Paradigm-Change in International Relations: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a Primer

“We remain committed to the principle that international borders must not be changed by force.”[1] This statement was signed by E.U. leaders, as well as officials at the state level, and even leaders of sovereign European states such as Britain and Norway several days after U.S. president Trump had met with officials from Ukraine at the White House on October 17, 2025. If only the Europeans had been so unified in 1939; it is difficult to fathom how the world would be 14 years short of a century later had World War II not taken place. Force as a de facto decider of territory has been the default through human history. For the principle of the European political leaders to become the default would represent a step forward in our species’ political development, but the even though principle sounds great, it also looks hopelessly idyllic and not at all realistic.

As if enshrining the validity of “might makes right” in territorial disputes, U.S. President Trump had said in an interview before the meeting at the White House, Putin has “won certain property.”[2] By several media accounts, Zelensky and his travelling cadre did not take this fact well at all subsequently at the White House. Just weeks before Trump’s statement, Putin had said that “force of arms would decide the matter” if there is not a peace agreement. The notion that bombs and guns can decide strikes me as an oxymoron. Force of arms take, rather than make decisions. A robber would not say that his gun will decide to whom the desktop computer in a house being robbed belongs. Robbery does not alter ownership.

Rather than feign insight into how the conflagration between Russia, an empire, and Ukraine, a sovereign state, could be solved other than to state generally that a war between an empire and a kingdom-level country is apt to be won by the former if by force of arms, I want to put “won certain property” (as if a sovereign country’s territory can be rethought into being a country’s property) directly up against the principle that “international borders must not be changed by force.” The word must may subtly import the mentality behind “might makes right.” If so, how could the new principle be rephrased so as to sever it from values that have given “might makes right” such staying power? In debate, it is better to find one’s own presuppositions and values than import those of the opposition and merely propose an alternative interpretation.

International borders are not legitimately changed by force, as opposed to an invader has won some territory, better characterizes the underlying antipodal values and beliefs that are actually in conflict. If only the values and presuppositions of the latter way of international relations when diplomacy fails could finally be overcome by those that have been recessive: namely, that territorial gains by force will not be recognized. The latter paradigm for international relations can include severing trade, cutting off memberships in international organizations like NATO and the UN, and even the use of force to push invaders back, as U.S. President Bush did in the early 1990s in leading an international coalition to forcibly remove Iraq’s dictator’s forces from Kuwait. The use of military force is the least preferred way of enforcing the new principle over the old because force itself is still being used in relation to territory. 

Much more consistent with the European 21^st century principle is ending trade even with an invader’s trading partners and seeing that the UN remove the invader from being able to participate (reversion to observer status, without a veto-power) for violating the UN’s charter. To avoid even more humiliation, the UN should do that anyway, and for any government that has serially violated the charter (e.g., Israel). 

Successfully changing the default in international relations from the notion that invaders “win” territory and territorial claims can be decided by force of arms to the principle that territorial borders cannot be changed by force would represent not only a paradigm shift, but also a long-awaited advance in political development, and such a change could not arrive too early in the nuclear age. Both Putin and Trump can be seen as antiquated in their world-views if enough of the rest of the world decides on its own to move on. Coming up with new, distinct sea-legs for the European principle that are NOT carried over from the underpinnings of the currently dominant, antithetical dogma that might makes right, or at least that forced territorial changes are legitimate, and then operationalizing the new principle in government policy would go a long way in actualizing the new paradigm in international relations. 

---

1. Euronews, “European Leaders Back Ukraine Ceasefire Proposal at Current Contact Line,” Euronews.com, 21 October 2025.
2. Kevin Liptak, “How Trump-Zelensky Meeting Turned Acrimonious over Demands or Territorial Concessions,” CNN.com, October 20, 2025.

