Mubarak Convicted in Egypt: A Precedent for Human Rights?

On June 2, 2012, an Egyptian court sentenced former President Hosni Mubarak to life in prison for being an accomplice in the killing of unarmed demonstrators during the protests in the “Arab Spring.” The significance of this verdict in terms of human rights from an international standpoint lies in the fact that the accountability on a ruler was accomplished by his own citizens—meaning the country’s own court. Lest the International Criminal Court be reckoned as coming up short in terms of being able to arrest and convict sitting or former rulers of states, the verdict from Egypt says, in effect, there is an alternative. Governments can fortify the independence of their respective judiciaries such that public officials can be held accountable domestically. Under this scenario, the ICC would be of value to the world particularly if it could be fortified to step in where states do not have court systems strong enough to arrest and try a current or former ruler. In other words, we ought not forget the alternative of national courts when we bemoan the weaknesses of the ICC.

All this is not to say that national judiciaries should necessarily be relied on—at least until they are strengthened in their capacity as a check on military, legislative, and executive officials and even heads of state. In the Egyptian verdict, for example, although Mubarak and his interior minister received life sentences, many officials more directly responsible for the police who killed the demonstrators were acquitted, as was Mubarak on corruption charges.[1] Furthermore, many lawyers said his conviction could be reversed on appeal. Accordingly, a prosecutor in the case announced an appeal would be made with a particular interest in convicting Mubarak’s sons of corruption and several police commanders of murder.[2] The want of convictions against them triggered popular protests across Egypt after the verdict.[3] Those protests signified a popular will that even high officials should be held accountable within the country rather than merely at the ICC. A judiciary should not depend on grass roots sentiment, however, so more evidently is needed before Egypt (and many other similar countries, no doubt) can be relied on to police their own officials on human rights abuses.

While hearing the life-sentence verdict against him, Mubarak shows no remorse.    Reuters TV

At the time of Mubarak’s conviction (and that of Charles Taylor by a Sierra Leon court at the Hague the week before), the world could be excused for having the false hope that dictators would thereafter finally be held accountable for violating the human rights of others. The hope in such a default-made-real can be funneled into a renewed effort to strength the ICC and the independence of governments’ own judiciaries. In other words, a better world wherein even the most powerful rulers and their subordinates are held accountable even for “giving the order” could finally be visualized, and out of this mere glimmer of sight could come the final push toward that better world.

1. David Kirkpatrick, “New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,” The New York Times, June 2, 2012. 

2. Alana Horowitz, “Mubarak Verdict To Be Appealed By Top Prosecutor,” The Huffington Post, June 3, 2012. 

3. David Kirkpatrick, “New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,” The New York Times, June 2, 2012. 

Former Liberian President Gets 50 Years for War Crimes

In the 50 year sentence handed to  former Liberian president Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone meeting at the Hague on May 30, 2012, the world came one step closer to being able to hold dictators accountable for war crime atrocities that go even beyond the violation of basic human rights. In particular, the prosecutor described, "The purposely cruel and savage crimes committed included public executions and amputations of civilians, the display of decapitated heads at checkpoints, the killing and public disembowelment of a civilian whose intestines were then stretched across the road to make a check point, public rapes of women and girls, and people burned alive in their homes.”[1] Insisting that he never knowingly assisted in the crimes, Taylor claimed that what he did “was done with honor.”[2] He maintained that he had been “convinced that unless there was peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia would not be able to move forward.”[3] Nevertheless, that he paid thugs in blood diamonds for the crimes means that he could be held accountable for the misdeeds themselves.

Of particular note, the conviction was the first of a former head of state since WWII. The judge stressed that the “special status of Mr. Taylor as a head of state puts him in a different category of offenders for the purpose of sentencing.”[4] The judge added that the crimes were of the “utmost gravity in terms of scale and brutality. The lives of many more innocent civilians in Sierra Leone were lost or destroyed as a direct result of his actions.”[5] That Taylor did not carry out the atrocities himself, as in raping a daughter while the father is forced to watch, or disemboweling a man so his intestines can be used at a border crossing, does not detract from his culpability. Yet the distance from the crimes themselves enabled Taylor to show (and presumably feel) no remorse as the sentence was being handed down. To be sure, he cannot be forced to recognize the sordidness of his role or feel contrition. Cognitive dissidence and sociopathic blockage of conscience can permanently forestall such a reckoning.

