Imagine if Japan had invaded and
claimed (and successfully held) an island of Hawaii as a protectorate and a
separate country due to the number of Japanese living there, and thus not as a
part of Hawaii even though the U.S. recognizes all of Hawaii as a member
state. Let’s say furthermore that the UN
has proposed the unification of Hawaii as a republic composed of two federated
states. Hawaii would be akin to Belgium in the E.U.—a federated state of two
sub-states in a federal union. This arrangement would fit with Althusius’ early
seventeenth-century theory of federalism based on the Holy Roman Empire: each
level of political organization is a federation. While this exists in the E.U.,
none of the U.S. states is itself a federation of states. So, the UN’s proposal
that Cyprus be united politically and be composed of two states even as the
E.U. already recognizes the entire island as an E.U. state is not outlandish to
a European eye. The problem with the proposal lies instead in Turkey, and this
in itself can be interpreted as an argument against Turkey’s accession to E.U.
statehood.
“Speaking at an event in the
north [part of the island in 2024] to mark the 50th anniversary of
the Turkish invasion that [had] split the island along ethnic lines, [Turkey’s President]
Erdogan ruled out resuming talks based on the Annan Plan which proposed the
establishment of a United Republic of Cyprus.”[1]
In rejecting the proposal, he was ignoring the fact that the E.U. recognized
the entire island of Cyprus as a state in that union. He was thus unwittingly
undermining the E.U. even as Turkey was still technically seeking statehood. I
submit that this undermines Turkey’s chances of accession, and furthermore,
that Turkey should not become a state. For at the very least, an aspiring state
should respect the E.U., even and especially on matters that touch on that potential
state. The case of the E.U. state of Hungary being found in wanton violation of
E.U. law by the E.U.’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice,
demonstrates just how harmful a disrespectful state government can be within a
federal union.
Erdogan’s establishment of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is only recognized by Turkey’s
government and was rejected in a 2004 referendum by more than 75% of the Greek
Cypriots in the south, would, if accepted by the E.U., limit the E.U.’s common
market to the south and thus create the need for customs checkpoints inside the
island. While not as complicated as the case of Northern Ireland, which is part
of the U.K. and yet also part of the Irish island—Ireland being an E.U. state—politically
splitting the island of Cyprus permanently would make things more difficult for
the E.U. with respect to its state of Cyprus in the south. Again, it would be a
case of Turkey making things more difficult for the E.U., and yet presumably
also wanting to become a state to enjoy the economic advantages of the union’s unfettered
interstate commerce. This combo must surely strike Europeans as unsavory and
thus as a de facto argument against Turkey joining the union. In other words,
the way Erdogan was playing his hand politically with respect to Cyprus showed
the Europeans that they had been right to hold off on accession talks with Turkey
because its government would not make a very good state government in the union.
Already Hungary was enough of a problem. That 90% of Turkey is not in Europe
and the culture is not European may be what is behind not only the tension in
Cyprus, but also why Turkey would be a problematic state in the European Union.
Lastly, Erdogan’s insistence on a
“two state” solution for Cyprus, as if the difference between the north and
south were as great as those between the Palestinians and Israelis in Israel,
discounts or even perhaps dismisses the mollifying effect that Cyprus being a
state in a union would have on the tensions on the island, and thus shows a
lack of confidence in the E.U. in its mission to forestall war in Europe. In
other words, the president of Turkey didn’t seem to have much faith in the
federal institutions, including the E.U.’s court of justice, to protect
minorities within the union and assuage tensions domestically, by which I mean
within the union. Just as the rationale of the U.S. as a federal union of dual
sovereignty was in part to use federal power to step in to stop Shay’s
Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, so
too the E.U. has the means at its federal level mediate any excitements within the
state of Cyprus. Yet Erdogan did not seem to trust Brussels enough to recognize
the entire island of Cyprus as an E.U. state.
Brussels already had Viktor Orbán of Hungary distrusting the federal institutions in 2024 and actively working at odds with E.U. foreign policy on Russia even as he held the presidency of the Council of the E.U. during the last six months of 2024. Taking note of the 50th anniversary of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus then, Brussels could have done worse than formally end Turkey’s proposed accession. A house divided cannot long stand, or at least cannot prosper and thrive as it could otherwise. With Russia belligerently knocking down Ukraine, Europeans could surely have benefitted at the time from a basic or fundamental unity that at the very least includes respect for and confidence in the European Union, given its rationale bearing on protecting Europe from war within.
1. “Erdogan
Dismisses UN Plan for Federated Cyprus, Reaffirms Commitment to Two-State Peace
Deal,” Euronews, July 21, 2024.
