Tuesday, September 23, 2025

The United Nations: Weak Even in Defending Itself

Besides its humanitarian work, the UN can boast of providing a situs in which officials of national governments can talk to and with each other. The best opportunity for in-person speeches and conversations annually is during the opening of the General Assembly. Even granting there being value to such communicating. the UN was not founded for this purpose; rather, it was founded to end war, and neither speeches nor in-person meetings, typically not directly between warring nations, so obviously have failed to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s occupation and genocide that may even be reckoned as another holocaust. All this aggression has come with impunity, and in this regard, the UN has failed. Even a UN official’s attempt to defend the international organization during the 2025 session of the General Assembly was weak. At the very least, the UN needed to hire some public relations firms, but even a patina of efficacy only goes so far. The staying power of such an institution is itself, I submit, a problem in that organizations tend not to get “the memo” on when it is time (and even past time) to close up and urge that another, different organization be established.

Speaking at the General Assembly on September 23, 2025, U.S. President Trump asked rhetorically, “What is the purpose of the United Nations?”[1] Later, standing next to his counterpart, E.U. President Von der Leyen, Trump answered his own question by saying, “I mean, we shouldn’t have any wars if the U.N. is really doing its job.”[2] The purpose of the UN is to end wars, and being a place where national officials can talk to and with each other is woefully below the UN’s potential in reaching its purpose. In short, a speaking forum with side talks is so far from the UN being able to stop wars and even genocides, not to mention holocausts, that Trump went on to say in his speech to the General Assembly, “I’ve always said (the UN) has such tremendous, tremendous potential, but it’s not even coming close to living up to that potential.”[3] To be sure, he did not provide any suggestions on how exactly the UN could tap into its potential, hence he left the UN to rot on the vine. Any suggestions would almost certainly have had to include providing the UN with enforcement mechanisms with which to implement its resolutions “on the ground” rather than just in words, and the U.S. had a longstanding policy of resisting such proposals due to the doctrine of absolute sovereignty held by recurrent American administrations. So it is really no surprise that Trump was short on ideas that could strengthen the UN in its task of ending wars and belligerent military occupations.

It was left to General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock to try to defend the international organization, which of course is not a government. “Sometimes we could’ve done more, but we cannot let this dishearten us. If we stop doing the right things, evil will prevail,” Baerbock told the Assembly.[4] That the UN had been unable to act even when Israel was bombing UN humanitarian areas in Gaza, not to mention in stopping the genocide and perhaps even holocaust there, begs the question: exactly what right things was the UN doing, as per its role in ending wars and occupations? Clearly not enough right things such that not doing them would enable evil to prevail. With Russia’s army bombing civilian locations in Ukraine and Gaza in the midst of a full-blown genocide and arguably a holocaust given the severity of the intentional infliction of suffering besides death, if evil was not prevailing already, it would be interesting to hear Baerbock’s definition of evil. In short, his defense does not stand up to even easy scrutiny; hence his defense of the UN can be regarded as being very weak, or deeply flawed. It is a defense that could be expected of an utterly failed organization unwilling to accept reality, including the organization’s abject failure to reach its potential.

The staying power of organizations not subject to market competition is too much, given the ability of even failed organizations to stay afloat. That even a weak defense can be sufficient to keep a failed organization—failed in terms of its primary mission—going may mean that more is needed to put failed organizations out of their misery, which of course their officials would deny. In the midst of Russia’s Putin and Israel’s Netanyahu easily dismissing the UN charter yet remaining members, while the UN ignores even such fragrant violations of membership, it is difficult to see how the UN has any integrity regarding even itself remaining, if indeed it ever had any.

A new international body, without certain nations having veto power and with the body having real enforcement power of its own, such that it would not have to rely on countries for actual enforcement—such reliance is also a sign of abject weakness—was desperately needed, given the large-scale aggression of Russia and Israel that had been going on with impunity for more nearly two years. This alone should be the death sentence for the UN, even with its weak attempts to defend it’s legitimacy and usefulness. Yet in terms of organizations, and even more so, institutions, momentum of the status quo is like a force of nature that is difficult even to divert.


1. Aamer Madhani, “Trump In Speech to U.N. Says World Body ‘Not Even Coming Close to Living Up’ To Its Potentional,” The Huffington Post, September 23, 2025.
2. Darlene Superville, “Trump Says Wars Wouldn’t Happen If UN Did Its Job,” The Associated Press, September 23, 2025.
3. Aamer Madhani, “Trump In Speech to U.N. Says World Body ‘Not Even Coming Close to Living Up’ To Its Potentional.”
4. Ibid.