Even if the defendant never “gets the message” on account of his sociopathy, the world came one step closer to telling sitting heads of government around the world that they had better be careful not to violate others’ human rights lest they too find themselves spending decades in a cell. Yet more is needed to make this deterrent a reality. 

Because the court that convicted Taylor is not international, the International Criminal Court (ICC) could not be expected to benefit directly. Governments such as those in the United States that are not members of the International Criminal Court marginalize the court's legitimacy and effectiveness because the court's lack of jurisdiction suggests or implies that public officials can get away with violating human rights. Governments not subject to the ICC should be pressured to join (perhaps even as a condition for continued membership in the UN). Additionally, the ICC needs more power in being able to arrest indicted officials, whether in or out of office, in countries subject to the court.  The United Nations could draw from members' military forces to form a special force that could have access to the territory of any member for the specific purpose to arrest and transfer any former or sitting official indicted by the ICC. Economic and political sanctions would automatically kick in for any member refusing the special force such access. This would not apply to any UN members who are not also members of the ICC, though ideally every member of the UN would also be subject to the ICC. While such a system may seem unrealistic as of 2012, the proposal is at least possible. With the world heading in the right direction with respect to holding violators of human rights accountable, it is advisable that such proposals are explored and discussed lest the momentum be squandered in line with the self-interest of people like Charles Taylor. 

1. Marlise Simons and David Goodman, “Judge Gives Taylor 50 Years for ‘Heinous’ Crimes in War,” The New York Times, May 30, 2012. 

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

U.S. “Foreign Aid” Enabling Pakistani Betrayal

Officials speaking on behalf of Pakistan’s government claimed that Pakistani officials did not know that Osama bin Laden had been living in Pakistan, and yet a Pakistani court sentenced a Pakistani to a 33-year prison sentence for treason in having conspired “to wage war against Pakistan” by aiding the CIA in its hunt for bin Laden.[1] If trying to find him constitutes treason, it follows that the Pakistani government was opposed to the Americans finding him. Meanwhile, that government accepted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign aid from the U.S. Government.  The reaction of an appropriations committee of the U.S. Senate in 2012 was merely to cut $33 million from $800 million in foreign aid to Pakistan. It would seem that the U.S. Government wanted it both ways—to castigate Pakistan for essentially hiding bin Laden while seeking to retain some influence with the Pakistani government by bribing it with foreign aid.

That the Pakistani government linked the 33-year prison sentence to that government’s demand for an apology form the U.S. for an airstrike that accidently killed 24 Pakistanis is, according to Sen. John McCain, “beyond ludicrous.”[2] At the very least, the linkage violates the defendant’s human right to freedom, as he had nothing to do with the U.S. airstrike. Senators McCain and Levin claimed to be outraged, yet it is strange that the result is a paltry $33 million cut (out of $800 million of foreign aid to Pakistan).  If helping the U.S. Government find the man behind 9/11 constitutes waging war against Pakistan, then the U.S. itself can be faulted for continuing to give Pakistan anything. Demanding that it earn back the privilege of being trusted (a privilege given the aid) is not too much to ask, especially for $800 million (even less the $33 million).

Even if the U.S. Senate was not principled enough to act on principle, the interest if the United States can be distinguished from financially enabling a government that prosecutes citizens for “waging war” against Pakistan for having helped the U.S. in a mission that the Pakistani government itself had indicated it accepted (and would help, rather than hinder). It is not in one’s interest to consider the friend of one’s enemy as one’s friend. That is to say, the U.S. Government could have done better even in terms of its own interest, if it is defined as something broader than short-term manipulation of other governments by essentially bribing them. Such influence assumes that governments do not accept the “foreign aid” only to act against the “donor.”  Therefore, even from the standpoint of political realism, the U.S. Senate committee did not go nearly far enough in its fiscal policy of foreign relations. As a result, other governments must have gotten the message that it is possible to take the money and tacitly act against the United States.

