Russian Economic Cooperation as a Eurasian Union Rivaling the E.U.?

At the end of May, 2014, Russia signed an economic treaty with Belarus and Kazakhstan that “forges closer trade and labor ties among the former Soviet republics.”[1] Even though the new economic ties fall short of another European Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the new trading relationships as the Eurasian Economic Union, which I contend is deliberately misleading. Being implicitly part of the category mistake, the E.U. itself could be further misunderstood as a consequence.

“Today, we are creating . . . a major regional market,” Putin said at the signing ceremony. In addition to establishing a common market characterized by free trade, the economic treaty coordinates the financial systems of the three countries and coordinates their respective industrial and agricultural—but not energy—policies along with their labor markets and transport systems.[2] Such an arrangement harkens back to the European Coal and Steel Cooperative, which was formed by six European countries in the wake of World War II in order to keep an eye on German iron production and possible re-militarization. Indeed, cooperative is a more fitting label than is union; as Bakytzhan Sagintayev, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister pointed out, “We fought over every letter of the agreement to make sure there was no political integration. . . . If Russia wants anything in the agreement, it needs our consent.” Therefore, the enhanced economic coordination falls short of the dual-sovereignty that characterize both the E.U. and U.S.

In the European case, qualified-majority-voting means that a state may find itself on the losing side of a vote in the European Council. That is to say, France may find itself bound by a federal law in spite of having voted against it. In fact, representatives in the European Parliament who live in the state of France may have voted for the new law! The E.U. goes far beyond any treaty between (and obliging) governments. Indeed, the exclusive competencies of the E.U. mean that some governmental sovereignty has been transferred to the federal level.

Similarly, the residual sovereignty remaining with the American states means that the U.S. federal authority is also delegated. Additionally, the Russian economic cooperative does not establish a legislative body directly elected by citizens without respect to their respective states, such as the European Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives. Strictly speaking, treaties are limited in that they can bind only states, rather than forging direct effect, or a direct political relation between individuals and a federal institution. Hence Putin’s economic treaty differs fundamentally from the E.U. basic law and the U.S. constitutional law.

In short, Putin’s use of the word union to describe a treaty that coordinates trade between three sovereign countries is erroneous at best, and in all probability disingenuous too. The category mistake is doubtless an attempt at propaganda to resurrect the notion of the old Russian empire even as Ukraine was leaning to the West rather than back into the fold. The real damage from Putin charade of diction may occur to the west, where too many Europeans were still under the illusion that their states too were still sovereign even as they were subject to E.U. rules, directives, and regulations. This misimpression has weakened the E.U. even as its responsibilities have increased. Imagine a parent saying to a teenager, “we expect you to take on the responsibilities of being a young adult, but we are still going to treat you like a child.” The teenager would quite understandably be confused and utterly frustrated at the sheer unfairness of the mischaracterization. “I’m not a kid anymore!”

At the crux of the matter of Putin’s incorrect use of the word union, dual-sovereignty and direct-effect, as in the establishment of direct citizen-federal relations, separate the E.U. and the U.S. as unions from economic coordinative treaties, and even from alliances, between sovereign governments. Put another way, the U.S. is more than the U.S. Senate and the E.U. is more than the European Council. Both federal levels have legislative, judicial, and executive machinery that goes beyond the intergovernmental sort that a treaty could establish. Nice try, Mr. Putin.

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[1] This and all other quotes in this essay are taken from: Anna Arutunyan, “Russia, 2 Other Nations Sign Pact,” USA Today, May 30, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

Syria: Democracy vs. An International Norm

Democracy is hardly simple, given that the momentary will of the people can be distinguished in at least some cases from what is in the people’s own best interest. Part of the job of an elected representative is discerning or judging under which of the two a given vote should be based. Adding to the complexity are the additional judgments concerning how much weight to give campaign contributors and lobbyists who have a vested interest in the vote. All this certainly applied to the decision on whether the U.S. should use limited missile strikes against the Syrian government as a means of enforcing the international norm and treaty banning chemical weapons. Such decisions should neither be made to satisfy the immediate passions of the people nor on the behest of defense contractors. That is to say, neither mob-rule nor the military-industrial complex should eclipse the best interest of the people.

Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.) said in a radio interview in late August, 2013, "I did notice, for what it's worth, that the manufacturer of the missiles that would be used has had an incredible run in their stock value in the last 60 days. Raytheon stock is up 20 percent in the past 60 days as the likelihood of the use of their missiles against Syria becomes more likely. So I understand that there is a certain element of our society that does benefit from this, but they're not the people who vote for me, or by the way the people who contribute to my campaign," he said. "Nobody wants this except the military-industrial complex."[1]

Raytheon stock had in fact surged over the preceding two months, though it's been slightly shy of 20 percent.

"I take the title of representative seriously,” Grayson continued. “I listen to people, I hear what they have to say. At a time when we are cutting veterans benefits, cutting education, student loans, cutting school budgets, contemplating cutting Social Security and Medicare, I don't see how we can justify spending billions of dollars on an attack like this." It is difficult indeed to put the intangible long-term benefits of enforcing international norms over flesh and blood human beings having to choose between food and paying the rent. This is perhaps the strongest argument for an international coalition wherein the costs of militarily enforcing a global security norm are spread out rather than incurred by "the world's police," which, by the way, has not charged the world for its services.

As the popular press headlined the debate in the U.S. on whether to engage militarily, opinion polls back up Grayson's assessment of people's attitude toward Syria. The Ipsos-Reuters poll, for example, had found “a 60 percent to 9 percent majority of Americans saying that the U.S. should not intervene in the conflict, although that poll did not test support for specific ways of intervening. In that poll, a 46 percent to 25 percent plurality of respondents said that the U.S. shouldn't intervene, even if the Syrian government has used chemical weapons.”[2] On September 1, 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that evidence of sarin gas had finally be established. Although the Syrian government could not be linked to the use, it is significant, Kerry, argued, that the missiles in all of the chemical attacks had all come from government-controlled areas and landed in rebel strongholds. Essentially, the argument is that Assad had been engaging in “collective justice” wherein an entire group are punished for the unjust deeds of a few.

With proof that chemical weapons known to be stockpiled by the Syrian government had been used, we can say that at the time, 25% rather than only 9% of Americans approved of U.S. military action to punish the Syrian government for having breached the international norm (and treaty) that had been in force since the end of World War I. Even so, a quarter of the people cannot be taken as the will of the people. Not that U.S. foreign and military policy should necessarily reflect that which the people would prefer.

For one thing, the public was not privy to the classified reports being given to the U.S. President, and on to members of Congress and their staffs. Secondly, enforcing an international norm, whether alone or in a coalition, may not be of immediate benefit to Americans so the momentary will of the people may not be what is in the people’s own best interest. This rationale is represented institutionally in the six-year term of U.S. senators, as well as by the theoretical role of the Electoral College (i.e., a state’s electors is a small group that does not have to vote in line with the majority of the vote for president in the state).

Therefore, even though it is fitting and proper in terms of representative democracy that President Obama asked for Congressional consent for limited airstrikes thwarting and punishing the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people (a sufficient number of the representatives having been privy to the classified intel), it does not follow that the representatives in turn should pass their decision on to their constituents (who will not have been privy to the intel). Furthermore, the president effectively kicked the legs out from under democracy by reserving his prerogative to act militarily in spite of the rejection by Congress of his "use of force" proposal. Either the power to declare war lies with Congress or it doesn't. Given the inherent conflict of interest in the commander in chief declaring war, the power should not be in the hands of the president.

Absent a pressing need to act militarily immediately on national security grounds, however, Congressional involvement could effectively remove the commander-in-chief's element of surprise over the adversary, hence compromising the strategic objective approved even by the U.S. House and Senate. Therefore, a proposal for your consideration:

"Whereas U.S. senators are elected by the people of the respective States (i.e., no longer by the legislatures) and have terms of six rather than two years, and

Whereas it can be rather hasty to declare war on the basis of the fuming passions of the moment, and

Whereas the U.S. House of Representatives was designed with a two-year term of office precisely to give voice to said passions,

The U.S. Senate shall, in consultation with the President (preferably in person, then absent for the vote), meet in closed session to ratify or amend the president's proposal, with appropriate instructions and immediate effect." 

Absent such an amendment being adopted, the requirement of Congressional approval from both the U.S. House and the Senate does not necessarily make it easy for members of Congress. Especially regarding matters of national security and contributing to the long-term viability of globally protective international agreements and norms, representative democracy is a tricky business.