A Drone Wall for the E.U.: Russian Aggression Assuages Euroskeptic States

Speaking after his meeting with U.S. President Trump in Alaska during the summer of 2025, Russia’s President Putin said that if no agreement is reached with Ukraine, the force of arms would decide the matter. In other words, might makes right, or at least military incursion is a legitimate way to decide political disputes between countries. I would have hoped that such a primitive mentality would be antiquated in the twentieth century, but, alas, human nature evolves only at a glacial pace undetected within the lifespan of a human being. In September, 2025, the United Nations was under attack from within the General Assembly because of the continuance of the veto held by five countries in the Security Council; the U.S. had just vetoed a resolution for an immediate cession of Israeli destruction in Gaza. As a former deputy secretary of the UN had admitted to me during the fall of 2024, the veto itself renders the UN unreformable; a new international organization would have to be established sans vetoes for efficacy to be possible. Even so, absent a real enforcement mechanism, such as a military force, a resolution even of a vetoless organization would merely be parchment. The impotence of the UN is one reason why NATO, a defensive military transatlantic alliance, has been valuable in the face of military threats by Russia. Yet in September 2025, after Russian drones had flown into four E.U. states, E.U. President Von der Leyen felt the need to take the lead by again stressing her proposal for a drone wall along the E.U.’s eastern border; she was not deferring to any international alliance, much less to the United Nations. I submit that Von der Leyen’s initiative is yet another means by which the E.U. can be distinguished from international “blocs,” alliances, and organizations. Unlike the latter three, the E.U. has exclusive competencies and is thus semi-sovereign (and the same goes for the state governments).

After “two or three large drones were spotted at Copenhagen Airport,” which is in the E.U., on September 23, 2025, the E.U.’s Commission “called for a drone wall, a novel initiative first unveiled by President Ursula von der Leyen” in her State of the Union speech.[1] “For those who still doubted the need to have a drone wall in the European Union, well, here we get another example of how important it is,” a spokesman at the Commission said.[2] Why had not the Commission pursued this proposal in time to block the incursions in August and September?

Euroskeptic, or anti-federalist, Europeans, which included at least two governors at the time, loathed the idea of federalizing defense (and foreign policy). Also, just as in the early decades of the U.S., some state governments resisted the federalization of “collective” debt. That the E.U.’s executive branch was “rolling out a €150 billion loan programme to boost defence spending, which could be mobilized to promote domestic production of drones,” represented to some governors a giant leap on the way to a central federal state that would eventually encroach on the state governments.[3] This fear, by the way, is precisely what led several U.S. states to try to exit the U.S. in 1861.

Whereas in the U.S., the state government’s direct power at the federal level had been weakened when state governments no longer appointed delegates to the U.S. Senate, E.U. state governments could wield veto power over a significant number of proposed federal laws and regulations. Whereas the U.S. state governments could no longer adequately protect their turf against federal encroachment, the E.U.’s federal governmental institutions could still be paralyzed by blocs of states or even just one state. So, it is incredible that the Commission was able to act on the incursions of drones once this had been in a north-western state (i.e., Denmark) to create a drone wall and issue significant “collective,” or federal debt. Unlike international organizations, the E.U. has some governmental sovereignty that had been delegated by the states, and this means that it is no surprise that the E.U. rather than NATO or the UN would take action in the face of Putin’s use of force of arms to decide the question of Ukraine. The problem is that the Commission has too often been paralyzed by the state governors, which is particularly damaging because the E.U. is not an international organization, and those that existed as of 2025 could not be relied upon.



1. Jorge Liboreiro, “We Cannot Wait’: EU Calls for Drone Wall to Deter Russia after New Incident in Denmark,” September 23, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Thursday, September 18, 2025

The E.U.’s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel: Excessive Reliance on the State Governments

To leverage the combined power, or united front, that is possible in Europe, the European Union was established in the waning years of the twentieth century. Roughly thirty years later, the power of the state governments at the federal level still compromised the leverage, especially in foreign affairs and defense. Even in sanctioning trading partners, even qualified majority voting in the Council of the E.U. can be said to have negatively impacted the ability of the E.U. Commission, the executive branch, to leverage the political muscle of the E.U. against other countries. State-level political agendas could essentially hold any possible leverage hostage. It may be worth thinking about why a qualified majority vote in the Council of the E.U., which represents the state governments, rather than in the E.U.’s parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, was necessary for trade sanctions to be applied to duty-free imports from Israel. That state-level political or economic interests could possibility trump applying economic leverage to stop Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, as well as Israel’s military attacks on other countries in the Middle East can be an indication that the state governments have too much power at the federal level. For if the E.U. is only an aggregation of states, without the whole being more than the sum of the parts, then the whole sans the aggregate cannot very well enact leverage on foreign actors abroad, even those whose behavior has been nothing short of atrocious.