1. Jonathan Weisman, “Senate Panel Holds Up Aid to Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 24, 2012.  

2. Ibid.

The Internet Escapes China's Grasp

The “surprising escape” of Chen Guangcheng, a blind legal activist, from house arrest to the presumed custody of U.S. diplomats was “buoying China's embattled dissident community” even as the government lashed out, “detaining those who helped him and squelching mention of his name on the Internet.”[1] Two points bear further scrutiny.

Chen Guangcheng, after his escape, with Hu Jia.   

First, that Chinese security officials “reacted angrily” strikes me as strange. It is as if institutional interests naturally prompt strong human emotions as though an insult were taken personally. In other words, unless the dissident had insulted or otherwise directly harmed the particular officials, it does not make sense that they would angrily inflict pain on the dissident’s supporters who were taken into custody after the escape. An institutional loss is not a personal affront. To treat the former as if it were the latter is essentially to anthropomorphize a given organization.

Second, the “squelching mention” of Chen Guangcheng’s name on the internet must have been a mission of futility in 2012. “Anything vaguely related to Chen [was] blocked on Chinese social media sites, such as posts including or key word searches for Chen, Guangcheng, GC, or even the words ‘blind person’.”[2] The inclusion of the latter term is almost funny in its overkill; it certainly points to the futility of tracing millions of blog posts and emails on the incident. After savvy internet users used “Shawshank Redemption” to refer indirectly to Chen, that movie title became a banned search term. The Chinese government was definitely playing defensive ball at that point. My point is that the game of snuffing out communication on the internet had already been lost—assuming the Chinese government does not prohibit the internet itself in China.

The government officials’ antiquated responses—both in terms of emotion and technology—suggest that the Chinese regime was still holding onto the ways of another century. This could be an indication that that regime will not survive the twenty-first. As technology continues to widen and deepen, antiquated means of control will become less and less efficacious through the century. Given the habit of officials reacting in “anger,” we can expect the increased difficulty with control to lead to more pain being inflicted on citizens. This in turn should lead to more popular resentment. In other words, the antiquated responses of government officials could be the seed of the regime’s destruction.

1. Alexa Olesen, “Chen Guangcheng Escape: China Activists Inspired by Blind Dissident Lawyer,” The Huffington Post, April 29, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

On the Arrogance of Assumed Superiority: Assad of Syria

One week after Assad’s Syrian government had agreed to a cease-fire with the state’s opposition, the government added further stipulations. First, it wanted “written guarantees” that rebels would  stop fighting and lay down their weapons before any government pull-back could occur. Second, the Syrian government wanted guarantees that Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would stop financing the armed groups within Syria. “The regime will not implement this plan,” Col. Riad As’aad, the leader of the opposition militia fatalistically said.[1]

The strategy was essentially a device with which to sabotage the truce. Either Assad had never intended to honor it or he had second thoughts about it after having agreed. Either way, the other side was perfectly justified in ignoring the government’s additional demands because they were not among the terms of the truce. That it is obvious that additional conditions are invalid after an agreement is made points to the lack of character—and indeed the psychological condition—in whomever in the Syrian government had come up with the strategy. At best, the ploy is dishonest. At worst, the culprits were so presumptuous as to think that they could legitimately add additional obligations on the other side. The question is perhaps whether the pertinent government officials were in denial regarding both the arrogance and the invalid nature of the move.

The mentality can also be found among apartment rentals. In some cases when I have looked for apartments, I have thought an agreement had been reached only to find an “oh, by the way” email adding a further condition that must be satisfied. Typically, the convenient presumptuousness takes the you need to form. That such a further obligation is invalid after the handshake just highlights the arrogance in the you need to. The mentality would really be shown for what it is if the renter were to reply, “I would be happy to consider your suggestion.” Essentially, both moves are predicated on the desire to dominate. It is a control-battle, in other words. My main point is that such efforts to dominate presume entitlements far beyond what is actually deserved. That the person renting the apartment would find the renter’s reply offensive—even an insult—just shows how much presumption is in the mentality. The renter would no doubt react to the ensuing, more direct imperative with legitimate consternation and resentment. When holding a party to the terms of the agreement is viewed as a provocation by the party, which continues to assume that its over-reaching is valid, there is no hope of working things out without an authority that is over both sides.