Russia’s President Putin: Political Realism with Lies

As a former KGB agent, Russia’s President Putin could probably write a book and teach a course on the art of lying, or fabrication, as means of doing foreign policy, which manipulation being the not so subtle subtext. The tactic can be reckoned as being expedient, with the loss of value in reputational capital being assessed to be a cost worth incurring. That Putin lied to U.S. President Trump in Alaska in 2025 on the Russian’s intention to “put an end to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine” should have caught the American off guard, if the claim made by Kurt Volker, an American envoy to Ukraine that Putin had indeed lied to Trump about being willing to meet and negotiate with the Ukrainian president is true.[1] The American president was, in short, naïve even in being willing to meet with his Russian counterpart, especially without the president of the E.U. present too, at least to serve as a reality-test regarding Putin’s real game, for Europe had more to lose—more on the line—than did America from incursions from the east. Political realism is the theory that best fits the Russian president.

In realism, states act in their own interests, even in multilateral negotiations, rather than forsaking any such immediate interests for the good of the global order, if indeed such an order exists institutionally. Power is the name of the game, and, as Nietzsche observed, the strong have incentive to give up their position of strength to the weak (so the weak can only hope to beguile the strong into feeling ashamed ethically of using their strength). In other words, Putin still had a winning hand when it came to extending his invasion farther west in Ukraine, so why would he unilaterally offer to sit down at a negotiating table unless any such territory were to be offered to him? Equality in terms of power is the only context in which justice is possible, Nietzsche wrote, and Hume as well as Nietzsche hold that equality does not really exist; more counter-power is needed for an invaded power to arrest the insurgency of a greater power. With Putin stating that the force of arms would decide the political matter of Ukraine, the world should have realized that political realism best fit and that any common good, or world order, would be nugatory in comparison to the interests of strong, powerful states. The impotence and fecklessness of the United Nations had created the vacuum in which both Russia’s Putin and Israel’s Netanyahu could blatantly pursue their respective military interests even at the expense of the civilian populations of their respective enemies. In other words, impunity, even in being able to arrest peaceful protesters in international waters, and throw them in prison, invites political realism to fill the void and come to characterize international relations. The world itself has been culpable in this by refusing to reform the UN or establish an alternative international body sans vetoes and with an enforcement mechanism of its own that could stand up to aggressors internationally, as Mo Di, the founder of Mohism, had done in China during the Warring States period of the Zhou Dynasty.

Political realism is dangerous, not only because states nakedly pursue their own interests without regard to the common good—that of the world—but also because the personal, emotional reactions of presidents can easily come into play. As Volker said of the effect of Putin’s lie on Trump: “He made Trump look weak and Trump doesn’t like looking weak, so this is now a personal issue for him.”[2] So Trump was considering sending long-range Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, whether doing so was in the strategic interest of the U.S. or not. Without a world order as a viable constraint as political realist states pursue their own interests in relation to other states, political realism can easily lapse into personal vengeance and retaliation even at the expense of state interests. In short, political realism can lapse in to something much worse—and much more dangerous. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a case in point, as nuclear weapons were in the mix.

So political realism is in need of a major constraint beyond what Koehane and Nye suggest in their theory of neo-realism; especially in the nuclear age when “force of arms” is still being relied on by some state actors to settle political questions and such actors are all too willing to lie, our species should engage in a stepwise political development resulting in a world federation of the willing—countries that are willing to subscribe without a veto and even be willing to transfer some military hardware and troops so the common good has a means of clamping down on state actors who seek to invade weaker states with impunity. It is interesting that even as our species has advanced technology so much, political development has been stalled for centuries. Perhaps a new millennium can mean something, politically, such that deciding questions by the primitive means of force of arms can finally be treated as antiquated.

1. Sasha Vakulina and Shona Murray, “’Putin Lied to Trump and Made Him Look Weak,’ Former US Envoy to Ukraine Says,” Euronews.com, 6 October 2025.
2. Ibid.