The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel."

Saturday, August 30, 2025

The UN in the US: Trump Bans Abbas

Should the UN’s General Assembly and Security Council be located in New York City? Both New York and the Union in which New York is a member-state have assumed the obligation of being proper hosts to people from around the world who come to the UN for its business. Even though that international organization has displayed an impotence in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli military incursion that has decimated Gaza and its residents, having an international forum in which talking can take place is not for naught. As an open speaking club of sorts, the United Nations permits adversaries and allies alike to make their views known to each other and the rest of the world. Even though the very existence of the vetoes in the Security Council styme action, that members of the UN so easily get away with violating resolutions renders the entire resolution-process de facto nugatory in real significance. So essentially, the UN building in New York City enables diplomats and heads of governments alike to speak out and with each other. It is vital, therefore, that the US take an expansive approach to issuing visa-waivers so institutional members of the UN can be as well represented as they desire to be. In this regard, the host—the United States Government—should refrain from applying its partisanship in international disputes by restricting the waivers to cover the bare essentials of personnel coming to the UN in New York from abroad.

After having suspended a program that had allowed injured Gaza children to come to the U.S. for medical treatment, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio “revoked the visas of a number of Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization officials ahead of the [September, 2025] meeting of the UN General Assembly” even though the two groups had previously been represented.[1] An official at the U.S. State Department said that Palestinian President Abbas and roughly 80 other Palestinians would be denied entry into the US to attend the UN General Assembly’s upcoming session. “Abbas’ office . . . was astonished by the visa decision” and insisted that the decision “violated the U.N. ‘headquarters agreement’.”[2] Palestine had enjoyed non-member observer-state status since 2012, so restricting the non-visa waiver for Abbas especially was indeed a violation of the “UN headquarters agreement.”

That Israel declared Gaza City to be a “combat zone” on the very same day attests to the salience that the Israeli militaristic incursion into Gaza would likely have in the upcoming session, and thus to the need for the Palestinian position—that of the victims (for a genocide is not a war)—to be well-represented both for the sake of fairness itself and so any possible deals can be struck amid full discussions and negotiations “behind the scenes.” The Trump administration held a lopsided position in considering the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas, in which over a thousand people died and hundreds of Israelis were taken hostage, to be too horrendous, but the Israeli attacks and perpetrated genocide and even holocaust in Gaza in which tens of thousands had already died and over a million more intentionally subjected to starvation as somehow warranted and thus deserved. In the regard, the monetary footprints of the American Israeli (and Israeli government) lobbyist political action committee in Washington can be inferred as it is probably that Netanyahu was behind the new restrictions on the Palestinian delegation.

It would be only natural for most countries of the General Assembly to object to such blatant unfairness; after all, Netanyahu rather than Abbas was wanted by the International Criminal Court. Additionally, 147 of the 193 countries (not “member states,” as the UN is an international organization, whereas the E.U. and U.S. are not) in the General Assembly already recognized Palestine as a country; a few E.U. states were even set to recognize Palestine as a country in the upcoming session, where Abbas was to take part in a high-level meeting, but Netanyahu did not approve, and even in spite of the genocide or even holocaust that his government was unleashing on Gaza’s 2 million residents, the Trump Administration remained sycophantic via the AIPAC Israeli lobby in Washington.

If indeed the real source of the visa-waiver infringement was the war criminal who at the time was still wanted by the ICC and whose militaristic actions had already violated the UN Charter many times over, the utter abject unfairness in Netanyahu being able to attend (and even speak at!) the General Assembly even as Abbas would be barred due to the “host” country, more than sufficient cause would exist for the General Assembly to hold a debate and vote during the upcoming session on whether another host-country should be found to replace New York.

