The Internet Escapes China's Grasp

The “surprising escape” of Chen Guangcheng, a blind legal activist, from house arrest to the presumed custody of U.S. diplomats was “buoying China's embattled dissident community” even as the government lashed out, “detaining those who helped him and squelching mention of his name on the Internet.”[1] Two points bear further scrutiny.

Chen Guangcheng, after his escape, with Hu Jia.   

First, that Chinese security officials “reacted angrily” strikes me as strange. It is as if institutional interests naturally prompt strong human emotions as though an insult were taken personally. In other words, unless the dissident had insulted or otherwise directly harmed the particular officials, it does not make sense that they would angrily inflict pain on the dissident’s supporters who were taken into custody after the escape. An institutional loss is not a personal affront. To treat the former as if it were the latter is essentially to anthropomorphize a given organization.

Second, the “squelching mention” of Chen Guangcheng’s name on the internet must have been a mission of futility in 2012. “Anything vaguely related to Chen [was] blocked on Chinese social media sites, such as posts including or key word searches for Chen, Guangcheng, GC, or even the words ‘blind person’.”[2] The inclusion of the latter term is almost funny in its overkill; it certainly points to the futility of tracing millions of blog posts and emails on the incident. After savvy internet users used “Shawshank Redemption” to refer indirectly to Chen, that movie title became a banned search term. The Chinese government was definitely playing defensive ball at that point. My point is that the game of snuffing out communication on the internet had already been lost—assuming the Chinese government does not prohibit the internet itself in China.

The government officials’ antiquated responses—both in terms of emotion and technology—suggest that the Chinese regime was still holding onto the ways of another century. This could be an indication that that regime will not survive the twenty-first. As technology continues to widen and deepen, antiquated means of control will become less and less efficacious through the century. Given the habit of officials reacting in “anger,” we can expect the increased difficulty with control to lead to more pain being inflicted on citizens. This in turn should lead to more popular resentment. In other words, the antiquated responses of government officials could be the seed of the regime’s destruction.

1. Alexa Olesen, “Chen Guangcheng Escape: China Activists Inspired by Blind Dissident Lawyer,” The Huffington Post, April 29, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

On the Arrogance of Assumed Superiority: Assad of Syria

One week after Assad’s Syrian government had agreed to a cease-fire with the state’s opposition, the government added further stipulations. First, it wanted “written guarantees” that rebels would  stop fighting and lay down their weapons before any government pull-back could occur. Second, the Syrian government wanted guarantees that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would stop financing the armed groups within Syria. “The regime will not implement this plan,” Col. Riad As’aad, the leader of the opposition militia fatalistically said.[1]

The strategy was essentially a device with which to sabotage the truce. Either Assad had never intended to honor it or he had second thoughts about it after having agreed. Either way, the other side was perfectly justified in ignoring the government’s additional demands because they were not among the terms of the truce. That it is obvious that additional conditions are invalid after an agreement is made points to the lack of character—and indeed the psychological condition—in whomever in the Syrian government had come up with the strategy. At best, the ploy is dishonest. At worst, the culprits were so presumptuous as to think that they could legitimately add additional obligations on the other side. The question is perhaps whether the pertinent government officials were in denial regarding both the arrogance and the invalid nature of the move.

The mentality can also be found among apartment rentals. In some cases when I have looked for apartments, I have thought an agreement had been reached only to find an “oh, by the way” email adding a further condition that must be satisfied. Typically, the convenient presumptuousness takes the you need to form. That such a further obligation is invalid after the handshake just highlights the arrogance in the you need to. The mentality would really be shown for what it is if the renter were to reply, “I would be happy to consider your suggestion.” Essentially, both moves are predicated on the desire to dominate. It is a control-battle, in other words. My main point is that such efforts to dominate presume entitlements far beyond what is actually deserved. That the person renting the apartment would find the renter’s reply offensive—even an insult—just shows how much presumption is in the mentality. The renter would no doubt react to the ensuing, more direct imperative with legitimate consternation and resentment. When holding a party to the terms of the agreement is viewed as a provocation by the party, which continues to assume that its over-reaching is valid, there is no hope of working things out without an authority that is over both sides.