Officials in Assad’s government surely realized the absence of an authority that could hold the government to its agreement without the added conditions. In such a case, obligation itself has no meaning. The agreement of a sovereign, in other words, is valid only in so far as it continues to be something the sovereign wants. There is no being held to anything. In the case of rental agencies, companies or owners, the presumption of an overweening entitlement is at odds with the nature of an economic transaction between two parties. It is not that one party is thereby the adult and the other is somehow in a child’s role. Nor is it an employer-employee role. Rather, money is exchanged for a good—the value of each being theoretically equal. A renter could object to the additional conditions and sue to have the lease enforced if the lessor should unilaterally stop performance on the basis of the additional conditions not being satisfied.

My main point is that the stubbornness of the presumptuousness that continues to insist that the additional conditions be met is without foundation and thus ought not to stand, yet it is amazing how resistant it is to being checked or corrected. The presumption of superiority lends an ignorance that can’t be wrong assumption to the presumption simply in adding the conditions. It is this phenomenon of arrogance on stilts (which shouldn’t even be standing on its own) that defies the laws of nature.

In other words, should Assad blame the rebels for his refusal to implement that which he agreed to because the two additional conditions had not been met, the blaming itself is at two degrees of separation from having any foundation. Even so, Assad could get away with not only his refusal, but also the further step of blaming the innocent party. Psychologically speaking, Assad should know that the blaming is illegitimate yet under this scenario he might not realize it.

Stubbornly holding to the lack of realization while imposing it on the other party is a phenomenon in need of an investigation. Specifically, how does it sustain itself and can it be knocked down. Simply insisting on the terms of the agreement typically does not work. Nor, for that matter, does making the invalid status of the additional conditions transparent. I suspect that the mentality, or brain sickness, is not unlike that of an alcoholic in denial.

1. Reuters, “Cease-Fire in Doubt as Syria Demands New Conditions,” The New York Times, April 9, 2012.  

A Myanmar Spring?

The party of dissident leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy, won a decisive victory in by-elections on April 1, 2012. The party 40 of the 45 seats reported as of April 3^rd, with the results of five more seats not yet in. The news of the victory reached the outside world, which reacted with optimism. Catherine Ashton, the E.U.’s foreign minister, said “I congratulate the government and people of Myanmar on the conduct of the by-elections.”[1] Meanwhile, the White House indicated that the vote marked “an important step in Burma’s democratic transformation.”[2] Both the E.U. and U.S. approached the outcome as necessary but not sufficient for democracy in the country that had had five decades of harsh military rule.

Aung San Suu Kyi on the day of the by-election.          Agence France/Getty

Indeed, the impact of the by-election must be put into perspective in terms of governing. At the time, the Wall Street Journal noted that the NLD party “will have only a small presence in Myanmar’s parliament, where most of the more than 600 seats are held by current or former soldiers linked to the old military regime.”[3] From this perspective, the by-election itself can be viewed as a public relations coup by the soldiers. Such a dramatic victory of the NLD would give the appearance of a new democracy when in fact nothing would change in who controls the government. At best, the by-election’s results would mean that the governing party would have to accommodate some dissent within the legislative chamber. In terms of removing sanctions, the U.S. and E.U. officials would be wise to wait until a majority within the parliament is up for grabs under a free and fair (and monitored) election.

Like the military in Egypt, that in Myanmar might have known that it could retain control even after the apparent shift to democracy. Indeed, all the optimism that comes with an apparent switch to democracy could operate as cover, enabling the real power to continue much as before. Becoming a true democracy in which power transfers between parties is likely a long process where a military dictatorship has been the rule. People don’t give up power easily, and they can be quite crafty in how they retain it.