Why Evangelical Christian Americans Support Israel

The Christian “belief in the ‘rapture’ of believers at the time of Jesus’ return to Earth is rooted in a particular form of biblical interpretation that emerged in the 19^th century. Known as dispensational pre-millennialism, it is especially popular among American evangelicals.”[1] This biblical interpretation is based on the following from one of Paul’s letters to a church:

“For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first: Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord.”[2]

Presumably the “trump of God” in the King James version of the Bible is distinct from Trump as God, for that eventuality would raise a myriad of questions and difficulties, and at least two difficulties pertain to the verse and, moreover, to dispensational pre-millennialism as a Christian doctrine. That it was constructed only recently by Christian standards raises the question of why the idea did not dawn on Christians closer to Paul’s time. That Paul does not represent himself in his letters as having met Jesus prior to the Resurrection and Paul’s use of mythological/Revelations language, such as “with the voice of the archangel,” also provide support for not taking the passage literally. After his resurrection in the Gospels, Jesus does not have the voice of an archangel. With Paul’s passage viewed figuratively or symbolically, rather than empirically and literally, the underlying religious meaning would of course remain unperturbed: keeping the faith is of value and thus in holding on to one’s distinctly religious (and Christian) faith, this strength will be vindicated even if no signs of this emerge during a person’s life. In other words, faith in vindication is part of having a religious faith, which is not limited our experience. The Resurrection itself can be construed as vindication with a capital V, regardless of whether Jesus rose from the dead empirically and thus as a historical event. In fact, a historical account or claim is extrinsic to religious narrative even though the sui generis genre can legitimately make selective use of, and even alter, historical reports to make theological points. The writers of the Gospels would have considered this perfectly legitimate, given that they were writing faith narratives and not history books. Making this distinction is vital, I submit, to obviating the risk that one’s theological interpretations lead to supporting unethical state-actors on the world stage, such as Israel, which as of 2025 was serially committing genocidal and perhaps even holocaust crimes against humanity in Gaza. In short, the theological belief that supporting Israel will result in the Second Coming happening sooner than otherwise can be understood to be an unethical stance based on a category mistake. American Evangelical Christians may have been unwittingly enabling another Hitler for the sake of the salvation of Christians, while the Vatican stood by merely making statements rather than acting to help the innocent Palestinians, whether with food and medicine, or in actually going to Gaza’s southern border (or joining the flotilla) to protest as Gandhi would have done.

The full essay is at "On the Ethics of Dispensational Pre-Millennialism."

---

1. Robert D. Cornwall, “The Roots of Belief in the 2025 Rapture that Didn’t Happen,” MSNBC.com, September 25, 2025.
2. 1 Thessalonians 4:16-17 (KJV)

The United Nations: Weak Even in Defending Itself

Besides its humanitarian work, the UN can boast of providing a situs in which officials of national governments can talk to and with each other. The best opportunity for in-person speeches and conversations annually is during the opening of the General Assembly. Even granting there being value to such communicating. the UN was not founded for this purpose; rather, it was founded to end war, and neither speeches nor in-person meetings, typically not directly between warring nations, so obviously have failed to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s occupation and genocide that may even be reckoned as another holocaust. All this aggression has come with impunity, and in this regard, the UN has failed. Even a UN official’s attempt to defend the international organization during the 2025 session of the General Assembly was weak. At the very least, the UN needed to hire some public relations firms, but even a patina of efficacy only goes so far. The staying power of such an institution is itself, I submit, a problem in that organizations tend not to get “the memo” on when it is time (and even past time) to close up and urge that another, different organization be established.

Speaking at the General Assembly on September 23, 2025, U.S. President Trump asked rhetorically, “What is the purpose of the United Nations?”[1] Later, standing next to his counterpart, E.U. President Von der Leyen, Trump answered his own question by saying, “I mean, we shouldn’t have any wars if the U.N. is really doing its job.”[2] The purpose of the UN is to end wars, and being a place where national officials can talk to and with each other is woefully below the UN’s potential in reaching its purpose. In short, a speaking forum with side talks is so far from the UN being able to stop wars and even genocides, not to mention holocausts, that Trump went on to say in his speech to the General Assembly, “I’ve always said (the UN) has such tremendous, tremendous potential, but it’s not even coming close to living up to that potential.”[3] To be sure, he did not provide any suggestions on how exactly the UN could tap into its potential, hence he left the UN to rot on the vine. Any suggestions would almost certainly have had to include providing the UN with enforcement mechanisms with which to implement its resolutions “on the ground” rather than just in words, and the U.S. had a longstanding policy of resisting such proposals due to the doctrine of absolute sovereignty held by recurrent American administrations. So it is really no surprise that Trump was short on ideas that could strengthen the UN in its task of ending wars and belligerent military occupations.

