As U.S. President Trump was
drawing a line in the proverbial sand by stating repeatedly that Iran cannot be
allowed to have nuclear weapons, E.U. foreign commissioner (i.e., minister) Kallas
warned the world that military involvement by the U.S. in the military spat going
on between Israel and Iran would “definitely drag” the entire Middle East into
the conflict.[1] Accordingly,
she “made clear the European Union would not back America’s armed intervention.”[2]
By the way she came to that public statement, the U.S. could take a lesson in how
to optimally utilize federalism such that all of its parts shine, rather than
just those at the federal level.
The E.U.’s foreign minister
made her public statement after having hosted a video conference with state
officials—one from each state government—who could represent their respective
states in affairs beyond the E.U. She had also called her U.S. counterpart,
Secretary of State Rubio, who “emphasized that it’s also not in their interest
to be drawn into this conflict.”[3]
Any daylight between Rubio’s position, that of the U.S. National Security
Director, and President Trump is not relevant here; rather, that Kallas reached
out not only to her counterpart in the U.S., but also to state officials in the
E.U. can illustrate how federalism can be utilized in the formulation of a foreign
policy in a federal system of public governance. Instead of being left out
entirely, the E.U. state governments played a role without eclipsing Kallas’
role in the E.U. speaking with one voice. Even if some state officials in the
meeting objected to the federal foreign minister’s statement, discerning a
consensus would be sufficient for Kallas in her role. As a result, the E.U.
could enjoy the benefits abroad from speaking with one voice.
In cases in which consensus on
an issue does not exist, and some state officials are at loggerheads, Kallas
could simply have abstained from commenting because the E.U. would not speak
with one voice. Qualifying this quietism, however, is the condition in which
the E.U. has an important strategic geopolitical or economic interest in an
issue in foreign affairs and the interest of the E.U. should outweigh the lack
of consensus at the state level, for the union is more than the aggregate of
the political units (i.e., states) within the union. This judgment too should
rest with Kallas in her capacity as a federal official.
A risk in involving officials
from each of the 27 states regards any one of them exceeding one’s role as a
state official by speaking unilaterally for the union publicly. Kallas
should thus have the authority to restrict such pronouncements for the good of
the union. A benefit of holding a meeting with the state officials is that
after a consensus has been discerned, Kallas could ask them for some analysis
of the international problem. Once benefit of federalism is that a federal
official can draw on the expertise of relevant state officials, both in the
politics and in geopolitical analysis as foreign-policy experts.
For example, Kallas stated that no one would benefit from a widening of the conflict in the Middle East. This point may not be true. The plight of the Gaza residents under the thumb of the Israeli army at the time could benefit from Arab countries entering the fray because their armies could possibly assume control of Gaza to feed and protect its residents. Put another way, the genocide was so one-sided (it could hardly be called a war) that were the U.S. to engage militarily against Iran, other Muslim countries could also become engaged and, as a byproduct, provide some balance in favor of the Palestinians in Gaza. That the E.U. was arguably more pro-Gaza than the U.S. was at the time may have meant that Kallas had a political incentive to suggest to the Arab governments in the Middle East that they could possibly take advantage of U.S. involvement against Iran to step in themselves on behalf of Gaza. If the U.S. Government had been paying brides to Arab countries (or to key officials therein) to keep them from intervening militarily in Gaza, the military involvement of the U.S. against Iran could be a game-changer, in effect forcing the hands of the Arab states to take action even if it means less U.S. money. State officials meeting with Kallas could perhaps have supplied her and each other with such analysis that in turn could have improved the substance of her public statement in terms of any impact on the players and spectators in the Middle East.
Kallas’ consultations both
abroad and with relevant state officials can be viewed as a strategic
competitive advantage of the E.U. over the U.S. because American federal appointees
have not been in the practice of consulting with state officials who may have expertise
in foreign policy and could relay and reflect foreign-affairs positions of
their respective states. As commander-in-chief of an army, the head of state of
a U.S. state should include foreign affairs in campaigning for office, as well
as in serving in office. The chief executive and head of state of Texas, for
example, is the regular commander-in-chief of the Texas National Guard. Lest
such an army be relegated as insignificant, California’s Newsom raised hell
when the federal president of the union, Donald Trump, officially borrowed California’s
army to engage against protesters in Los Angeles in June, 2025.
In short, Kallas’ utilization
of the E.U. federal system may be more optimal than Rubio’s utilization of only
federal officials in the U.S. on foreign policy, such that the latter could take
a lesson from the former on how to optimize federalism in foreign policy by
more fully engaging more of the parts of the system. To be sure, the involvement
of state officials risks state governments diverging publicly from a federal
policy and thus undercutting it. But such a tension is part of federalism. Being
able to speak with one united voice yet while accommodating the differences
that naturally exist within an empire-scale union is not cost- or risk-free,
but I submit that federalism is the best system for such unions, which in scale
and qualities are distinct from (early modern) kingdom-level states that have
their own federal systems. The heterogeneity of culture and ideology within an
empire-scale federal union dwarfs such differences that exist within a
state thereof. Federalism is thus more of a benefit to the former than the
latter.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