1. Patrick Barta, “Suu Kyi’s Victory Leads to Rethink About Sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2012.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Corporate Legal Personhood in the Kiobel Case

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the U.S. Supreme Court waded into the murky waters of corporate legal personhood, at least potentially, in hearing oral arguments in late February 2012. The issue in the case is whether corporations can be held liable to the extent that they are complicit in a foreign government’s human rights abuses. Legal personhood would say that they could be. This would represent an obligation that goes with legal personhood. The question is whether the justices who conferred in the Citizens United decision the right of corporations, based on their legal personhood, to make unlimited political donations would also be willing to view obligations as “part and parcel” with such personhood. If not, then legal persons, unlike human persons, would have the benefits of personhood without any of the obligations—an oxymoron to corporations to be sure. In other words, such an asymmetry would render the legal personhood doctrine itself as akin to a one-sided coin—which cannot exist, let alone stand.

The full essay is at "Corporate Legal Personhood."

Refusing for its Own Sake: Israel on the Palestinian Unity Government

President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority reached a deal for a unity government with Hamas on February 6, 2012—which was also the sixtieth anniversary of the Accession Day of Queen Elizabeth II of Britain. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had warned that a unity government with Hamas would rule out any chance of making peace with Israel. Meanwhile, the E.U. and U.S., as well as the state of Israel, had conditioned recognition and aid to Hamas on that party renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and agreeing to previous agreements reached between the P.L.O. and Israel. In short, for all that achieving a unity government requires in terms of hard decisions and effort, the accomplishment was not exactly valued by Israel and the West. Aside from the baleful consequences in refusing to recognize something of value out of stubbornness and inflexibility, Israel and the West may have been hurting themselves by ruling out a chance for peace at the outset.

“Hamas is an enemy of peace,” Netanyahu said. “It’s an Iranian-backed terror organization committed to Israel’s destruction.”[1] Doubtless that description reflects Hamas historically, but in sticking to the description, it was the Prime Minister rather than Hamas that was cutting off any chance of peace. He was ignoring or dismissing the possibility that Hamas could change as a result of negotiations and a deal. Part of what happens as two parties negotiate and reach a deal is that the parties’ respective perspectives and interests can also change. To condition the negotiations themselves on the other party already having changed is illogical, besides being utterly unfair to that party irrespective of whatever its past may or may not have been. It is essentially to presume that that which takes place during negotiations must somehow occur beforehand—and for only one of the parties. In continuing to build settlements, Israel has not exactly been kosher going into the negotiations; Abbas’s unity government could insist that Israel itself change as a condition for negotiations to begin.

Ironically, Abbas’s unity government may be requisite to any agreement, for otherwise Hamas would be outside any such deal. Presumably everyone concerned must be part of a peace deal for peace to ensue. Therefore, Israel as well as the U.S. and E.U. would be wiser not to look the gift horse in the mouth—meaning complain about that which is really a gift to them. Abbas has undoubtedly had to swallow hard to accept a unity government with his rival. He is due credit for this, and his action should be recognized for what it is: a necessary step on the way to a definitive agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. At the time of Abbas’s announcement, it would have been wise for Israel and the West to seize the opportunity of the unity government rather than view it as ending any chance of an agreement.

The lack of change projected onto Hamas was really in its adversaries. “Give peace a chance” means being willing to relax one’s stubbornness such that one can change. The change needed is ultimately in oneself—not the other guy. With this on one’s plate, to worry oneself with the other’s change involves a rather presumptuous overreaching that one can ill-afford. This is not to say that the other guy has been an angel. Hamas has been far from it, but the same could be said of Israel. It takes two to tangle, and angels have no need for peace talks. Sometimes appearances can be deceiving here on earth. The smallest excuse may easily be made use of by the party most interested in sustaining a feud. If there is anything that must change before negotiations can begin, it is this: a refusal to come to the table, presumably conditioned on some change in the other guy other than his refusal to come to the table. The refusal usually says much more about the refuser than the refusee.

1. Ethan Bronner, “Abbas Will Lead thePalestinians in a Unity Pact,” The New York Times, February 7, 2012. 

Is Syria’s Sovereignty Absolute?

“Fundamentally, the argument over Syria reflects a deeper divide between those who would use the Security Council to confront nations over how their governments treat civilians, versus those who consider that it has no role whatsoever in settling domestic disputes.” On the one side, Sheik Hamad, the prime minister of Qatar, reported to the Security Council, “The government killing machine continues effectively unabated.”[1] The implication is that people running a government do not have legitimate authority to kill over 5,000 fellow citizens.