For one thing, the institutional protections for representatives willing to vote against the popular, perhaps even momentary passions of constituents (and contributors) in order to act in the people's best interest can also enable representative, including the president, to act on the behest of American oil companies or defense contractors, for instance. Such slippage built into the political system's design is precisely why Rep. Grayson stressed that he was not acting in the financial interest of any defense contractor that stood to gain from American missile strikes. However, he opened himself up to “going with the flow” rather than leading his constituents by convincing them that it is in their long-term best interest that international norms against weapons of mass destruction are enforced.

In fact, it could even be argued that the U.S., or any country party to the treaty banning chemical weapons, has a duty to enforce said treaty even if taking action is not in the country’s national interest. I suspect that any daylight between the trajectories of a people's best interest and that of the international system of norms constraining governmental violence even on a government's own people  disappears at a sufficient distance in time. Therefore, it is reasonable to have faith that acting in the best interests of global security is really in a national interest, even if it seems otherwise at the moment.

As human organization gets ever larger and increasingly complex, as evinced by Russia (and the U.S.S.R. before it), China, the U.S. and E.U., power has occasion to become more and more centralized or consolidated. With such power comes greater responsibility, as well as discretion that can be used ethically or corruptly. In other words, the stakes rose through the twentieth century both in terms of the power that a president can unleash and the harm that could come to mankind from rogue states with chemical or nuclear weapons.

It is perfectly justifiable and entirely fitting that journalists investigate whether the people's elected representatives are too reliant on the defense contractors in what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex. In his farewell address, he warned of peril should the U.S. military and its contractors come to eclipse the will of the people. In decisions such as whether to enforce the international norm and treaty banning chemical weapons, the people do not have sufficient information to be justifiably the decisive factor in their representatives' decision-making. So we can tweak Eisenhower's sage advice into the following maxim: The coalescing interests of the military and its private contractors should not be allowed to dominate or even rival the people's best interest. Otherwise, the republic is lost to plutocracy and its agent, the rule that "Might makes Right."

In conclusion, there is a reason why so much time and energy goes into elections; they matter not just in terms of political ideology, but also (and perhaps more) in those decisions in which the electorate is simply not in a position to render a judgment. Accountability comes at as the prospect of being re-elected approaches. I suspect that the people, reduced to expecting the representatives to mimic the people's flavor of the month, have virtually no comprehension that the intervening time was designed on purpose to protect the representatives in office who act in the people’s best interests rather than impulsively asking, "How high should I jump?"   

Recommended Video: "Syria: From Protests to War"

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1. Ryan Grim, "Alan Grayson on Syria Strike: 'Nobody Wants This Except the Military-Industrial Complex," The Huffington Post, August 29, 2013.

2. Emily Swanson, "Syria Poll Finds Little American Support for Air Strikes," The Huffington Post, August 28, 2013.

E.U. Federalism Enabling Russian Expansionism

The visuals alone in the closing news conference of the EU-US “summit” held in Brussels, which President Barroso denoted as “the capital of Europe,” on March 26, 2014, must have struck Europeans and Americans alike as novel, if not rather bizarre; we are not yet accustomed to seeing the EU and US presidents on the same stage, for we are mired in the paradigm of another epoch. The failure to "catch up" may tacitly enable the expansion of another empire-level federation.

Were the original 12-star US flag used, the similarity would be too striking to ignore. This is not to say that the EU and US are identical in basic law. Whereas the US has one federal president, the EU has two. A council of presidents in the US had been considered in 1787 and dropped in favor of the energy that only a "single executive" could have. (Image Source: Reuters)

The old mental framework may sense itself already out of place—that is to say, on borrowed time in the new century and millennium. Clutching tight to one word, country, as if the global system were exhausted by it (and reduces to it), may suggest just such a felt insecurity as a houseguest might feel once his or her relations have moved away and only strangers remain.

In the stage with EU Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso, US President Obama probably had no sense of the ambiguity latent in his reference to “the countries represented here today.”[1] To the overstayed houseguest, Obama was referring to the EU’s states and to the US but not to its states. The mental staying-power of a framework firmly ensconced in the global (collective, which is to say, shared) consciousness rides headlong over the silent category mistake that inheres in thinking of the states in one empire-scale union as each corresponding to another such union rather than to its states. Both in terms of scale and governmental sovereignty (i.e., dual-sovereignty), the states are states and the unions are unions—the situs of foreign policy, whether at the state or federal level, not being decisive as to the ontological nature of the unions as federal empire-scale unions-of-semi-sovereign states.