Switzerland, having earned a reputation of neutrality, could better be counted on than New York, whose membership in the US now compromised that state’s ability to serve as a host. Unlike New York, Switzerland was staying out of the EU so to protect and ensure neutrality in international affairs. Such built-up or accumulated reputation can be understood as a long-term intangible asset that takes considerable effort to build but can be ruined by a single expedient decision that is in line with the immediacy of power and money. Were the General Assembly to let the US Government get away with doing Israel’s bidding even as Israel was declaring Gaza City to be a combat-zone (wherein only one side is allowed to fight), the credibility of the UN itself would be on the line. Unable even to enforce its own resolutions, the UN would be even more compromised, if that was possible. Even just in its capacity as a forum for talking, the UN would fall short if only aggressors and their enablers are able to speak. Such a decrepit institutional condition of the waning post-1945 world order could be dangerous, as power abhors a vacuum, especially in a Hobbesian state of nature wherein might makes right and maintains control of the doors. It should not be forgotten that no international police department existed as of 2025, hence the US Government could get away with putting international partisanship above neutral hospitality even when such partisanship was enabling a genocide and holocaust.



1. Gavin Blackburn, “US Revokes Visas of Palestinian Officials Ahead of UN General Assembly, State Department Says,” Euronews.com, August 29, 2025.
2. Kanishka Singh and Ali Sawafta, “US Bars Palestinian Leader Abbas from UN as Allies Back Statehood,” Reuters.com, August 30, 2025.

Thursday, August 28, 2025

Russia Damages E.U. Diplomatic Offices: Implications for International Law

Even though the Vienna Convention of 1961 includes protections for diplomatic and consular properties in active war-zones, Russia’s attack of 629 missiles and drones on Kiev, Ukraine, came within 50 meters of the E.U.’s diplomatic offices there late on August 27, 2025, severely damaging them but killing nobody in the E.U.’s delegation. The two bombs that hit nearby were enough to give the Europeans the impression that President Putin of Russia did not consider himself bound by international law in war. To the extent that fighting between two sovereign countries, Russia and Ukraine, fits Hobbes’ infamous state of nature, international law is really not law at all, for jurisprudence, including mutually acknowledged rights, requires an overarching polity to enact and enforce laws. So the E.U. could not enjoy a right to be sparred death and destruction at its diplomatic offices in Kiev during the war there, but the Union could claim another right at Russia’s expense within the E.U.’s territory.

After the bombing, the E.U.’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, said of it, “It shows that the Kremlin will stop at nothing to terrorize Ukraine, blindly killing civilians—men, women and children and even targeting the European Union.”[1] Even though it was not clear that two bombs going off in the vicinity necessarily means that Putin was targeting the E.U., António Costa, chairman of the European Council, which represents the state governments, stated, “The EU will not be intimidated. Russia’s aggression only strengthens our resolve to stand with Ukraine and its people.”[2] In return for the E.U. having just come in close contact with brazen Russian military might, E.U. President Von der Leyen “promised to tighten the screws on the Russian war machine with a 19th package of EU sanctions.”[3] That so many so-called packages had already not worked gives little credibility to what a 19th might do in terms of making a difference to Russia’s war calculus.

Fortunately, Von der Leyen said that the E.U. would work at the federal level “on new ways to further mobilize Russia’s frozen assets, worth about €210 billion, that are “on EU soil, to finance Ukraine’s defence capabilities and reconstruction.”[4] Even though international law put constraints on confiscation of the funds, and an E.U. spokesperson said the efforts would continue to pertain to “the windfall profits, rather than the money itself,” I contend that if it can be proved that Russia had violated international laws militarily in Ukraine, the E.U. should be released of any legal and moral obligation not to confiscate the frozen Russian assets.[5] It would be unfair to Ukraine, as well as the E.U., were international law to be applied to only one side while the other ignores the very existence of law internationally in line with how Hobbes describes the state of nature prior to any social contract.

It was obvious at the time that Ukraine could use any additional military support that could come from the E.U. confiscating the frozen Russian assets in the E.U., but perhaps even more significant would be the decision that could be taken on whether international law itself pertains to the war. In deciding that no law applies to both sides because of a lack of de jure and de facto recognition by both sides and enforcement, the question of even whether there is such a thing as international law—whether jurisprudence applies in a domain in which enforcement mechanisms are lacking, whether institutionally, as by a militarized international federation or a coalition of the willing.

