In an epoch of technological development, the relative dearth
of political development as concerns international relations has been evident.
In June 2015, Pope Francis advocated the establishment of a global institution
having governmental sovereignty with which to combat the human contribution to
climate change. Such a political development would be significant, given the
long-standing default of sovereign nation-states and unions thereof. In July
2015, U.S. President Barak Obama announced an agreement with Iran that would
keep that nation-state from develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the removal
of economic sanctions. Just three years earlier, war had seemed unavoidable. I submit that Obama’s accomplishment can be thought of as a step toward rendering war itself as obsolete, or at least perceiving it as a primitive means of resolving disputes internationally. More subtly, the feat makes the sheer distance between the premises of war and those of diplomacy transparent. Paradoxically, this insight implies just how difficult a shift from a war-default to one that takes war as obsolete must be.
Even if diplomacy can deliver more than
war, obviating the path toward war can require a lot of time and effort. “Today,
after two years of negotiations, the United States, together with our
international partners, has achieved something that decades of animosity has
not—a comprehensive, long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from
obtaining a nuclear weapon,” Obama declared in announcing the deal.[1]
With Iraq still a trouble-spot in spite of the U.S. invasion and occupation,
costing more than $2 trillion, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s two years
of arduous work with Iran can be viewed as superior to war as a means of
satisfying U.S. interests—not to mention that of the international community.
As difficult as it was for Obama to persuade a
militaristic people to have faith in diplomacy as being capable of delivering
more than war—a thankless task to be sure—he found himself having to defend
even his campaign promise that he would talk to America’s enemies. When he
first declared he would negotiate with adversaries, it was by accident. During a 2007 presidential debate, when asked if he would
negotiate with adversaries as president, he made the
unprompted declaration and explained it by discrediting the antithetical,
war-default premise. “(T)he notion that somehow not talking to countries is
punishment to them— which has been the guiding diplomatic principle of this [George
W. Bush] administration—is ridiculous.”[2] Obama's premise obviating war is clearly far removed from his predecessor's war-premise.
Tellingly
for what it reveals about where the American people stood at the time, the declaration that initial
communication should not be conditional “set his campaign into a minor
tailspin. ‘We did not expect him to say that,’ former Obama spokesman Bill
Burton told The Huffington Post of that debate moment. ‘We were like, 'Oh my
God. How do we walk it back? [Former Secretary of State] Madeline Albright’s
attacking us!'’"[3]
That a former Secretary of State would criticize the very notion of talking to
adversaries is itself remarkable. Did she believe that not talking is actually
punishment? What is it in American society that undergirds such an
uncompromising, even childish, attitude that is so presumptuous or “entitled”?
Malignant narcissism, such as can be found in spoiled children, may be behind
the primitive level of social skills (which, not coincidentally, is in turn consistent
with the mindset of war as the default “problem-solver”). In other words, the
hypertrophic conditional regard (e.g., conditional love) may have been
acceptable in American society. This point is in itself worthy of
investigation.
From the not-speaking-as-punishment assumption, Obama’s
mere overtures to Iran must have seemed radical, even ludicrous. “After just
two months in office, Obama took the unconventional step of sending
Iranians a holiday message on Nowruz, the Iranian new year. ‘For nearly three
decades, relations between our nations have been strained,’ he said. ‘But on
this holiday, we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together.’
Shifting his focus from the Iranian people to the Iranian leadership, Obama
looked into the camera: ‘My administration is now committed to diplomacy that
addresses the full range of issues before us.’ . . . it was the first time
since the dissolution of U.S.-Iranian relations [in the late 1970s] that an
American leader publicly extended the offer of rapprochement.”[4] The
sheer amount of time spent under the war premise would make the greeting seem
radical even though from the antithetical diplomacy premise the overture could
only be counted as a first step.
In conclusion, the ideational and attitudinal distance
between the default—that of war as the preferred problem-solving device—and Obama’s
premise that war itself can be surmounted by replacing it’s premises with those
conformable to direct communication—attests to just how much time and effort is
needed in political (as distinct from technological) development. That is to
say, political development in the realm of international relations is not apt
to come about as easily as technological development has since the early
twentieth-century. Moving humanity off war is clearly no easy feat, and Obama’s
accomplishment may have to withstand several relapses before the American
people have sufficiently shifted their mindset to treat Obama’s premises as the
default.
[1]
Sam Stein and Jessica Schulberg, “How
a 2007 Debate Gaffe Paved the Way for a Deal that Will Define Obama’s Legacy,”
The Huffington Post, July 14, 2015.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Ibid.