muslims, I suspect that the U.S. Government was still too oriented to redressing the attack that took place on September 11, 2001, to accurately and fairly even perceive the one-sided over-kill being committed by Israel in Gaza.

The Israeli government’s perception was biased, which is why John Locke argued that government should exist to impartially judge cases of injury because victims tend to exact too much punishment by being swayed by emotion (hatred). Following Locke, Adam Smith wrote that the administration of justice should be “exact,” meaning not disproportional, and “equal and impartial.”[13] Victims who have been injured are in no position to determine and dispense justice in such a matter; hence the need for government. But what if governments are themselves the victims?

Holding onto resentment more than twenty years after the Muslim attack on the World Trade Tower in New York City may explain why the Biden administration was tacitly going along with Israel’s excessive “pay-back,” also known as punishment-as-vengeance, against the civilians residing in Gaza. Even allies should not be entrusted with being able to reasonably assess and contribute to punishment. Israel had been woefully excessive in inflicting suffering on the civilians in Gaza, acting with impunity in part because the E.U.’s states had not transferred enough sovereignty to the union in foreign policy and defense for the E.U. to be able to act as a counterweight to the United States.

It is dangerous when a sovereign country, such as Israel, can act with the presumption of de facto impunity internationally. That the rest of the world had not acted with sufficient force to arrest Israel’s aggression and deflate the sense of impunity suggests that if the UN could not be given real power, at least the European Union should be strengthened at the federal level. More to the point, the delusion that the E.U. is but an international organization or alliance and thus should not be given more power by its states has cost not only the E.U., but also the world. 



1. Stefan Grobe, “UNRWA: Risk of Famine in Gaza without Swift Action,” Euronews.com, November 15, 2024.
2. Euronews, “UN Warns Famine Is ‘Imminent’ in Northern Gaza as Israel Siege Continues,” Euronews.com, September 11, 2024.
3. Euronews, “14 Killed in Israeli Strike on UNRWA School Used as Shelter for Displaced Gazans,” Euronews.com, August 11, 2024.
4. Ibid.
5. Euronews, “US Accuses Israel of ‘Not Doing Enough’ to Address Concerns over Strikes in Gaza,” Euronews.com, October 31, 2024.
6. Ibid.
7. Ellen Knickmeyer, Aamer Madhani, and Matthew Lee, “US Says Israel’s Use of US Arms Likely Violated International Law, but Evidence Is Incomplete,” The Associated Press, May 11, 2024.
8. Ibid.
9. Jacob Magid, “US Says It Won’t Withhold Weapons to Israel, as Deadline to Address AidCrisis Passes,” The Times of Israel, November 13, 2024.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Shona Murray and Jorge Liboreiro, “Borrell Proposes to Suspend E.U.-Israel Political Talks over Gaza War,” Euronews.com, November 13, 2024.
13. Peter Minowitz, Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith’s Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 38. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), V. i. b. 1, 15, and 25.