It was left to General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock to try to defend the international organization, which of course is not a government. “Sometimes we could’ve done more, but we cannot let this dishearten us. If we stop doing the right things, evil will prevail,” Baerbock told the Assembly.[4] That the UN had been unable to act even when Israel was bombing UN humanitarian areas in Gaza, not to mention in stopping the genocide and perhaps even holocaust there, begs the question: exactly what right things was the UN doing, as per its role in ending wars and occupations? Clearly not enough right things such that not doing them would enable evil to prevail. With Russia’s army bombing civilian locations in Ukraine and Gaza in the midst of a full-blown genocide and arguably a holocaust given the severity of the intentional infliction of suffering besides death, if evil was not prevailing already, it would be interesting to hear Baerbock’s definition of evil. In short, his defense does not stand up to even easy scrutiny; hence his defense of the UN can be regarded as being very weak, or deeply flawed. It is a defense that could be expected of an utterly failed organization unwilling to accept reality, including the organization’s abject failure to reach its potential.

The staying power of organizations not subject to market competition is too much, given the ability of even failed organizations to stay afloat. That even a weak defense can be sufficient to keep a failed organization—failed in terms of its primary mission—going may mean that more is needed to put failed organizations out of their misery, which of course their officials would deny. In the midst of Russia’s Putin and Israel’s Netanyahu easily dismissing the UN charter yet remaining members, while the UN ignores even such fragrant violations of membership, it is difficult to see how the UN has any integrity regarding even itself remaining, if indeed it ever had any.

A new international body, without certain nations having veto power and with the body having real enforcement power of its own, such that it would not have to rely on countries for actual enforcement—such reliance is also a sign of abject weakness—was desperately needed, given the large-scale aggression of Russia and Israel that had been going on with impunity for more nearly two years. This alone should be the death sentence for the UN, even with its weak attempts to defend it’s legitimacy and usefulness. Yet in terms of organizations, and even more so, institutions, momentum of the status quo is like a force of nature that is difficult even to divert.

---

1. Aamer Madhani, “Trump In Speech to U.N. Says World Body ‘Not Even Coming Close to Living Up’ To Its Potentional,” The Huffington Post, September 23, 2025.
2. Darlene Superville, “Trump Says Wars Wouldn’t Happen If UN Did Its Job,” The Associated Press, September 23, 2025.
3. Aamer Madhani, “Trump In Speech to U.N. Says World Body ‘Not Even Coming Close to Living Up’ To Its Potentional.”
4. Ibid.

A Drone Wall for the E.U.: Russian Aggression Assuages Euroskeptic States

Speaking after his meeting with U.S. President Trump in Alaska during the summer of 2025, Russia’s President Putin said that if no agreement is reached with Ukraine, the force of arms would decide the matter. In other words, might makes right, or at least military incursion is a legitimate way to decide political disputes between countries. I would have hoped that such a primitive mentality would be antiquated in the twentieth century, but, alas, human nature evolves only at a glacial pace undetected within the lifespan of a human being. In September, 2025, the United Nations was under attack from within the General Assembly because of the continuance of the veto held by five countries in the Security Council; the U.S. had just vetoed a resolution for an immediate cession of Israeli destruction in Gaza. As a former deputy secretary of the UN had admitted to me during the fall of 2024, the veto itself renders the UN unreformable; a new international organization would have to be established sans vetoes for efficacy to be possible. Even so, absent a real enforcement mechanism, such as a military force, a resolution even of a vetoless organization would merely be parchment. The impotence of the UN is one reason why NATO, a defensive military transatlantic alliance, has been valuable in the face of military threats by Russia. Yet in September 2025, after Russian drones had flown into four E.U. states, E.U. President Von der Leyen felt the need to take the lead by again stressing her proposal for a drone wall along the E.U.’s eastern border; she was not deferring to any international alliance, much less to the United Nations. I submit that Von der Leyen’s initiative is yet another means by which the E.U. can be distinguished from international “blocs,” alliances, and organizations. Unlike the latter three, the E.U. has exclusive competencies and is thus semi-sovereign (and the same goes for the state governments).