The Arab League taking on Syria at the Security Council.           (Mario Tami/Getty)

On the other side, the Russian envoy, Vitaly Churkin, adopted a “where will it all end” argument. The Council, he said, will start saying “what king or prime minister needs to step down. The Security Council cannot prescribe recipes for the outcome of a domestic political process.”  The Russian foreign minister added that the “Russian policy is not about asking someone to step down; regime change is not our profession.”[2] He might have well have said, It is none of our business whether Assad kills his people. He did say that “the decision should be made by Syrians, by the Syrians themselves.”[3] What he did not say is that, “Russia’s long ties to Syria generate billions of dollars in weapon sales, plus the relationship gives Moscow the entrée it needs to be at the table for Middle East peace talks. In addition, the Russian Navy deploys some ships from the Syrian port of Tartous, widening Russia’s sphere of influence into the Mediterranean.”[4] Of course, the West has a strategic interest in toppling Assad to weaken his ally, Iran, as well as Hezbollah, which backs Assad.

Strategic interests, regardless of which side they happen to be on, should not be determinative, even as the existence of the veto in the Security Council allows them to be. The fundamental issues go beyond what fascinates an analyst, and thus should not be cut short by momentary concerns. The basic question has to do with whether “the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity” of a country, including Syria, is absolute. Can human rights legitimately counter the claim of absolutism? In other words, does a ruler have the right, internationally-speaking, to use a government’s monopoly (or at the very least, advantage) of force to kill non-violent citizens? If not, should the U.N. have the right to intercede?  These were the questions before the world in 2011, and they were no closer to being resolved as 2012 got underway at the U.N.’s Security Council.

Perhaps compromise can be found, such as having the International Criminal Court, rather than the Security Council, decide whether a ruler has violated human rights. An international code of human rights violations sufficient for a ruler to be vacated by the court would need to be formulated. Contributing forces to the enforcement effort would be required of any country that has signed onto the Court’s jurisdiction, so the U.N. need not be the instrument. However, as this compromise will have kept the Security Council from being in the regime change profession in terms of making the decision, perhaps Russia and China would agree to the U.N. serving in some capacity following the Court’s verdict.

Absent such a compromise, the question may be whether the U.N. or a new organization should limit national sovereignty where human rights of citizens are being sufficiently violated. The self-interest of rulers sitting on the Security Council may dictate that a precedent applying an international check on the power of current office-holders is undesirable. As with strategic interests, such a conflict of interest should not be allowed to interfere with, or obstruct, a decision on the fundamental question: Is national sovereignty absolute, and, if not, should the U.N. play a role in limiting it?

I suspect that “we’ll just have to agree to disagree” would be as far as discussions between the E.U. and Russia would get on the question. If so, then—and Europeans should recognize this from their own differences on the Union-level—members of the U.N. who are no longer willing to recognize national sovereignty as an absolute could form a separate “track” from the U.N. that would include a new United Nations. Members of it would of course be subject to that organization as a check. Additionally, that organization could decide to support efforts to defend human rights with military force in a country that is not a member.

I do not believe that the philosophical difference between the “absolutists” and the “human rights” camps in the Security Council is such that anything short of a split can answer the question. Lest this appear too pessimistic, a wider time-perspective could allow for a different perspective in both Moscow and Beijing. In the meantime, a coalition of the willing should not lose any time in setting up a new U.N. that includes “human rights-justified regime change” in its mission, because the existence of the veto means that the existing U.N. will remain stuck—which essentially means led by the few holdouts rather than the majority of the members. Rather than being stymied by a few members of the Security Council, each of whom retain a veto-right, the forces willing to act against peers who are systematically violating human rights should step up to the plate—assuming there really is an interest in putting human rights before absolute national sovereignty.