President Van Rompuy, chairman of the European Council—which like the US Senate is based on intergovernmental principles as polities rather than citizens are represented—had only his chamber’s half of modern federalism in mind when he stated, “We have to coordinate [sanctions] among our member states; they are not all in the same position as far as trade, energy, financial services is concerned; so we have to coordinate among us and of course with the United States.”[2] By implication, the United States is on par with the “member states” in the European Union. 

President Obama had already laid the perfect groundwork for his counterpart by observing that there “has been excellent coordination between the United States and Europe.”[3] To be sure, Obama was on more solid ground in stating that Russia has not driven a wedge “between the United States and the European Union,” and that over the years, “we have been able to deepen the ties between the European Union and the United States.” [4] Yet he quickly reverted to treating the EU as if it were like NATO instead. “The twenty-eight members of the European Union are united; the twenty-eight members of NATO are united.”[5] Well, the fifty members of the United States were united too; hence the name, whose use in the singular rather than plural only became definitive nearly a century after the Declaration of Independence declared to the world thirteen sovereign states, or countries.

The American president’s uses of Europe and members are both logically problematic (especially at an EU-US Summit!). Furthermore, the rhetoric played into the European president’s institutional and prejudicial agenda in privileging the EU’s states at the expense of not only the US’s states but also the EU itself.

Put in terms of the development of federalism both historically (and relatedly) in terms of the theory, Van Rompuy was reducing modern federalism, which contains both national and intergovernmental governmental institutions at the federal level, to the much older confederal, alliance-based, sort of federalism that is entirely intergovernmental at the federal level.  Excluded from the mythic paradigm wherein the EU is like the ancient Athenian Alliance and Spartan League are EU institutions such as the European Parliament (which like the US House of Representatives is founded on national-government principles), the European Commission (also national rather than intergovernmental), and the European Court of Justice.

In practical terms, President Van Rompuy’s antiquated vantage-point reinforces a major weakness of the EU. En fait, Van Rompuy’s council of the EU state governments could not get past their commercial differences to arrive at a formidable array of sanctions “with sharp teeth” to impose on Russia in the wake of its invasion of the Crimea region of Ukraine, an independent state between two empire-scale federations. Whereas the governments of the republics and regions of the Russian Federation did have sufficient power to thwart Putin’s adventurism at the federal level, the EU’s states had enough power in the EU’s federal system to obstruct a united response with enough “teeth” to push Putin back into Russia and keep him from further incursions at the expense of neighboring independent states.  

As it stood, Ukrainian lawmakers could only lament Ukraine’s agreement with Russia and the US to give up the third-largest stock of nuclear weapons in exchange for the counterparties respecting Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. “We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement,” Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament, said in the wake of the Russian invasion. “Now there’s a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake.”[6] As if unable to part with his partial (intergovernmental) understanding of the EU as something akin to NATO or the Athenian Alliance rather than Russia, China, and the US, President Van Rompuy reflected in his remarks the institutional bias of his own chamber at the expense not only of the EU itself, but also the world. 

The failure of the whole (i.e., the EU) to relativize the particular state interests in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) to the overarching interests of the EU (as represented in the Commission and the European Parliament as a body) informed Rizanenko’s reservations and thus tacitly sent the message that reducing nuclear proliferation does not pay. Add in the message to Putin that he could invade Ukraine with virtually no cost to Russia and we can conclude that the imbalance in the EU in favor of the state governments at the expense of the Union (and its foreign policy) has already made the world a much more dangerous place. The antiquated, and indeed mistaken view of the EU as comparable to NATO and thus of the EU’s member states though little united states of Europe (while the US states are somehow like European provinces) is not merely an ideologically convenient (i.e., self-serving) series of category mistakes; the resulting fecklessness in the EU had had a direct impact in weakening global security.

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[1] Closing News Conference, “EU-US Summit,” March 26, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Oren Dorell, “Ukraine Lawmaker Laments Giving Up Nuclear Arsenal,” USA Today, March 11, 2014. 

High Finance Answering Putin’s Imperial Ambitions: A New Age?