After “two or three large drones were spotted at Copenhagen Airport,” which is in the E.U., on September 23, 2025, the E.U.’s Commission “called for a drone wall, a novel initiative first unveiled by President Ursula von der Leyen” in her State of the Union speech.[1] “For those who still doubted the need to have a drone wall in the European Union, well, here we get another example of how important it is,” a spokesman at the Commission said.[2] Why had not the Commission pursued this proposal in time to block the incursions in August and September?

Euroskeptic, or anti-federalist, Europeans, which included at least two governors at the time, loathed the idea of federalizing defense (and foreign policy). Also, just as in the early decades of the U.S., some state governments resisted the federalization of “collective” debt. That the E.U.’s executive branch was “rolling out a €150 billion loan programme to boost defence spending, which could be mobilized to promote domestic production of drones,” represented to some governors a giant leap on the way to a central federal state that would eventually encroach on the state governments.[3] This fear, by the way, is precisely what led several U.S. states to try to exit the U.S. in 1861.

Whereas in the U.S., the state government’s direct power at the federal level had been weakened when state governments no longer appointed delegates to the U.S. Senate, E.U. state governments could wield veto power over a significant number of proposed federal laws and regulations. Whereas the U.S. state governments could no longer adequately protect their turf against federal encroachment, the E.U.’s federal governmental institutions could still be paralyzed by blocs of states or even just one state. So, it is incredible that the Commission was able to act on the incursions of drones once this had been in a north-western state (i.e., Denmark) to create a drone wall and issue significant “collective,” or federal debt. Unlike international organizations, the E.U. has some governmental sovereignty that had been delegated by the states, and this means that it is no surprise that the E.U. rather than NATO or the UN would take action in the face of Putin’s use of force of arms to decide the question of Ukraine. The problem is that the Commission has too often been paralyzed by the state governors, which is particularly damaging because the E.U. is not an international organization, and those that existed as of 2025 could not be relied upon.

---

1. Jorge Liboreiro, “’We Cannot Wait’: EU Calls for Drone Wall to Deter Russia after New Incident in Denmark,” September 23, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The E.U.’s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel: Excessive Reliance on the State Governments

To leverage the combined power, or united front, that is possible in Europe, the European Union was established in the waning years of the twentieth century. Roughly thirty years later, the power of the state governments at the federal level still compromised the leverage, especially in foreign affairs and defense. Even in sanctioning trading partners, even qualified majority voting in the Council of the E.U. can be said to have negatively impacted the ability of the E.U. Commission, the executive branch, to leverage the political muscle of the E.U. against other countries. State-level political agendas could essentially hold any possible leverage hostage. It may be worth thinking about why a qualified majority vote in the Council of the E.U., which represents the state governments, rather than in the E.U.’s parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, was necessary for trade sanctions to be applied to duty-free imports from Israel. That state-level political or economic interests could possibility trump applying economic leverage to stop Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, as well as Israel’s military attacks on other countries in the Middle East can be an indication that the state governments have too much power at the federal level. For if the E.U. is only an aggregation of states, without the whole being more than the sum of the parts, then the whole sans the aggregate cannot very well enact leverage on foreign actors abroad, even those whose behavior has been nothing short of atrocious.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel."

The UN in the US: Trump Bans Abbas

Should the UN’s General Assembly and Security Council be located in New York City? Both New York and the Union in which New York is a member-state have assumed the obligation of being proper hosts to people from around the world who come to the UN for its business. Even though that international organization has displayed an impotence in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli military incursion that has decimated Gaza and its residents, having an international forum in which talking can take place is not for naught. As an open speaking club of sorts, the United Nations permits adversaries and allies alike to make their views known to each other and the rest of the world. Even though the very existence of the vetoes in the Security Council styme action, that members of the UN so easily get away with violating resolutions renders the entire resolution-process de facto nugatory in real significance. So essentially, the UN building in New York City enables diplomats and heads of governments alike to speak out and with each other. It is vital, therefore, that the US take an expansive approach to issuing visa-waivers so institutional members of the UN can be as well represented as they desire to be. In this regard, the host—the United States Government—should refrain from applying its partisanship in international disputes by restricting the waivers to cover the bare essentials of personnel coming to the UN in New York from abroad.