1. Neil MacFarquhar, “At U.N., Pressure Ison Russia For Refusal to Condemn Syria,” The New York Times, February 1, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The U.S. Military in Europe: On the Tyranny of the Status Quo

On January 14, 2012, the American media reported that the U.S. Pentagon would bring home two brigades from Europe. That would reduce the U.S. Army presence by 10,000 to 30,000. “During the height of the cold war, when America’s heavily armored and nuclear-tipped force in Europe comforted allies and deterred the Soviet Union, the Army reached a peak of 277,342 troops on the Continent.”[1] A mere 30,000 might seem trite in comparison, and thus palatable, unless it be noticed that the cold war ended with the fall of the USSR. So it is perplexing that the “reductions come as some European leaders and analysts make their case for a sustained American presence on the Continent to deal with uncertainties, including a rambunctious Russia — even as these same NATO allies are unable or unwilling to increase spending for their own defense.”[2] There it is then—a military subsidy of sorts. To be sure, Russia is uneasy about Eastern European countries becoming states in the E.U., but this hardly counts as rambunctiousness—at least at the level justifying a military defense. It is democracy, rather than Europe, that needs defense in terms of Russia, given the hegemony of the United Russia party in Russian politics. As one senior European official said, “We don’t need a massive presence of U.S. troops. After all, we don’t see Russia anymore as an enemy or an adversary, but even as a partner, if a difficult one.”[3] The shift from adversary to ally has perhaps not fully sunk in—human perception being slow to let go of long-held assumptions.

In my opinion, the uncertainty in Europe in the wake of the Pentagon’s announcement involved more than a bit of overreaction. “Philip H. Gordon, the State Department’s assistant secretary for European affairs, already was visiting capitals on the Continent, reassuring an audience in Berlin . . .  that ‘the United States remains committed to a strong Europe, the collective defense of our NATO allies, and to building and maintaining the capacity and partnerships that allow us to work together on a global scale.’”[4] Such reassurance was hardly needed. In fact, it would not be needed were the remaining 30,000 troops pulled out. That would not be tantamount to the United States leaving NATO, after all. Yet strangely, the perception would be exactly that, and in politics perception can create its own effects, even reality.

Beyond the matter of military strategy (in the context of a $15 trillion U.S. Government debt), the fact that the U.S. is leaving 30,000 troops in Europe may itself point to the staying power in the status quo as an object or worship. Beyond lapses in “readjusting,” it may be that the adage, “same old, same old” gets too much air time, particularly given that the twenty-first century is not the twentieth. Thomas Jefferson advocated a new constitution every twenty years, or at least a decision on the matter. It might not be a bad thing were a little “spring cleaning” done  in the first few decades of any new century—rather than simply continuing so much on the books from the last century. The U.S. as protector of Europe is from the standpoint of the twenty-first century so antiquated that a pathological aversion to change can be suspected, with justification itself being presumed to be in the sheer existence of a practice. In other words, it’s always been done that way, so why question it? Under the tyranny of the status quo, layers of old laws and regulations pile up like old clothes in a basement. New clothes are instantly labeled as “extreme” and are therefore eliminated from serious consideration. The inertia of ongoing practices stifle even thought itself and render human experience far too constricted, even regimented. To break on through to the other side, where there is fresh air to breath and room to flex one’s muscles as nature intended, the entire order must have collapsed, and this seems hardly necessary.

1. Tom Shanker and Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Faces New Challenge of Fewer Troops in Europe,” The New York Times, January 13, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Futility of a League: Arab Action against Assad

With observers on the ground in Syrian cities, the Arab League conceded at the beginning of 2012 that the monitors had “failed to halt the lethal violence” in Syria.[1] Nabil Al Arabi, the organization’s chair, acknowledged that snipers persisted in major cities, but that the allegiance of the shooters had not been ascertained. Such cautiousness was itself likely a contributor to what the Journal refers to as “pitfalls of the organization’s self-reinvention as a regional diplomatic playmaker.”[2] Criticism had been mounting that the “monitoring mission has done little to resolve a conflict that the United Nations [estimated at the time had] taken more than 5,000 mostly civilian lives. Perhaps this might be an indication of the snipers’ allegiance.

