Does the European Union
represent a novel paradigm and thus a step in political development? Whether
this is so or not, can the E.U. be thought of as a step on the way towards a
world federation? In a talk at Harvard in 2025, Anthony Pagden, a professor at
UCLA, addressed these questions when the E.U. was just a few years over thirty—comparable
to the U.S. in 1820. The question was not whether the E.U. too would lean
towards political consolidation around a federal head, but whether the world
was making its way institutionally toward the creation by compact of a world
federation, which in turn could presumably stave off war. In 2025, the need for
global accountability on willful, militarily-aggressive national governments was
on at least some minds. The implication is that the global order based on
national sovereignty was insufficient, especially given the advanced
destructiveness of military weapons.
According to Pagden, the
nation-state concept is at its core an ethnic concept that was extended in the
19th century to include states that had territory extended beyond
that of a particular ethnic group.
Although nation-states had existed, the concept came into its own in the
1800s, so the modern notion of the nation-state is ahistoric, and thus perfectly
capable of being superseded should political development occur. The related
notion of sovereignty only became salient in the 16th century (e.g.,
Jean Bodin) and this continued in the next century in Hobbes’ Leviathan.
Hobbes’ assumption was not that governmental
sovereignty could not be split like an atom, but that it should not be
divided lest civil war break out. Europe was no stranger to war in the 1600s, given
the Thirty Years War, which was based on religious differences bearing on political
power.
Of course, the atom of
sovereignty was split in the U.S. Convention in the following century, with the
checks-and-balances in federalism being relied upon to keep the inherently
unstable division stable. Although Pagden didn’t mention this point, he did say
that relations between nation-states had historically tended to be through
empires but more recently (in centuries) has been through federations. In the process,
the very notion of sovereignty has been undergoing a gradual transformation. Whereas
Russia’s President Putin once claimed that either a country is sovereign or it’s
a colony, Pagden claimed that at least as of 2025, sovereignty had reached
international organizations. Together with nation-states, the notion of multilevel
sovereignty had come into its own. From this notion, Pagden claimed, a world federation
would someday be likely. He cited Durkheim’s prediction that at some point humanity
would form a global “social order” may be correct, but Kant’s claim that peace
would only be possible but not probable under a world federation also
deserves attention. Even if the world’s shift from empires to federal
governments and international confederations (which actually extend back to
antiquity--Sparta and Athens having headed military confederations) makes a
world federation more likely, the question of whether having one would stave
off war warrants reflection too. I think the key would be whether such a federation
has enforcement power, for the U.N. has arguably sidelined itself because it
lacks the authority and power to enforce its own resolutions and the veto mechanism
on the Security Council is a contributing factor that relegated the U.N. to the
sidelines as Russia invaded Ukraine and Israel ravaged Gaza—both cases evincing
an utter lack of accountability from beyond the sovereignty of the
nation-state.
Pagden stressed that even
though historically, empires have shaped the geography of the modern world,
federations will likely make an indelible imprint on the world in the future. “Empires
and federations have much in common,” he said. Both are legal societies. But with
respect to confederal international organizations, including the United
Nations, “international law is controversial.” I would add that the lack of
enforcement power renders such law de facto impotent in its own right,
although such law can be used by nation-states in the exercise of their
sovereignty on the world stage.
Even though empires and
federations have elements in common—indeed, originally federations were
exclusively international--empires are created by conquest, whereas federations
begin by consent. In European history, countries that had sovereign states in
Medieval times became political sub-units of federal nation-states in the
early-modern period. Pagden characterized Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium as “centralized
federalism.” U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin once told me that Congress delegating
functions to the state governments is “decentralized federalism.” Relatedly,
Pagden said that the notion of subsidiarity comes from Roman law; only
legislation that affects all of the political sub-units should be at the empire
level. In his Political Digest (1603), Althusius relates this point to his
claim that only the members at a level in a federal system are to be
represented at the next-highest level: individuals belong only to the first-level.
That Germany and Belgium are themselves states in the E.U. federal system resembles
the structure of Althusian federalism, which is based on the Holy Roman Empire.
By implication, geographically diverse U.S. states, such as California and New York,
could federate and still remain as states in the U.S., just as Belgium and
Germany in the European Union. Once you get the levels right, comparative federalism
gets very interesting (and contentious, for most people compare apples with
oranges—a state in one Union with another Union).