After having suspended a program that had allowed injured Gaza children to come to the U.S. for medical treatment, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio “revoked the visas of a number of Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization officials ahead of the [September, 2025] meeting of the UN General Assembly” even though the two groups had previously been represented.[1] An official at the U.S. State Department said that Palestinian President Abbas and roughly 80 other Palestinians would be denied entry into the US to attend the UN General Assembly’s upcoming session. “Abbas’ office . . . was astonished by the visa decision” and insisted that the decision “violated the U.N. ‘headquarters agreement’.”[2] Palestine had enjoyed non-member observer-state status since 2012, so restricting the non-visa waiver for Abbas especially was indeed a violation of the “UN headquarters agreement.”

That Israel declared Gaza City to be a “combat zone” on the very same day attests to the salience that the Israeli militaristic incursion into Gaza would likely have in the upcoming session, and thus to the need for the Palestinian position—that of the victims (for a genocide is not a war)—to be well-represented both for the sake of fairness itself and so any possible deals can be struck amid full discussions and negotiations “behind the scenes.” The Trump administration held a lopsided position in considering the October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas, in which over a thousand people died and hundreds of Israelis were taken hostage, to be too horrendous, but the Israeli attacks and perpetrated genocide and even holocaust in Gaza in which tens of thousands had already died and over a million more intentionally subjected to starvation as somehow warranted and thus deserved. In the regard, the monetary footprints of the American Israeli (and Israeli government) lobbyist political action committee in Washington can be inferred as it is probably that Netanyahu was behind the new restrictions on the Palestinian delegation.

It would be only natural for most countries of the General Assembly to object to such blatant unfairness; after all, Netanyahu rather than Abbas was wanted by the International Criminal Court. Additionally, 147 of the 193 countries (not “member states,” as the UN is an international organization, whereas the E.U. and U.S. are not) in the General Assembly already recognized Palestine as a country; a few E.U. states were even set to recognize Palestine as a country in the upcoming session, where Abbas was to take part in a high-level meeting, but Netanyahu did not approve, and even in spite of the genocide or even holocaust that his government was unleashing on Gaza’s 2 million residents, the Trump Administration remained sycophantic via the AIPAC Israeli lobby in Washington.

If indeed the real source of the visa-waiver infringement was the war criminal who at the time was still wanted by the ICC and whose militaristic actions had already violated the UN Charter many times over, the utter abject unfairness in Netanyahu being able to attend (and even speak at!) the General Assembly even as Abbas would be barred due to the “host” country, more than sufficient cause would exist for the General Assembly to hold a debate and vote during the upcoming session on whether another host-country should be found to replace New York.

Switzerland, having earned a reputation of neutrality, could better be counted on than New York, whose membership in the US now compromised that state’s ability to serve as a host. Unlike New York, Switzerland was staying out of the EU so to protect and ensure neutrality in international affairs. Such built-up or accumulated reputation can be understood as a long-term intangible asset that takes considerable effort to build but can be ruined by a single expedient decision that is in line with the immediacy of power and money. Were the General Assembly to let the US Government get away with doing Israel’s bidding even as Israel was declaring Gaza City to be a combat-zone (wherein only one side is allowed to fight), the credibility of the UN itself would be on the line. Unable even to enforce its own resolutions, the UN would be even more compromised, if that was possible. Even just in its capacity as a forum for talking, the UN would fall short if only aggressors and their enablers are able to speak. Such a decrepit institutional condition of the waning post-1945 world order could be dangerous, as power abhors a vacuum, especially in a Hobbesian state of nature wherein might makes right and maintains control of the doors. It should not be forgotten that no international police department existed as of 2025, hence the US Government could get away with putting international partisanship above neutral hospitality even when such partisanship was enabling a genocide and holocaust.

---

1. Gavin Blackburn, “US Revokes Visas of Palestinian Officials Ahead of UN General Assembly, State Department Says,” Euronews.com, August 29, 2025.
2. Kanishka Singh and Ali Sawafta, “US Bars Palestinian Leader Abbas from UN as Allies Back Statehood,” Reuters.com, August 30, 2025.