As of January 3^, 2012, 390 people had been killed in Syria since the observers arrived on December 29^th—which is less than a week before the report.[3] The observers were tasked with monitoring Assad’s compliance with his promise to pull security forces from the city streets, release political prisoners, and allow foreign journalists and human rights workers to enter Syria. Unless the protesters were shooting on themselves, the gun-shots and 390 deaths suggest that Assad was furtively continuing the government’s involvement in the violence.

On January 11, 2012, Anwar Abdel Malik, one of the observers, abruptly resigned because “he felt that the mission was serving the interests of the government rather than trying to end the crackdown on protesters. The mission was a farce, and the observers have been fooled,” he said. “The regime orchestrated it and fabricated most of what we saw, to stop the Arab League from taking action against the regime.” He added, “The regime isn’t committing one war crime, but a series of crimes against its people.” A week earlier, the human rights group Avaaz had reported that the group’s “researchers had gathered the names of at least 617 people who had died under torture in government installations since the beginning of the uprising against [Assad].”[4]

On the day that Malik resigned, Assad was at an outdoors rally in Damascus, telling the cheering crowd that he had come to draw energy from it. “I belong to this street,” he said before promising to end the “conspiracy” then underway—as if blatant protests in the cities of Syria were somehow secret and hidden from view.[5] In reaction to how Assad depicted the protests and the extent to which he claimed that the evidence against his government’s atrocities simply did not exist even though it did, we might want to worry a bit more about how much validity we give to the microphone in defining social reality. An official says X, and society takes X as valid, more often than not wholly uncritically as if little fish with mouths wide open, mindlessly swimming in a school without a hint of education.

Given Assad’s rock-hard intransigence, going the route of monitors being led around by his government officials can be reckoned as tantamount to admitting impotence. The response by the League was a marked departure from when the League asked the U.N. Security Council to impose a No Fly Zone over Libya. To be sure, even if the Arab League were to make the request in the case of Syria, the existence of the veto in the Council would likely merely confirm the impotence of the “regional diplomatic playmaker.” So what can be done?

Although not sufficient as a remedy, strengthening the Arab League from being a confederal alliance of largely empty threats to a federal system with teeth on par with the E.U. and U.S. might be good a start. The Journal reports that the failure of the monitors was opening new rifts within the league. The president of the Arab Parliament, a mere advisory body of Arab League diplomats whose decisions are non-binding, recommended that Arabi withdraw the observers. Even though they may have been providing Assad with cover and a tool of delay, Arabi was free to disregard the “parliament’s” advice. Conversely, if the E.U. Parliament, which is composed of elected representatives of the E.U. citizens, passes the law (i.e., not just advisory), the president of the E.U. Commission cannot simply ignore it. As the Arab league stood at the beginning of 2012, relying on the alliance to stop Assad was more than a bit naïve. The Arab League “diplomats” might examine the E.U. in particular for ideas on how the league could become something more than a league, adding the checks and balances that dual sovereignty enables. Were Syria a state in such a union, its basic law could allow a supermajority of elected representatives and state officials in Arab Union bodies to impose a No Fly Zone or do even more militarily.

Of course, the U.S. and the state of Israel would doubtless object to an Arab federal union, but such an entity could in principle be drawn up without the permission of the outside parties. My basic point over all here is that the Arab Spring in 2011 could serve as a springboard for Arab leaders to think about systemic changes that go beyond incremental fixes that don’t really fix anything. According to Salman Shaikh at the Brookings Institution, Arab leaders are “feeling the wishes of their street much more. Whereas perhaps they could have ignored them before, they are hearing now that 85% to 90% of the people are with the protesters.” So, he added, the leaders are “being compelled to act.” The question is perhaps whether their institutions can afford them the ability to do so, or whether the “actions” will continue to be “monitors” and diplomats’ statements.

1.  Matt Bradley and Nour Malas, “Arab World Diplomacy Fails to Stop Syria Clash,” The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2011. 
2. Ibid.
3. Kareem Fahim, “Hundreds Tortured in Syria, Human Rights Group Says,” The New York Times, January 6, 2012. 
4. Nada Bakri, “Syria’s President Is Defiant in Rare Public Appearance,” The New York Times, January 12, 2012. 
5. Ibid.