The ECJ says that the EU
treaties evince a constitutional order, so common law from the ECJ is indeed law. Pagden disagreed with the
European Court of Justice on this point, whereas I agree with the court. Even
so, he said, “The E.U. is a federation even if not in name.” The contradiction
is only apparent. The E.U., according to Pagden, is an exception—thus instantiating
a new paradigm and thus a step in political development. He could have cited
the Athenian League and Sparta’s confederation as evincing the close
association that federalism has had with distinctly international rather than
national political entities. The British Commonwealth too is international, but
it being voluntary differentiates it from federalism, which has tended to be
treaty-based.
I contend that to classify the
E.U. as an international organization is incorrect. Unlike NATA, the UN, ASEAN,
and the AU, the E.U. has a federal government of three branches: the European
Court of Justice, a legislature (the Council of the E.U., the European Council,
and the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens rather than
states), and an executive branch (the European Commission). Like the U.S. the
E.U. has federal institutions based on national (e.g., the ECJ, the Parliament
and the Commission) and international (e.g., the European Council and the Council
of the E.U.) principles. The U.S. House is based on national principles whereas
the U.S. Senate is based on international principles—the same ones that the UN
is based on). Both empire-scale federations, the E.U. and U.S., fall under the
rubric of federalism wherein governmental sovereignty is “dual,” or split,
whereas the UN and NATO are not, for full sovereignty is retained by the
countries. Applicable to the E.U. as well as the U.S., John Stuart Mill claimed
not only that federations are not stable over time, but also that a federation
can become a nation-state. Indeed, the E.U. and U.S. effectively split the very
notion of nation-state between two governmental systems over the same
territory.
The basic paradigmatic likeness
of the E.U. and U.S. flies in the face of Pagden’s argument that the E.U.
evinces something politically sui generis; this point in turn he uses to
claim that the new type of federalism is more useful than the American type as
a basis for a world federation constructed by regional federations. I submit
that the E.U. and U.S. are empire-scale federal systems and thus can be
characterized as regional with respect to the global level. The E.U. doesn’t
need to be unique for the construction of a world federation by consent to be
achieved; the U.S. and E.U. both evince the useful step in that both federations
fall under “modern federalism,” which Ken Wheare distinguishes from
confederalism because only in the former type is governmental (not popular!)
sovereignty split, whether by treaty, basic law, or constitution. Furthermore, that
the interstate heterogeneity in both the E.U. and U.S. is a leap from intrastate
diversity whether in terms of political ideology or culture qualifies both unions
as being a useful step potentially if a world federation is someday to be constructed.
The diversity within the E.U. is much greater than is the diversity within
Germany, for example. The same applies to France. Hence federalism, in being
able to accommodate differences, is more useful at the level of the E.U.
(and the U.S.).
Pagden rightly points to Europe’s shared political and legal
culture from Roman law, and all of the delegates at the U.S. convention were of
European extraction at some point. A world federation would be another leap in
terms of inter-state diversity because no such common cultural basis would
apply. The distinction between British common law and the French code pales in
comparison between ancient Roman and Chinese law. Also, the absolutist interpretation
of sovereignty by the governments of Russia and China is a world away from the
notion of dual sovereignty that characterizes “modern federalism” as evinced in
the E.U. and the U.S, both of whose federal institutions are based on national
and international principles depending on the institution. This hybrid is
precisely what a world federation might need, and yet the notion of applying federalism
to making a nation-state and yet one whose members are semi-sovereign (with residual
sovereignty!) was even by 2025 foreign to a Hobbesian notion of sovereignty as
unitary and absolute.
Therefore, I do not think that
a new paradigm or type of federalism will be necessary for a world federation
to be constructed. In fact, the hybrid that is at the federal level in the
cases of the U.S. and E.U. can be useful, and even perhaps necessary, for such
a federation not to succumb to impotence on enforcement. Yet I suspect this would
be the sticking point for countries like Russia and China. Simply put, the
absolutist view of national sovereignty must give way to make way for Wheare’s
notion of dual-sovereignty in federalism for national governments, whether
federated or not, to consent to a global federation. Staving off war is
arguably worth scrapping the absolutist view, but try convincing Presidents Xi
or Putin of this; after all, a very intelligent man, Immanuel Kant, thought that
world peace would only be possible—not probable.
