In the E.U., the 27 state
governments are able to wield a veto on most important policy proposals in the
European Council. Expecting unanimity where not even consensus is enough is so
utterly unrealistic at 27 that it may be time to reconsider whether the E.U.
can afford such an easy (and tempting) means by which state governors can
exploit the E.U. by essentially holding it hostage. To be sure, like the
filibuster in the U.S. Senate, the veto in the European Council represents the
residual sovereignty that states in both unions enjoy, but extortion for
financial gain by means of threatening or exercising a veto in the European
Council (and the committees of the Council of the E.U.) suggests that the continued
use of a veto by state governments is too problematic to be continued. Residual
sovereignty can find adequate representation by qualified majority voting,
which is closer the threshold needed to maintain a filibuster in the U.S.
Senate. That the E.U. state of Slovakia maintained its veto on a proposed number
of federal sanctions against Russia on July 9, 2025 when the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that Russia had violated international law in invading
Ukraine is a good indication that the veto had outlived its usefulness and was
being used by governors for sordid purposes by using the E.U. rather than
strengthening it in foreign affairs.
The full essay is at "Russia Benefits from Flawed E.U. Federalism."