A week and a half after government representatives from Russia, the E.U., the U.S., and Ukraine agreed to deescalate the political instability in eastern Ukraine, the U.S. Government imposed additional “targeted sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and companies” after concluding that the Russian government had not ceased from fomenting violence in eastern Ukraine.[1] With the official numbers on capital flight from Russia at $50 billion a month for the first three months of 2014, this announcement on April 28^th is oriented to exploiting a Russian vulnerability. Moreover, the statement signals a step-wise, “surgical” approach premised on the value of money—a symbol of value. In relative terms, a broad military response looks almost primitive, if not (hopefully) antiquated.

In posing the question of how to stop a government of one country from invading another country ‘in this day and age,” Bill Browder of Hermitage Capital sought to convince the CNBC audience that the morning’s White House announcement could be seen as fit for a new age, even if we are not all there yet. With the Russian president and about a thousand other Russians holding the vast majority of the money in Russia, Browder argued that targeting the financial cost (“pain”) to particular Russians and Russian companies would be the most effective (and efficient) means of constraining Vladimir Putin’s attempts to reconstruct the Russian Empire.

The Russian Empire exactly a century before Putin's invasion of Crimea. 

(Image Source: Wikipedia)

With just such a strategy in mind, the White House announced that the U.S. Treasury Department would impose sanctions (including asset freezes and U.S. travel bans) on seven Russian government officials. Seventeen Russian companies “linked to Putin’s inner circle” would also be subject to economic sanctions; thirteen of those companies would also bear the brunt of a license requirement denying the export, re-export or other foreign transfer of U.S.-based items to those companies.[2]

How would old man Kant deem the UN as a world federation oriented to perpetual peace?

Plato and Kant would doubtless have been pleased to find the exactitude of reason replacing the shot-gun approach of a large-scale military response. A polis, whether a city or the international domain, is just, Plato reasons, only if reason is governing desires rather than vice versa.  Given the pathological nature of human nature itself, Kant reasoned, perpetual peace is possible but not probable. Although Kant advocated a world federation as a means to keep the human pathology from effecting ruinous consequences, he, as well as Plato, would likely approve of strategic reasoning oriented to balance sheets over the passions having the upper hand in the heat of battle. Moreover, the shift from military to financial geo-political strategy would likely fit within Hegel’s perception of progress through human history as the (collective) human spirit becomes increasingly free. 

Even if my inclusion of notable philosophers is too lofty, Browder’s point that countries just don't invade other countries in the twenty-first century may (hopefully) portend a new age following the astonishingly bloody twentieth century. The question facing Putin as he sought to drag the eastern half of Ukraine back “into the fold” of a Russian empire in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq is perhaps whether he could accomplish his imperial goal before the “new rules” go into effect, effectively closing the door on the old way of doing things. Considering the sheer staying power of (pathological) human nature as well as the millennia in which military might established and defended the interests of states and their respective rulers, I have difficulty seeing how geo-politics in international relations could ever reduce to high-finance. Even though this might be possible, I submit it is not probable.

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[1] White House Statement on Ukraine, April 28, 2014.  Also available at: “U.S. Announces New Sanctions on Russia Over Ukraine Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2014.

[2] White House Statement on Ukraine, April 28, 2014.

Russia’s Putin on National Sovereignty: Political Realism Undone?

On February 28, 2014, Ukraine’s UN Ambassador Yurly Sergeyev informed the Security Council that Russia had invaded the Crimean Peninsula, a semi-autonomous region of the sovereign state. Heretofore, in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, Russia had agreed in a treaty to respect the territorial borders of the Soviet Union’s former republic. After briefly discussing whether Putin’s land-grab should have come as a surprise to the world, I take a critical look at the Russian president’s rationale for invasion. I argue that political realism (i.e., strategic interests of particular states being the signature feature of international relations) undergirds Putin’s geo-political view. This foundation is problematic as evinced by Putin’s inconsistencies on national sovereignty.

Coming on the heels of the Olympic games meant to showcase Russia to the world, Putin’s show of force must have come as a complete surprise to the world.[1] After all, on the day before the obviously-planned invasion, Vitally Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations had dismissed with a burst of haughty laughter a journalist’s question on whether Russia was suddenly conducting its “military exercises” near Crimea as a cloaked precursor to invasion. Indeed, the diplomat even conveyed a sense of having been insulted by the very question! We, the rest of the world, were being played like a sleepy fiddle.