The lack of any enforcement can be distinguished from a weakness in enforcement or even an abject failure of an extant enforcement effort. That no enforcement mechanism existed at least as of 2025 on international law arguably renders such “law” as merely wishes by some people or organizations. If Russia’s Putin and Israel’s Netanyahu were able to treat international law as such, this is all that would be required to render international law as something less than law itself. For other people to continue to refer to international law would be an error predicated on a mere wish rather than being a statement of fact. A dictum could be presented to the world wherein international agreements cannot, or at least should not, be labeled as law unless credible enforcement mechanisms exist; by credible, I mean likely to be efficacious in constraining culprit governments. In short, federal officials of the E.U. should not feel constrained by international law on confiscating the frozen assets, just as Russia’s President Putin had been ignoring international “law” in having invaded a sovereign country. With so many obvious attacks on civilians and kidnapping of Ukrainian children, taking them inside Russia far from Ukraine, the very concept of international law goes out the window.

Applied to Russia and Israel in 2025, the invasions would have had to be stopped with the invaders pushed back for there to be such a thing as an international law against invasion (or targeting civilians). To claim that there is such a thing as international law while a genocide or even holocaust is underway unimpeded involves cognitive dissidence, if not an abject refusal to think at all. In Cameron’s film, Titanic, an employee of the ship tells third-class passengers that they cannot go through a passageway only to be knocked into the rising water by Dawson. Without enforcement, the employee can only be regarded as strongly expressing a desire. Similarly, a food-aide or medical-aide worker in Gaza could shout again and again at Israeli tanks, you can’t come into Gaza City, but if those tanks keep rolling in, it is not as though the worker would be supposing that a law is being broken, for there is no viable enforcement to force the Israelis out of Gaza; not even a coalition of the willing had emerged to do so in more than a year. Netanyahu could easily dismiss such shouting as pleas rather than even a demand, much less a law. Anyone watching the tanks continue onward would regard any onlooker making a demand as crazy. I submit that it is just as crazy to refer to international law in the context of the Russian and Israeli invasions in the mid-2020's.



1. Jorge Liboreiro, “EU Delegation in Kyiv Severely Damaged by Shock Wave of Russian Strike,” Euronews.com, August 28, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Jorge Liboreiro, “EU Summons Russian Envoy after Strike Damaged the Bloc’s Delegation in Kyiv,” Euronews.com, August 28, 2025.

Monday, August 25, 2025

The E.U.’s Hungary Overreaching on Sovereignty: International Trade

Sovereignty is not a word to be casually used, especially if in overreaching. In both the E.U. and U.S., state governments have overreached at the expense of the delegated competencies or enumerated powers of the respective Unions of states. The Nullification Crisis in the U.S. and de facto unilateral refusal of the E.U. state of Hungary to observe E.U. law both demonstrate how the overreaching by state governments can compromise a federal system.[1] In the E.U. the refusal to do away with the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. enable and even invite such overreaches at the expense of the E.U. itself, and its distinctly federal officials. Even a state government’s pursuit of it’s state’s economic interests does not justify holding the E.U. hostage. The case of supporting Ukraine in the midst of the invasion by Russia is a case in point.

In part because of Hungary’s veto of the accession of Ukraine into the Union, as intimated by Ukrainian President Zelensky on August 24, 2025, Ukrainian attacks on the Druzhba oil pipeline blocked oil imports into the E.U. states of Hungary and Slovakia. “Ukraine attacked oil facilities on Russian territory with drones and rockets.”[2] This violation of Russia’s sovereignty was predicated on Russia’s long-standing invasion of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Accordingly, the main motive for the bombings of the oil facilities in Russia can be said to have been to weaken Russia’s military by reducing the revenue to the Russian state from oil exports. To be sure, Ukraine’s president himself “suggested that the attacks on the pipeline might be connected to Hungary’s veto on Ukraine’s EU accession.”[3] On the anniversary of Ukraine having broken off from the Soviet Union, Zelensky said, “We always supported the friendship between Ukraine and Hungary. And now the existence of the friendship depends on what Hungary’s position is.”[4]

The overt threat to continued imports of Russian oil was received loud and clear in Budapest, the Hungarian state capital. The state’s foreign minister, Péter Szijártó “said his government firmly rejected what he described as the Ukrainian President’s intimidation and considered those bombings on the Russian pipelines as an attack on Hungary’s sovereignty.”[5] On social media, the foreign minister puts sovereignty in terms of “territorial integrity, and, furthermore, claims that an “attack on energy security is an attack on sovereignty.”[6] I beg to differ.