Officials in Assad’s government surely realized the absence of an authority that could hold the government to its agreement without the added conditions. In such a case, obligation itself has no meaning. The agreement of a sovereign, in other words, is valid only in so far as it continues to be something the sovereign wants. There is no being held to anything. In the case of rental agencies, companies or owners, the presumption of an overweening entitlement is at odds with the nature of an economic transaction between two parties. It is not that one party is thereby the adult and the other is somehow in a child’s role. Nor is it an employer-employee role. Rather, money is exchanged for a good—the value of each being theoretically equal. A renter could object to the additional conditions and sue to have the lease enforced if the lessor should unilaterally stop performance on the basis of the additional conditions not being satisfied.

My main point is that the stubbornness of the presumptuousness that continues to insist that the additional conditions be met is without foundation and thus ought not to stand, yet it is amazing how resistant it is to being checked or corrected. The presumption of superiority lends an ignorance that can’t be wrong assumption to the presumption simply in adding the conditions. It is this phenomenon of arrogance on stilts (which shouldn’t even be standing on its own) that defies the laws of nature.

In other words, should Assad blame the rebels for his refusal to implement that which he agreed to because the two additional conditions had not been met, the blaming itself is at two degrees of separation from having any foundation. Even so, Assad could get away with not only his refusal, but also the further step of blaming the innocent party. Psychologically speaking, Assad should know that the blaming is illegitimate yet under this scenario he might not realize it.

Stubbornly holding to the lack of realization while imposing it on the other party is a phenomenon in need of an investigation. Specifically, how does it sustain itself and can it be knocked down. Simply insisting on the terms of the agreement typically does not work. Nor, for that matter, does making the invalid status of the additional conditions transparent. I suspect that the mentality, or brain sickness, is not unlike that of an alcoholic in denial.

1. Reuters, “Cease-Fire in Doubt as Syria Demands New Conditions,” The New York Times, April 9, 2012.  

A Myanmar Spring?

The party of dissident leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, won a decisive victory in by-elections on April 1, 2012. The party 40 of the 45 seats reported as of April 3^rd, with the results of five more seats not yet in. The news of the victory reached the outside world, which reacted with optimism. Catherine Ashton, the E.U.’s foreign minister, said “I congratulate the government and people of Myanmar on the conduct of the by-elections.”[1] Meanwhile, the White House indicated that the vote marked “an important step in Burma’s democratic transformation.”[2] Both the E.U. and U.S. approached the outcome as necessary but not sufficient for democracy in the country that had had five decades of harsh military rule.

Aung San Suu Kyi on the day of the by-election.          Agence France/Getty

Indeed, the impact of the by-election must be put into perspective in terms of governing. At the time, the Wall Street Journal noted that the NLD party “will have only a small presence in Myanmar’s parliament, where most of the more than 600 seats are held by current or former soldiers linked to the old military regime.”[3] From this perspective, the by-election itself can be viewed as a public relations coup by the soldiers. Such a dramatic victory of the NLD would give the appearance of a new democracy when in fact nothing would change in who controls the government. At best, the by-election’s results would mean that the governing party would have to accommodate some dissent within the legislative chamber. In terms of removing sanctions, the U.S. and E.U. officials would be wise to wait until a majority within the parliament is up for grabs under a free and fair (and monitored) election.

Like the military in Egypt, that in Myanmar might have known that it could retain control even after the apparent shift to democracy. Indeed, all the optimism that comes with an apparent switch to democracy could operate as cover, enabling the real power to continue much as before. Becoming a true democracy in which power transfers between parties is likely a long process where a military dictatorship has been the rule. People don’t give up power easily, and they can be quite crafty in how they retain it.

1. Patrick Barta, “Suu Kyi’s Victory Leads to Rethink About Sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2012.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.