A day or two before the invasion, unmarked Russians brought in by bus (members of Putin’s favorite biker group being among them) took over the provincial legislature. Once the Russian thugs were in control there, the pro-Russian Crimean leader, Sergey Aksyonov, somehow found himself installed as the region’s ruler. He “returned the favor” by asking Putin for help in maintaining peace.[2] The two-step dance by the emperor and his aspiring governor-to-be resulted in a sham referendum quickly followed by a hasty annexation of Crimea as a region of Russia. The sheer speed of these events belied the veracity of the Russian narrative, a mere gloss for the de facto power of possession.

Speaking with U.S. President Barak Obama on the first day of the invasion, Putin stressed “the presence of real dangers to the lives and health of Russians who are currently present in the Ukrainian territory.” Putin stressed that Russia reserves the right to defend its interests and the Russian-speaking people who live in Ukraine.[3] Indeed, the Russian president claimed that Russia’s parliament had explicitly given him the right to intervene in Ukraine militarily. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s acting President Oleksadr Turchynov insisted that any reports of Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens in the Crimean region being at all threatened were pure fiction, and thus merely a Russian front or subterfuge for raw military aggression.

Surely international law does not confer Russia, or any other sovereign country for that matter, with the right to invade (not to mention annex) other sovereign states simply because its ex-patriots may find their ethnicity is not fully protected; strategic geo-political interests of a state runs up against the doctrine of national sovereignty. Of course, this doctrine can give way, as a natural rather than state-sourced (and thus delimited!) right arguably exists to intervene across national boundaries if the systematic harm to inhabitants is sufficiently grave (e.g., the Nazi holocaust). As a likely subterfuge for taking the entire eastern half of Ukraine after having conquered Crimea, Putin attempted just this rationale. “If the Kiev government is using the army against its own people this is clearly a grave crime,” he said.[4] It would indeed be, were Ukraine’s government turning against ethnic Russians as Assad’s Syrian government had turned on protesters. Yet ironically Putin had vetoed efforts by the UN Security Council to sanction efforts to intervene in Syria, which unlike Ukraine could enjoy the absolutist variant of national sovereignty. Putin’s inconsistency on national sovereignty undercuts not only his credibility, but also that of his political theory of choice, political realism.

Being based on the primacy of a state’s power-interests, political realism implies a semi-permeable rather than absolutist rendering of national sovereignty. In his seventeenth-century masterpiece, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes argues that a sovereign ruler should be given the power to do whatever he wants if peace is the aim. A century earlier, Jean Bodin also held an absolutist view of sovereignty, though unlike Hobbes, the sovereign is bounded by divine law while still ruling rather than only in divine judgment in the afterlife. So even within the absolutist camp, discernable differences exist (albeit premised on the belief in divine punishment—which held considerable sway in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).

Whereas the state that subscribes to political realism (i.e., the primacy of the country’s own interests) regards its national sovereignty as absolute (i.e., being invaded is not in the state’s geo-political interests), the story is quite otherwise with respect to the sovereignty of other countries (i.e., being invaded may be in the realist state’s interests). This inconsistency with respect to national sovereignty points to a fault-line running through political realism itself. 

At least in Russia's case, the absolutist interpretation is only to be selectively defended (i.e., when violating it is contrary Russia’s geo-political national interests), and with it the right to intervene in another country’s internal affairs. The oxymoron of a state-designated right being somehow valid beyond that state’s borders is itself indicative of the sheer incredulity of Putin’s stance. Perhaps the truly perplexing question bears on why the ruler of a modern empire would suppose that such logical problems can safely be dismissed. Perhaps the answer is that the world is all too willing to comply, being still too comfortable with antiquated ideas and ways.

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[i] See “The 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia: ‘Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire.”

[ii] Chelsea Carter, Diana Magnay, and Ingrid Formanek, “Obama, Putin Discuss Growing Ukraine Crisis,” CNN, March 1, 2014.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Jacob Resneck and Olga Rudenko, “Putin Issues New Threat,” USA Today, April 25, 2014.