Sovereignty as understood territorially and applied to the E.U. state of Hungary does not include Ukrainian bombings within the territory of Russia because the latter is not Hungarian territory. Furthermore, energy security is not sovereignty, especially when such security depends on international trade. The severing of such a contract by the inability of a counterparty to deliver product does not violate sovereignty. In fact, as pointed out by Andriy Sybiha, Ukraine’s foreign minister, the E.U. state of Hungary could have diversified and become independent of Russian oil “like the rest of Europe.”[7] Indeed, the ability to do so would have been an exercise of the governmental sovereignty retained by the Hungarian government in the E.U., and the latter may have used its portion of sovereignty to assist the state, given the consensus at the E.U. level against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which began in 2014 with Crimea.

The problem of the Hungarian overreach on what sovereignty means and entitles helps to explain why Viktor Orbán, the governor of Hungary, had been serially violating E.U. law and regulations even after the Commission began withholding money for the state. Orbán’s refusal to recognize that some governmental sovereignty, in the form of competencies—full and shared—had been delegated to the E.U.’s federal governmental institutions in 1993 coupled with an overreaching construal (or distortion) of what territorial sovereignty means and entitles, explains why Hungary has stymied so much at the federal level, given the power that states wield there through the European Council and the Council of the European Union. Therefore, it is ironic that Tamás Deutsch, a representative in the European Parliament representing a district that is within the state of Hungary, “said the pipeline bombings represent a military attack against an EU member state, and that the EU should not conduct [accession] talks with Ukraine as a result.”[8] So Hungary is a member-state after all, when being one is convenient.

Playing by convenience at the state level without concern for the viability of the federal level is precisely what could unravel the European Union. The irony is that without the E.U., Hungary would not have an empire-scale union at hand to push back against Russia, should Putin decide to invade Hungary after all. That would be a violation of Hungary’s sovereignty. So resisting the urge of convenience or state-rights ideology to exploit state power at the federal level could actually strengthen Hungary’s sovereignty even if international trade deals do not all go Hungary’s way. Unfortunately, the principle of unanimity at the E.U. level ultimately undermines rather than strengthens the remaining governmental sovereignty of the states if the veto power is exploited for expediency rather than to protect vital, long-term state interests against federal encroachment on the governmental sovereignty reserved by the states.



1. In 1832-1833, the government of South Carolina held that the U.S. tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void within the state. “The resolution of the Nullification Crisis in favor of the federal government helped to undermine the nullification doctrine,” which holds that states have the right “to nullify federal acts within their boundaries.” Britannica.com (accessed August 25, 2025). I submit that the European Court of Justice could do worse than declare the same with regard to state laws, including the refusal of a governor or state legislature to implement federal directives, that are in violation of E.U. law and regulations. Monetary sanctions by the European Commission have not been a sufficient deterrent. If either de facto or de jure nullification becomes the norm, then it would only be a matter of time before the Union dissolves and the states could once again take up arms against each other.
2. Sandor Zsiros, “Hungary and Slovakia in Spat with Ukraine over Bombed Druzhba Oil Pipeline,” Euronews.com, August 25, 2025, italics added.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Wednesday, August 20, 2025

On Presumptuous Pride: Netanyahu Castigates Europe

While conducting a genocide and even a holocaust in Gaza from 2023 through at least the summer of 2025, the Israeli government was in no position to launch diplomatic threats against either the E.U. or any of its states for recognizing a Palestinian state alongside the Israeli state.[1] At the time, the warrants issued by the ICC for the arrest of Netanyahu and a former defense minister were still outstanding, and no doubt more warrants would be issued for other culprits in the Israeli government and military. I applaud Jews around the world, and especially in Israel, who have had the guts to protest publicly on behalf of human rights in Gaza and against Israel's savage militaristic incursion into Gaza and the related death of tens of thousands and starvation of millions. The human urge of self-preservation is astonishing in that as of August, 2025, so many residents of Gaza were still alive. So, for Netanyahu to charge government officials in the E.U. with being antisemitic is not only incorrect and unfair, but highly presumptuous given the severity of the atrocities unleashed by Netanyahu and his governmental cadre. Regarding both the Israeli protesters and the Netanyahu government, distinguishing the ethical from the theological domains, which are admittedly very much related, is helpful.


The full essay is "On Presumptuous Pride."