On how to decolonize Eastern Europe, its states must disentangle themselves from the history of the U.S.S.R. and even Russia. This is not simply a matter of severing business and political ties; a more intangible disengagement “mentally” must also take place. Because most of us tend to dismiss the “soft” or paradigmatic side of international political economy, highlighting the “real” implications of not attending to this side is beneficial. In short, I have in mind the “victim” cultural identity that can easily stick to former colonies or parts of empires more generally.
During the early months of
Russia’s unilateral invasion of Ukraine, the governments of countries in
Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, sought reassurance from the West
of military protection should Russia continue its militaristic advance beyond
Ukraine once that country has been subdued and firmly back in the Russian
empire. Even Sweden and Finland, which had not been part of the U.S.S.R.,
quickly sought membership in NATO. Serbia and Georgia sought to expedite accession
talks to become E.U. states even though from the E.U.’s standpoint those two
states would be relatively pro-Russia along with Hungary in the E.U. and thus
dilute its anti-Russian consensus.
All of those efforts could be said to be predicated on a “victim” identity. Running for protection from a bigger power against a former and yet baleful bully is classic “victim” behavior. This creates a dilemma in that running for cover might be in the existential interests of the governments living near such a bully as Russia, and yet doing so can be said to be from a “victim” self-identity. Lamenting and trying to “work through” past imperial expansion does not seem very helpful to me. Instead, what is needed is to seek protection and then quickly pivot to non-victim policies, such as in taking an active role within the protection. For example, the Baltic states could have taken an active role in E.U. foreign-policy making, such as in capitalizing on their knowledge of Russia to target particular sanctions against certain Russian oligarchs. Internationally, those states could take an active role by agreeing to more of the alliance’s hardware being located in those states. Eastern Europe can thus both seek out the protection of the West and assert a non-victim stance toward Russia.
