Even though Russia’s ongoing
invasion of Ukraine was prompting E.U. officials to bolster the union’s
defenses in 2025, U.S. President Trump’s statements early in 2026 in favor of the
U.S. buying or invading Greenland, an “autonomous” part of the E.U. state of
Denmark, triggered defensive rhetoric in that state’s government. I contend
that the rhetoric was largely, though not completely, hyperbolic, and that more
substantial statements could have come from the E.U.’s foreign minister because
the E.U. is, as an empire-scale political union of states, equivalent to the
U.S.[1]
That the E.U. could in principle take on the U.S. is enough to view the Danish
state’s rhetoric as hyperbolic, and thus as not credible enough to dissuade an
American invasion of Greenland.
In January, 2026, Denmark’s
Defense Ministry, which doubtless would be jealous in giving up even any part of
its military powers so the E.U. could “walk with a big stick” rather than mere public
statements, felt the need to confirm the 1952 military directive that directs
soldiers stationed in Greenland to fire immediately, rather than upon orders issued
by superiors, upon any other military invading the island. Danish military personnel
would be required to “immediately take up the fight” even if their respective
commanders are not aware that Denmark has issued a declaration of war.[2]
That public confirmation was triggered by U.S. President Trump having “repeatedly
threatened to take control of Greenland by force if necessary, describing the
Arctic territory as vital to American national security.”[3]
Trump had recently directed his military forces to extract the sitting
president of Venezuela to face trial in New York City, so officials in not only
Greenland, but also Mexico and even Iran in addition to little Denmark were
understandably on edge.[4]
The hyperbole was in the
Danish governor’s statement that an attempt to take Greenland by the U.S. would
mark the end of NATO.[5]
“If the United States chooses to attack another NATO country military,” Mette
Frederiksen said, “then everything stops. That is, including our NATO and thus
the security that has been provided since the end of World War II.”[6]
Tellingly, she omitted any mention of the E.U. even though the fact that
Denmark was at the time a semi-sovereign state in a political, economic, and
social (policy) union is more significant than that Denmark was in
an international military alliance. The prime minister’s omission reveals a
lot, and is consistent with the anti-federalist ideology in Europe. At the very
least, she could have threatened that if NATO would go down, presumably from her insistance alone, she would
use her power in the European Council to propose an exclusive competency by
which to strengthen the E.U. militarily—something that would displease the sitting
American president, who preferred to meet with governors of E.U. states rather
than with President Von der Leyen and the President of the Council (the
counterpart of the American Vice President, who is the President of the U.S.
Senate, which represents the States).
Threatening that an American
invasion of an autonomous territory of Denmark would cause NATO to collapse is
not something that the U.S. State Department or President Trump would (or should)
take very seriously, especially with more than a few NATO countries being in
the neighborhood of Putin’s military prowess in Ukraine at the time. The hint
or outright claim that Denmark could unilaterally “pull the plug” on a giant
military alliance reflects back on the state’s government at the expense of the
credibility of its public statements. Such hyperbole can actually make an
invasion more likely because weakness often tries to make itself look
stronger than it is. In fact, even Denmark's threat of military force to repell an American invasion could be viewed as hyperbolic. Stephen Miller, Trump's deputy chief-of-staff, told CNN, "Nobody's going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland. . . . We live in a world, in the real world, . . . that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power."[7] Even if Denmark would not cave once the U.S. has gained actual possession of the territory, the odds in terms of military strength were against the small E.U. state.
The E.U.’s case for additional
competencies in defense and foreign affairs is actually strengthened when a small state such as Denmark shows signs of such weakness by overplaying its hand in making threats that it
cannot keep. It was not just because of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine
that such additional competencies should already have been ceded by the state
governments in the E.U.; small states especially could benefit from collective
action in defense and foreign policy at the federal level, irrespective of the
Russian threat to the east. In very practical terms, if government officials at
the state level in the E.U. truly want to counter U.S. President Trump, strengthening
the E.U.’s enumerated powers (i.e., shared and exclusive competencies) even
though that would mean delegating such powers would be a prime way to do it. Like
the Schengen Agreement and the Growth and Stability Pact, both of which began
outside the E.U.’s framework and then were incorporated within it, not every
state need be included. Hungary and Slovakia, for example, could be initially excluded
and thus not given the power of obstruction that those states’ respective
governors had relished too much. Unlike the U.S., the E.U. is more flexible
with regard to the coverage of the enumerated powers, or competencies, that are
at the federal level. Every state need not participate, though that every state
would presumably benefit from a military-defense at the E.U. level is admittedly
an argument for unanimity unless “third-party” externalities (i.e., benefits)
are acceptable to the states subject to the coverage.
2. Aleksandar Brezar, “Danish Soldiers Would Shoot Back If Invaded, Government Confirms,” Euronews.com, 8 January, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. My paternal grandmother’s parents came to Wisconsin from Denmark, so I am not trying to insult Denmark by alluding to the fact that it is a small E.U. state; rather, I am trying to emphasize the benefits for such a state of collective action that the E.U. could provide in defense of the state were it not for Euroskeptic, anti-federalist ideology especially in some of the eastern states of the E.U.
5.
6. Ibid.