Russia Invades Ukraine as World Squashes Anti-Semitism

At a joint EU-US news-conference on 26 March 2014, Presidents Barroso, Van Rompuy, and Obama discussed the problematic Russian invasion of the Crimea province of Ukraine.  The “chairman” of the European Council and the “chief executive” of the European Commission both responded to concerns that the European Union had not stood up to its business interests in order to enact economic sanctions capable of putting Putin back in his pen. Even though the two EU presidents sought to "puff up" the force latent in the sanctions already in place, Barroso insightfully made the more significant point that aggressively sending tanks across a border was no longer tolerable. Perhaps from “lessons learned” from Hitler’s exploits in the twentieth century, global challenges such as global warming (and, relatedly, the species’ over-population), and an internet-enabled closer world in the twenty-first century, a paradigm-shift in international relations may harken some sorely needed progress in international relations (i.e., political development)  in the new millennium. The key would be a stark refusal to tolerate a practice that had been tacitly accommodated, even in opposition, just decades earlier. 

Did President Obama miss a chance to put Putin's exploits into historical perspective? President Barroso may have come out of the news conference as the visionary leader. 

(Image Source: Reuters)

The turn from one century to another is admittedly artificial as far as empirical (i.e., observed) change is concerned. Indeed, the internet actually took off during the last decade of the twentieth century, rather than in the new millennium. Even so, a temporal benchmark, especially one involving a new millennium, can spark a moment of reflection “taking stock” of gradual shifts that would otherwise go unnoticed in their accumulated significance. This “product” can in turn leave its own imprint, such that a new paradigm is “born” (i.e., recognized). On the individual level, while turning 60 does not instantaneously turn a person into an old man or woman, the milestone can prompt a person to re-evaluate previous lifestyle choices and thus have a real impact on the person’s life as well as self-identity. Additionally, the “big picture” reflection that a benchmark birthday triggers can easily enable recognition of the many gradual changes in the aging process that would otherwise go unnoticed and thus without conscious effect. The same dynamic can occur at the societal level, especially when a new millennium is in the mix.

Considering the dramatic technological advances that took place in the twentieth century, the relative dearth of political development in or out of the nation-state system is telling. The American invasion of Iraq and the Russian invasion of Crimea in the first and second decades, respectively, of the twenty-first century dispelled any hope that the internet revolution might make the increasingly integrated world a “kinder and gentler” place in which nations can play together. Yet I suspect something subtle had changed between the two invasions, as evinced in Barroso’s statement at the EU-US news conference in 2014. “The real problem is this,” he said. “(I)n the twenty-first century it’s just not acceptable that one big power takes part of another sovereign country recognized by the United Nations.” Hearing this, I could not remember such a “new epoch” statement having been made by a country’s president as the U.S. military was toppling statues in Baghdad. Something had changed—but what exactly?

To be sure, the status-quo dies hard. Obama essentially reinforced it by serving up a warmed-over dish. “It’s about the kind of world in which we live,” he said, citing the familiar respect for national sovereignty and international law, both of which Russia violated in invading Ukraine. At least as far as the U.N. Security Council is concerned, Putin was well aware of the concept of national sovereignty. Obama’s response does not begin to get at Putin’s belief that his legislature had given him the right to invade Ukraine. As political rights apply only within the polity that grants them, Putin’s avowed right would have to be natural, as in the right of the strong to subdue the weak by sheer might. Barroso’s line in the sand effectively says that the world had moved on from tolerating the law of the jungle.

Generally speaking, a person used to doing something as it’s always been done will need to feel the considerable force of the “new rules” for them to have any effect. Such is the force of habit, and the presumption that goes along with it. The muted force of the European and American economic sanctions fall short from effecting a course correction in line with new standards. Resorting to the (also antiquated) knee-jerk military response would have only meant that the E.U. and U.S. government officials had decided to reaffirm “the old way.” Instead of being countered, Putin would feel the added confidence of a paradigm reaffirmed.

It thus appears that a new paradigm making invasion a heretofore relic of an early epoch in history had not sufficiently gelled. Another way of seeing this is by looking at a more firmly established post-twentieth-century paradigm: one forged by the horror of the Nazi holocaust.

As unmarked Russian military men were fomenting civil unrest in the eastern parts of Ukraine, masked men handed pamphlets to Jews leaving a Passover service in Donetsk. The Jews were presumably to register and provide a list of their respective properties and pay a registration "fee" of $50. The pamphlet read in part, "ID and passport are required to register your Jewish religion . . . as well as documents establishing the rights to all real estate property that belongs to you."[1] Noncomplying Jews would “be deprived of their citizenship and deported outside the republic and their property confiscated.”[2] Denis Pushilin, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic (the newly declared pro-Russian government) had signed the leaflets, giving them the connotation of authoritative legitimacy. 

Not surprisingly, it did not take long for scathing reactions to come in from around the world. US Secretary of State John Kerry (who once tried to convince me that he is a fiscal conservative because he believes in efficient government) issued a statement saying, "This is not just intolerable--it's grotesque."[3] A rabbi who had received one of the leaflets told NBC News, "[I] couldn't believe it was real." Such reactions as these indicate that the anti-semitic paradigm that had held such currency in prior centuries, including the previous one, was essentially "dead on arrival" in the twenty-first century. 

That is to say, the intellectual "blown away" aspect of the ensuing international condemnation eviscerated any semblance of credibility for the leaflets; the anti-semitic paradigm had been so resolutely discredited by the world's discovery of the Nazi holocaust some seventy years earlier that the stunt fell flat on its face in the Ukraine. Barroso’s reaction to Putin's invasion could easily apply. Registering one's Jewish religion just isn’t done anymore. Not today. Not in our world. Considering all the bloodshed in WWI and WWII, Barroso's clarion call of a paradigm change has just as much merit as Kerry's statement. Both the leaflets and Putin's presumed prerogative can leave onlookers around the world saying to ourselves, I can't believe this is happening. So why is one essentially being allowed while the other was stopped in its tracks? The explanation probably lies with the respective paradigms--one of the two still having some residual currency in our collective mentality.

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1. Oren Dorell, "Outrage as Jews Told to Register in East Ukraine," USA Today, April 18-20, 2014.
2. Andrew Kramer, “Demands That Jews Register in Eastern Ukraine Are Denounced, and Denied,” The New York Times, April 17, 2014.
3. Dorell, "Outrage."

Mubarak Convicted in Egypt: A Precedent for Human Rights?

On June 2, 2012, an Egyptian court sentenced former President Hosni Mubarak to life in prison for being an accomplice in the killing of unarmed demonstrators during the protests in the “Arab Spring.” The significance of this verdict in terms of human rights from an international standpoint lies in the fact that the accountability on a ruler was accomplished by his own citizens—meaning the country’s own court. Lest the International Criminal Court be reckoned as coming up short in terms of being able to arrest and convict sitting or former rulers of states, the verdict from Egypt says, in effect, there is an alternative. Governments can fortify the independence of their respective judiciaries such that public officials can be held accountable domestically. Under this scenario, the ICC would be of value to the world particularly if it could be fortified to step in where states do not have court systems strong enough to arrest and try a current or former ruler. In other words, we ought not forget the alternative of national courts when we bemoan the weaknesses of the ICC.

All this is not to say that national judiciaries should necessarily be relied on—at least until they are strengthened in their capacity as a check on military, legislative, and executive officials and even heads of state. In the Egyptian verdict, for example, although Mubarak and his interior minister received life sentences, many officials more directly responsible for the police who killed the demonstrators were acquitted, as was Mubarak on corruption charges.[1] Furthermore, many lawyers said his conviction could be reversed on appeal. Accordingly, a prosecutor in the case announced an appeal would be made with a particular interest in convicting Mubarak’s sons of corruption and several police commanders of murder.[2] The want of convictions against them triggered popular protests across Egypt after the verdict.[3] Those protests signified a popular will that even high officials should be held accountable within the country rather than merely at the ICC. A judiciary should not depend on grass roots sentiment, however, so more evidently is needed before Egypt (and many other similar countries, no doubt) can be relied on to police their own officials on human rights abuses.

While hearing the life-sentence verdict against him, Mubarak shows no remorse.    Reuters TV

At the time of Mubarak’s conviction (and that of Charles Taylor by a Sierra Leon court at the Hague the week before), the world could be excused for having the false hope that dictators would thereafter finally be held accountable for violating the human rights of others. The hope in such a default-made-real can be funneled into a renewed effort to strength the ICC and the independence of governments’ own judiciaries. In other words, a better world wherein even the most powerful rulers and their subordinates are held accountable even for “giving the order” could finally be visualized, and out of this mere glimmer of sight could come the final push toward that better world.

1. David Kirkpatrick, “New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,” The New York Times, June 2, 2012. 

2. Alana Horowitz, “Mubarak Verdict To Be Appealed By Top Prosecutor,” The Huffington Post, June 3, 2012. 

3. David Kirkpatrick, “New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak,” The New York Times, June 2, 2012.